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Abstract 
The evolution of the concepts of jus cogens norms and obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole has had a strong impact on the work of the 
International Law Commission for the codification of the law on State responsibility. 
The acceptance that not all primary international norms were of the same gravity or 
significance because of the nature of the rights they seek to protect could not but 
influence the legal consequences to derive from the violation of such norms. However, 
the categorization of internationally wrongful acts to serious and less serious raises 
significant questions concerning the enforcement of these 'superior' norms, but also the 
subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing State in case of their 
infringement. Yet, the adoption of the 2001 Final Articles on State Responsibility has 
far from concluded the debate over the entitlement of States other than the individually 
injured to resort to countermeasures. Whilst the ILC has found that State practice 
supporting a right to third-State countermeasures in response to the violation of these 
collective interests is still inconclusive, Article 54, which makes a general reference to 
"lawful measures" rather than "countermeasures", leaves the settlement of the issue to 
the ftirther development of international law. The question of third-State 
countermeasures becomes even more compelling in the absence of effective and 
compulsory mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of the most fiindamental 
interests of the international community. 
The current research attempts to unfold the notion of third-State countermeasures as 
explored in the work of the ILC and as developed in international theory and practice. 
Most important, and in view of the possibility of the recognition of a right to third-State 
countermeasures in the future, this work places particular emphasis on the need of 
restraint, and in particular on the principle of proportionality. 
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X V I 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
"Do Not Command What You Cannot Enforce" 
In the absence of a structure equivalent to that existing in domestic legal systems, with 
compulsory legislative, judicial and enforcement procedures, international law has often 
come under attack as not being "real" law,^ but rather a system of moral values and 
principles which vanish whenever the geo-political or other interests of the stronger 
components of the international community are at stake. Whilst law-making takes place 
in the international legal order in the form of customary and conventional rules and 
general principles, and adjudication finds expression in the jurisdiction, even i f 
consensual, of the Litemational Court of Justice and other international tribunals, the 
lack of an automatic and compulsory enforcement mechanism is the most striking 
feature of public international law. Yet, the legal loophole is not filled with the 
existence of the SC whose role is merely restricted to the safeguarding of international 
peace and security and not, although it may at times coincide, to the enforcement of 
intemafional law. As a consequence, compliance with international law and with the 
fundamental principles of the international community as a whole still, and to a great 
extent, relies on the good will of each state. 
In such a decentralized legal system in which as a matter of general rule resort to the use 
of armed force is prohibited, the notion of peaceful countermeasures comes to fill the 
legal lacuna and to an extent contributes towards compliance with and even the 
enforcement of international law. As noted, "Countermeasures are mechanisms of 
private justice that find their raison d'etre in the failure of the institutions".^ In 
particular, this notion corresponds to peaceful measures, unilateral in character, taken in 
response to an internationally wrongful act which was previously committed by the 
state against whom they are turned and which, under normal circumstances, they would 
themselves be unlawfiil as infringing the rules of international law. The concept of 
countermeasures finds jusfification in the need to restore the equality between sovereign 
' Koskenniemi M., Erik Castren Institute of International Law and Human Rights Seminar on The 
Enforcement of International Law, August 2002 quoting Pascal. 
" See for this purpose the Austinian school of thought in Reisman/1971/645. 
^ Alland/2002/1226. 
states and to restore the balance that has been disturbed with the commission of the 
internationally wrongful act. Despite the fact that they are otherwise internationally 
wrongful acts themselves, countermeasures are justified, and thus responsibility is 
precluded, by reasons of self-protection, reciprocity, and the need to induce the 
defaulting state to cease the wrongful act, to offer reparation for the injury suffered by 
the aggrieved party, and to secure guarantees for non-repetition in the future. It is now 
clearly established that for countermeasures to be legitimate they must not be aimed at 
revenge and they must have temporary effect.'' Nevertheless, whilst the right to resort to 
countermeasures by an injured state is undisputed, the same does not apply with the 
right of third states to respond with countermeasures or, as otherwise known, solidarity 
measures,^  whenever the fundamental interests of the international community as a 
whole are endangered. 
Bearing in mind that in some cases of gross violations of international law there is no 
injured state but injured people, nationals of the same state committing the violation 
such as in the case of genocide, apartheid and torture, to preclude the possibility of 
peaceful but nonetheless coercive action by independent components of the 
international community means to deny those most in need the hope of justice. 
Furthermore, and although aggression has for long been considered as the most serious 
offence of international law threatening peace and security, now other violations such as 
the ones mentioned above are worth of equal attention. The paradox however lies on the 
fact that whilst third states are entitled to resort to the use of force on the basis of 
collective self-defence in response to armed attack, the current international legal order 
seems to prohibit third states from resorting to milder means, such as countermeasures, 
in reaction to serious infringements of specific international rules, including aggression. 
The concept of third state countermeasures is closely associated with the early 
realization in international legal doctrine that not all internationally wrongful acts were 
of the same legal weight, significance and effect. In 1915 for instance Professor Elihu 
Root, making a comparison between municipal and international law, pinpointed to the 
necessity for a distinction in the international legal order between wrongs that affected 
only the parties directly involved in the dispute and wrongs which inflicted a legal 
" Elagab/l988/46. Also see Crawford/2003/283. 
' Koskenniemi/2001/339. 
injury to every nation.^ This early understanding was later to have a great impact on the 
field of state responsibility, in other words on the legal consequences to arise as a result 
of the infiingement of primary international norms. However, it was not until the end of 
the Second World War that "a real current opinion emerged" according to which 
general international law provided for two different regimes of responsibility: one that 
would apply as a result of the breach of obligations of great significance to the 
international community as a whole, and another that would apply to breaches 
concerning obligations of lesser importance.^ This debate led to the realization that there 
may be different ways in which a state is affected by the commission of a wrongfial act 
and that the legal consequences of certain violations do not leave unaffected the 
international community as a whole. It has been therefore acknowledged that should a 
violation of obligations established for the collective interest of a group of states or even 
of the international community as a whole occur, these states should be entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state. By what means they may be entitled to 
do so has been in the centre of much controversy and it will be at the main focus of this 
work. 
Consequently, contemporary intemafional law has been enriched with new principles, 
new rules and new concepts. In a highly interdependent world, community values have 
surfaced formulating a distinction between wrongfiil acts and legal consequences, whilst 
widening the spectrum of actors which have an interest to invoke the responsibility of 
the wrongdoing state. In this regard, current international law consists of more than just 
reciprocal obligations between two states: the recognition of interests and values placed 
to serve collective interests and the international community is now undisputed. Most 
significantly, international law is now moving towards adopting new mechanisms for its 
enforcement in an attempt to escape fi-om the legal stagnation imposed by its own lack 
of compulsory enforcement jurisdiction over the most flagrant violations of 
international law. Similarly, the role of individual in contemporary international law has 
been enhanced: thus, international law is not merely drafted to protect sovereign states, 
but also individuals and peoples. 
It is with this new orientation of international law in mind that this research was carried 
out and which was also the result of a deep urge to shed some light to the general 
* Root/1915/9. 
' Fiftli/Report/Ago/1976/26/(80). 
question, 'What is, and what should be, the function of international law todayT. In a 
more specific context, this thesis evolves around the law on state responsibility and the 
categorization of internationally wrongful acts, both in respect of their 
gravity/seriousness, as well as of the international actors entitled to take action, by way 
of countermeasures, in order to remedy a certain infringement. The emphasis is 
therefore placed upon the notion of "solidarity measures", or countermeasures by states 
other than the injured and how this notion is accommodated in international legal 
doctrine today. 
The examination starts with an analysis of the attempts of the ILC to codify the law on 
state responsibility - a painstaking work that has lasted for almost five decades - and to 
categorize the legal consequences of a given international wrongdoing in accordance 
with the significance of the rule inMnged. This study intends to set the background 
within which the need for differentiation between serious and less serious violations of 
international law and more specifically between "crimes" and "delicts" emerged in the 
law on state responsibility, and the strong impact it had on the determination of the legal 
consequences to arise therefrom and of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility 
of the wrongdoing state. The second chapter builds on this analysis and turns its 
attention on specific notions such as jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes 
which have signified the fundamental changes the international community and 
international law itself have undergone with the passage fi-om "pure" bilateralism to the 
recognition of community values. The chapter also examines how these notions are 
reflected in the final articles on state responsibility adopted by the ILC in 2001, and 
their significance for the determination of the question "who is entitled to do what" in 
the event of their infringement. In the third chapter the study takes a different direction: 
it attempts to shed light to the relationship between lex specialis and the so-called self-
contained regimes on the one hand, and the general law on state responsibility and 
countermeasures on the other. The issue gains particular significance in view of the 
multiplication of agreements in the international legal order, thus narrowing 
significantly the content of the international responsibility of states, and especially of 
countermeasures, even whenever the most flagrant violations of international law are 
involved. The analysis leads to the examination of another, closely linked phenomenon, 
that of the fragmentation of international law. Should the international legal order be 
construed, as it is, as consisting of multiple "anarchical" legal systems that exist in 
parallel but which at times clash between them, the danger of fragmentation then 
becomes evident. The fourth chapter is driven by the need to fiirther examine the 
conclusions of the ILC in its 2001 articles that state practice permitting countermeasures 
by states other than the injured is sparse and embryonic. Whatever the outcome of the 
investigation, the author believes that it will have something important to say about the 
direction the international community has moved, or is moving on the matter, since such 
countermeasures, in the absence of other satisfactory enforcement mechanisms, may at 
times consfitute the only means to respond to violations that affect collective interests. 
Finally, the last chapter, and in view of the recognition that countermeasures may be 
used and abused especially by powerfiil states, turns its attention on the question of 
proportionality. This study is carried out upon the reahzafion that should 
countermeasures, especially by states other than the injured, be permitted, this should 
only be done in accordance with the most stringent conditions. 
C H A P T E R 1 
The Work of the International Law Commission on the Law on State 
Responsibility 
1. Introduction 
The present study will focus on the concept of state responsibility as this was conceived 
and formulated over the years by the ILC within its attempts to codify the law on state 
responsibility, and ultimately, to either conclude an international treaty on the matter or 
endorse the ILC's final work in a United Nations General Assembly resolution. Whilst 
the ILC finalized its study on the question of state responsibility in 2001, the fate of the 
final articles has not definitely been determined. More specifically, and despite the fact 
that the GA incorporated the articles soon after their completion by the ILC in 
resolution 56/83,* it did so without prejudice to the question of whether they will be 
further incorporated in an international convention or whether they wil l be merely 
reflected in a GA resolution, an issue that until this day still remains unsettled.^ In 
September 2004 the GA allocated the topic of the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts to the UN Sixth Committee for further discussion. On its 
part, the Sixth Committee, in draft resolution A/C.6/59/L.22 adopted in November 
2004, highlighted the significance of the final articles to the relations between states and 
it requested from the UN Secretary-General to call governments to make 
recommendations concerning the legal future of the articles. At the same time it 
requested the Secretary-General to prepare a compilation of all decisions by 
international courts and tribunals and other bodies in which reference to the final 
articles is made, and to call governments to provide information regarding their use and 
reliance on these provisions. The draft resolution also provided that this information 
^ GA/Resolution/56/83 of 12 December 2001. 
' Various arguments have been produced supporting the one or the other solution which go beyond the 
scope of the current examination. It suffices however to say here that whilst a treaty would be a more 
legally attractive solution as it would solidify the norms reflected in the articles, the possibility of many 
states not signing and ratifying it would put in jeopardise the customary character of some of the norms 
codified by the ILC. On the other hand, a General Assembly resolution would lack any legally binding 
effect. Yet, the incorporation of the Articles on State Responsibility in such a resolution would create 
hopes for the fiiture development of at least some of the provisions as customary rules of international 
law. 
should be submitted before the 62"'' session of the GA scheduled to take place in 2007.'" 
This draft resolution was later incorporated in a GA resolution in December 2004." 
This research is considered necessary due to the immeasurable impact of the ILC's 
conclusions on the law on state responsibility and which intended not only to codify 
already established international norms, but also to incorporate concepts which have 
evolved through the progressive development of international law. Accordingly, the 
legal significance of the ILC's final articles on this area of intemadonal law lies not 
only on the fact that they identify what the law is, but also on the fact that they indicate 
how the law on this particular area could and perhaps should develop in the fiiture. 
More particularly, the attention of this work wil l be drawn on two major, inter-related 
issues regarding the legal nature of the regime on state responsibility on the one hand, 
and the legitimacy of third state reaction in international law as a response to the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by another state on the other. This study 
is essential for the comprehension of the background fi-om which the notion of 
countermeasures taken by states other than the (directly) injured emerged in 
contemporary international law. Furthermore, and in view of the development in the 
international legal thought of a theory concerning "international state crimes" as 
opposed to the notion of "international state delicts", the main concern here wil l be on 
how the law of the international responsibility of states was considered by international 
jurisprudence, the literature and state practice on the basis of such a distinction: did 
states aim at attaching to the regime of state responsibility a punitive character, in which 
case the "criminal" element of the wrongfiil conduct committed by a state is 
recognized? Or did they merely see it as a delictual regime of responsibility identical to 
the one applicable in the domestic legal order, entitling the injured state to obtain 
reparation for the injury it has suffered? 
It is therefore suggested to initiate the examination from an in-depth analysis of the 
conclusions of the second Special Rapporteur appointed by the ILC, Mr Roberto Ago, 
whose input has been immeasurable in the later development of the work of the ILC on 
the matter, and then proceed with an analysis of the Special Rapporteurs appointed at a 
following stage, namely Mr Riphagen and Mr Arangio-Ruiz. The conclusions of the last 
UN/Sixth/Committee/Report/2004. 
" GA/Resolution/59/35 of December 2004. 
Special Rapporteur appointed to codify the law on state responsibility. Professor 
Crawford, due to their significance and impact, constitute the subject of separate 
examination included in the second chapter which elaborates further the notions of jus 
cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. 
2. Review of the Work on State Responsibilitv: 1969-1979 
2.1. The Beginning of a New Era? 
It is true that the lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism in international law has 
often brought it under cross-fire, although most times not unjustifiably. Yet, 
international law remains a field of law with strong dynamics in the reality of 
contemporary international relations. An affirmation of this position is the development 
of the concept of the international responsibility of states, in other words the 
establishment of legal consequences imposed upon states as a result of their failure to 
conform with their obligations under international law, and in this way precluding their 
imputability in the international arena. 
The international responsibility of states was a concept already very deeply rooted in the 
theory of international law, and upheld in the international state practice and 
international jurisprudence. However, and although the codification of the rules 
governing the responsibility of states in the international plane had for long been in the 
attention of scholars, the diversity of opinions and the uncertainty of law on the matter 
on the one hand, and the failure of previous attempts to see the regime of state 
responsibility as a distinct field of international law on the other, delayed any further 
development on the study concerning state responsibility. 
With the memories of the atrocities of the Second World War still vivid in the conscious 
of mankind, the doctrine of the international responsibility of states found its 
justification on the consensus that the international community is structured on the basis 
of legal norms that impose legal obligations on states. As such, it has been unanimously 
accepted by the jurisprudence, state practice and theory of international law that the 
commission of an internationally wrongfiil act creates new international legal 
relationships that differ fi-om the ones existent before the commission of such act and 
which entail the accountability of the wrongdoer. Already in 1938 the PCIJ affirmed in 
the Phosphates in Morocco Case that, whenever a state is guilty of an internationally 
wrongful act against another state, then intemafional responsibility is established 
"immediately as between the two states".'^ In what ways this latter position developed 
in intemafional law is the object of later consideration. It is important however within 
the scope of the present presentation to stress that the law on state responsibility aims to 
ascertain on the one hand the powers of the injured state in the event that its rights by 
another state have been infringed, thus determining the legal consequences of the 
violation of international law, and on the other to protect the defaulting state from 
excessive, abusive or unrestricted reaction by the injured or any other state. 
After the end of World War I I , and in the footsteps of the legacy of the League of 
Nations for codifying the rules concerning the international responsibility of states, the 
General Assembly, realizing the significance of such a codification in contemporary 
international law, established the ILC which was empowered with the authority to 
gradually codify international law, including the rules governing the law on state 
responsibility. Under a recommendation passed by the General Assembly in 1953 the 
ILC was eventually authorized to initiate its work on the law on state responsibility. In 
the years that followed, the Special Rapporteur appointed at the time, Mr Amador, 
submitted six reports on the matter. According to him, the law on state responsibility 
was not viewed merely as the responsibility of the defaulting states to make reparation, 
but also as an international criminal responsibility on the basis of a distinction between 
"merely wrongful acts" and "punishable acts", according to which even individuals 
were entitled to bring a claim against the violating state before international bodies and 
tribunals. At the same time, he associated the responsibility of states with the 
responsibility that arises as a result of violations concerning the treatment of aliens. 
These views met the reaction of many states which rejected a concept of "criminal" 
international responsibility of states and opposed the attempts to limit state 
responsibility merely to injuries caused to the property and person of aliens thus 
ignoring other substantial areas of state responsibility. 
When Mr Ago took over as the new Special Rapporteur, and contrary to his 
predecessor, he took the position that the codification of state responsibility should 
concern the responsibility of states resulting from the violation of their international 
" WCRyi936-42/Vol.IV/325 in Second/Report/Ago/1970/179/(12). 
obligations, irrespective of the nature, origin or object of the obligations concerned.'^ In 
this regard he made a distinction between "primary" rules of international law, that is to 
say rules that impose certain obligations upon states in the international plane, and 
"secondary" rules, in other words rules that determine the legal consequences that arise 
when a "primary" rule has been infiinged. Only the latter rules fall within the sphere of 
state responsibility. In this context, the rules relating to the legal consequences that 
derive as a result of the breach of an international obligation come to supplement some 
other rules that define what the obligation of the state is, and therefore, what its conduct 
should be. More specifically, "the link between the breach of an international obligation 
and the incurring of further obligations or sanctions as a consequence of that breach, 
demonstrates that the rules relating to the international responsibility of the State are, by 
their very nature, complementary to those which give rise to the legal obligations which 
States may be led to breach".''' The law on state responsibility constitutes only one 
particular aspect of international law; thus, any attempt to codify the principles 
governing the law on state responsibility cannot possibly lead to the codification of 
international law in its entirety. This approach was repeatedly endorsed by the ILC 
which affirmed that any attempts of codification should be independent from the 
codification of the so called "primary" rules of international law stressing at the same 
time that there shouldn't be confusion between these two spheres of international law.'^ 
It was further agreed by both Mr Ago and the ILC that the examination of the law on 
state responsibility would be divided in three parts. Accordingly, the first part would be 
dedicated to the subjective and objective elements of state responsibility and to the 
circumstances the existence of which might preclude the wrongfiilness of the act of the 
state. The second part would concentrate on the forms and degrees of state 
responsibility in the light of the significance of the rules giving rise to the international 
obligations of states, and in view of the seriousness of the violation of such rules. In the 
same context, the ILC would also turn its attention to the subjects entitled to invoke the 
international responsibility of the state, in other words to the question as to whether the 
violation of an international obligation established a legal relationship merely between 
the injured and the defaulting state, or as to whether, in cases of serious breaches of 
international law, it could give rise to legal relationships between the defaulting state 
and a group of states or the international community as a whole. Furthermore, the ILC 
First/Report/Ago/1969/127/(6). 
Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/4/(l). 
'^ILCreport/1976/71/(68). 
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concluded that the detenninafion of the various degrees of responsibility would 
unavoidably also have an impact on whether a state had a right to seek reparation and/or 
to impose sanctions against the defaulting state.'^ Finally, a third part would concentrate 
on the implementation of the responsibility, and the settlement of disputes. 
It was from the beginning acknowledged that international state responsibility could not 
be invoked unless two requirements are fialfilled, a subjective according to which the 
wrongful act is attributed to a state as a subject of international law, and an objective 
according to which there exists a failure of that state to comply with an international 
obligation incumbent upon it.'^ Such obligation could derive from the decision of an 
international judicial or arbitral body, the decision of an international organization, an 
international treaty, customary international law or general principles of international 
law. It was mentioned in this regard that "the confrast between the State's actual 
conduct and the conduct required of it by law constitutes the essence of the 
wrongfijlness."'^ Mr Ago took the view that the objective element was based on the 
correlation between a legal obligation on the one hand, and a subjective right on the 
other. As it had been very characteristically remarked on this particular point, "as 
distinct from what is said to be the situation in municipal law, there are certainly no 
obligations incumbent on a subject which are not matched by an international subjective 
right of another subject or subjects, or even... of the totality of the other subjects of the 
law of nations".'^ 
For the purposes of the present paper, the examination will next focus on the objective 
element of state responsibility, as this was conceived and thoroughly explained by Mr 
Ago. Especially the attention will be turned on the content of the international 
obligation breached and the impact it may have on the characterization of an act as an 
internationally wrongful and on the legal consequences applicable as a result. 
2.2. The Content of the Obligation Breached 
Before examining in depth the implications that may be bom from the content of the 
infringed obligation, it is only appropriate to mention here that the source of the 
ILCreport/1969/233/(79-82). 
" Third/Report/Ago/1971/214. 
"* Second/Report/Ago/1970/191/(41). 
Third/Report/Ago/I971/220-21/(65). 
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obligation, and in particular whether customary, conventional or other, should bear no 
significance on the characterization of an act committed by a state as wrongful or on the 
legal consequences (international responsibility) to derive therefrom, unless general 
international law provided so (such as for instance a treaty, in which case it would take 
precedence, as lex specialis, over the general provisions on state responsibility). 
One of the most crucial questions next dealt with by Mr Ago and the ILC related to the 
impact that the content of the obligation breached may have on the "determination of 
the type of responsibility that international law attaches to different kinds of 
internationally wrongfial acts, namely the problem of deciding whether a basic 
distinction should be made between internationally wrongfial acts according to the 
degree of essentiality that respect for the obligation concerned has for the international 
community, precisely because of the content of the obligation, and according to the 
seriousness of the breach of that obligation".^' Observing that at the time of the 
preparation of his Fifth report precedents on the above two questions were few, Mr Ago 
noted that his examination was based on the "true requirements of the contemporary 
international community and to the more authoritative ideas and tendencies which are 
emerging".^^ 
It was early realized that the commission of an internationally wrongfiil act incurred the 
responsibility of the defaulting state in the international level irrespective of the content 
of the obligation breached.^ ^ Quite distinct from that stood the question as to whether 
the content of the breached obligation affected the regime of responsibility applicable in 
each particular case, in other words as to whether international law accepts the existence 
of a single regime of responsibility for all international wrongs, or whether different 
regimes of responsibility are applicable on the basis of international obligations with 
different content. Mr Ago, in what he described as one of the most difficult aspects of 
codifying the law on state responsibility, suggested two elements to be taken into 
consideration: the significance of respect of that particular obligation for the 
international community as a whole on the one hand and the seriousness of the breach 
on the other. 
ILCreport/1976/180/(5); Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/7-8. 
Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/5/(9). 
Ibid/6/(ll). 
Ibid/24-25/(72-73). 
Ibid/5/(9,26,79), 
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The argument was further made that there would be no point in making such a 
differentiation between various wrongfiil acts in accordance with their content, i f the 
same legal consequences were to be applied for every single internationally wrongful 
act. In the past, in the great majority of cases, such responsibility was associated with 
the duty of the offender to offer reparation. Nevertheless, even where other 
consequences were provided such as the duty to restore the status quo ante and to 
execute the obligation breached, such a distinction was never based on the content of 
the obligation, except from very few cases in which international arbitral tribunals had 
ordered the payment of "penal" damages".'^ ^ 
Thus, the prevailing view among international jurists and authors was that international 
law concerning state responsibility provided for a single regime of responsibility 
applicable to all wrongful acts irrespective of the content of the obligation that had been 
infringed. In the period between the two World Wars the "classical" position came 
under serious criticism. However, it was at the end of the Second World War that the 
concept of two different regimes of responsibility began to gain territory. The one 
would apply as a result of the breach of obligations of great significance to the 
international community as a whole, such as the prohibition of aggression, genocide and 
apartheid, and another that would apply to breaches concerning obligations of lesser and 
less general importance.This distinction paved the way to the appearance of the 
notion of state crimes. 
2.3. The Subjects Entitled to Invoke State Responsibility 
The question regarding the differentiation between two types of internationally 
wrongful acts and accordingly of two types of responsibility is closely related to the 
determination of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing 
state. One would expect that the distinction between obligations whose respect and 
protection involve the interests of the international community as a whole, and 
obligations of less important character, and subsequently a distinction between 
international crimes and simple breaches, would also affect the determination of the 
subjects which possess the right to invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state and 
to take action against it. As Mr Ago noted, the content of the obligation breached is 
" Ibid/27/(82). 
Ibid/26/(80). 
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important for the determination of the subjects against whom the violation took place 
since only on this ground a distinction between different kinds of internationally 
wrongftil acts can be expected.Therefore, the members of the ILC and the Special 
Rapporteur were faced with the question as to whether such right was merely 
recognized to the states directly affected and injured by the infringement, or whether 
there were cases in which this right should also be recognized to other states as well?* 
It was for long the position of international judicial and arbitral bodies that only the 
directly injured state had a right to bring a claim against another that had acted contrary 
to its international obligations. This position was upheld in the South West Africa Case 
in which the ICJ did not accept that international law recognized "the equivalent of an 
actio popularis' or right resident in any member of a community to take legal action in 
vindication of a public interest".^^ However, only few years later, the ICJ recognized 
two categories of international obligations in its Barcelona Traction Case?*^ Mr Ago 
concluded that with this ruling the Court sought to draw a fundamental distinction 
between different internationally wrongful acts depending on whether the international 
community had an interest in the protection of the obligations involved, with varying 
legal consequences arising as a result. In the Court's view, there are certain international 
obligations in the protection of which, by reason of their significance to the 
international community as a whole, all states have a legal interest. As Mr Ago 
observed the Court upheld that "the responsibility flowing from the breach of those 
obligations is entailed not only with regard to the state that has been the direct victim of 
the breach (e.g. a state which has suffered an act of aggression in its territory); it is also 
entailed with regard to all the other members of the international community. Every 
state, even i f it is not immediately and directly affected by the breach, should therefore 
be considered justified in invoking the responsibility of the state committing the 
internationally wrongful act".^' Nevertheless, the judgment was still very recent, and 
thus no concrete conclusions could be drawn from it with regard to the development of 
international law on the matter. It did however set the subject into a new perspective. 
As regards the position adopted in state practice, the views can be distinguished on the 
basis of the period preceding the Second World War during which the prevailing view 
" Ibid/5/(7). 
Ibid/28/(88). 
ICJReps/1966/47 in Fifth Report/Ago/1976/28/(89). 
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was that the breach of an international obligation, irrespective of its content, established 
a single regime of responsibility; and the period that followed the Second World War 
which was signified by a gradual change of the above mentioned position. 
The work of the 1930 Codification Conference is a very characteristic reflection of the 
opinion possessed at the time by states on the matter under consideration. Whilst having 
accepted that any violation of the obligations concerning the treatment of aliens entailed 
the international responsibility of the state, there was nothing in the replies of the 
representatives of the participating states to associate the legal consequences as a result 
of a wrongfial act with the content of the breached obligation. Nor did the participating 
states regard that the content of the obligation could have any significance on the 
determination of the state with the right to invoke the responsibility of the offender. 
According to Mr Ago, "even though third States have sometimes asserted their right to 
intervene to proclaim the consequence of an internationally wrongfial act committed 
against a given state, it cannot be said that the content of the obligation breached was 
used as a criterion in order to draw an inference with respect to the determination of the 
active subject of the international responsibility relationship".^^ Hence, it seems to have 
been the position of the participating states that any distinction concerning the 
categories of internationally wrongfiil acts, the forms of responsibility applicable, and 
the subjects entitled to respond to a wrongful act, were issues independent firom the 
content of the obligation infringed. 
It has to be stressed however that already in the period preceding the Second World War 
there were signs of change. More particularly, the emergence of the prohibition of 
aggression as an offence that could not be seen as an offence "like any other", indicates 
the belief that certain violations of a more serious character already existed in the 
international legal order. As it can be seen in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance 
prepared by the League of Nations in 1923, the war of aggression was regarded as an 
"international crime". Furthermore, the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the settlement of 
international disputes refers to war of aggression as a violation of the solidarity of the 
members of the international community and again as an international crime. Although 
no mention is made in these documents to the regime of responsibility applicable in the 
case of a war of aggression, Mr Ago expressed the belief that it would be contradictory 
Ibid/30/(93). 
'^ Ibid/30/(94). 
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i f states had only wished to distinguish crimes from other violations of international law 
i f they did not mean to attach to these more serious offences a heavier regime of 
responsibility as well.^'' Reference is thus made to the fact that the Covenant of the 
League of Nations provided for a special regime of responsibility in case of breach of 
the obligation not to resort to a war of aggression, and especially for the imposition of 
sanctions against the aggressor by all member states. 
Nevertheless, the terrible memories of the Second World War made stronger the need to 
put serious wrongful acts such as aggression, the use of force and other violations of the 
rules of international humanitarian law in a separate category that would identify them 
from other internationally wrongfiil acts/^ Moreover, in the struggle of peoples to 
independence and decolonisation some new rules of international law evolved, whilst 
others, already existent, gained new significance. This new tendency in the international 
legal thought became even more solid especially with the formulation of rules of 
peremptory character on which the international community attached such significance 
that no derogation was meant to be permitted. The Special Rapporteur stressed in this 
regard that "these rules impose on states obligations whose fiilfilment represents an 
increased collective interest on the part of the entire international community. 
Furthermore, there has gradually arisen a conviction that any breach of the obligations 
imposed by rules of this kind cannot be regarded and dealt with as a breach "like any 
other", that it necessarily represents an internationally wrongful act which is far more 
serious, an infraction which must be differently described and must therefore be subject 
to a different regime of responsibility."^^ Likewise, the recognition of the existence of 
such essential rules for the international community in its entirety could not have left 
unaffected the determination of the subjects empowered with the right to respond to a 
violation of international law. 
Despite the general agreement that the breach of particular obligations was of more 
grave and serious nature, the same could not be said with respect to the type of action, i f 
at all, that could be taken as a response to such violations and the subjects empowered 
with such right. 
Ibid/31/(96). 
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With respect to the position taken by the literature on the matter, Mr Ago divided his 
study in three periods according to which the first period started from the middle of the 
19 '^' century until the outbreak of the First World War; the second covered the period 
from 1915 until 1939, and finally, the third period covered the post-World War I I period 
until the time the fifth report of Mr Ago was submitted to the ILC for consideration. 
During the first period, authors writing at the time did not particularly deal with the 
determination of the legal consequences deriving as a result of the commission of 
internationally wrongfril acts, nor with the problem whether the content of the 
international obligafions could be determinative for disfinguishing intemafionally 
wrongfijl acts and the regimes of responsibility applicable as a result. On the contrary, 
some authors had implicitly ruled out such differentiation by holding that reparation 
constituted the only legitimate response to the commission of a wrongfial act, whatever 
the content of the obligation at risk. Furthermore, those writers that did distinguish 
among various forms of reparation such as restitution, redress for moral and material 
damage, satisfaction or preventative measures for the non-repetition of the breach, did 
not do so on the basis of the content of the obligation that had been infiinged but solely 
on the ground that the injured state had the right to choose among various forms of 
reparation. For these authors, whether the injured state applied sanctions or other 
repressive or coercive measures depended on it (in some cases provided that an 
unsuccessfial demand for reparation was previously made), and not on the content of the 
obligation breached, so long as the action taken was proportionate to the breach and the 
lawfiil aim pursued.^* 
With the majority of authors rejecting the existence of different categories of wrongfial 
acts and different regimes of responsibility, Bluntschli, a Swiss expert of international 
law, expressed the opinion that the injured state was entitled either to require the 
defaulting state whose conduct was contrary to its international obligations to resume its 
obligations, or to redress the injury caused as a result, or to terminate the treaty whose 
provisions had not been complied with. By way of excepfion, Bluntschli noted that i f 
the breach was of even more serious nature affecting the legal domain of another state, 
or interfering with that state's property, then the latter might be entitled, in addition to 
the other measures, to even take punitive measures against the offender. In the same 
context, Bluntschli believed that in such cases of serious breaches which imposed a 
Ibid/41/(123). 
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threat to the international community as a whole, not only the injured state but also all 
the other states were entitled to safeguard and restore the international legal order.^ ^ 
However, there was a general suspicion towards the acceptance of this position by other 
authors of international law. We see in this regard that this "lone but highly 
authoritative voice of Bluntschli" whose ideas a century ago coincide with "the most 
advanced ideas of the authors of today"''° did not have a great impact on the 
development of legal opinion during the period under consideration. Most of the writers 
at the time supported the view that international law recognized the right to reaction 
against the offender only to the directly injured state. 
During the second period under consideration, and in particular the period fi-om 1919 
until 1939, although again no distinction or differentiation between more internationally 
wrongfijl acts or more types of action on the basis of the content of the breached 
obligation and its importance to the international community was made, there was a 
tendency towards accepting two kinds of internationally wrongful acts, thus aggression 
on the one hand and all the other wrongful acts on the other. In this regard, Reitzer was 
one of the few writers of that period that devoted much of his attention to the 
relationship between reparation and sanctions. After careful examination of the 
jurisprudence and state practice Reitzer reached the conclusion that in principle the 
injured state could resort to sanctions only after it had exhausted prior demand for 
reparation. By way of exception he recognized that in the case of aggression the victim 
state was entitled to take immediate steps in self-defence without being required to first 
seek reparation. 
With respect to the subjects entitled to put forward an international claim against a state 
that has failed to comply with its international obligations, some authors went so far to 
support that this issue should be dependent upon the content of the said obligation. 
Hence, Root and Peaslee maintained that international law should make a distinction 
between breaches that affect merely the injured states, and breaches that affect interests 
of the international community in its entirety and the punishment of which any state is 
entitled to seek. However, this was the opinion of what continued to be the minority in 
the international legal theory. Accordingly, the majority of the writers during the period 
Ibid/42/(124). 
Bluntschli/1872/259 in ibid/41/(124). 
between the two World Wars were of the opinion that only the injured state could take 
action such as reprisals as a response to another internationally wrongful act."" 
Among the majority of opinions which did not believe in the significance of 
differentiating between two categories of internationally wrongful acts, there was a 
group of writers who, attaching to the matter under consideration an entirely penal 
perspective, believed that such a distinction was important in the international legal 
order. These were the supporters of a theory regarding the criminal responsibility of 
states. However, Mr Ago pinpointed in this regard that one should not draw a close 
connection between the theory of state crimes and the existence of two different kinds 
of internationally wrongful acts as, inter alia, there was still dichognomy as to what the 
"criminal responsibility of States" really meant. Some of the advocates of this theory, 
namely Pella, Saldana, de Vabres and others, were of the idea that a code listing all the 
serious breaches of international law and the legal consequences- sanctions attached to 
them should be adopted, provided that the application of such sanctions would be 
determined by an international criminal court to be set up for this purpose. It becomes 
evident from the above that although such views were not generally endorsed, a doctrine 
supporting the distinction between a category of less serious international violations 
subject to the traditional regime of responsibility and a category of the most serious, 
even qualified as criminal violations of international law subject to a much stricter 
regime of penal sanctions, gradually began to emerge.'*^ 
As a concluding remark it can be said that even though the question concerning whether 
the content of the obligation breached had any bearing in the categorization of 
internationally wrongful acts and the applicable regimes of responsibility in the period 
before the Second World War had not been the object of further consideration, it had 
not been entirely overlooked either. 
In the post-World War I I era, there was an increased interest of authors with regard to 
the scope of state responsibility. It is very characteristic that two experts of international 
law, Lauterpacht and Levin, raised the question as to whether international law should 
distinguish between two different categories of internationally wrongful acts in view of 
their gravity. More specifically, according to Lauterpacht "the comprehensive notion of 
Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/44/(132). 
Ibidy45/(133). 
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an international delinquency ranges from ordinary breaches of treaty obligations, 
involving no more than pecuniary compensation, to violations of international law 
amounting to a criminal act in the generally accepted meaning of the term".'*^ He further 
maintained that the violation of an "ordinary" obligation gave rise to the right to 
reparation, and only i f this was denied the injured state could take enforcement 
measures against the violator. However, when a rather grave violation was involved 
then state responsibility should not be confined to the right to seek reparation but it 
should also extend to the imposition of coercive measures as well, such as the conduct 
of war, reprisals, or sanctions as those envisaged in Chapter V I I of the UN Charter. 
Levin, on his part, referred to simple breaches of international law and international 
crimes which turned against the "very foundations and essential principles of the legal 
order of international society".'*'* Similarly, Jessup, like Root in 1916, raised the 
question as to whether there was a need to consider violations against the peace and 
order of the international community as a "violation of the right of every nation" with 
which all states are regarded to have been injured.''^ According to this school of thought, 
a separate category of more severe internationally wrongful acts amounting to crimes 
existed in the international plane that should accordingly bear more severe legal 
consequences than any other violation of international law, hence attaching to it a 
punitive character. Nevertheless, the supporters of this theory again associated the 
existence of serious offences with the existence of an international criminal court. 
Overall, the position taken in the literature in the 1950s seems to little associate the 
diversity of legal consequences deriving as a result of the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act with the content of the obligations breached. Nevertheless, 
and although the authors writing during this period do not generally distinguish between 
two separate types of internationally wrongfiil acts, it had become well accepted that a 
distinction concerning the use of force and other internationally wrongful acts existed. It 
was thus the position of a number of writers that when it came to aggression all the 
restrictions regarding retaliation cease to exist, whilst the regime of responsibility 
applicable becomes even stricter. According to this position, the state victim of 
aggression is entitled to resort to measures that infringe the rights of the defaulting state 
even, in exceptional cases, without prior demand for reparation having been made. Such 
measures could extend in cases of self-defence to the use of force under the conditions 
Oppenheim/1947/307 in Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/45/(136). 
Levin/1966/105 in Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/46/(136). 
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already set by the UN Charter. It was also acknowledged by these authors that in cases 
of aggression, and only in those cases, a third state could assist the victim of aggression, 
even by resorting to the use of force. 
In the years that followed more and more writers started to accept and recognize the 
concept that not all wrongftil acts should be treated in the same way by international 
law. In a study prepared in 1962 Tunkin arrived at the conclusion that since World War 
I I international law had recognized two categories of violations, each entailing a 
different regime of responsibility. The first category included offences that constituted a 
threat to peace, whilst the second concerned all the other violations of international law. 
Similar ideas were shared by Levin. Of even more interest, the State Institute of Law of 
the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union distinguished between breaches that 
affected the rights and interests of a particular state, and more serious wrongdoings that 
constituted "assaults upon the fiandamental principles of international relations and thus 
encroach upon the rights and interests of all states",'*^ thus maintaining that the content 
of the wrongfiil act had a significance not only for the determination of the regime of 
responsibility applicable, in other words the legal consequences that would derive as a 
result, but also for determining the subjects entitled to respond to the breach with action. 
At the same time, the legal theory in Western countries continued to develop, attaching 
more severe consequences to the use of force due to its seriousness in contrast to 
consequences attached to other wrongfial acts. In this regard Verzijl distinguished 
between "delinquencies", and "international crimes", in the latter case the offender 
could also be subjected to sanctions. However, Verzijl used the term "international 
crimes" as indicative not merely of the crime of aggression but also of other offences 
such as grave breaches of the laws of war and crimes against humanity. For Schindler, 
colonization and racial discrimination should be viewed as internationally wrongful acts 
erga omnes justifying even non-forcible third party reprisals, whilst Brownlie 
characterized as an international crime any breach of the rules of jus cogens. 
It is evident from the above analysis that "in the international literature of various 
countries and of various legal systems, ideas have moved substantially ahead. The 
positions which in older doctrine represented the isolated voices of certain especially 
forward-looking thinkers have become more and more frequent and increasingly firm. 
Soviet/Law/Institute/1957/420 in Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/48/(140). 
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to the point that in modem works they represent a solidly established viewpoint and 
significantiy, one which is not contested".'*^ It thus becomes indisputable that by the 
1970s a basic unity of opinion had been established in the international legal theory and 
practice regarding the general awareness that contemporary international law required 
the distinction between two types of internationally wrongfial acts in the light of the 
content of the obligation breached. Whilst it is stressed accordingly that all international 
obligations are of significant character, and thus they should all be complied with for 
the benefit of all the components of the international community, there are certain 
obligations such as aggression that due to the interests that they protect are recognized 
as being of a more fiindamental character for the fiilfilment of the goals of the 
international community, namely international peace and security. The commission of 
these acts is no longer confined to the establishment of a bilateral relation between the 
wrongdoer and the wronged state, but it is also extended to the establishment of a 
relation that involves and threatens all the members of the international community. For 
this reason, all states carry an interest for the fulfilment and respect of these rules some 
of which have already evolved to norms of jus cogens, that is norms from which no 
derogation is allowed. In this regard, Mr Ago observed that the distinction between 
serious and less serious internationally wrongfial acts is comparable in importance to the 
distinction between derogable and non-derogable norms as provided in article 53 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.'*'* Nevertheless, Mr Ago emphasized 
that only the commission of wrongdoings of particular gravity should fall within the 
category of wrongful acts that entail more severe consequences for the perpetrator. 
At the drafting of what later on was to be accepted by the ILC as article 19 Mr Ago used 
the term international crime as opposed to international delicts to indicate wrongs of a 
more serious character than others. According to the Special Rapporteur, this term had 
consistently been used in various documents such as the 1923 draft Mutual Assistance 
Treaty prepared by the League of Nations and the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes, and in many acts of the UN General Assembly 
such as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States and the 1975 Definition of Aggression. This 
term had also been used in the literature and the debates of the United Nations. 
Fifth/Report/Ago/1976/50/(142). 
Ibid/53/(151). 
22 
With respect to the legal consequences deriving from the breach of an obligation of 
ftindamental character it was noted that states have in particular cases responded to 
serious infringements threatening international peace and security with the application 
of coercive measures and sanctions. However, the Special Rapporteur stressed that the 
determination of the regimes of responsibility that should apply in each particular case 
should be the subject of examination in another context, and in particular within the 
ILC's efforts to determine the forms and content of state responsibility.'*^ Furthermore, 
Mr Ago highlighted that the ILC, in its attempts to distinguish between internationally 
wrongful acts, should not overlook the fact that law is a field continuously evolving and 
developing. In this regard, the possibility of the emergence of new rules in the fiature the 
violation of which would be equally regarded as grave and serious should not be 
precluded. 
The ILC agreed with the Special Rapporteur that there was a necessity, but also a 
general agreement in contemporary international legal theory and practice to 
differentiate between various internationally wrongful acts in accordance with the 
content of the infringed obligation. For it, the determination of the gravity of the 
wrongful act and the legal consequences that should attach to it as a result should 
depend on the significance attached to the fulfilment of certain obligations by the 
international community. The ILC went even ftirther by accepting that the commission 
of a wrongful act did not create a relation only between the two parties directly 
involved, but it could also result, in particular cases, to the establishment of relations as 
between other subjects of international law as well " i f the international obligation 
breached is one of those linking the state, not to a particular state, but to a group of 
states or to all members of the international community". 
In passing what used to be draft article 19, the ILC seems to have incorporated what 
was already the tendency in international law to distinguish between a rather limited 
category comprising of particularly serious wrongs generally identified as international 
state crimes, and a much broader category covering all the other wrongs of much less 
serious character despite the fact that, according to the Commission's view there was 
not "any real consensus of opinion as to what kind of "action" or "measures" may 
legitimately be taken to deal with the acts referred to, or upon other delicate points of 
Ibid/52/(146). 
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law".^' In this regard the ILC also stressed that such a differentiation would also be 
reflected in the determination of the subjects authorized to implement the legal 
consequences against the defaulting state.''" 
2.4. Circumstances Precluding the Wrongfulness of the State 
Next, the examination turns to the concept of circumstances the existence of which 
precludes the wrongfulness of the state, such as consent, the legitimate application of 
sanctions,ybrce majeure and fortuitous event, self-defence, and necessity. 
In explaining why the term "circumstance precluding wrongfulness" instead of the term 
"circumstances precluding responsibility" was preferred, Mr Ago pointed out that the 
true effect of these circumstances was not merely the preclusion of responsibility for the 
commission of an otherwise wrongftil act, but the preclusion of wrongfulness itself 
Hence, wrongfulness and responsibility are not synonymous as Kelsen used to believe 
and according to whom each wrongful act always entailed the responsibility of the 
offender; on the contrary, and according to this assertion i f no responsibility was 
attached to the commission of a certain act, then this act was not wrongful. However, 
Mr Ago argued that i f one was to accept the notion of wrongfiilness as meaning the 
conflict of a certain conduct committed by a state with an obligation imposed upon it by 
a "primary" rule of international law, and the notion of responsibility as meaning the 
legal consequences which another, a "secondary" rule of international law attaches to 
the violation of the "primary" rule, then the term "wrongftilness", although linked with 
the notion of "responsibility", is a notion distinct from it. Accordingly, the presence of 
these circumstances has an impact on the effect of the international obligation that has 
been violated with as a result the act to cease to be wrongful "for the good reason 
that.... the state which committed the act was not under any international obligation to 
conduct itself otherwise".^ "* Responsibility is therefore precluded because the objective 
element concerning the breach of an international obligation does no longer exist. 
Although the Special Rapporteur accepted that it was theoretically possible to preclude 
responsibility without at the same time precluding the wrongfulness of the act in 
question, he noted in this regard that it would be contrary to the principle that each 
" Ibid/108/(29). 
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wrongful act entails the responsibility of the state to say that the existence of certain 
circumstances preclude the responsibility but not the wrongfulness of the act.^ ^ 
Emphasis will be further given to the notion of sanctions as one of the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness. According to this principle, international responsibility for the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act does not arise i f the breach constitutes a 
measure admissible in international law as a sanction in response to an international 
offence committed by another state. The term "sanction" is used here by the Special 
Rapporteur as meaning the infliction of punishment or the securing of performance of 
the obligation breached, as a result of the infringement of the subjective rights of 
another state. 
The Special Rapporteur made clear that only legitimate sanctions could be regarded as 
circumstances precluding wrongfiilness, stressing for this purpose that only when 
certain conditions were met was the wrongfulness of the infiingement precluded. 
Furthermore, Mr Ago stressed that only in specific cases did international law allow the 
injured state, or even other subjects of international law to resort to action that in itself 
was a violation of international law.^^ In this regard, i f international law in a particular 
case entitled the injured state to merely demand reparation against the defaulting state, 
then the violation of another international obligation in response constituted, or rather 
remained, an internationally wrongful act. The same held true in those cases where 
international law required prior demand to make reparation before recourse was made to 
the imposition of sanctions. Likewise, the fact that a state had suffered a breach of its 
rights by another state did not invariably or automatically authorize it to breach another 
international obligation incumbent upon it towards the defaulting state. 
In addition, it was pointed out that the application of sanctions as a response to a prior 
breach in order to preclude the wrongfulness and therefore the responsibility of the 
responding state should be commensurate to the injury suffered by the initial offence.^^ 
In the award given in the Naulilaa Case, the Tribunal, before proceeding to establish the 
lawfulness or wrongfiilness of certain acts by the German authorities, justified by the 
Ibid/28/(52) 
Ibid/39/(79). 
" Ibid/39/(79). 
Ibid/40/{82). 
25 
latter as reprisals to an internationally wrongful act previously committed by Portugal, 
wished to establish when and in what circumstances reprisals were to be deemed 
legitimate. According to its ruling, "the latest doctrine, and more particularly German 
doctrine, defines reprisals in these terms: 'Reprisals are an act of taking the law into its 
own hands by the injured state, an act carried out after an unfulfilled demand in 
response to an act contrary to the law of nations by the offending state. Their effect is to 
suspend temporarily, in the relations between the two states, the observance of a 
particular rule of the law of nations. They are limited by the experiences of mankind and 
the rules of good faith, applicable in the relations between states. They would be illegal 
i f an earlier act, contrary to the law of nations, had not furnished the motive.'"^' The 
Tribunal held that even i f Portugal had indeed previously committed a wrongfiil act, the 
imposition of reprisals by Germany would again be unlawful since no prior demand for 
reparation had been made. 
So far state practice was concerned at the time under consideration, it had been often, 
sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, accepted that the legitimate application 
of sanctions precluded the wrongfulness of the state. When during the works of the 
1930 Codification Conference the Preparatory Committee raised the question under 
what conditions a policy of reprisals would be justified, the Committee automatically 
recognized the existence of cases in which reprisals could be permitted. It is noteworthy 
that no Government disputed this point, thus also recognizing that in a number of cases 
states were free to react by means of conduct that would otherwise be unlawful and 
entail their international responsibility. In the "Basis of Discussion" drawn by the 
Committee for the Conference, it was finally adopted that "a state is not responsible for 
damage caused to a foreigner i f it proves that it acted in circumstances justifying the 
exercise of reprisals against the state to which the foreigner belongs".^" A few decades 
later, the representative of the Netherlands Government stated in the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly in 1968: "any state, no matter to what region of the world it 
belongs, may find itself in the position of suffering damage from illegal acts on the part 
of another state and that such a state, for that reason, would be justified in taking 
measures of non-violent reprisal".^' The preclusion of wrongfulness in the case of 
legitimate sanctions is also unanimously upheld in the literature, sometimes referring to 
it as "sanctions", other times as "reprisals", and others as "measures of self-protection". 
RIAA/1949/1025-1026 in Eighth/Report/Ago/1979/41/(86). 
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It is relevant to add that the emergence of the prohibition of the use of force as one of 
the most fundamental principles of international law after the end of Second World 
War, led to a change of the position concerning the legitimacy of armed reprisals, as 
especially reflected in article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. 
A final question considered by Mr Ago concerned what formerly constituted the 
monopoly of the directly injured state to respond by way of reprisals to the commission 
of another wrongfial act. Attention was thus drawn to obligations erga omnes. Mr Ago, 
aware of the risks behind recognizing a right of third states to resort to sanctions in 
response to a breach that does not directly affect them, and thus the right to take 
punitive action against the wrongdoer, expressed the view that the task of determining 
the existence of a breach of an obligation of fundamental significance for the 
international community as a whole, and of deciding the measures that should be taken 
in response, should be vested not to individual states but to international institutions and 
organizations, such as the United Nations.^^ 
It is significant at this stage to point out that the ILC, in its report to the General 
Assembly prepared in 1979, having taken into consideration the suggestions of Mr Ago 
concerning the application of sanctions as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, 
replaced the term "sanctions" with that of "countermeasures".^^ 
In its fiarther consideration of countermeasures whose object was to punish another state 
or to secure compliance with its obligations, and which, under normal circumstances 
would be unlawfiil as infiinging the rights of another subject of international law, the 
ILC highlighted that these were justified only under the conditions imposed by 
international law.^ '* 
The ILC further noted that when its report was prepared, there was no expressive 
affirmation in international practice and jurisprudence of the principle that an injured 
state could lawfully take an act against the defaulting state in the form of 
countermeasures, since any discussion on the matter was focused on whether or not the 
adoption of certain measures should have been contingent on failure of a prior attempt 
to make reparation, proportionality etc. Nevertheless, the ILC expressed the opinion that 
''^  Eighth/Report/Ago/1979/43-44/(91-92). 
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there was an implicit recognition of countermeasures as a circumstance precluding the 
wrongfulness of the state. Making reference in this context to the Declaration on the 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States adopted by the General Assembly, 
the ILC concluded that states had implicitly or explicitly recognized the legitimacy of 
reprisals with the exception of the use of force and provided that certain requirements 
were met; namely, that a prior demand for reparation has already been made, that the 
reaction was not disproportionate to the offence, and that no provision existed 
concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes.^^ 
It is finally remarkable that the ILC, in recognizing the right to countermeasures not 
only for the injured state, limited this power to international organizations and not to 
third states. More specifically, accepting the special significance of certain obligations 
to all members of the international community, it noted in this regard that this 
affirmation "has led the international community to turn towards a system which vests 
in international institutions other than states exclusive responsibility, first, for 
determining the existence of a breach of an obligation of basic importance to the 
international community as a whole, and, thereafter, for deciding what measures are to 
be taken in response and how they are to be implemented".^^ 
3. The Conclusions of Mr Riphagen on Part Two of the Draft Articles on State 
responsibilitv: 1980-1986 
3.1. Some Preliminary Remarks 
Mr Riphagen examined international responsibility in part two of the draft articles in the 
light of the new legal consequences arising from the violation of international law, 
stressing however that the aim was not to draw an exhaustive list of all the legal 
consequences of every internationally wrongful act. According to him, although there 
was a general agreement between states on a number of legal consequences of certain 
types of internationally wrongful acts there still existed a "grey zone" where opinions 
differed.^^ 
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Whilst it was the main hne of Mr Ago and the Commission under part one of the draft 
articles that the international responsibility of a state arises irrespective of the existence 
of any injury to the interests protected by the primary rules of international law,''^ Mr 
Riphagen was of the view that such injury and the subjects whose interests are affected 
by the breach could not but be taken into consideration in part two concerning the forms 
and degrees of international responsibility. In relation to the latter particularly, it was 
stressed by the Special Rapporteur that the determination of the subject of the primary 
rule was essential for the determination of which conduct could be demanded by the 
injured, and possibly third states against the perpetrator of the wrongful act. Similarly, 
although the origin of the international obligation, whether customary, conventional or 
other, had no effect on the establishment of state responsibility, it could not be ignored 
when determining the new legal relationships that derive as a result of an internationally 
wrongful act.^ ^ 
Mr Riphagen examined legal responsibility in the light of three parameters. 
Accordingly, the first parameter concerned the content of the new obligations of the 
author state and its duty to make reparation in its various forms (self-enforcement); the 
second parameter concerned the new rights of the injured state and the principle of non-
recognition and other countermeasures (national enforcement); and the third parameter 
dealt with the position of third states concerning the unlawfiil situation created as a 
result of the wrongfiil act and their right, or duty, to take a non-neutral position 
(international enforcement).^ *^ 
It is these parameters that are examined next. 
3.2. The Legal Consequences of an Intemationallv Wrongful Act 
3.2.1. The New Obligations of the Defaulting State 
Mr Riphagen identified three degrees concerning the new obligations of the author state 
as a result of the violation of its international obligations, all seen in the context of 
restitutio in integrum: the re-establishment of the right taken away by the wrongfiil act, 
although this was often difficult to achieve {ex nunc); the payment of damages in the 
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form of reparation for the injurious consequences caused by the wrongful act (ex tunc); 
and the assurance of non-repetition of the wrongful act in the fbture {ex ante). 
Whilst pointing out that there should be quantitative proportionality between the breach 
and the legal consequences deriving as a result, according to which the more serious the 
breach the more there existed the need to complete restitutio in integrum, Mr Riphagen 
at the same time posed the question as to whether the subject-matter of the obligation 
breached had any impact on the determination of the legal consequences and, 
subsequently, of the new legal relationships. He answered this question in the 
affirmative confirming that the content of the international obligation may be relevant 
for the determination of the content of both the new obligations of the guilty state and 
the rights of the injured state. '^ More specifically, in determining the legal 
consequences of an international wrong, Mr Riphagen suggested that various factors 
were needed to be considered such as the subject-matter protected by the primary rule 
and the seriousness of the breach itself under the particular circumstances of the case. 
He then went on to note that 
Indeed, whatever the quality of the primary rule breached, there should be restitutio in integrum. 
However, the quality of the primary rule may certainly be relevant to the allowable response of the 
injured State or States in respect of the response; yet even within the context of the first parameter of the 
legal consequences, there might be a qualitative correlation. Thus it would seem that, in general, the 
giving of "guarantees" against future breaches (the ex-ante aspect) is reserved for cases of violation, 
through the use of external force or similar means, of fundamental rights of another State, whereas a mere 
reparation ex tunc is required in cases where, within the framework of the exercise of internal jurisdiction 
of a State, an obligation "concerning the treatment to be accorded to aliens" (art. 22) has been breached.'^ 
Nevertheless, it was stressed in relation to the above that the case-law on this matter did 
not seem to establish definite rules. 
One of the primary obligations of the offending state identified by Mr Riphagen was its 
duty to cease the violation, regardless of whether such duty came as a result of the 
continuing effects of the primary legal obligation, or whether it came as a new legal 
consequence arising as a result of the wrongful act. Next in what the Special Rapporteur 
described as a scala of responses came the duty of the wrongdoer to make reparation in 
substitute of the primary obligation not performed, thus by paying the injured state a 
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sum of money corresponding to the value of the loss suffered and not repaired. The 
author state also had a duty to restore the situation which would have existed had the 
breach not been committed, in other words to make restitutio in integrum stricto sensu 
including the adoption of retroactive measures, and finally, to give satisfaction in the 
form of apologies, a formal re-confirmation of the obligafion breached, or a declaration 
that measures would be taken in order to prevent future similar breaches. 
With regard to the legal regime applicable when an international crime in the sense of 
article 19 of the draft articles was committed, it was noted that although again here the 
perpetrator had a duty to cease the criminal conduct, the response was quite distinctive 
fi-om the response applicable when an international delict was involved. With specific 
reference to the violation of the principle of non-interference in another state's affairs 
and aggression, the Special Rapporteur highlighted that the legal consequences of the 
former could not be as severe as in the case of aggression which entailed not merely the 
duty of the aggressor to restore completely the status quo ante, including the wiping out 
of all the consequences of the wrongftil act and the providing of guarantees for non-
repetition, but also the right to individual or collective self-defence. 
According to Mr Riphagen article 19 was a reflection of the position in international 
law, as already recognized by the ILC, that the subject-matter of the international 
obligation had an impact on the regime of responsibility.^'^ For the conclusion that an 
international crime had been committed two factors were relevant: the obligation should 
be of essential importance (the recognition of which should precede its infiingement), 
and the breach should be serious. The concept of international crime implied that the 
wrongftil act could not be made good by any substitute performance (first parameter), 
and that it caused injury to all states (second parameter) in deviation fi-om the traditional 
approach of bilateralism in international affairs. Furthermore, it implied the third 
parameter of legal consequences, thus a form of international enforcement. 
Yet, in order to accept the notion of state crimes it was important for Mr Riphagen to 
identify its specific legal consequences and its means of implementation by the 
international community which should be the main body to determine the legal 
consequences of an international crime and the procedures with which such breach 
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could be established. For this purpose, he suggested an amendment of article 19 since it 
failed to make clear how and when a recognition of an act as an international crime by 
the international community as a whole took place, nor did it specify the special legal 
consequences of such a crime7^ 
3.2.2. The Injured State and Its Rights 
Before determining the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act Mr 
Riphagen considered that it was imperative to first identify the parties towards which 
the obligation established by the primary rule was owed and whose interests were to be 
protected under the law on state responsibility. Nevertheless, to do that it would be 
necessary to examine both the content of the primary legal relationship, in other words 
the rights and the duties infringed, and of the new legal relationships. It was submitted 
in this regard that whilst every state may have an interest in the compliance with the 
international obligations of another state, it should by no means be concluded that every 
state is authorized to demand the performance of such obligations, or to take 
countermeasures. As Mr Riphagen noted, this was in accordance with the principle of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state.'''' 
In most cases of a violation of international law it is not difficult to identify the state 
entitled to claim reparation, invoke reciprocity, or take reprisals against the wrongdoer. 
Problems however do arise in cases of violation of a primary rule that protects extra-
state interests, and in cases where the secondary rule authorizes, or even obliges, other 
states to actively or passively participate in the enforcement of the primary rule. As 
noted, both these cases have an exceptional character^* and can only arise under the UN 
Charter.^ ^ Accordingly, an injured state is the state whose right under a customary rule 
of international law has been infringed; the state party to a treaty i f it is established that 
the obligation in question was stipulated in its favour; or the state party to a dispute i f 
the breach is a breach of an obligation under a judicial decision or other binding 
decision in a dispute settlement process. 
Third/Report/Riphageii/1982/48. 
" Fourth/Report/Riphagen/1983/21/(l 13). 
Ibid/21/(114). 
™ Ibid/21-22/(115). 
32 
Moreover, in determining the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of the 
defaulting state the origin of the international obligation breached is not without 
significance. With this under considerafion, an obligafion that has been established 
through a treaty will be owed only to the states parties to that particular treaty and 
therefore no third state will be entitled under international law to invoke the 
responsibility of the state that fails to meet its obligafions under the treaty in question. 
However, it is often the case that not all the state parties to a treaty wi l l be directly 
affected by a breach. In this regard the Special Rapporteur concluded that article 60 of 
the 1969 VCLT itself draws a distinctive line and thus differentiates between a party 
on 
specially affected by the breach and any other party to the treaty. 
Mr Riphagen concluded that the crucial point to be considered with respect to 
determining the legal consequences of a wrongful act was the distinction between a 
state directly affected by a particular violation and other states, whether parties to a 
multilateral treaty or not. In this regard, "Within a scala of legal consequences, the new 
legal relationship created by the wrongful act of a State is primarily one between the 
guilty State and the State (or States) whose material interests are directly affected by 
that wrongful act."^' 
It is not therefore sufficient for a state, in the context of a treaty and for the exercise of 
the rights under the second parameter, to merely be a party to a multilateral treaty. It is 
common in intemafional law that many multilateral treafies, like customary rules, 
establish many distinctive bilateral legal relationships. In this way the multilateral treaty 
is further divided into multiple bilateral relationships and the rights and obligations 
deriving from such treaties cannot be transferred or exercised by the other states, 
members to the same treaty. Having said that, there is nothing to prevent the parties to a 
multilateral treaty from creating a system of solidarity as between all the other parties 
when a state violates its obligations under the particular treaty. Although traditional 
international law has been hesitant in recognizing rights to third states, contemporary 
international law "seems to admit increasingly a 'constructive injury' to a state, either as 
a result of its participation in multilateral rule-making, or as a result of the recognition 
of extra^state interests being protected by the primary rule of international law. In both 
cases the primary rule of international law itself has to create the constructive injury. 
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either explicitly or implicitly." For Mr Riphagen, a constructive injury may derive 
fi-om the object and purpose of the primary rule. He thus remarked that: 
94.... Actually, the introduction of extra-State interests as the object of protection by rules of international 
law tends towards the recognition of an actio popularis of every State having participated in the creation 
of such extra-State interest, the other possibilities of enforcement being either only self-enforcement, or 
enforcement by the subject to which this extra-State interest is allocated for this purpose. 
95. The existence of a "derived" or a "constructive" injury does not necessarily mean that the injured 
State is entitled to take all the measures of the second parameter catalogue. In particular, self-defence, 
self-help and countermeasures outside the field of the relationship involved in the breach are probably not 
allowed (at least not without a collective decision to this effect). In other words, there may be a 
correlation between the degree of involvement in the injury and the degree of second parameter measure 
allowed.*^ 
Consequently, the extent to which a state with a "derived", "constructive", or "extra-
State" injury is entitled to national enforcement within the second parameter or to self-
enforcement by the author state is a question to be determined by the primary rule 
which not only is decisive of the international obligation, but also of the right it intends 
to protect.*'* The Special Rapporteur continued stressing that: 
Being a party to a primary legal relationship, being a "party" to the breach of an international obhgation, 
and having a persona standi for the purpose of activating an international procedure of remedy are 
different stages, the first not necessarily entailing the second, let alone the third. Consequently, while the 
possibility of a purely factual situation, where one act of a State causes injury to more than one other 
States, has always been recognized, traditional international law has been hesitant to admit "derived", 
"constructive" or "extra-State" injury.*' 
The Special Rapporteur then turned his attention to the new rights of the injured state 
established as legal consequences of a wrongftil act, highlighting in this regard the 
significance of the right, or even duty, of non-recognition of the "f ini t" of the 
unlawfiilness. However, it was noted that the exercise of this right was subject to 
specific restrictions according to which no wrongful act could justify non-compliance 
with the rules of diplomatic protection, the rules concerning the protection of 
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fiindamental human rights, or other rules irom which international law permits no 
derogation, thus implicitly making reference to norms of peremptory character.^ ^ 
Mr Riphagen also referred to the entitlement under article 60 of the 1969 VCLT of a 
state party to a bilateral treaty to suspend or terminate in whole or in part the treaty in 
question where a material breach has occuned. However, it should be stressed here that 
the law of treaties and the law on state responsibility are two distinct spheres of 
international law which must not be confiised. Whilst the one constitutes the general 
law applicable in treaties, the other is applicable in all violations of international law, 
without totally being excluded fi-om the former. The relationship between the law of 
treaties and the law of state responsibility is thoroughly examined in Chapter 3. 
The right of the injured state not to fiilfil its obligations towards the defaulting state is 
not restricted to obligations with the same object and purpose as the primary obligation 
breached, although proportionality should be relevant in this case." 
With respect to the right of an injured state to resort to countermeasures Mr Riphagen 
made clear that this power was not unlimited. In this connection a distinction was made 
between countermeasures aiming at restoring the balance in the positions of the state 
parties involved in the dispute, a balance that was disturbed with the wrongfiil act 
(reciprocity), and countermeasures aimed at making the author state comply with its 
new obligations (reprisals).^^ It was noted accordingly that "indeed, the justification for 
the "weaker" countermeasure by way of reprisal is cormected with the intention and 
effect of the internationally wrongfiil act to which it is a response."*^ 
In reciprocal measures the notions of proportionality and interim protection are inherent 
in them. Nevertheless, it was accepted that the reciprocal suspension of obligations with 
peremptory character should not be permitted. Furthermore, reciprocity is limited in its 
effects to the wrongdoing state.'" By contrast, when reprisals are undertaken, the content 
of the response is not reciprocal to the content of the primary obligation. In other words, 
"there is no legal connection between the obligation breached by the author State and 
the obligation whose performance is suspended by the injured State". With regard to 
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proportionality, Mr Riphagen noted that the effects of the response should not be 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the breach. Since the reprisal is an intentional 
failure to comply with an international obligation, its justification should be similarly 
based on the intention and the effects, in other words the seriousness, of the initial 
infringement.^' And added that "a measure of reprisal, even i f not manifestly 
disproportional, remains by its very purpose at least 'a wager on the wisdom...of the 
other Party', a unilateral act directed ultimately at the 'enforcement' of the primary 
relationship. From this point of view, the existence and availability of other means to 
ensure the performance of obligations is clearly relevant."^^ Therefore a precondition to 
the application of reprisals is the exhaustion of international procedures for the peaceful 
settlement of the dispute where such a procedure is of compulsory character. In these 
cases other means of enforcement including reprisals are precluded. However, this 
precondition does not come without exceptions. First, such procedures may require the 
cooperation of all the parties to the dispute, in which case the adoption of measures with 
the purpose of securing this cooperation are permitted. Secondly, the third body may 
have limited powers in relation to the specific dispute both in relation to finding of fact 
and law and the adoption of effective interim measures of protection. Finally, there may 
be no compliance with the interim measures ordered by the third party. 
In the context of suspension of the performance either by way of reciprocity or by way 
of reprisals of obligations that under a multilateral treaty create extra-state interests it 
was noted that such a suspension would unavoidably affect parties other than the 
wrongdoer. In this regard, a rule prohibiting the unilateral suspension by the injured 
state of the performance of its obligations towards other states appears to exist. 
However, even in cases where the multilateral treaty creates collective interests not all 
the states members to the treaty will be equally affected by the violation. A collective 
decision about the interest to be served by the countermeasure as opposed to the effects 
on the interests of the individual states parties must be taken, especially i f the treaty 
itself provides for this procedure of collective decision.^^ 
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3.2.3. The Position of Third States in respect to Intemationallv Wrongfiil Acts 
According to Mr Riphagen, whilst intemafional law established primarily relafions of a 
bilateral nature, one could idenfify three exceptions to the rule. More specifically, 
whenever there exists more than one directly injured state (although here one may 
wonder about the "exceptional" character of this category); whenever the obligation 
breached derives from a mulfilateral treaty; and finally, whenever the infringed 
obligation protects a "fundamental interest which is not solely an interest of an 
individual State". '^' The latter involved the commission of acts that fell within the scope 
of article 19 which outlined different legal consequences in the event of the commission 
of an intemafional crime. As Mr Riphagen remarked the distinction between 
intemational delicts and international crimes would be of little significance i f it did not 
imply different legal consequences. As provided in the draft article 14, an intemational 
crime entailed all the legal consequences of an intemationally wrongfiil act and, 
additionally, such rights and obligations deriving from its nature as criminal and 
accepted by the intemational community. According to him, these additional 
consequences might concem a new collective right of every other state to require the 
author state to comply with its normal secondary obligations; additional secondary 
obligations for the author state going beyond the "undoing" of its acts qualified as an 
intemational crime (in which case they could only be determined by the intemational 
community as a whole i f and when it recognized some wrongful acts as constituting 
intemational crimes); new obligations between the other states not to recognize or 
support the results of such an intemational crime (principle of solidarity in which case 
solidarity and the mechanism of its implementation may be determined by the 
intemational community as a whole.) 
Nevertheless it was pointed out that the legal consequences in such exceptionally 
serious violations were not identical in every case as this would be in conflict with the 
principle of proportionality. Moreover, whilst the response of any state might be 
proportionate, the same response by several states would not be. 
With respect to the right of third states to take countermeasures it was pointed out that 
where a material breach of a multilateral treaty occurs, then only collective and 
unanimous action by the parties to the treaty was permitted for its suspension or 
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termination. This question was addressed in a different context in the ICJ's advisory 
opinion concerning South Africa's continued presence in Namibia where the Court had 
to determine the legal consequences for third states of a UN resolution passed on the 
matter declaring such presence as illegal. Thus, in this case there already existed a 
collective decision in response to South Africa's wrongful act. As the SC had already 
determined that the situation created was illegal under its powers under Chapter VI I of 
the UN Charter, the Court found that it did not have to examine what the legal situation 
would be i f no such resolution had been passed. In this way the Court assimilated the 
SC's resolution, leaving to the latter the authority to determine the existence and the 
content of the new legal relationships between South Afiica and other states.'^  It was 
accordingly concluded by Mr Riphagen that any action against South Africa required a 
collective response through the UN mechanism since even the cases of individual action 
recognized in the particular case by the Court were accepted on the basis of the 
resolution "as responses already indicated by a collective decision."^^ 
It has thus been argued that any response by third states to an internationally wrongfiil 
act must be taken in the light of a collective decision, although some expressed the view 
that no such requirement existed in international law. Apart from the fact that in the 
Namibia Case there was no injured state, the Court there dealt only with mandatory 
responses, as a duty of a third state not to comply with its international obligations 
towards the guilty state it could not easily be established under international law. As the 
Special Rapporteur pointed out: 
At most one could require a State which is not an injured State to refrain from giving support a posteriori 
to the wrongful act, and this requirement might even prevail over obligations of the third State towards 
the guilty State.'" 
3.2.4. A Dutv Upon Third States? 
Converse to the question of the existence of a "right" of third states to take action in 
response to a wrongful act committed by another state, lies the question of the existence 
of a duty upon third states to maintain a non-neutral position. According to Mr 
Riphagen, such a duty "could only be justified by the necessity of ensuring the 
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"credibility" of a primary rule itself, regardless of the relationship between the guilty 
State and the injured State involved in the breach of that primary rule."'^ ^ In its Advisory 
Opinion in the Namibia Case, the ICJ held that there was an erga omnes duty not to 
recognize a situation in violation of international law.^^ 
Whereas such a duty of third states to act (or refrain from otherwise lawfiil acts) did not 
seem to be precluded by a rule of international law, especially in the cases of 
international crimes and regardless of whether the infringement amounted to a threat to 
peace and security or not, Mr Riphagen noted that such a duty should be the result of a 
collective decision subject to the rule of proportionality.'"^ It was only reasonable to 
assume that i f such a duty is imposed upon third states, then an identical duty must also 
exist towards the state injured by the wrongfiil act, thus denjdng it of its normal faculty 
to waive its right to response. This position was in accordance with article 29 of the ILC 
draft articles on state responsibility concerning the exception of consent as a reason 
precluding wrongfulness whenever jus cogens norms were involved. 
It was fiirther noted in this regard that a duty upon all states to cooperate in order to 
compel the offender to stop its criminal conduct, to refrain from support a posteriori of 
the wrongful act itself, or to support other states in taking countermeasures should be 
recognized. 
3.3. Secondary Rules in the Context of Various Categories of Internationally Wrongfiil 
Acts 
The point was often made that although the commission of an internationally wrongfiil 
act entails legal consequences for the perpetrator, similar to any domestic legal order, 
there is a fimdamental structural difference between domestic and international law. 
More specifically, and despite the development of international law towards recognition 
on the one hand of entities other than states which possess interests protected by 
international law and which sometimes can even be seen as actors on the international 
plane, and of rules such as the general principles of law and jus cogens norms similar to 
those existing under domestic law on the other, international law is still based on the 
sovereign equality of states. As noted, "those developments do not destroy the original 
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basis of international law, and the new entities and concepts remain in a way something 
like a corpus alienum, requiring a mutual adaptation in respect of the principle of 
sovereign equality of States"."" This should be interpreted as meaning that unlike the 
position in domestic law where one party, the state, is in a superior position from its 
subjects, the same relationship of superiority is not existent in the international arena. It 
was therefore stressed that the distinction valid in internal law between "norms" and 
"sanctions" and "authority" and "subjects" cannot be transplanted to international law 
without elaboration. Similarly, the distinction made between primary rules, secondary 
rules or rules concerning the international responsibility of states, and implementation 
rules, should not be used as destroying the essential unity of the structure of 
international law. On the contrary, the manner in which the primary rules are 
established and their different functions cannot, according to Mr. Riphagen, but 
influence the various contents of state responsibility and its implementation. Finally, the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms in international law makes it even more necessary to 
define the legal regime applicable in cases of violation of the rules of international law, 
including certain restrictions that would restrain states from arbitrarily exercising their 
powers against smaller and weaker states. 
One of the issues examined by Mr Riphagen was the determination of secondary rules 
on the basis of various categories of internationally wrongflil acts. He referred in this 
regard to the writings of some authors, including Graefrath and Steiniger, who 
identified three categories of internationally wrongful acts: aggression and threat to the 
peace by forceful maintenance of a racial or a colonial regime; other violations of 
sovereignty; and violations of other conventional or customary law obligations.'*^^ 
In contrast, other publicists referred to another category of internationally wrongful acts, 
that of international crimes with an erga omnes character. According to these authors 
the commission of an international crime established the duty upon states not to support 
the act ex post either by recognizing its result as legal or by rendering aid or assistance 
in maintaining such a result; the duty to support the measures taken by the states 
specially affected by the breach; and the duty to participate in collective action for the 
protection of fiindamental interests of the international community as a whole. 
However, it was pointed out that not all international crimes bore the same legal 
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consequences in each particular case although nothing could preclude the establishment 
of a "minimum common element" of legal consequences applicable to all intemational 
crimes. As noted, the legal consequences of aggression for example were determined in 
the context of the UN Charter, especially in relation to the right of individual or 
collective self-defence. Mr Riphagen however opposed the suggestion made by some 
that the ILC should include an article on the legal consequences to be derived as a 
consequence of aggression as such an act justified any demand and any countermeasure 
provided that it complied with the mles of quantitative proportionality, y w^  cogens, and 
the UN Charter.'"^ 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the erga omnes character of intemational crimes 
related to intemational peace and security could not award all the other states with the 
same rights and duties. Wondering whether and to what extent the Commission should 
try to determine the legal consequences of other intemational crimes Mr Riphagen was 
faced with a lack of state consensus concerning not whether a conduct constituted an 
intemational crime, but the punishment that derives as a result. As he observed: 
Indeed, in fields of "fundamental interests of the international community", such as "the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment" or "safeguarding the human being", or, for that matter, 
"safeguardmg the right of self-determination of peoples", the progressive development of intemational 
law has brought about primary rules, and even tertiary rules, at least some machinery of implementation; 
but as to special secondary rules, different from those applying to intemationally wrongful acts in general, 
there is little evidence of generally accepted legal consequences of serious breaches...Nevertheless, as 
previously indicated, there are elements of special legal consequences common to all intemational 
104 
crimes. 
One such element applicable to all intemational crimes constituted according to Mr 
Riphagen the erga omnes character of the obligation infringed according to which every 
other state possessed the right to require from the author state the self-enforcement of 
the obligation breached (reparation ex nunc, ex tunc and ex ante.) Furthermore it was 
submitted that when an intemational crime was committed then the organized 
intemational community, i.e. the UN, had jurisdiction over the situation, and at the same 
time the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state became 
ineffective. Nevertheless, Mr Riphagen stressed that the author state should not be 
deprived of its fundamental rights under intemational law and the violation of which 
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would itself constitute an international crime.Another common element identified for 
all international crimes was the fact that they established new legal relationships 
between all the states other than the author state, and, in addition to the duty not to 
provide support ex post facto to the crime, they created as a legal consequence duties of 
solidarity between all other states. However, there was less certainty as to the duty of 
other states to support legitimate countermeasures. As suggested, for such a duty to 
exist some form of international decision-making machinery should exist such as the 
United N a t i o n s . A s known, the UN is empowered to take specific countermeasures 
against a state that with its actions threatens or breaches international peace and security 
(although the SC has shown in the era after the end of Cold War willingness to widen 
the meaning of what constitutes threat or breach to international peace and security), 
which may even go beyond measures prohibited by other rules of international law. As 
noted, the SC can even impose the duty upon all states to support and even to participate 
in collective measures. Such duties should prevail over duties deriving from other rules 
of international law.'°^ 
4. The Conclusions of Mr Arangio-Ruiz: 1988-1996 
4.1. Substantive and Instrumental Consequences of an Internationally Wrongful Act 
There was a common consensus that the codification of the law on state responsibility 
was central for the compliance of states with their international obligations and the 
reinforcement of the binding character of the international legal order. At the same time, 
there was a strong belief among states that the distinction made by article 19 between 
international delicts and international crimes, and the categorization of responsibility on 
the basis of the importance of the infringed right, the subjects entitled to respond with 
sanctions and the scope and kind of sanctions, strengthened the effectiveness of 
responsibility.'^^ 
In this context, Mr Arangio-Ruiz initiated his work on the codification of the law on 
state responsibility by examining two sets of legal consequences that could apply in 
both delicts and crimes. On the one hand there were the rights and duties of states in 
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relation to the various forms of reparation and the cessation of the wrongful act, and on 
the other there were the rights, or facultes, of the injured states to resort to measures that 
aimed either at securing reparation and cessation, or at inflicting punishment, or both. 
Such measures, even when of a punitive form, were described as "essentially 
instrumental" compared to the various forms of reparation (and cessation) that 
performed a merely substantive role. However, such measures should be "dressed" with 
certain conditions of lawfulness, "including such onera as may be incumbent upon the 
injured State or States with regard to representations, intimations or summations, which, 
except in cases and circumstances to be determined, should precede resort to 
measures".'^ ^ 
Mr Arangio-Ruiz studied extensively the form and scope of the substantive 
consequences of internationally wrongful acts, and in particular cessation, restitution in 
kind and satisfaction. It is not however within the scope of the present examination to 
analyze further these legal consequences. It suffices only to mention that Mr Arangio-
Ruiz was of the view that satisfaction could have a punitive character despite the fact 
that there was a growing concern that this would be in conflict with the composition or 
structure of the society of states. This can be rested on two grounds. Firsfly because 
punishment or penalty could be conceived only as against human beings; and secondly, 
that the infliction of such punishment or penalty presupposed the existence of 
"institutions impersonating, as in national societies, the whole community, no such 
institutions being available or likely to come into being soon-if ever- in the 'society of 
States'". "'^ Mr Arangio-Ruiz disagreed with this position, defending the existence of 
satisfaction (in its punitive form) and pointing out that it was due to the lack of such 
mechanisms of prosecuting, trying and punishing criminal offences that made it 
necessary to have these remedies in an attempt to fill the legal loophole of international 
legal community. Yet, he made a distinction between satisfaction and other measures, 
such as sanctions. Whilst the latter consisted of action imposed by the injured state, 
satisfaction consisted of specific conduct taken by the wrongdoing state, and in that 
sense satisfaction did not pose a threat on the principle of sovereign equality of states.''' 
With respect to the instrumental consequences and in particular countermeasures, it is 
observed that the lack of an adequate institutional framework becomes even more 
Preliminary/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1988/9/(14). 
"° Lauterpacht/1938/350 in Second/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1989/41/(141). 
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apparent and compelling in this particular area which exposes small and weak states to 
abuses by powerfiil states. It was therefore essential for the Commission, in its 
codification of the law on state responsibility, to "devise ways and means which, by 
emphasizing the best of lex lata or careful progressive development, could reduce the 
impact of the great inequality revealed among States in the exercise of their faculte (and 
possibly obligation) to apply counter-measures, which is such a major cause of 
concern." 
The use of the term "countermeasures" was preferred in contemporary legal thought and 
in the work of the Commission from that of "sanctions" which were reserved, according 
to the latter, to indicate measures adopted by an international body."^ 
4.2. Conditions and Functions of Countermeasures 
The acceptance of countermeasures in the law of state responsibility was accompanied 
by certain concerns and considerable reservations. In what was described by the ILC as 
the most controversial aspect of state responsibility,"'* countermeasures were dealt with 
in Chapter I I I of the draft articles provisionally adopted in first reading in 1996. 
According to the general commentary, countermeasures were justified in response to a 
previous violation of the rights of the injured state and may be necessary in order to 
ensure the compliance of the wrongdoing state. The ILC recognized that 
countermeasures did not constitute a "wholly satisfactory remedy" but rather a 
"rudimentary" system, firstly because the judgment for their justification is formed by 
the very same state relying upon them (unilateral assessment of both whether there has 
been an infringement and whether the reaction is lawful), and secondly because of the 
actual inequality of states in respect of military and economic strength."^ There were 
some states which for the reasons mentioned above disfavoured the inclusion of 
countermeasures in the draft articles and that argued that to rely on the principle of 
proportionality as a way of limiting any possible excessiveness of such measures would 
not be of much assistance as the exact content of the principle was not yet universally 
agreed and determined. However, the ILC decided to include countermeasures in the 
draft articles as it found that there existed enough evidence in customary law that 
Third/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/l991/7-8/(4). 
Ibid/10/(15). 
ILCreport/1996/153/(l) 
Ibid/153/(1) 
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countermeasures are permitted as a lawful response to an unlawful conduct, 
emphasizing at the same time that the restrictions and limitations for resorting to such 
measures should not be ignored."^ Countermeasures, "a reflection of the imperfect 
structure of the international community","^ were also supported by many other 
member states which asserted that "in any society a certain degree of coercion had to be 
tolerated, provided it did not go beyond certain limits" and that "at the present stage 
they were the only means whereby international law could be implemented when an 
international obligation was violated"."^ It was also the position that countermeasures 
should serve only for the cessation of the wrongful act and not as a means of 
punishment since the international community was comprised of states that were legally 
equal between them. 
The recognition that countermeasures could turn into a powerful weapon in the hands of 
states was the driving force behind the urge to impose the strictest conditions in the use 
of such measures. It was imperative that such measures were subjected to restrictions 
and limitations so as to safeguard that they would only be used whenever necessary in 
response to another infringement. Draft article 47 provided that countermeasures 
entitled the injured state "not to comply with one or more of its obligations towards the 
wrongdoing state", in order to achieve the permissible functions and aims of such 
measures, in particular cessation or reparation. Anything exceeding these functions 
would be unlawftil, particularly the infliction of punishment upon the wrongdoer."^ The 
ILC wished to ensure that countermeasures would not be used easily. For this reason it 
required that before resorting to countermeasures there should be failure of the 
wrongdoer to comply with its obligations under draft articles 41 to 46 concerning 
cessation, reparation, restitution in kind, compensation, safeguards for non repetition 
and satisfaction. The other restrictions provided for constituted the duty of the injured 
state to negotiate (with the exception of cases where urgent action was needed for the 
protection of the injured state's rights) and to submit the dispute before any dispute 
settlement procedure existing between the parties; that its action was not out of 
proportion to the degree of gravity of the internationally wrongful act and the effects on 
the injured state; and that the measures were not in violation of the prohibition of the 
use or threat of force, did not constitute extreme economic and political coercion against 
Ibid/153-4/(2) 
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the territorial integrity or political independence of the wrongdoer, did not infringe 
diplomatic immunities and basic human rights, and finally did not violate peremptory 
n o r m s . A t the same time, it was stressed that countermeasures needed to be necessary 
to induce the wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations. This prerequisite of 
necessity was interpreted as meaning first that the injured state should only resort to 
countermeasures i f other means failed or proved ineffective, and secondly that 
countermeasures must be used reasonably, in good faith and at the injured state's own 
risk. Effectively, the injured state was empowered to judge, from its dialogue with the 
defaulting state, whether the necessity for countermeasures had arisen. It was noted 
accordingly in this regard that, "The necessity of countermeasures diminishes in inverse 
proportion to the achievement of their legitimate aims."'^' The burden to establish the 
necessity of countermeasures therefore laid upon the injured state. 
There was also consideration of the view advanced by some writers that not all the 
injured states were entitled to unilaterally resort to countermeasures, fearing that a 
general faculte to this end would pose a threat to the certainty in the enforcement of the 
law and would lead to reactions unjustified by the aim of achieving the compliance of 
the wrongdoer. Mr Arangio-Ruiz, whilst acknowledging the dangers that unilateral 
resort to countermeasures could envisage, noted that refiising such right amounted to 
denying erga omnes obligations from any binding effect, the violation of which would 
bear no consequences and no regime of liability for the wrongdoer. He went on by 
saying that 
The only real peculiarities of the situations determined by the presence of a plurality of injured States, 
that is to say, by the fact that the infringed rule is an erga plurimos or erga omnes rule- is that the rights 
and facultes of the various injured States must be determined in concreto and implemented with a view to 
the pursuit of the totally or partially common legal interest infringed by the breach.'"^ 
The Special Rapporteur emphasized that resort to countermeasures precluded the use of 
force, whilst it demanded respect for human rights and the inviolability of diplomatic 
immunifies, and compliance with imperative rules and erga omnes obligations. In 
relation to jus cogens norms Gaja remarked that, "it would be illogical....at the same 
time [to] admit that the breach of an obligation imposed by a peremptory norm is 
justified only because another State had previously violated an international obligafion. 
'^ ^ Ibid/156. 
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The same applies when the previous violation also concerns an obligation imposed by a 
peremptory norm; the very existence of such a category of norms implies that there is a 
general interest in international society that they should be respected".'^^ With respect 
to erga omnes obligations Lattanzi pointed out that "...there can be no doubt that the 
lawfulness of a reprisal consisting in a violation of erga omnes rules is excluded 
precisely by the fact that the violation of an obligation to the detriment of one State in 
such a case simultaneously represents a violation of the same obligation to the detriment 
of all those to whom the rule applies. It would be inadmissible for the sanction imposed 
on one State to constitute the violation of an obligation towards another S ta te" .The 
same position was taken again by Gaja who stressed that "...one of the cases in which 
international law cannot allow countermeasures...is when the obligation which is 
violated operates in specific cases towards all other States: the rights of irmocent States 
would then necessarily be infringed". 
4.3.The Injured State 
Looking next at the question of which states are entitled or even obliged to react to a 
wrongful act, Mr Arangio-Ruiz noted that the involvement of injured states would vary 
in accordance with the nature and extent of the injury suffered.'^^ Various positions 
have occasionally been held with specific attention to the distinction between "directly" 
and "indirectly" injured states, specially affected, or even third states. This matter 
increased in significance, especially after the introduction of draft article 19 concerning 
international crimes and of the notion of obligations erga omnes. However, the legal 
differentiation of the position of states could also be found in relation to what was still 
at the time considered as an international delict, and in particular in the context of 
multilateral treaties such as those giving rise to international or integral rights and 
obligations, like for instance peace, disarmament or environmental treaties. 
The Special Rapporteur noted that the concept of "third" states was misleading, whilst 
reference to non-directly affected or injured states was inaccurate and vague.'^^ 
According to him, an injured state was not merely the one that has suffered an unjust 
physical damage. It was rather the state whose right has been violated; this infiingement 
Gaja/1982/297 in Third/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1991/35/(l 19). 
Lattanzi/1989 in Third/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1991/35/(121). 
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itself constituted the injury of the state in question and that was in conformity with the 
definition of an internationally wrongful act which requires that an international 
obligation is equivalent to an international right. The attention is then drawn to the 
distinction made between the traditional view of international law and contemporary 
legal trends. According to the former, international relations are structured in such a 
manner that their violation affects only one or few other states, even in the case of 
multilateral treaties which seem to rather establish multi-bilateral legal relationships. On 
the other hand, the practice and literature of international law indicate the existence of 
rules that simply "do not fit the pattern of bilateralism described above. These are the 
rules which, in the pursuit of 'general' or 'coUecfive' interests, create obligafions, 
compliance with which is in the legally protected interest and, in that sense, a legal right 
of all the States to which the rule applies".'^* As Spinedi commented: 
These rules impose on every State obligations towards all the other States in each of which the 
corresponding subjective right is vested. A breach of these obligations simultaneously injures the 
subjective rights of all the States bound by the rule, whether or not they have been especially affected-
apart, of course, from the subjective right of the State that committed the breach. The term "erga omnes 
obligation" is generally used to denote the obligations in question.'^' 
One of the questions examined by the Special Rapporteur was whether the position of 
all the injured states under an erga omnes rule was the same, and i f not in what sense it 
differed. As pointed out, whilst there might be no difference in the fact that all states are 
injured, there could be difference as to the way that each state has been injured. For 
instance, i f a coastal state closes a canal which although within its jurisdiction is 
connecting two parts of the high seas, then all the states possess a general entitlement 
under international law to transit. However, not all the states will be affected in the 
same way. More precisely, states whose ships have been prevented to cross the canal 
and have suffered a material damage will be affected in a different way fi-om the states 
which have a general right to innocent passage. For this reason Mr Arangio-Ruiz 
concluded that, "The only reasonable starting-point for the substantive as well as the 
instrumental consequences of a violation of erga omnes obligations- and the 
consequences of any other kind of international bilateral or multilateral obligation- thus 
Ibid/44/(131). 
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appears to be the characterization of each injured State's position according to the 
nature and the degree of the injury sustained". 
Under the 1996 draft articles the notion of the injured state was widely defined, so that 
to include all other states in the case of an international crime. 
4.4. The Notion of State Crimes 
Although the notion of state crimes was introduced in the ILC draft articles on state 
responsibility in 1976 with the provisional adoption of article 19, it was not until 1996 
that the substantive consequences of state "crimes" were actually formulated. 
During the discussion of the 7"' report prepared by Mr Arangio-Ruiz some member 
states expressed the view that there could be no clear distinction between crimes and 
delicts on the basis of their gravity as this would require an examination of the primary 
rule itself, something that could not fall within the ambit of examination of the 
secondary rules. Others stressed that the term "crime" bore punitive connotations with it 
and as such it should be precluded, something that the ILC did not accept.'^' Some 
members observed that a state could not be punished, like individuals could, and some 
others expressed concerns that the victims of such punishment would be the nationals 
belonging to the "criminal" state. Others expressed their concern that such 
determination would empower strong states to resort to countermeasures, entailing 
much risk for abuse. Other states took the position that the individual accountability 
should be strengthened instead. With respect to the fact that a crime constituted a breach 
of an erga omnes obligation and that consequently all states were regarded as injured 
states as actually suggested by Mr Arangio-Ruiz, some states noted that not all states 
could have the same, substantive and instrumental entitlements as a result of the 
commission of a state crime. The point was also made that the "universalization" of the 
notion of the injured state entailed the risk of multiple claims with a threat for escalation 
of the conflict. The discussion also brought into light the question as to who was 
entitled to determine that a wrongful act had been committed, with some members 
suggesting that such an authority should be placed upon a third-party settlement 
' Fourth/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1992/46/(138). 
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procedure so that powerful states would not abuse such powers bom fi-om 
countermeasures.'" 
As noted by Mr Arangio-Ruiz the nature of a wrongftil act as a crime would reasonably 
aggravate the substantive and instrumental legal consequences to arise for the defaulting 
state, among which the recognition of a right to all states to resort to 
countermeasures.'^ '^  In the Draft Articles adopted in first reading in 1996 the ILC 
incorporated special consequences to derive from the commission of a state crime, and 
more specifically the removal of the specific restrictions concerning the obligation of 
the wrongdoing state to make restitution in kind and to satisfaction. In particular, the 
ILC removed the restriction provided under Article 43 of its Draft Articles according to 
which the defaulting state would not be obliged to make restitution i f this placed upon it 
a great burden disproportionate to the benefit restitution would bring to the injured state. 
It was the ILC's position that a state having committed a crime should not be able to 
benefit from the fiiiits of its wrongful conduct.'^^ Moreover, the loosening of the 
specific restriction was not contrary to the requirement of proportionality as the 
restoration of the previous situation in the case of a crime could rarely be 
disproportionate. Similarly, the ILC decided to remove the restriction which prohibited, 
in intemafional delicts, restitution which could seriously jeopardize the polifical 
independence or economic stability of the wrongdoer. With respect to the requirement 
under Article 45 that satisfaction does not impair the dignity of the defaulting state, the 
ILC noted that by committing the crime the state concerned "had itself forfeited its 
dignity".'^^ Despite this, the ILC considered it necessary that the requirement that the 
claim for damages was proportionate to the gravity of the crime should remain. As for 
the other legal consequences provided under Articles 41 to 45, and more specifically the 
duty for cessation of the wrongfiil act, reparation, restitution in kind, compensation, and 
satisfaction, these were equally applicable in international delicts and international 
crime. One can see from these provisions that the legal consequences were almost 
identical irrespective of the nature of the violation, whilst states, described under the 
current Final Articles on State Responsibility as "states other than the injured", had in 
the case of a crime the same powers as those states directly injured, with no attempt of 
differentiation. At the same time however, with draft article 53 the ILC imposed certain 
ILCreport/1992/25/(168). 
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obligations on all states as a result of a wrongfial act that amounted to crime and in 
particular an obligation not to recognize as lawfiil the situation created as a result of the 
crime, not to render any aid or assistance to the defaulting state and to cooperate with 
other states to eliminate the consequences of the crime. 
5. Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ILC's 
work on the codification of the law on state responsibility in view of the great impact 
that this work has had and will have in the fiiture development of international law. 
Unfortunately, one of the most interesting and intriguing features of this work has been 
the realization that not all internationally wrongfril acts have the same legal effects and 
that as opposed to simple breaches, there are others which cannot leave unaffected the 
international community in its entirety. The attempts to establish a regime of 
responsibility for these acts, which would most possibly differ from the one applicable 
in the event of violation of "ordinary" obligations, has definitely not been without 
problems which mainly had their epicentre in the different perceptions expressed by 
states as to the very nature of the international community, and the role of state 
sovereignty. This can also be revealed from the hesitation expressed by states and 
commentators to accept notions such as peremptory norms and obligations erga omnes 
in the first place, fiirther elaborated in the following chapter. As already discussed 
earlier, the notion of state crimes was not welcomed by states because it was viewed as 
taking away something from the principle of sovereign equality of states. Fears that 
states would attempt to inflict their will through the adoption of punitive measures lead 
the ILC to suggest the abandonment of this proposition, an issue specifically examined 
in the next chapter. At the same time it became clear that the categorization of 
internationally wrongftil acts into "delicts" and "crimes", or into serious breaches and 
ordinary or simple violations could not but influence the spectrum of states entitled to 
invoke the international responsibility of the wrongdoer. After having elaborated the 
ILC's conclusions on these matters as they gradually evolved and flourished over time, 
the attention is next turned to the development and significance of the notions of jus 
cogens norms and obligations erga omnes in contemporary international law in general 
and in the law on state responsibility in particular. It will also be seen how these 
concepts have influenced the debate on the legal consequences to derive as a result of 
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the commission of a wrongftil act of this nature. These are now reflected in the final 
articles on state responsibility adopted in 2001. 
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C H A P T E R 2 
The International Community, Jus Cogens Norms and Obligations Erga 
Omnes 
1. Introduction 
At the time the ILC was considering the question of categorization of internationally 
wrongfiil acts into serious and less serious and their legal consequences on the basis of 
the nature of the rights protected by the infringed rule as discussed in chapter one, there 
was a certain degree of unease in legal doctrine in accepting these "superior" norms 
whose exact scope and content remained disputed, and which arguably contravened the 
nature and function of international law. Not that long ago for instance Professor Weil 
was warning emphatically against an international law that was moving towards a 
"relative normativity" and away from the traditional principles on which it was 
structured. With modem international law having developed through the decentralized 
system of state entities that emerged from the Peace Treaty of Westphalia 1648 and 
which resulted in the collapse of the hierarchical structure of international society, the 
emphasis was placed on the peaceful relations and the common interests of states, 
equals among equals and sovereigns among sovereigns.'" Professor Weil was of the 
view that the essence of this Westphalian system and modem intemational law 
remained unchanged. He argued in this regard that modem intemational law remained a 
legal order deeply rooted on the principle of sovereign equality and the consent of 
138 
states. For this reason he described the distinction made between jus cogens and 
ordinary norms, state crimes and delicts, as "a key that will not fi t the lock it wil l have 
to open".'^^ The intmsion, he said, of ideology in the neufrality of intemafional law, 
where all states are equal and therefore none could impose its own values upon the 
others, of ill-defined notions over clearly established norms, and the weakening of the 
consensual character of the intemational legal order "might well destabilize the whole 
intemational normative system and turn it into an instmment that can no longer serve its 
Okafor/Obasi/2003/22-3. 
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p u r p o s e " . I t was therefore imperative, for international law to fulf i l its normative 
functions, to consist of norms of "good quality".''*' Professor Weil warned against the 
adoption of notions which lacked definition, such as the nofion of the "intemafional 
community of states as a whole", stressing at the same time that only i f the international 
society fundamentally changed the structures on which it was built would these ideas 
work. 
However, legal developments have now paved the way to two clearly distinguishable 
perceptions of international law idenfified in the literature as traditional or "classic" 
international law and contemporary international law (although one could preferably 
speak about existing international law and progressive developments). It is to these 
developments that this chapter turns its attention, particularly in view of the 
undisputable predominance of notions such as jus cogens norms and obligations erga 
omnes in the theory and practice of contemporary international law. 
2. The Transition from Bilateralism to the "International Community as a Whole" 
2.1 • A Bilateralist Approach 
Traditional international law as most recently referred to in legal writings is built upon 
the notion of bilateralism and establishes a bipartite relation of multiple rights and 
obligations that constitute a "minimal law" and are reciprocal in character.''*^ Within 
this framework, one state is the carrier of the right and the other the carrier of the duty, 
thus establishing legal relations among states identical in kind to those established under 
civil law. Bilateralism is built upon a strong perception of state sovereignty and the 
prohibition of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state. States are legally 
bound only because they had themselves given their consent to restrict certain of their 
sovereign powers, usually because they have come to realize that it is on their own 
benefit to do so. This position was upheld by the PCIJ which pointed out that "The rules 
of law binding upon States....emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law."''*^ This 
position is co-related with the pacta tertiis rule according to which no state can be 
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bound by a treaty which it has not signed and ratified. On the same footing, under this 
perception of international law no state can be bound by a rule the development of 
which it has opposed. In this bilateral relationship, and while traditional international 
law provides for certain dispute settlement mechanisms based on the consent of all 
parties involved, in case of an infringement, it is solely upon the carrier of the right to 
pursue the fulfilment of what has been refiased to it and to resort to coercive measures 
which for long took the fonn of armed force, or even to unilaterally denounce its 
claims.''*'* This was a very well established principle of international law that had 
consistently been upheld by the ICJ, with particular emphasis made in its Opinion 
concerning the Reparation for Injuries Case where it concluded that "only the party to 
whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in respect of its breach".''*^ 
Bilateralism could not leave unaffected the sphere of "sanctions". For many, in the 
absence of a hierarchical order which was precluded by the nature of international law 
as a legal order of co-ordination rather than subordination, and in the light of the 
principle that all states were equal actors in international affairs, "sanctions" themselves 
found no place.'"^^ 
Despite the fact that under bilateralism states are protected (at least in theory) from 
unlawfial interference and there is clear identification of the injured states entitled to 
seek redress, it leaves enforcement on the state whose rights have been infringed. Given 
the factual inequality of states, bilateralism weakens the position of already weak and 
small states which are unable to take action against the wrongdoer, no matter how 
serious the violation and how fiindamental the right at stake.''*^ Furthermore, it ignores 
the need for certain common values essential for the very existence of mankind and 
which have to be protected even i f no specific state is directly targeted by their 
violation. Accordingly, bilateralism cannot explain current legal trends such as the fact 
that there may be cases where the action of one state may affect the interests of all other 
states and that there are certain issues that are the concern of all states, for example, 
human rights and environmental considerations, or the legal status of Antarctica or the 
legal status of the sea-bed which extends beyond the jurisdiction of any state. With 
respect to human rights and the protection of the environment it has been noted that they 
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"are typically the subject matter of multilateral treaties which define mutually accepted 
uniform standards. Their conclusion as instmments of codification or progressive 
development of intemational law weighs against a bilateral perspective which signifies 
a reciprocal exchange of commitments."''*^ Bilateralism cannot give answers to the 
increasing need to protect certain principles, thus expanding the sphere of interested 
actors in the intemational legal arena. Mosler observed in this regard that: 
International law cannot be defined solely in terms of bilateral or multilateral relations between subjects 
which possess legal capacity. The collection of subjects participating in the intemational legal order 
constitutes a community living according to common rules of conduct. 
2.2. Community Interests in Contemporary Intemational Law 
Whilst the traditional pattem of intemational law is what still significantly describes the 
intemational relations of states today, one can say with confidence that contemporary 
intemational law has also evolved to something more than just being "minimal law" in 
certain areas, expanding the competences of the organized community which ceases to 
be just an abstract idea on the one hand, and limiting the sovereign powers of the states 
on the other. Contemporary intemational law promotes the notion of community interest 
to the extent that "absolute sovereign freedom to accept or dismiss a legal mle simply 
appears anachronistic in the present time".'^ *^ It has also been realized that a consensual 
perception of intemational law could not address contemporary concerns which required 
an intemational public order with which all states would have to strictly comply.'^' In 
his Anarchical Society, Bull argues that the intemational society is not stmctured 
exclusively on realist or moralist/idealist theories. He rather makes the point that the 
intemational society bears characteristics of both. Therefore, while it consists of 
sovereign states seeking to gain power, these very states recognize the significance of 
peacefiil cooperation and coexistence with other states. This is what is purported with 
the formulation of intemational organizations and common mles because a common 
interest consists the Gordian knot that binds all states together.'^^ In present day, the 
outlawing of the use of force and the protection of certain fimdamental principles 
become the concem of all: their violation is to affect all states, and therefore, all states 
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have an interest in their performance. This has increased the need of having a strong 
organised international community and solidarity among states, the latter being 
described by Professor MacDonald as: 
An agreement among formal equals that will all refrain from actions that would significantly interfere 
with the realization of common goals and fundamental interests. Solidarity requires an understanding that 
every member of the community must consciously and constantly conceive of its own interests as being 
inextricable from the interests of the whole. No State may choose to use its power to undertake actions 
that might threaten the integrity of the community.'" 
In 1937 Verdross wrote that the international community consists of higher interests 
that restrict both the sovereignty and freedom of states, "for it is the quintessence of 
norms of this character that they prescribe a certain, positive or negative behaviour 
unconditionally; norms of this character, therefore, cannot be derogated from by the will 
of the contracting parties".'^'* 
It accordingly became common ground, especially in the post-World War I I era, that the 
sovereignty of states does not have any longer the absolute and exclusive character that 
it possessed in the past and which unfolded in two ways: first, as an absolute freedom 
concerning the domestic affairs of the state, and secondly as an unrestricted power to 
enforce international law when a breach against it had occurred. With the current 
growing interdependence of states, sovereignty, despite the fact that it still possesses a 
prominent role in contemporary international law, is not conceived as an absolute 
instrument of strength and inviolability in the hands of dictators or human rights 
violators.'^^ At the same time, and as a result of immense progress in the international 
legal thought concerning the protection of international peace and security, states 
recognized that it was in their benefit to avail themselves of certain international rules in 
the light of the realization that war and conflict could not be factors of stability and 
development. Hence, a new conception of the role of states in the international plane 
had gradually begun to unfold on the basis of the necessity for the co-operation and 
peaceftil co-existence of the various components of the international community. The 
appearance of the "international community" as a legal concept was about to change the 
international legal balance in that a state which violated fiindamental principles of 
Macdonald/l993/293 in Simma/1994/238. 
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international law would now be faced with the international community as a whole.'^^ 
The reference to this concept, although not completely unknown before, flourished ever 
since the adoption of article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
on jus cogens norms. As such qualify norms which are "accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole" and "from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent nonn of general 
international law having the same character".'^' 
Not long after the adoption of article 53 the International Court of Justice itself 
pronounced in the Barcelona Traction Case that there needed to be a distinction 
between obligations which derived from the law of diplomatic immunities on the one 
hand, and obligations owed to the international community as a whole on the other. 
Although the Court did not say what action could specifically be taken in response to 
the violation of the latter obligations, it did recognize a legal interest to all states in their 
protection. The significance of this ruling lies not only in the fact that the international 
community is authorized to attend an erga omnes character to certain obligations, but 
also upon the fact that obligations of this category are owed to and enforced on its 
behalf.'^ '^  
The concept of the "international community" has often been cited as evidence to the 
evolution of international law. Judge Bedjaoui, moving away from the ruling in the 
Lotus Case according to which states have such freedom of action as long as it is not 
prohibited by a rule of international law, commented that: 
[i]t scarcely needs to be said that the face of contemporary international society is markedly 
altered....Witness the proliferation of international organizations, the gradual substitution of an 
international law of co-operation for the traditional international law of co-existence, the emergence of 
the concept of 'international community'... .The resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international 
law still current at the beginning of the [twentieth] century....has been replaced by an objective 
'^ ^ Although the term "international community" is being frequently used in various contexts, it does not 
always have a normative character. Greig/2002/563. 
The linkage between jus cogens norms and the international community was made upon a proposal 
submitted by the Governments of Greece, Finland and Spain. Rozakis in particular spoke of a 
"confrontation between...growing social concerns and the...perseverance of States in their sovereign 
rights". The inclusion of the notion of peremptory norms revealed "that the international community is 
rapidly heading towards some more advanced forms of organization under the rule of law and justice". 
Rozakis/1976/197 in Greig/2002/537. 
ICJReps/1970/32-3/(33-34). 
''•^  Greig/2002/547. 
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conception of international law, a law more readily seeking to reflect a collective juridical conscience and 
respond to the social necessities of States organised as a community.'^ " 
A reflection of the growing view that international law has not remained static 
constitutes the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen in the Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons}^^ Rejecting the Lotus ruling he 
pointed out that the lack of a rule, conventional or customary, to prohibit the use of 
nuclear weapons could not infer that the use of such weapons were lawful. Rather, it 
was imperative to look at more general principles, and he suggested that "in a case of 
this kind, the action of a State is unlawful unless it is authorized under international 
law".'^^ Judge Shahabudeen identified as the crucial question in the case whether during 
the commencement of the nuclear age there existed, or did not, a rule prohibiting or 
allowing the use of nuclear weapons. I f one could ascertain either answer, then it would 
be possible to find what the current legal position is with respect to the legality of such 
weapons. According to Judge Shahabudeen since the appearance of nuclear weapons 
there has been no crystallized opinio juris towards the direction of outlawing what was 
previously allowed, or vice versa, permitting what was previously unlawful. In 
determining therefore whether the use of so strong weapons that could signal the end of 
mankind was allowed, the Judge suggested looking at the "juridical foundations" on 
which a legal system, here the international legal system, is structured. He pointed in 
this regard to Ibn Kaldun according to whom "laws have their reason in their purposes 
they are to serve", namely the preservation of civilization. As characteristically 
highlighted, "injustice invites the destruction of civilization with the necessary 
consequence that the species wil l be destroyed".'^^ This seems to reflect an earlier 
distinction between two kinds of international law and in particular between the 
necessary law of nations embodying the law of nature {jus strictum) and the law created 
by agreement and custom. According to Vattel, "Since therefore the necessary Law of 
Nations consists in the application of the law of nature to states - which law is 
immutable as being founded on the nature of things, and particularly on the nature of 
man - it follows, that the necessary Law of Nations is immutable. Whence as this Law 
is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations 
can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own 
Bedjaoui/Nuclear/Weapons/Legality/1996. 
Ibid. 
'<^ I^bid. 
Kaldun/1981/40 in Shahahudcen/Nuclear/Weapom/Legality/1996. 
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conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of i f .'^'' The same 
conclusion was reached by Mosler more than one century later who emphasized that, 
"The law cannot recognize any act either of one member or of several members in 
concert, as being legally valid i f it is directed against the very foundation of law".'^^ 
Judge Shahabudeen concluded accordingly that since "the preservation of the human 
species and of civilization constitutes the ultimate purpose of a legal system", the 
immense, "clear and palpable" risks for the very survival and existence of the 
intemational community that can arise from the use of nuclear weapons, make their use 
unacceptable and "repugnant to the conscience of the community. "'^^ Most 
significantly, support of the position that what is not prohibited is permitted, he said, 
would remind the advice given by Persian judges to King Cambyses when asked i f he 
could marry his sister. In answering the question posed by the King the judges said "that 
though they could discover no law which allowed brother to marry sister, there was 
undoubtedly a law which permitted the King of Persia to do what he pleased."'^^ 
Similarly, to say that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is permitted under 
intemational law, "would mean that, while the Court could discover no law allowing a 
State to put the planet to death, there is undoubtedly a law which permits the State to 
accomplish the same result through an exercise of its sovereign powers".'^* But even i f 
no prohibition of nuclear weapons is found, the Judge was of the view that the co-
existence of states in the intemational legal system restricts the freedom of action of 
each other state. These restrictions define the very notion of sovereignty of states which 
he described as an "objective stmctural framework" which "shuts out the right of a State 
to embark on a course of action which would dismantle the basis of the framework by 
putting an end to civilization and annihilating mankind".'^^ 
According to Judge Shahabudeen the conclusions to be derived from the Lotus Case 
were improper for another reason as well. More specifically, that case did not concem 
the possibility of the entire destmction of mankind and that since that mling there have 
been significant legal developments in contemporary intemational legal community 
Vattel/1834/lviii in Jorgensen/2000/86. 
'^ ^ Mosler/1980/18 in Frowein/1994/364. 
Shahabudeen/ICJReps/1996/3 86. 
Herodotus/1959/187 in Shahabudeen/M<c/ear/lFeo/7O«5/Z,ega/i0'/ICJReps/1996/392/fn6. 
"'^  Shahabudeen//VMc/ear/fFea;7o«5/Z,ega/;fF/lCJReps/l996/392/fn6. 
'""Ibid. 
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reflected first, in the prohibition of the use of force and in the promotion of a "universal 
international community". Both, it seems, at the expense of state sovereignty.'™ 
The acknowledgement of the existence of community interests, as revealed also fi-om 
the work of the ILC on the codification of state responsibility, signalled the initiation of 
a long debate regarding the categorization of various internationally wrongful acts on 
the basis of their seriousness and also the interests they affect on the one hand, and of 
differentiated legal consequences on the other. The discussion of community interests 
could not but influence the determination of the actors affected by a certain 
infringement of obligations establishing community interests, and their entitlements 
arising therefrom, with special attention given to whether or not they possess a right to 
resort to countermeasures. 
3. Moving towards Jus Cosens Norms and Obligations Erga Omnes 
3.1. Jus Cogens Norms 
Despite the wide acceptance in contemporary international law of the notion of jus 
cogens norms there still exists much ambiguity with respect to its scope and its nature. 
Similarly, the introduction of the notion of erga omnes obligations and international 
crimes have not been without problems either. It is argued in this regard that 
"international law scholarship lacks a coherent understanding of hierarchy and, in 
essence, nothing has been changed since Prosper Weil argued in his famous 1982 article 
that such a hierarchy would hinder the functioning of international law in its main role, 
namely to ensure coexistence and a common aim in a fundamentally pluralistic 
society".'^' 
At the same time it needs to be stressed that despite the similarities between jus cogens 
norms and erga omnes obligations in that they both protect common state interests and 
as a result they often overlap, they are not identical. Whilst jus cogens norms establish 
obligations erga omnes the same does not apply with respect to erga omnes obligations 
which most of the time do not possess a peremptory character.'^ '^  
'™Ibid. 
Koji/2001/918. 
Jorgensen/2000/97. 
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The inclusion in article 53 of the 1969 VCLT of the notion of norms of jus cogens, apart 
from the barrage of arguments and counter-arguments that has caused as to the 
acceptability of the notion in the first place, has contributed significantly to the shift of 
the discussion fi-om a bilateral, exclusively consensual basis of traditional international 
law, to a multilateral structure of contemporary international law according to which 
there exist certain common values the protection of which is cherished as fiandamental 
for the survival of the international legal order. For Professor Tomuschat, "it would be 
wrong to assume that States as a mere juxtaposition of individual units constitute the 
international community. Rather, the concept denotes an overarching system which 
embodies a common interest of all States and, indirectiy, of mankind.""''^ This may 
somehow also be revealed by the gradually evolved practice of the SC which has 
directed its resolutions for arms and economic embargoes not only to those states 
members to the UN, but also to all states whenever it has felt that there has been a 
breach or a threat to international peace and security.'^'* Nevertheless, this can hardly 
find justification under the conventional and customary rules on the Law of Treaties 
regarding the imposition of rights or obligations to third states. Having said that it is 
also important to stress that the UN, and in particular the SC, does not possess in the 
international arena the role of the law enforcer. Rather, its powers are limited to the 
safeguarding of international peace and security, even though a broad interpretation to 
this end has been attempted since the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, the SC remains 
a political body where states' own interests still bear gravity in the decision-making 
process. 
Although the VCLT does not provide a definition of peremptory norms, something that 
may entail the risk of abuse, it incorporates three distinctive elements that may be used 
by way of interpretation. More specifically article 53 pinpoints that under general 
international law a peremptory norm is one accepted and recognised as such by the 
international community of states as a whole, that allows for no derogation, and that it 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of the same character. It is noted in this 
regard that these characteristics differentiate jus cogens norms fi-om other non-derogable 
rights which however do not have a peremptory character. Yet, the decisive requirement 
is the recognition and acceptance of a norm as jus cogens by the international 
community of states as a whole. It has been argued that the latter requirement is 
Tomuschat/1993/227. 
SC/Res./660/1990, SC/Res/670/1990, SC/Res/713/199), SC/Res/757/1992. For an analysis see 
Tomuschat/1993/252-5. 
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indicative that consent is also essential with respect to peremptory norms and it takes 
two forms: first, consent about the character of a norm under general international law, 
and secondly, consent as to its non-derogable nature.'^^ 
With respect to the requirement that a peremptory norm is recognised by the 
international community "as a whole" it has been noted that this does not presuppose 
unanimity. Roberto Ago suggested that such a norm should be recognised by the "basic 
components" of the international community such as Western and Eastern countries, 
equally developed and developing, but this position has been criticised due to the 
continuous evolution of the international community. As noted by the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, "[t]he Drafting Committee had wished to stress that there was no 
question of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognised as peremptory by all States. It 
would be enough i f a very large majority did so; that would mean that i f one State in 
isolation refiised to accept the peremptory character of the rule, or i f that State was 
supported by a very small number of States, the acceptance and recognition of the 
peremptory character of the rule by the international community as a whole would not 
be affected."'™ Not only a hierarchy of norms now seems to make its appearance also in 
the international legal order, but states will still be bound by such norms even i f they 
have persistently opposed them. I f this position is taken to be true, it then seems that the 
notion of jus cogens norms has deprived traditional international law one of its most 
characteristic features: the understanding that international law was structured merely 
upon the consent of states. 
Verhoeven however takes the view that no rule can be considered as having a 
peremptory character unless states are in agreement. Whilst international legal theory 
and practice reveals very few, exceptional examples of jus cogens norms, the 
significance of the notion should not be underestimated. As noted, "the scarcity of 
examples merely reflects the still rudimentary organization of a 'community' which is 
no longer a 'family' (of nations) but which has not yet developed into a society."'^^ 
Moreover, the reference to obligations "owed to the international community as a 
whole" should not be construed to imply that the international community is a legal 
person. Rather, it is an abstract concept since even until the present day where states 
"'Koji/2001/928-9. 
'^ "^  Yaseen/1968/472/(12) in Greig/2002/534-5. 
Verhoeven/1998/196. 
63 
have conferred large powers on the UN as a body to observe international peace and 
security with the capability of resorting to the use of force, states remain the main actors 
in international affairs and international law-making. Professor Crawford in particular, 
responding to suggestions made by some states during the second reading of the draft 
articles on state responsibility adopted by the ILC in 1996 that reference to international 
community as a whole should read as "international community of States as a whole", 
noted that this was not necessary mainly because it was well-established that states 
continued to have central role in international decision making, but also because apart 
ft-om states, the international community now includes other entities in addition to states 
such as the European Union and other international organizations/^^ 
Although the ICJ has been reluctant in applying this notion (international community as 
a whole) in practice, it can be revealed that there are certain community interests the 
fate of which is not any longer left to the wi l l of individual states. Their violation is a 
violation towards all. As noted, there are at least some obligations that "are universal in 
scope, and cannot be reduced to bundles of bilateral interstate relations".'^^ Professor 
Koji stressed accordingly that because jus cogens norms must be recognized as such not 
only by a specific group of states, even i f it is the majority, but by all the essential 
components of the international community, the substance of the norm has a significant 
role to play. Consequently, "JMS cogens must include common elements among major 
different (legal) cultures." What is suggested here for the identification of peremptory 
norms fi-om other norms is a double criterion according to which due regard is given to 
the content of the norm but also to the subjects to which the norm relates. 
Article 53 also provides that a treaty in breach of a jus cogens norm wil l be null and 
void. Nevertheless, during the debates for the codification of the Law of Treaties it was 
commented that what makes a norm of peremptory character is not merely that it is 
recognised as such by all states but also the nature of the interests at stake which touch 
the morals and the international legal order .However , not all rules of international 
law are of such character but on the contrary only those that protect fiandamental 
interests of the international community are considered as such. Furthermore, many 
industrialized states had made clear that they would not ratify the convention unless it 
Crawford-Peel-Olleson/2001/973. Also Fourth/Report/Crawford/2001/(37). 
Crawford/2000/ 
Koji/2001/929. 
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17. 
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Tliird/Report/Fitz aurice/1958/41/(76). NCLT/1969/472/(12) 
provided for adequate and compulsory procedures whenever the parties in a dispute 
regarding a specific treaty could not themselves settle the matter. On the other hand 
socialist and third world countries opposed this idea. As a compromise the ILC adopted 
article 66 which provides that whenever a dispute regarding a peremptory norm arises 
under article 53 then it must be submitted to the ICJ unless the parties agree to resort to 
arbitration. This means that a state which is not a party to the VCLT cannot be forced to 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court, as article 66 does not seem to reflect a customary 
rule of international law. However, these states are still bound by the jus cogens norm as 
reflecting customary international law. It needs to be noted that some states after the 
conclusion of the VCLT expressed specific reservations regarding article 66. Despite 
the fact that especially for the industrialized states the inclusion of article 66 was a 
precondition for accepting those provisions of Part V which were expressive of 
progressive development, according to one view such reservations could not be 
regarded as invalid as they did not oppose the object and the purpose of the 
Convention.'^^ In such an event, states opposing reservations regarding article 66 are 
entitled to oppose the force of the convention between themselves and the states that 
have expressed reservation to this provision. Yet, this does not affect the applicability of 
peremptory norms which are accepted to have a customary character.'^ ^ 
A further question that emerges from the adoption of article 53 is whether states 
persistently objecting to jus cogens norms are still bound by them. This issue gains 
particular significance in the context of customary rules. In this respect Professor Sur 
wonders 
Should one then consider that the formation of a rule of jus cogens is identical to that of a customary rule 
and that jus cogens is a strengthened form of custom, a higher derivation of custom, or is there an 
autonomous, original mode of formation, which perhaps does not form part of practice?'** 
As Shelton very pointedly observed, "The urgent need to act [.. .] fundamentally 
challenges the consensual framework of the international system by seeking to impose 
on dissenting States obligations, that the 'international community' deems 
185 
fundamental." It is well-established that a state may not be bound by a customary rule 
i f three stringent criteria are met: (a) the rights and interests the objector wants to 
Verhoeven/1998/197-8,202. 
Ibid/202. 
Sur/1988/128 in Simma/1994/291. 
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preserve are wider than those provided by the newly formulated customary rule; (b) the 
objector must oppose the rule fi-om its very genesis, and (c) its opposition must be 
unambiguous, express and open. Nevertheless, i f one accepts that international law has 
moved away from the structures of mere bilateralism or state consensus, then the 
binding effect of jus cogens norms even upon states not in agreement is the best proof 
for the existence of community interests in the international legal order. 
Some states have feU that the inclusion of this provision would threaten the stability of 
treaty relations, whilst at the same time the attribution to the ICJ of jurisdiction to 
resolve issues regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention would make 
states that already had difficulties more hesitatnt to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. 
Similarly, acceptance of the concept of jus cogens norms had implications also in 
relation to whether states, other than the contracting parties to a treaty in breach of a jus 
cogens norm, would be entitled to invoke the invalidity and nullity of the said treaty. 
However, the VCLT in article 65 seems to indicate that the invalidity of a treaty may 
only be invoked by a state party to it, thus making the two positions difficult to 
reconcile.'^^ 
Whilst article 53 is unequivocal about the legal consequences to derive from a treaty 
that is found to be in violation of a peremptory norm and sets out the invalidity of the 
treaty in its entirety, there is nothing specifically mentioned about the status of a treaty 
that only indirectly contributes to the breach of a jus cogens norm and the legal 
consequences to derive therefrom. In fact, contemporary international law finds no 
examples of treaties under which two or more states agree to commit genocide or 
torture. Quite the contrary, in most cases treaties seem, as Professor Crawford put it, 
"innocent" in their purpose. Nevertheless, it often happens that compliance with the 
terms of a particular treaty indirectly assists in the infringement of a peremptory norm. 
A question that needs to be addressed as a consequence is whether a state party to a 
certain treaty may be entitled to either suspend or terminate the said treaty, or refijse its 
performance under the law on state responsibility by way of countermeasures. As it will 
analytically be discussed in the following chapter, article 60 of the 1969 VCLT only 
'^ ^ France is among those states that have not ratified the 1969 V C L T . France's opposition is not against 
the notion of jus cogens in general, on the contrary it supports such notion with respect to certain human 
values accepted by all states. However, a state that supports nuclear testing itself, France was afraid that 
accepting the notion would have an impact on the stability and security of the law of treaties, but also to 
state sovereignty. UNCLT/1969/FirstSession/309-310; UNCLT/1969/Second Session/93-5. 
'^ ^ Gaja/1981/281,283. 
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permits the suspension or termination of a treaty in case of a material breach of the 
terms of that specific treaty. Any events occurring outside the fi-amework of the treaty 
are not relevant and thus leave unaffected the obligations of the concerned parties. As 
for the non-performance of this treaty by way of countermeasures it is already pointed 
out that current international law does not accommodate a right to third, not injured 
states to resort to countermeasures. One therefore is left wondering as to the remedies 
available under international law regarding a treaty that assists in the commission of a 
violation of a jus cogens norm, given the fact that in this case it is not the treaty itself 
which violates the norm, but rather the performance of the treaty. This can be illustrated 
by an example. Two states conclude a treaty for the sale of weapons and military 
material. The treaty, on its face, suffers of no wrong. If, however, one of the parties is 
involved in a genocidal plan to exterminate a specific ethnic group living on its 
territory, the question arises as to whether the other state will still be obliged to conform 
with its treaty undertakings. Professor Crawford says in relation to this: 
If a peremptory norm invalidates an inconsistent treaty, how can the obligation to perform the treaty stand 
against the breach of such a norm? No doubt the link between perfomiance of the treaty obligation and 
breach of the peremptory norm would have to be clear and direct. But in such cases, the temporary 
suspension of the obligation to perform surely follows from the peremptory character of the norm that 
would otherwise be violated.'** 
Yet, Professor Crawford is of the view that in these cases of indirect conflict with a 
peremptory norm there is no need for the total invalidation of the treaty in question. 
Furthermore, in his opinion a norm having a jus cogens character should prevail over all 
other international obligations which do not have the same normative effect. Therefore: 
in such cases the State concerned would not have the choice whether or not to comply: if there is 
inconsistency in the circumstances, the peremptory norm must prevail. On the other hand, the invalidation 
of a treaty which does not in terms conflict with any peremptory norm, but whose observance in a given 
case might happen to do so, seems both unnecessary and disproportionate. In such cases, the treaty 
obligation is, properly speaking, inoperative and the peremptory norm prevails. But if the treaty can in 
fumre have applications not inconsistent with the peremptory norm, why should it be invalidated by such 
an occasional conflict?'*' 
Second/Report/Crawford/1999/39/(311). 
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It seems further to be the position of Professor Crawford that the obligations deriving 
fi-om a jus cogens norm are to be found in the "system of international law", but he did 
press for an inclusion of a provision on precluding the wrongfulness of an act i f this act 
is required by a jus cogens norm.'^^ Indeed, the notion of jus cogens norms would 
diminish in significance i f it at least did not have this effect of entitiing the non-
observance of a certain treaty obligation which assists in the commission of a jus cogens 
violation. 
Along the same lines Professor Fitzmaurice points out that: 
A treaty obligation the observance of which is incompatible with a new rule or prohibition of 
international law in the nature of jus cogens will justify (and require) non-observance of any treaty 
obhgation involving such incompatibility.'^' 
Although there can be no doubt about the soundness of the above arguments, it is 
imperative that the legal basis of such "non-performance" of treaties indirectly assisting 
in the commission of a violation of a jus cogens is clarified. In other words, will the 
authority for the non-performance of these treaty obligations find justification in article 
53, or will it have to rely on something else, such as the law on state responsibility? It is 
already stressed that article 53 is characterized by two things: first, it has the effect to 
invalidate the treaty which by itself violates a peremptory rule; and secondly, that the 
matter falls within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Thus, by inference, any 
question concerning the non-performance of a certain treaty which by itself does not 
violate a jus cogens norm must lie within the law on state responsibility and not within 
article 53. One could therefore make the argument that the right of non-performance 
under these circumstances relies either on article 41 (2) of the ILC articles according to 
which no state "shall" render aid or assistance to the commission of a jus cogens norm, 
or on the assumption that it may resort to countermeasures even i f it is a state other than 
the injured. It is suggested that the difficulty with the first approach is that it lacks 
mechanisms to monitor possible abuses identical to those provided under the VCLT in 
the event that a treaty violates such a norm. The second approach also creates 
difficulties due to the controversy regarding the permissibility of countermeasures by 
states other than the injured. As it can be understood, this issue has deeper implications: 
were the measures taken by states, such as the US against South Afiica for instance, an 
'''°Ibid/40/(314). 
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example of third state countermeasures, or were they justified as legal consequences 
that derive from the notion of jus cogens norms? 
In any event, in order to justify the non-performance of a treaty under these conditions it 
will be imperative to show the existence of a direct link between the observance of the 
treaty and the commission of an act which is in violation of peremptory norms. On this 
reasoning it could be argued that the use of nuclear weapons would be directly and 
clearly contributing to the violation of jus cogens norms since some of the rules of 
international humanitarian law have been enforced with such status. 
Finally, although a treaty is null and void when in breach of a peremptory norm, there is 
not much said about the legal consequences of a customary rule in violation of a jus 
cogens norm. However, it would be safe to conclude that such a rule will become 
ineffective and inoperative in the same way as in the case of treaties. 
The recognition of jus cogens norms as part of international law prepared the ground for 
the appearance of another notion, not less controversial, that of international state 
crimes, as thoroughly explored within the work of the ILC on its codification of the 
Law on State responsibility. The realization that not all violations had the same output 
and the need to attach a more grave nature to some of them due to the fundamental 
character of the rights protected under certain international rules, was the driving force 
for the introduction of the concept of state crimes in the international legal debate. The 
serious implications arising from the incorporation of the concept in international law, 
with the possibility of some states being faced with punitive measures, forced many 
states to look at the notion with a great amount of suspicion and disbelief The legal 
consequences to derive from such violations and the states entitled to take action were 
among the most significant concerns that attracted legal attention, aggravated by the 
lack of a centralized enforcement mechanism in international law. This notion is further 
discussed in section 4.1. of this chapter. 
3.2. Obligations Ersa Omnes 
A major turning point from bilateral and reciprocal obligations to obligations 
established for the protection of the common good was achieved with the inclusion by 
the ICJ of specific reference to the notion of erga omnes obligations in its Barcelona 
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Traction ruling. It has to be stressed however that this concept was not previously 
unknown in international jurisprudence. An examination of the findings of both the 
PCIJ and of the ICJ suggest that long before the Barcelona Traction Case international 
law recognised that something more than mere individual state interests exist in the 
international legal order. But the development of obligations with a different until then 
content does not cease there. Already in 1957 Scharzenberger had made reference to 
erga omnes when commenting on the legal effects of treaties for third states.'^ ^ More 
significantly, the concept appears in the debate for the drafting of article 62 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties concerning Treaties that Give Rise to Rights 
and Obligations of Third States during which Manfred Lachs, later Judge of the ICJ and 
the Barcelona Traction Case itself, suggested that a distinction should be drawn 
between such treaties and "treaties establishing objective regimes and obligations erga 
omnes".Furthermore, Judge Jessup, a few years before the ruling in the Barcelona 
Traction case, observed that states may possess a general interest in the protection of 
values and benefits common to the international community.'^'* 
Yet, the Barcelona Traction Case constituted the first case to confirm the existence of 
obligations erga omnes, yet which also acknowledged the emergence of a hierarchy of 
international human rights norms.'"^^ 
3.2.1. The Barcelona Traction Case 
Nothing in the Barcelona Traction Case was so widely discussed as the reference made 
by the ICJ to the concept of obligations erga omnes. Whilst the Court has often been 
criticised for introducing a notion whose necessity was not required byneither the legal 
issues or the facts of the case,'^ ^ its pivotal contribution to the establishment of this idea 
as a general principle of international law is now generally acknowledged. 
The Barcelona Traction case concerned a complaint filed by Belgium on behalf of 
several Belgian citizens who had been shareholders to the Barcelona Traction company, 
a cornpany registered in Canada, for daniages they suffered at the hands of the Spanish 
'^ ^ Schwarzenberger/1957/459. 
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authorities. Spain based its argument on the ground that the claim was of bilateral nature 
involving Canada and Spain, thus precluding Belgium from any right of action on 
behalf of Canada or the company itself The Court's dictum on erga omnes was 
"provoked" by Spain's reference to the possibility of invocation of state responsibility 
by any state for the commission of an international crime, although finally rejecting that 
this was the case in the present circumstances. The judgment identified two main 
features of the notion of erga omnes: universality in that erga omnes obligations bind all 
states without exception, and solidarity in that every state has a legal interest in their 
protecdon.'^^ It is suggested that the judgment adopts a two-way approach according to 
which the international community recognises certain obligations, although few in 
number, the compliance with and respect for which is the concern of the entire 
international community of states. Yet, it is left to individual states to put into operation 
any enforcement mechanisms due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms by the 
community itself 
According to the famous dictum of the Court: 
An essential distinction should be drawn between obligations of a State towards the international 
conmiunity as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By 
their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, 
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection."' 
The dictum in the Barcelona Traction case came only four years after the ruling of the 
same Court in the South West Africa Case. In that case, as will be discussed below, the 
Court rejected the existence of an actio popularis in international law according to 
which every state would possess a right to bring a claim for violations of international 
law irrespective of whether there had been a violation of an individual interest.^°° As 
already seen, the possibility of third state measures for the infiingement of an 
international obligation is a notion unknown to traditional international law as no state 
can act as a "world policeman". The only state entitled to take action against another 
state is the one that has suffered a wrong, to whom the obligation was owed and whose 
rights have been disregarded. Thus, any state claiming to be injured needs to establish 
Ragazzi/1997/17. 
"* Tomuschat/1993/231. It has been noted that there was also disagreement among states regarding the 
existence of the international community itself, what that represented, which states, and what powers did 
that conmiunity have in the safeguarding of the international legal order. 
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the existence of a subjective legal interest. Whilst the Court distanced itself from an 
absolute application of bilateralism in the Barcelona Traction case, recognizing that all 
states have legal standing to seek compliance whenever the most fiindamental interests 
of the international legal order are at stake, it went on to add in paragraph 91: 
With regard more particularly to human rights, to which reference had already been made in paragraph 34 
of this Judgement, it should be noted that these also include protection against denial of justice. However, 
on the universal level, the instruments which embody human rights do not confer on States the capacity to 
protect the victims of infringements of such rights irrespective of their nationality.^ "' 
It has been suggested that with this passage the Court negatively filtered the erga omnes 
invocation of human rights abuses by imposing an unwanted restriction upon states. I f 
one thinks that in most cases human rights violations occur by the state of nationality of 
the victim, to demand that states respect the nationality rule would be tantamount to 
expecting the violator to protect its own victims. Frowein interpreted the Court's 
approach by noting that: 
Although the relationship between this paragraph and the one on obligations erga omnes is not absolutely 
clear, it would not seem to be correct to interpret the latter as foreclosing the possibility for States to act 
on the basis of obligations erga omnes. This seems to be confirmed by the difference of formulation the 
Court uses as far as human rights are concerned. While the Court explains in the first part that the 'basic 
rights of the human person' form part of those norms which create obligations erga omnes, it refers to the 
wider spectrum of "human rights" in the latter part.^ "^  
The same position is adopted by Professor Koji who identifies two factors creating erga 
omnes obligations: rights which are incorporated in general international law and 
"international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character", the latter of 
which is absent with respect to rights referred to under paragraph 9\?^^ 
De Hoogh attempted to explain this admittedly confusing ruling by observing that the 
"legal interest" is not automatically associated with locus standi or the right to resort to 
countermeasures. On the contrary, there also has to be a right of protection conferred 
upon the~sfafe~ taking action.^ *''* Following a similar line of reasoning Bruno Simma is of 
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the view that "although the terms 'legal interest' and capacity of action {'qualite pour 
agir') are identical, specific international agreements may channel such 'qualite pour 
agir' into appropriate procedures, thereby excluding the possibility of recourse to the 
classical means of self-help under general international law to a certain extent, that is, as 
far as these agreements can be considered self-contained".^°^ He further illustrates his 
point with an example. In particular, when a violation of human rights has occurred this 
usually affects not directly the state but various groups or individuals. However, even in 
these instances, the implementation of this obligation is to be performed by the state 
bound by it. Simma thus seems to suggest that the erga omnes character of an obligation 
is not precluded even in the case where states have agreed for specific requirements to 
be fiilfilled regarding their implementation. This position, concerning the right of third 
states to invoke the liability of the defaulting state by means of judicial remedies finds 
its justification in the consensual character of the international judicial machinery that 
has not been defeated even with the emergence of such norms and obligations such as 
those qualified as jus cogens and erga omnes. It can therefore be concluded that third 
states do not possess an unlimited right to invoke all the remedies recognized to an 
injured state. This is particularly true with respect to the capacity to bring a case before 
the ICJ.^ **^  It is noted in this regard, that the ICJ, when called to determine a specific 
dispute between certain parties, must do so weighing its jurisdictional powers on the 
one hand, and the interests of international community on the other.^ *^ ^ As noted, the 
Court needs to find a balance between preventing parties making claims before it that 
would endanger third states' interests, and not allowing third states to prevent the Court 
from adjudicating issues submitted before it with the consent of the parties before it.^ '^ ** 
It is stressed that despite the ambiguity which arises due to the lack of certain legal 
consequences derived from the violation of obligations erga omnes, either by way of 
proceedings before an international court or tribunal, or even by way of 
countermeasures, the significance of the Barcelona Traction Case as setting a hierarchy 
of norms in international human rights should not be undermined. 
Simma/1994/296. 
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3.2.2. Legal Standing before International Courts for Violations Erga Omnes 
Apart from the fact that international law lacks compulsory enforcement mechanisms 
unless where expressly provided (and therefore the existence of such mechanisms is 
conditioned upon the initial agreement of states), it also lacks compulsory judicial 
jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation and 
implementation of international rules. Consequently, the ICJ does not have jurisdiction 
to look into a case without the consent of all parties concerned, echoing the PCIJ which 
had earlier defined a dispute as a disagreement between two states on issues of law, fact, 
legal views or interests, thus associating proceedings before it with bilateralism.^'^ Due 
to the fact that not all states are always willing to subject a certain dispute to the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ, the ICJ often finds it difficult to look into the substance of the 
questions submitted before it and is hence unable to adjudicate on significant issues of 
international law. Moreover, a dispute may often involve a wider number of subjects 
who may be affected in numerous different ways, either directly and indirectly, and in 
moral, economic, legal, ideological or other terms.^" The matter is of particular interest 
when considering violations of obligations for which all states are deemed to possess an 
interest in their protection. 
Issues related to the notion of obligations erga omnes came to the attention of the ICJ 
some years even before its famous ruling in the Barcelona Traction Case, although the 
actual context of the concept and the legal consequences connected to it remain 
somehow vague and ambiguous to this day. When the UK, France, Italy and Japan 
initiated proceedings against Germany as "interested" Powers for the violation of the 
Treaty of Versailles and in particular of its obligation to allow free and open access to 
the Kiel Canal to the vessels of all nations at peace with Germany, the PCIJ accepted 
their claim on the basis that they all possessed "a clear interest in the execution of the 
provisions relating to the Kiel Canal, since they all possessed fleets and merchant 
vessels flying their respective flags''.^The violation took place when Germany denied 
access to the Canal to a British vessel chartered by a French company that was carrying 
military material to Poland, who at the time was at war with Russia. Germany justified 
its action on the argument that allowing access to the vessel would put its neutrality at 
MavTOma«w/PCIJ/A/1924/l lin Chinkin/1993/15. 
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risk. While one should bear in mind that these states were in any case entitled to raise a 
claim on the basis of express treaty provisions rather than erga omnes claims that "a 
legal interest is deemed to be vested in all States by operation of general international 
law"^'^, the decision does not lack in significance. The Court, in examining Germany's 
entitlement to deny access to the Canal, determined that with the Treaty of Versailles 
the parties wished to establish an "international regime" that would benefit all 
nations.^ 
A similar question regarding the notion of "permanent international interests" was 
raised in the case of the Aaland Islands. The Aaland Islands were offered by Sweden to 
Finland, then still part of Russia, in 1809, but when Russia was defeated in the Crimean 
war, it concluded an agreement with France and Great Britain to demilitarise the 
Islands. This agreement was annexed to the General Peace Treaty signed by Austria, 
France, Great Britain, Turkey, Russia, Sardinia and Prussia. When Finland later gained 
its independence in 1917 a dispute broke out between Finland and Sweden concerning 
inter alia the duty for the demilitarisation of the Islands. Whilst Sweden had not been 
party to the demilitarisation Agreements, the Committee appointed by the Council of 
the League of Nations to examine the dispute concluded that "The Powers have, on 
many occasions since 1815, and especially at the conclusion of peace treaties, tried to 
create true objective law, a real political status the effects of which are felt outside the 
immediate circle of contracting parties."^ 
Furthermore, the Agreements did not establish reciprocal rights, but on the contrary the 
provisions relating to the prohibition of fortification were: 
laid down in European interests. They constituted a special international status relating to military 
considerations, for the Aaland Islands. It follows that until these provisions are duly replaced by others, 
every State interested has the right to insist upon compliance with them. It also follows that any State in 
possession of the Islands must conform to the obligations, binding upon it, arising out of the system of 
demilitarisation established by these provisions.^ '^ 
'^^  Ragazzi/1997/25. 
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However, the duty for demilitarisation had not been set for the benefit of all states 
indistinctiy, but only for those states directly affected by the demilitarisation. 
One of the main issues considered by the ICJ in the dispute between the UK and 
Albania after the explosion within the Albanian territorial waters of mines resulting ino 
the loss of life and damage to British warships, was whether Albania bore responsibility 
for the explosions. It was accepted by all the parties to the dispute that the principles 
endorsed in the Hague Convention No VII I of 18 October 1907 relating to the laying of 
mines, applicable in time of war, reflected principles that constituted a "minimum 
international standard binding at all times on civilised States".^''' As a corollary to it, 
there was a duty to any state laying mines to give notification to international shipping. 
Therefore, the disagreement between the two parties was not one of law but rather one 
of fact: Albania claimed that it was not aware of the mines. The Court concluded that 
Albania must have been aware of the mines whilst stressing that the duty of notification 
established general and well-recognized principles. More specifically, it constituted: 
elementary considerations of humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the 
freedom of maritime communication; and every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to 
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.^ '* 
When Albania refused to comply with the ruling of the ICJ in the Corfu Channel Case, 
and to compensate the UK for damages it incurred as a result of the explosion of the 
mines, a Tripartite Commission established after the end of Second World War and 
consisting of France, the UK and the US decided to grant Albanian gold seized by them 
to the UK. Italy initiated proceedings before the ICJ against France, the US and the UK 
claiming compensation for the expropriation of the Albanian National Bank which 
according to it had been built mainly with the use of Italian capital. The Court however 
declined to examine the case as it would inevitably not only affect Albania's legal 
interests but would constitute the very subject-matter of the proceedings in Albania's 
absence with legally binding implications upon that state. '^^  It is noteworthy to mention 
that had the gold been Albania's, the action of the US and France, as third states, to 
seize it could arguably be justified as a lawful countermeasure in response to Albania's 
^' ^  Corfu/Channel/lCSReps/1949/22. 
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failure to comply with the earlier ruling of the ICJ. Chamey suggests in this regard that 
there is a universal right to assist in the compliance with the judgments of the ICJ.^ *^^  
In the case brought by Nicaragua against the US the ICJ refused to reject the case 
brought before it as inadmissible upon the contention of "indispensable third rights" 
despite the fact that the Court did not deny that the judgment would affect a third state, 
namely El Salvador. The Court attempted to distinguish this case from the Monetary 
Gold case in that, in the latter case, Albania possessed a proprietary interest in the 
subject matter of the dispute. Therefore, the Court refused to indiscriminately dismiss a 
case that involved the rights and legal interests of a third state unless these formed the 
subject-matter of the case.^ '^ It has been argued however that the Court's differentiated 
approach in the Monetary Gold case on the one hand and in the Nicaragua case on the 
other may be explained on the basis of the greater protection afforded at the time to 
proprietary rights as opposed to sovereignty and self-defence.'^ ^^ 
In the Nauru Case concerning compensation claimed by Nauru against Australia for 
damages that the latter allegedly caused during mining activities when it was an 
administering power, the Court dismissed Australia's argument that the ruling of the 
Court would unavoidably have an impact on the UK and New Zealand which were not 
parties to the proceedings but had joint authority with Australia to administer Nauru 
under the Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Nauru. The Court differentiated 
this case from the Monetary Gold Case mentioned above on the ground that Australia's 
responsibility was independent from any responsibility of the UK and New Zealand.^" 
In 1963 an erga omnes claim was raised regarding certain provisions of the Trusteeship 
Agreement for Cameroon established for the purpose of protecting the common 
interests of UN member states. It was therefore asked from the Court to say whether 
each member state possessed a right to action. No answer was given to this crucial 
question as the Court dismissed the action on other grounds.^ '^' 
Chamey/1989/67. 
McaragMfl/Case/lCJReps/1984/431/(88). 
-^ ^ Chinkin/1993/202. 
/VflMrw/ICJReps/1992/261-2. 
Norlhern/Cameroons/lCJRcps/1963. 
77 
In the South West Africa Case which concerned a Mandate concluded in 1920 to protect 
the common interests of the former member states of the League of Nations, the ICJ 
gave rather contradictory ruUngs. In its ruling concerning the preliminary objections the 
Court acknowledged that "the members of the League were understood to have a legal 
right or interest in the observance by the Mandatory of its obligations both toward the 
inhabitants of the Mandated Territory, and toward the League of Nations and its 
Members",^^' and that the only route for the protection of the rights of the people 
protected under the sacred trust was resort to the Court initiated by any member of the 
League, as neither the Council nor the League were entitled to appear before the Court. 
Although the Court avoided any direct reference to the notion of erga omnes 
obligations, it pointed out that the injured entity consisted of people who needed to turn 
to the organized international community for the achievement of the goals of the trust 
and that there existed '"a sacred trust of civilisation' laid upon the League as an 
organized international community and upon its Members".Nevertheless, the Court 
dismissed the case at the second phase on the ground that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked a 
legal right or interest in the issue before the Court.^ ^^ More specifically, the Court, 
examining whether the Mandate created obligations towards other states members to the 
League of Nations individually, held that "the mandatories were to be the agents of the 
League and not of each and every member of it individually" and that the members 
were not considered as being directly concerned with the mandates.^ ^^ The Court even 
stated that the fact that it was recognized that the Mandatory was a "sacred trust of 
civilization" did not strengthen it with a legal effect. As noted, "In order to generate 
legal rights and obligations, it must be given juridical expression and be clothed in legal 
form. The moral ideal must not be conftised with the legal rules intended to give it 
effect. The principle of the "sacred trust" had no residual juridical content which could, 
so far as any particular mandate is concerned, operate per se to give rise to legal rights 
and obligations outside the system as a whole."^^^ 
However, in 1971, one year after its ruling in the Barcelona Traction Case and a few 
years after its ruling in South West Africa Case, the Court was asked to give its Opinion 
regarding the legal consequences of the continuing presence o f South Africa in South 
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West Africa despite a SC resolution in 1970 terminating the mandate. The ICJ held that 
(a) member states were bound not to recognise the lawfulness of South Africa's 
administration of South West Africa, and (b) non-member states should assist the UN in 
its action relating to South West Africa, finding the termination of the mandate as being 
an obligation erga omnes. However, the Court avoids to explain on what grounds a SC 
resolution was binding even upon non-member states to the United Nations, thus having 
an erga omnes effect. Different interpretations have been attempted, including the view 
that the obligations of all states in this particular case derived from an obligation erga 
omnes not to recognise a jus cogens breach. However, this solution is not satisfactory as 
the ICJ made no reference to the concept of jus cogens norms. 
In the East Timor Case, Portugal initiated proceedings before the ICJ against Australia 
arguing that the treaty concluded by the latter with Indonesia concerning the 
exploitation of the natural sources of East Timor, violated both the right of East 
Timorese to self-determination and the subjective right of Portugal as the administrating 
power of East Timor. Furthermore, Portugal complained that Australia's actions 
constituted an infringement of SC resolutions 384 and 389 with which all states were 
called upon to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the right of East 
Timorese to self-determination, and which called upon Indonesia to withdraw its troops 
from the territory of East Timor.^ ^*^ As a consequence, Australia incurred international 
responsibility both towards the East Timorese people but also towards Portugal as well. 
The ICJ, whilst recognising the right of East Timorese to self-determination as having 
an erga omnes character, refused to examine the merits of the case ruling that this would 
unavoidably require it to adjudicate on the lawfulness of the actions of Indonesia, a state 
that was not a party to the proceedings. More specifically, the Court drew a distinction 
between the erga omnes character of a norm and the issue of consent to the jurisdiction 
of the Court.^^' 
Despite the fact that it was not the position of the Court that a third state was not 
entitled to invoke a violation of an erga omnes obligation but solely the fact that its 
ruling would have an impact on a third state that had not consented to its jurisdiction, its 
judgement was widely criticised as preventing the enforcement of such obligations and 
as insisting upon a bilateral approach to the proceedings. It has been argued that since 
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erga omnes obligations by their very nature involve many states, bear legal 
consequences extending beyond a strict bilateral relationship and are owed to the 
international community as a whole, each state ut singuli possesses a legal interest in 
their observance but also, especially in the case of violations of jus cogens norms, a 
duty to do so. Nevertheless, Bruno Simma is of the view that the ruling of the ICJ in 
the East Timor Case, although not adding anything to the concept of obligations erga 
omnes, does not pose a threat to it either. The Court, having accepted that the right to 
self-determination is an obligation erga omnes, retained the doctrine of the 
"indispensable third party" established in the Monetary Gold Case concluding that it 
could not adjudicate a matter in the absence of a state that would be directly affected by 
1'X'X 
such ruling. 
One may observe from the above that the Court has based its conclusions on whether 
the defendant's responsibility could be founded exclusively on its own obligations. As 
noted, only i f a finding relating to the legal interests of a third state was necessary for 
the determination of the responsibility of the defendant, such a third state will be 
regarded an indispensable state and thus preclude the examination of the case by the 
international court. Thus, where the legality of the action of a third state is inseparable 
from the legality of the action of the defendant the Court wil l decline to examine the 
claim before it.^^'* A very interesting point that arises however is what would the 
position of the ICJ be in the East Timor Case had hidonesia accepted the jurisdiction of 
the Court. Would the ICJ be willing to look into the legal issues arising from Portugal's 
application, or would it be unable to find that Portugal possessed a legal standing to 
bring this case before it? Another interesting point raised is what the decision of the 
Court would be i f Portugal had argued that the treaty concluded between Australia and 
Indonesia itself was a violation, either directly or indirectly, of a peremptory norm, 
namely the right of the East Timorese to self-determination? Would Portugal be entitled 
to invoke the invalidity of the treaty or Australia's responsibility before the ICJ? This 
issue is further examined below. It suffices to mention here that Portugal would not be 
able to claim the invalidity of a treaty to which it is not a party, whilst it seems to be the 
posifion of the ICJ that since this issue would require determination of the lawftilness of 
the action of a state not party to its proceedings, it would be prevented from ruling 
against Australia. 
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As characteristically pointed out concerning initiation of legal proceedings before the 
ICJ: 
The existence of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole does not, ipso facto, 
confer on all states the title to initiate litigation for its vindication in case of breach. Nor does the 
existence of that obligation suspend the operation of rules governing the exercise of the Court's 
jurisdiction- such as the Monetary Gold doctrine- in cases where a specific jurisdictional title exists. 
Whether a requisite and effective jurisdictional link exists depends on the circumstances of the 
case Accordingly, if the jurisdictional link in issue is wide enough, an interested state could bring an 
action seeking a declaratory [emphasis added] judgment that another state was in breach of a peremptory 
obligation arising under general international law. For instance, if both states had deposited unrestricted 
declarations under article 36 (2) of the Statute, an action would surely be competent to determine 'the 
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation' 
(subparagraph c). Even such a factual contest, as to whether or not a delict had actually been committed, 
would be sufficient to fulfil the requirement that a dispute exists between the parties which is necessary to 
seize the Court. As the Court reaffirmed in the East Timor case, 'a dispute is a disagreement on a point of 
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties'. 
Erga omnes concerns were also raised in the proceedings initiated by New Zealand and 
Australia against France's atmospheric nuclear tests conducted in the South Pacific 
between 1966 and 1972.^ '^' However, the ICJ did not examine the jurisdiction or the 
merits of the case on the ground that the two countries did not seek a declaration on the 
illegality of nuclear tests under international law, but merely the cessation of the French 
nuclear tests in the South Pacific. In this regard, the Court reached the conclusion that 
certain statements of the French government amounted to a unilateral undertaking of 
ceasing fiirther nuclear tests. In this way the Court avoided adjudicating on a central 
issue regarding the legality or illegality of nuclear tests. 
In other decisions the Court chose a more carefiil approach with respect to erga omnes 
considerations. Furthermore, in the Tehran Hostages Case, although the Court 
highlighted the imperative character of the norms envisaged in the Vierma Convention 
on the Diplomatic and Consular Relations for the international community as a whole, it 
hesitated to say anything that would be in conflict with the traditional bilateral approach 
of international law, consequently restricting the dispute as being between the US as the 
Scobbie/2002/1218-9. 
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injured party and Iran as the defaulting state.^ '^' Also, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court 
refiised to accept that the prohibition of non-intervention had an erga omnes character, 
thus concluding that the US, as a third party, had no right to use force in response to 
armed intervention in another state. In particular the Court concluded that "[the acts of 
which Nicaragua is accused] could not justify countermeasures taken by a third State, 
the United States, and particularly could not justify intervention involving the use of 
force".^^^ 
By contrast, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights reveals that for the 
initiation of proceedings before it, it is not a prerequisite that a state is directly injured 
by a violation of a right under the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
An example of this kind constitutes the inter-state application brought against the 
dictatorship in Greece by Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden in 1967. The 
states above relied on their legal interest in seeing compliance by Greece with the 
international agreement to which they were parties. 
3.2.3. The Scope and Content of Obligations Erga Omnes 
The notion of erga omnes obligations is frequently confused with the notion of jus 
cogens nonns. However, whilst the two notions have many things in common in that 
they both intend to protect interests and values common to all states, and they both 
derive from the need to safeguard certain rules of international law that are not at the 
disposal of any state, they differ in one significant aspect: a jus cogens rule always 
creates obligations erga omnes whereas an erga omnes obligation does not always have 
peremptory character. In this regard, and whilst a jus cogens norm establishes an 
obligation of observance derogation from which is prohibited unless so provided by a 
rule having the same normative effect, erga omnes obligations do not have such a 
strong, compulsory effect. However since the latter create obligations that are owed to 
the international community as a whole and accordingly to all states, derogating from 
such norms is made very difficult. More specifically, in attempting to understand what 
erga omnes rules stand for and what is the practical significance for the holders of the 
equivalent right of qualifying an obligation as such the role of consent is another 
significant concern that comes into play. Accordingly, i f one accepts that erga omnes 
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rules establish obligations empowering all states without exception with a legal interest 
in their performance, it remains to examine what wi l l happen in the event that two or 
more states decide, with a specific agreement, to derogate from such rules. There is no 
doubt that since the obligation is owed to all states, such an agreement would 
unavoidably affect the interests of all the other members of the international community 
that were not included in the pact. It thus seems to be the position that a violation of an 
erga omnes obligation with the consent of some only states is not permitted. 
Consequently, only with the consent of all states to which the obligation is owed will 
any state be entitled to derogate from such obligations, otherwise their violation will 
constitute an internationally wrongful act empowering a state to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoer. I f however, there can be no derogation from an erga 
omnes obligation, the legal effect is identical with that concerning y'w^ cogens norms, 
which brings us to the question as to how these two notions differ. As Professor 
Crawford observes: 
From the Court's reference to the international community as a whole [ICJ in the Barcelona Traction 
case], and from the character of the examples it gave, one can infer that the core cases erga omnes are 
those non-derogable obligations of a general character which arise either directly under general 
international law or under generally accepted multilateral treaties (e.g in the field of human rights). They 
are thus virtually coextensive with peremptory obligations (arising under norms of jus cogens). For if a 
particular obligation can be set aside or displaced as between two States, it is hard to see how that 
obligation is owed to the international community as a whole.^ '^ 
For example when Russia invaded Afghanistan claiming that it had the consent of the 
Afghan government, the General Assembly, in a resolution adopted in 1980, declared 
that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states constituted 
a fundamental principle entailed in the UN Charter, which permitted no violation "on 
any pretext".^ '**' This was justified on the ground that an obligation falling under this 
category is owed towards all states as members of the international community as a 
whole, and therefore its violation is the concern of all unless all states had consented to 
it. As Professor Gaja remarks: 
The fact that an act is considered to be wrongful also in the relations between the injuring State and the 
State specifically injured has little practical meaning so long as the latter State does not put forward any 
Third/Report/Crawford/2000/49/( 106)(a). 
Keesing/1980/30229,30236. 
83 
claim. In order to give the provision in the draft articles a greater significance one would also have to 
assume that no waiver to such a claim is admissible.^ '" 
Nevertheless, the issue of invocation or preclusion of responsibility in the case of 
consent with respect to erga omnes obligations remains unresolved even within the 
context of the 2001 Articles on State responsibility and in particular within article 20. 
At the same time a reasonable question that derives from the notion of obligations erga 
omnes concerns the effect of objection by some members of the international 
community to the creation of an erga omnes obligation. One could argue that once an 
obligation has gained an erga omnes character no state will be able to derogate from it 
unless under the conditions described above. Therefore, in this instance, the answer 
should be looked for at the moment of the creation of an obligation. In other words, one 
could presume that i f a state objects to the creation of an obligation as having an erga 
omnes character, then this rule would never acquire that status. One realizes the dangers 
but also the unsatisfactory conclusions of such an approach. No rule would ever be 
considered as such since it is almost definitely impossible to have absolute unanimity by 
all the components of the international community. Quite the contrary, one would be 
able to argue that the development of erga omnes obligations results from the fact that 
the international community deviates from the traditional consensual structure it has 
until very recently known. The ICJ, in its Barcelona Traction ruling, and on other 
occasions, has failed to elaborate on this and a number of other crucial questions 
concerning the nature of erga omnes obligations and their normative effect, and on the 
requirements necessary for the correct determination that an obligation is owed to the 
international community as a whole. 
In distinguishing between the two notions, jus cogens norms and obligations erga 
omnes, Gaja refers to international rules the violation of which affects only the state or 
states upon which a specific right is vested by the infringed rule and which are entitled 
to just reparation, countermeasures and any other action permitted by international law 
on the one hand; and those which create obligations owed to all states irrespective of a 
direct legal interest on their part such as those entailed in human rights treaties, the 
violation of which constitutes an infringement of the rights of all other parties. The 
significance of this distinction lays on the fact that derogation from obligations falling 
Gaja/1981/296. 
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under the first category is permitted (provided that there is no other interested state) 
whilst the same does not apply for obligations owed to the international community as a 
whole. In this regard, Gaja differentiates the legal consequences to derive from the 
violation of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes and goes on to specify that 
not: 
all the norms imposing obligations towards States irrespective of the existence of a direct interest on their 
part are peremptory norms. The implementation of any treaty derogating from such norms is wrongful, 
but the conclusion of the treaty is not necessarily so. Any action with regard to the validity or legality of 
the treaty is a preventive measure which protects the respect of the obligation, but such an action cannot 
be taken to be required by any norm imposing an obligation of the type now being considered. 
Similarly the ILC, examining the differences between these two notions, stressed that: 
There is at least a diflference in emphasis. While peremptory norms of general international law focus on 
the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the focus of obligations 
to the international community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all States in compliance-
i.e. in terms of the present articles, in being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach.^ ''^  
Although jus cogens and erga omnes overlap, the former entail "elements of 
international public policy" and for this reason they cannot be derogated fi'om.^'*'* It is 
stressed however that it should not be concluded that whenever a rule permits for no 
exceptions it is of a jus cogens character. 
With respect to the invocation of the nullity of a treaty in conflict with a jus cogens 
norm it is the position, also reflected in article 65 of the 1969 VCLT, that only a party to 
such treaty is entitled to invoke its default and claim that the treaty is without legal 
effect. It is noted in this regard that third states, while not entitled to invoke the nullity 
of the treaty or even make a declaration to this effect, may have other means of pressure 
outside the scope of the VCLT against the implementation of the treaty. The entitlement 
to use such other means will derive from the erga omnes character of the obligation 
incorporated in the infiinged jus cogens norm. To this end, the concept of erga omnes 
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obligations becomes a shield for the protection of fundamental principles entailed in the 
jus cogens norms.^ "*' 
Concerning counter-claims brought before the ICJ it has been stressed that a state 
cannot evade its responsibility and cannot justify its own violations of an erga omnes 
obligation on the ground that it responded to a previous wrongful act by another state.'^ '*^  
The issue was raised for the first time in the case brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina 
against Yugoslavia for breaches of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide. Yugoslavia submitted a counter-claim concerning violations of 
the Convention allegedly committed by Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was argued that the 
travaux preparatoires of the Rules of Procedure of the PCIJ reveal a narrow meaning to 
counter-claims within which the rejection of the initial claim is requested in addition to 
other remedies. It operates as a defence to the claim and it is so closely related to that 
claim that it cannot be ignored. From the jurisprudence of both the PCIJ and the ICJ one 
can see that these courts, in their interpretation of counter-claims, have held that their 
purpose was, i f proven genuine, to rebut the initial claim.^ '*^ 
4. The position of the ILC on Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes and the 2001 Articles on 
State responsibilitv 
4.1. State Crimes and Serious Breaches of Peremptory Norms 
When Professor Crawford was appointed as Special Rapporteur for the second reading 
of the draft articles on state responsibility, he favoured the retaining of the distinction 
between primary and secondary norms of international law and placed particular 
emphasis on the latter, as codification of the primary rules would be very difficult to 
achieve due to the innumerable treaty and customary international obligations. '^** He 
further acknowledged that in view of some limited normative hierarchy apparent in 
international law, there exist various forms and degrees of state responsibility in view of 
both the significance of the rules imposing obligations upon states and the seriousness 
of the violation of such rules and that such a distinction should also be reflected in the 
final articles on state responsibility. One of the most contentious areas which faced 
Ragazzi/1997/206. 
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Professor Crawford was faced was the inclusion of draft article 19 recognising state 
crimes. Professor Crawford acknowledged that there existed a deep division among 
states as to the inclusion of the nofion of state crimes in article 19, which as it stood 
made no reference to any specific characteristics which would clearly distinguish delicts 
from crimes, for instance a special system of enforcement or substantive consequences. 
Moreover, article 19 did not specifically define which acts consfituted a crime, but 
merely that a crime "may result" from violations of the obligations referred to under 
paragraph 3, namely: obligations essential for the maintenance of international peace 
and security; self-determination of people; widespread violations of obligations 
essential for the protection of the human being; and the preservation of the human 
environment. At the same time, the determination of whether the commission of a crime 
finally occurred was dependent upon "the rules of international law in force".^ '*^ 
Likewise, Professor Crawford noted that the definition of crime as reflected in that 
article provided for an additional element of gravity which was not always existent in 
the elements of specifically defined internationally wrongful acts. For example, the 
reference to widespread violations of obligations essential for the protection of human 
beings added an additional element that did not exist in the definition of genocide. It is 
not widespread genocide that it is prohibited but genocide. Another criticism of the 
notion related to the legal consequences deriving from the commission of a crime, 
which did not appear in the draft to be distinguishable from the consequences deriving 
as a result of a delict. Furthermore, under draft article 40, following the commission of a 
crime all other states were considered as injured states, and as such are entitled to seek 
reparation and to resort to countermeasures. Professor Crawford was also critical of the 
decision to remove the restrictions placed on the exercise of restitution or satisfaction 
whenever a crime was involved. Nor did the draft articles provide for any special 
procedure for determining whether a crime had been committed or what consequences 
should arise, such proposals having been rejected by the ILC in 1995 and 1996.^ *^^  The 
Special Rapporteur concluded that there existed no judicial practice supporting the 
existence of a distinction between state crimes and delicts, despite the recognition that 
international law consists of different norms which go beyond a strict bilateral 
relationship and which have different hierarchy.^^' He commented that reference to a 
"criminal" element could prove misleading. Taking all of the above into consideration, 
^^ '^  First/Report/Addendum/Crawford/1998/(49). 
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the Special Rapporteur suggested the deletion of article 19, but without prejudice to the 
future development of international law on the matter. 
Instead, Professor Crawford supported the inclusion of a provision on serious breaches 
of peremptory norms, such as aggression, genocide, apartheid and denial of self-
determination, since they "shock the conscience of inankind".^^^ However, this proposal 
also met with the negative reaction of some states which viewed the proposal as a 
remnant of the notion of state crimes. It is noteworthy that nowhere in the articles 
does the ILC attempt to give a definition for jus cogens, relying instead upon article 53 
of the VCLT. This has provoked the view that "the 1969 text defines peremptory norms 
only in terms of their consequences in matters of treaty law, which is not very rational 
from the standpoint of the law of international responsibility: that amounts to saying 
that when a rule renders a conflicting treaty invalid, its breach entails particular 
consequences in matters of responsibility; this is a not very usefial combination of two 
quite distinct branches of law".^ "^* 
Chapter I I I of part two of the articles concluded in 2001, and more particularly articles 
40 and 41, provide for specific consequences arising fi-om serious violations of 
obligations under peremptory norms. It needs to be stressed that not all the breaches of 
jus cogens entail aggravated legal consequences but only those that are of a serious 
nature; in other words those which constitute gross or systematic infringement of such 
norms. However, in this author's opinion, reference to an additional element, that of the 
seriousness of the violation of such norms, imposes an unnecessary legal constraint. 
One would think that the violation of jus cogens norms, irrespective of their intensity, 
would suffice to be serious enough. It may thus be suggested that genocide of a certain 
amount of people is not serious enough. Who determines the seriousness and using 
which criteria? Despite this, with the introduction of article 40 emphasis was placed not 
only on the fact that certain norms are given priority over others, but also on the fact 
that all states have a legal interest in their preservation. It is imperative, i f the distinction 
between serious and less serious violations of international law is to be meaningfiil, to 
attach additional consequences to these violations for which all states are entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. In this context, article 41 sets out the 
specific consequences arising as a result of a serious violation of a peremptory norm. 
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and in particular establishes a duty on states to cooperate to bring to an end the 
wrongftil act by lawfiil means, not to recognize as lawfiil the situation which will result 
from the violation, and not to render aid or assistance to the wrongdoing state.^ "" These 
consequences are additional to the consequences deriving fi-om article 48 concerning 
violations of jus cogens norms that carmot be qualified as serious, and obligations 
established for the collective good either of a group of states or the international 
community as a whole. Commenting on the distinct legal consequences Professor 
Crawford stressed that these should not have a punitive character but merely reflect the 
gravity of the breach as there was a strong position that international law did not permit 
for such punitive element in the law on state responsibility.^^^ Nevertheless, and as will 
be discussed below, article 54 of the 2001 Articles regarding the right of a state other 
than the injured to invoke the responsibility of another state avoids the use of the term 
"countermeasures". Instead, it gives emphasis on "lawful measures", a terminology that 
has sparked divergent interpretations as to its exact meaning and scope, whilst at the 
same time not ruling out future developments in this respect (paragraph 3).^ ^^ In its 
commentary on article 54, the ILC notes that countermeasures by states other than the 
injured state were still very much disputed whilst state practice was "embryonic". 
The action of these states than the injured was rather confined to securing the cessation 
of the breach and reparation on behalf of the injured state or the beneficiaries by other 
means permissible under international law. It was therefore feared that codifying and 
establishing such a right would open Pandora's box, such that powerful states could 
behave in an arbitrary way as the law's executers and enforcers. 
It should be noted that this omission does not appear to reflect the personal view of 
Professor Crawford, who in fact proposed the inclusion of countermeasures in 
protection of general interests in two situations: whenever a state was invited to resort to 
such countermeasures by the state directly injured on the basis and scope of the given 
consent, and, in the absence of an injured state, whenever an obligation owed to the 
international community was infringed.^^^ None of these suggestions however were in 
the end adopted. Despite this, one can see from the final articles and especially from the 
commentaries to articles 22 and 54 that the issue was not intended to be conclusively 
settled. In particular, the commentary to article 22 provides that: 
ILCreport/2001/277. 
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Article 54 leaves open the question whether any State may take measures to ensure compliance with 
certain international obligations in the general interest as distinct from its own individual interest as an 
injured State. While Article 22 does not cover measures taken in such a case to the extent that these do 
not qualify as countermeasures, neither does it exclude that possibility.^ ^" 
Furthermore, article 41 (3) on the consequences to derive as a result of serious breaches 
of peremptory norms provides that it is without prejudice to other consequences which 
may be entailed under international law, suggesting that "international law allows the 
possibility for ('non-injured') states to take countermeasures of general interest 
following breach by any state whatever of an obligation arising under a norm of jus 
cogens.'"^^^ Although it is possible to interpret this provision as suggesting that there 
may be other consequences envisaged under international law in response to serious 
violations of peremptory norms, this is subject to the condition that countermeasures in 
the general interest in particular are recognized under international law. Moreover, 
Professor Alland is of the view that the final articles, and in particular article 54 on 
"lawful measures", do not reconcile with the "saving" remarks concerning 
countermeasures of general interest, made regarding articles 22 and 41 (3). As he points 
out it is quite remarkable why such countermeasures for serious violations of 
peremptory norms were left "outside", i f international law recognizes the existence of 
such a right. Furthermore, he stresses that article 22 can by no means be reconciled with 
article 54: the former article clearly states that it concerns "wrongful acts" of a state, 
whilst the latter speaks about "lawful" measures. According to his interpretation, this is 
a fundamental difference between acts of retortion and countermeasures,^ ^^ and that 
concomitantly, there are substantial reasons to believe that the ILC has precluded, at 
least for the time being, the concept of countermeasures by states other than the injured. 
As he points out with its decision not to include a principle allowing countermeasures 
for the most serious violations of international law, the ILC gave preference to "the 
absence of any consequences for the most serious wrongful acts" as against the 
admittedly "subjectivism of a decentralized response in defence of general interests", 
should institudonal acfion fail.^^^ Yet, one could argue that Professor Alland's 
interpretation does not agree neither with the intention of the ILC, nor with the final 
articles and their commentary. Accordingly, one could also interpret article 54 as a 
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provision that does not, for the time being, incorporate a right to third state 
countermeasures but which does not preclude it either should such a norm permissive of 
third state countermeasures evolve in the future (an interpretation in accordance with the 
commentary of article 22 quoted above). It is also suggested that a countermeasure that 
fulfils the predefined conditions of legality does not constitute an unlawful, but rather a 
lawful measure itself, an interpretation that would enable third state countermeasures to 
fall within the scope of article 54 in the future. 
4.2. The Injured State and States Other than the Injured 
Many states endorsed the recommendation of Professor Crawford for a distinction 
between "injured" and "other" states, in deviation from the position previously reflected 
in the draft articles adopted in first reading. Looking at the question as to which state is 
entitled to invoke the responsibility of another state as an injured state, the ILC noted in 
its commentary to article 42 of the final articles that as such a state is one whose 
individual right has been impaired, or which has been particularly affected by the 
infringement. It is important to point out that article 42 was drafted on the model of 
article 60 of the 1969 VCLT, although the two should not be confiised. Firstly, because 
article 60 applies only in relation to treaties, whilst article 42 concerns any violation of 
international law. Secondly, because article 60 concerns material breach as a ground for 
the suspension or termination of a treaty whilst article 42 is concerned with the 
invocation of responsibility, irrespective of the gravity of the violation.^*''* Accordingly, 
an injured state is the state to which a right is individually owed, or whenever the 
violation of a collective obligation to which it is a party specially affects it, and finally 
whenever the violation of a collective obligation to which it is a party radically changes 
the position of all other states with respect to the further performance of that obligation. 
The latter concerns integral or inter-dependent obligations. 
Article 42 (a) deals with obhgations arising in the context of a bilateral, delictual 
relationship between the state to which an obligation is owed and the state which carries 
the duty not to violate the obligation in question, irrespective of whether such an 
obligation requires a certain act or an omission. This form of relationship is a central 
characteristic of traditional international law: any third state is precluded from bringing 
a claim in case of violation of obligations of this nature. Although this is still the case to 
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a great extent, contemporary international law has moved towards the recognition of 
certain international rules the respect of which lies within the interest of all states, even 
in the cases where there also exists a strictly speaking bilateral relationship. As a 
consequence, the circle of the subjects entitled to invoke the responsibility of a 
defaulting state has expanded significantly. To this extent, it is pointed out that in order 
to escape from conception of international law merely as the basis of many bilateral 
relationships among states, it is also necessary to identify the various subjects of 
international relations, and their role in each case. In other words, in the cases of those 
principles and values that affect the international community as a whole, not all states 
are affected in the same way. Whilst one state may be specifically and materially 
injured, others may have suffered nothing more than a "moral" damage. In the latter 
case their interest comes as a result of the fact that an obligation owed to a group of 
states established for the collective interest (erga omnes partes) or an obligation owed 
to the international community as a whole {erga omnes) has been violated. As Professor 
Crawford notes: 
We cannot make progress in developing the idea of a public international law (rather than a private 
spectre of international law), unless we distinguish between the primary beneficiaries, the right holders, 
and those states with a legal interest in compliance.^ *'' 
This position is now reflected in articles 42 and 48 of the 2001 articles on state 
responsibility. Whilst under article 42 the injured state possesses a right to invoke 
another state's responsibility (defining as injured state only the one affected in its 
subjective rights either because the infringed obligation is owed to it, or because it 
belongs to a group of states to which the obligation is owed, and either that state is 
specially affected by its infringement, or the infringement is of such character as to 
radically change the position of all states to which the obligation is owed), in the case of 
article 48 the state only has a "legal interest" in compliance without necessarily having 
to prove that the obligation is individually owed to it or that it is specially affected by 
the violation.^^^ The differentce in position has legal significance as only the injured 
state is entitled to all the remedies provided under the law on state responsibility: on the 
contrary, non-directly injured states enjoy only limited rights in relation to action they 
may be entitled to against the wrongdoing state.^ ^^ Although it is accepted that there are 
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certain obligations the significance of which concerns a wider spectrum of states, be it a 
group of states or the international community as a whole, the damage suffered by each 
state is not always the same. It will vary according to whether the rule involved an 
obligation owed to a state individually or as a member of a wider group of states. In the 
former case the injury caused is of a more "direct" nature, whilst in the latter case, 
although the legal interest is never disputed, the injury only comes as a result of a rule 
established for the general good. Terms like "directly" and "non-directly injured", and 
"third states" have been frequently used in the literature and the work of the ILC to 
indicate those states whose legal interest is established not in the context of a bilateral 
relationship but in the spectrum of a multilateral relationship bom either within general 
international law or the law of treaties. The ILC in its 2001 Articles chose, in an attempt 
to dissolve the possibility of any misconceptions as to the meaning of such phraseology, 
to refer to "States other than the injured State". 
Article 42 (b) is more controversial as it deals with those cases of international 
conventional rules that create rights and obligations that are "indivisible for all states 
party to the treaty". Under these circumstances, each state member to the treaty bears 
the duty to fu l f i l its obligation towards each other state also party to the agreement. The 
violation of the obligation by one state either specially affects or radically changes the 
position of all other states parties. The latter obligations are integral or interdependent in 
nature, the performance of which is a pre-condition for the fialfilment of the objectives 
set by the treaty. As it has been very characteristically pointed out, the notion of integral 
or interdependent obligations envisaged in the draft articles should be construed 
narrowly so as to cover "obligations which operate in an all-or-nothing fashion, such 
that each state's continued performance of the obligation is in effect conditioned upon 
its performance by each other part".^ ^^ Article 60 of the VCLT which deals with these 
cases provides that any state party is entitled to invoke the material breach and to 
suspend the treaty in question, thus threatening the treaty structure in its entirety. An 
example of obligations of this kind is a disarmament treaty. Here, each state undertakes 
the obligation to reduce its military capability on the assumption that the other states 
members to the agreement will do the same. Breach of such an obligation would 
destabilize the balance aimed to be established by the treaty and would result in the 
for many as another term, although carefully selected by the ILC, for counteimeasures, even for minor 
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radical change of position of every other state part to the treaty. However, human rights 
treaties are not interdependent. On the contrary, "human rights obhgations are 
incremental, and human rights treaties do not operate in an all-or-nothing way".^ *^^  As a 
consequence, a state cannot rely on the infringement committed by another state to 
avoid the implementation of its own obligations regarding the protection of human 
rights. 
On the other hand, article 48 reflects the position that there are certain international 
obligations, either deriving from customary or conventional rules, owed to the 
international community as a whole (genocide is an often cited example) as proclaimed 
in the obiter dictum of the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case, or to a group of states 
established for the protection of a collective interest (this includes regional agreements 
on security, protection of human rights within a specific region, or regional systems 
established for the protection of the environment). The latter provision incorporates 
obligations erga omnes partes, thus obligations created for the protection of a common 
interest, such as those relating to the protection of the environment, the security of a 
system, human rights or the protection of certain peoples. Obligations falling under this 
category differ from obligations the violation of which radically changes the position of 
every state in the treaty in that they "tend to promote extra-state interests, are not of a 
synallagmatic nature and fall outside the interplay of reciprocity. A breach of human 
rights by state A, however serious it may be, in no way changes the position of other 
states regarding compliance with their own obligations in the same area."^ '^ 
Of course, as already pointed out earlier, not all human rights are of such significance so 
as to establish a legal interest to the international community as a whole. 
Under article 48 states are affected by a certain infringement not based on their 
individual capacity but rather because they are members of a group or the international 
community to which the obligation is owed. In the first case, two requirements must be 
met, in particular that the state is a member of that group and that the obligation aims to 
protect a collective interest. The second category concerns obligations owed to the 
internafiorial community as a whole and no flirther requirements need to be satisfied. 
This provision concerns not merely the violation of jus cogens norms but also the 
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violation of erga omnes obligations. The ILC avoided to use the term "legal interests" 
as appears in the Barcelona Traction Case since this would leave no room for 
distinction between the injured states under article 42, and states other than the injured 
under article 48.^ ^^ 
Once the criteria of article 48 are fulfilled, the state invoking the responsibility of the 
wrongdoing state may do so not only by demanding cessation of the internationally 
wrongful act but also by demanding reparation "in the interest of the injured State or of 
the beneficiaries of the obligation breached". This is another indication of moving away 
fi-om the traditional perception of international law as found expression in bilateralism. 
In relation to this it has been argued that to allow a third state not individually affected 
by a breach of this kind to claim reparation when the injured state itself has waived its 
right to do so is without precedence in international law.^ ^^ 
Article 48 reveals the intention of the drafters to expressly deviate from the ruling of the 
ICJ in the South West Africa Case. As already noted, in that case the Court refused to 
examine the claims brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against South AfHca on the ground 
that they lacked a special material interest regarding South Africa's practices over South 
West Africa in violation of the Mandate. Furthermore, the Court rejected that there 
existed an actio popularis in international law or a right of any member of the 
international community to take legal action whenever an issue of public interest was at 
stake."^ 
4.3. The Legal Position of States in the Context of Multilateral Treaties 
It has been mentioned earlier that one of the most distinguishing characteristics of 
bilateralism is that no rights or obligations can be imposed upon a state without its 
consent. This principle, otherwise known as pacta tertiis finds expression in article 34 
of the VCLT 1969. Despite the fact that this article does not permit for any exceptions, 
being in this sense termed in an absolute and inflexible way, it has been argued that the 
recognition of jus cogens norms and the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ regarding 
tHe conflict of a specific tfeafy witli siich norms, have paved the way to exceptions.^''^ 
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Upon realization that international peace and security, respect for human rights and the 
protection of the environment could not be achieved in a bilateral context, states have 
increasingly engaged in the conclusion of multilateral treaties that now form a large part 
of international law. Many of these treaties have been accepted by the majority of states, 
representing and safeguarding in this manner the general interests of the international 
community as a whole. 
Nevertheless, there are certain difficulties arising from multilateral treaties such as the 
identification of the injured party and, consequently, of the party entitled to bring a 
claim for reparation or to resort to countermeasures. The difficulty becomes apparent 
with respect to obligations that do not have a strict bilateral character. Obligations 
arising from multilateral treaties can be distinguished as either bilateral or integral in 
nature. While not the only distinction of obligations that can be identified, this is the 
most important. 
One of the main characteristics of bilateral obligations established by a multilateral 
treaty is that, despite the plurality of states parties to the treaty and the fact that they are 
all bound by the same rules, the treaty creates a bundle of obligations of a bilateral 
character, with one state party being the carrier of the obligation set by the treaty, and 
the other the carrier of the right. It is also noteworthy that such bilateral relationships are 
not necessarily established as between all the parties. An example of a multilateral 
treaty establishing rights and obligations between two states is the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations: once a state accepts to have a foreign diplomatic 
mission within its territory, it is bound to provide the mission all the rights and 
protections provided under the Convention. Thus, only towards the state with which it 
has established diplomatic relations and with which it has exchanged diplomatic 
missions does the state have the obligations under the Convention. Yet, the ICJ in the 
Tehran Case drew attention to the fact that violation of the obligations under diplomatic 
immunities law could be detrimental for the "security and well-being of the complex 
international community .of the present day, to which it is more essential than ever that 
the rules developed to ensure the ordered progress of relations between its members 
should be constantly and scrupulously respected".^ ^^ However, one should not presume 
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by this that any member of the international community would be able to bring a claim 
against Iran for the violation of its obligations under the law of diplomatic immunities 
towards the US. 
The Convention on the Law of the Sea offers another example of a multilateral treaty 
establishing multiple bilateral obligations.^^^ The violation of a bilateral obligation 
contained in a multilateral treaty necessarily has a bilateral character itself, meaning that 
the dispute arises between the two parties actually involved, with the one being the 
author state and the other the injured state. All the other parties to the treaty are not 
affected and thus they are third states to the dispute. As a consequence, i f a violation of 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea occurs concerning the right to innocent passage, 
only the coastal state may bring a claim against the flag state. 
With respect to integral obligations bom in the context of multilateral treaties, these are 
owed to all the parties: the fulfilment and performance towards one state, is fulfilment 
and performance towards all. Similarly, violation of such obligations affects all the 
member states although perhaps in different ways. Examples of treaties establishing 
integral obligations can be found in human rights instruments, treaties on disarmament 
or on the protection of the environment. Their purpose is to protect a common good 
shared by all the parties. As a result of a violation of an integral obligation a collective 
interest suffers. In these cases, the ILC has recognized that each state is an injured party, 
and for this reason entitled to claim reparation, to seek safeguards of non-repetition, to 
cease the wrongful act, to restore the status quo ante where this is possible, or even to 
resort to countermeasures. 
4.4. Circumstances Precluding Wrongfiilness and the Right to Resort to 
Countermeasures 
Professor Crawford, like his predecessors, recognized that the existence of certain 
circumstances precluded the responsibility of a state, thus rendering, for as long as they 
persist, the international obligation inoperative.^^^ Accordingly, the legal obligation 
affected does not cease to exist, like it does in the case of termination of a treaty, nor 
does it cease to have legal effect, even temporarily, as is the case in the suspension of a 
Sachariew/1988/277. 
Second/Report/Crawford/1999/6/(221). 
97 
treaty. Although this wi l l be the subject of fiirther examination in Chapter Three 
regarding self-contained regimes, it suffices to refer here to the words of Fitzmaurice 
according to whom: 
Some of the grounds justifying non-performance of a particular treaty obligation are identical with some 
of those causing or justifying the termination of a treaty. Yet.... the two subjects are quite distinct, if only 
because in the case of termination... the treaty ends altogether, while in the other [case].... it does not in 
general do so, and (if a paradox is permissible) the non-performance is not only justified, but 'looks 
towards' a resumption of performance so soon as the factors causing and justifying the non-performance 
are no longer present.. 
This principle was affirmed in the Rainbow Warrior Arbitration and in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Cases where a distinction was made between the law of treaties on the basis 
of which the force of treaty should be assessed on the one hand, and the law on state 
responsibility on the basis of which the legal consequences and any circumstances 
precluding wrongfiilness should be assessed on the other. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the notion of countermeasures which now appears in 
Chapter I I part three of the final articles. They constitute, according to the ILC, the main 
characteristic of the decentralized character of the international community and they 
aim to restore the legal relationship between the injured state and the wrongdoer. It is 
stressed that they refer to non-armed action and that they must be resorted to only in 
exceptional situations. They must be distinguished from acts of retortion which 
although unfiiendly, are not otherwise unlawful (unlike countermeasures). In relation to 
the latter, Professor Crawford took the view that whilst it is possible to have non-
performance of a synallagmatic obligation by way of countermeasures, reciprocity has a 
more limited application than countermeasures, it is not subject to the same limitations 
and it constitutes a specific response to a particular breach. At the same time, reciprocity 
differs from the suspension of a treaty in that it refers to the same or similar obligation 
which has been infringed and not to the entire treaty like suspension does, and it comes 
as a result not merely of a material breach but in fact, as a result of any breach of any 
rule of international law. It has been concluded by the ILC that countermeasures may 
be reciprocal, but are not necessarily confined to reciprocal measures.^ *" 
Fourth/Report/Fitzmaurice/l959/41 in ibid/7/(224). 
Second/Report/Addendum/Crawford/1999/13/(383). 
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The ILC stressed that countermeasures are instrumental in character and that they come 
as part of the implementation of state responsibility rulesfor the purpose of inducing the 
wrongdoing state to comply with its obligations.Their purpose is limited to inducing 
the wrongdoing state to cease its unlawful conduct and to offer reparation to the injured 
state and for as long as the wrongdoing state is not complying with its obligations. 
Therefore they should not been viewed as punitive measures. Countermeasures must not 
violate obligations towards third, innocent parties and they are not unlimited in scope. 
Rather, they have to comply with the requirement of proportionality and they must be 
reversible in their effects. Likewise, certain obligations, because of their nature, do not 
allow their non-performance by way of countermeasures. 
One of the most disputed aspects of the law on countermeasures was, and still remains, 
the entitlement of third states to resort to countermeasures. The examination of the 
position of Mr Arangio-Ruiz on the matter revealed that countermeasures were open to 
effectively all states, i f an international crime had been committed. Yet, the ILC and 
Professor Crawford, wary of the implications that the recognition of such a general right 
could have in the preservation of the international legal order, decided not to include 
such a right with respect to states other than the injured. The justification given was that 
such right was not supported by state practice which was sparse. Although this issue is 
thoroughly examined in the fourth chapter, it is necessary to outline the main issues of 
concern. Whilst one cannot ignore the driving force behind the ILC's and especially 
Professor Crawford's decision not to include a general right to countermeasures for the 
time being, namely the worry that countermeasures can be used and abused by powerful 
states at the expense of the sovereign rights of other states, a worry deeply shared by 
this author, one can also not overlook the fact that international community itself has 
progressed. It no longer consists of an abstract idea, but rather is a real community, with 
real actors, and structured on real legal principles commonly shared by states. No matter 
how strong the idea of state sovereignty remains in international legal reality, there has 
been an undisputable force according to which certain values must be respected by all, 
even by states that have opposed their development. As already seen, this is reflected in 
the notion of jus cogens norms. In view of the immobility and inflexibility of law 
enforcement in the international legal order as revealed from the primarily political role 
of the SC and also from the unfair power balance within the SC, which often fails to 
stand up and meet its aspirations, it is imperative that the international community finds 
ILCreport/2001/325-6/(3). 
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effective mechanisms to fight international injustices which "shock the conscience of 
mankind". It is not possible in today's world to stay impassive, but also legally 
incapable, when genocide or torture is committed. I f the international community is 
currently unable to agree upon the existence of central mechanisms entitled for the 
implementation and respect of international law, it is suggested, although still with a 
great amount of hesitation, that this gap could be filled with the recognition of an 
entitlement to third states to take countermeasures. Nevertheless, the recognition of such 
a right should only come with the most stringent conditions so as to ensure that 
countermeasures are not turned into a powerful weapon to the detriment of international 
law and subject to manipulation by the existing superpowers. The issue of 
proportionality therefore merits separately examination in the last chapter. 
4.5. Nationality of Claims. Obligations Erga Omnes and Peremptory Norms 
At the same time of widespread acceptance and recognition of the erga omnes character 
of at least the most "basic" fundamental human rights, article 44 (a) of the final articles 
introduces a specific admissibility requirement for the invocation of state responsibility, 
thought by some to stand against the very notion of erga omnes obligations and jus 
cogens norms. More specifically article 44 (a) provides that the responsibility of the 
state cannot be invoked unless in agreement with any applicable rule regarding the 
nationality of claims. This provision has been viewed by some commentators as being 
in conflict with articles 42 and 48 by making it impossible for a state whose nafionals 
are not the victims of a certain violation to act. It was also illustrated in the debates of 
Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection that "Under international law, obligations 
concerning human rights were typically obligations erga omnes. Any State could 
request cessation of the breach, whether the persons affected were its own nationals, 
nationals of the wrongdoing State, or nationals of a third State. Thus, any requirement 
of nationality of claims appeared to be out of place when human rights were 
invoked".^^^ 
Whilst the ILC has commented on article 44 that the question of the nationality of 
clMffir wil l be dealt with within the framework of the ILC's work on diplomatic 
protection, it has been characteristically pointed out that the latter is in apparent conflict 
First/ReportyDugard/2000 and Addendum/2000/145/(422) in Scobbie/2002/1216. 
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with the provisions on state responsibility.^^'' This is due to the fact that diplomatic 
protection requires a link between the national whose rights have been infringed and the 
state exercising protection on their behalf, despite the ILC's conclusion that "diplomatic 
protection [is] not separate from State responsibility; a State acting on behalf of one of 
its nationals [is] nonetheless invoking State responsibility".^^^ 
Notwithstanding the Commentary to Draft Article 1 on Diplomatic Protection, it needs 
to be pointed out that article 44 (a) is subject only to those cases where the requirement 
of nationality of claims is applicable, and therefore not all cases of invocation of state 
responsibility will raise such questions. For example, when the UK complained to the 
US government regarding the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, being 
held in legal limbo since 2001, it put forward the following legal argument: while it 
pointed out that it was entitled to make representations to the US government 
concerning violations of the ICCPR taking place against its own nationals, it could not 
do the same with respect to violations against individuals who although they were 
British residents they did not possess the British nationality. 
5. Conclusion 
Having examined in the first chapter how the work of the ILC concerning the legal 
consequences to derive from the commission of an internationally wrongfiil act has 
progressed, and how different regimes of responsibility may be applicable in accordance 
with the nature of the infringed obligations, this chapter focused on the emergence of 
peremptory norms, obligations erga omnes and community interests in the theory and 
practice of international law. The development of these concepts was however met with 
scepticism as they were regarded by some states and commentators as a tool restrictive 
of the sovereign powers of states, and as being irreconcilable with the "traditional" 
function of international law which is the co-existence of equal state sovereigns without 
the consent of which no norm can evolve. The recognition of these notions raises 
significant questions with respect to the nature of international law as they seem to go 
beyond merely establishing bilateral relations between states. Accordingly, i f 
ihtFriiational law is construed as a minimal legal system consisting of powerful 
sovereigns which are restrained only to the extent they have accepted, then these norms 
Scobbie/2002/1201. 
ILCreport/2000/86/(286). 
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have no place in such a system. I f on the contrary international law is construed to be 
structured on the basis of also collective interests not only owed to, but also binding all 
states and from which no derogation is permitted, then international law seems to 
resemble a constitutional or quasi-constitutional legal order. 
Yet, the examination of these notions is also deemed necessary for the comprehension 
of the emergence of another concept, that of countermeasures taken by states other than 
the injured and which lies at the heart of this research. The recognition of certain norms 
which due to the nature of the rights they protect are fundamental for the protection of 
collective interests, has unavoidably raised questions regarding their implementation in 
the international legal order in the event of their violation. Therefore, a look into the 
content and scope of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes, as these are 
elaborated in the literature, state practice but more specifically the jurisprudence of the 
PCIJ and the ICJ, may reveal the justifiability behind the development of the notion of 
third-state countermeasures. Nevertheless, and as it can be seen from the findings of the 
second chapter, the understanding that a specific norm has a peremptory character or 
that it establishes obligations erga omnes does not automatically establish a right to 
countermeasures by any state, nor a right to bring the case before international judicial 
bodies. 
It was accordingly shown in this chapter that international law consists of norms the 
violation of which does not affect all states in the same way, nor does it entail the same 
legal consequences as it can be reflected from the final articles on the law on state 
responsibility. Having therefore examined the significance of jus cogens norms and 
obligations erga omnes in international law, the attention is next turned to the impact 
that specific legal norms may have on the law on state responsibility and the right to 
resort to countermeasures by way of not performing obligations arising from specific 
legal regimes, in response to violations of jus cogens norms and obligations erga omnes. 
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C H A P T E R 3 
Self-contained Regimes, State Responsibility and the Fragmentation of 
Intemational Law 
1. Introduction 
The incorporation of community interests in the main body of intemational law, as 
elaborated in chapters one and two, has not prevented states from still possessing a 
pivotal role in the formulation of intemational norms. This principle finds its roots on 
the principle of sovereign equality of states which constitutes one of the most 
fiindamental stmctures of the intemational legal order and according to which all states 
are able to establish intemational rules by conferring upon each other rights and 
obligations that possess equal legal value. As has been characteristically noted in this 
regard, "Intemafional law is a law of cooperation, not subordination. Its creation 
depends essentially on the consent of states, be it explicit or only implicit. The lack of 
consent by a given state generally means that it cannot be held subject to the mle in 
question {pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). As a result, since each state is largely its 
own lawmaker, the legal relationship between states varies enormously depending on 
the states concemed." 286 
What is more, states are entitled to enter into specific agreements in deviation from the 
general rules of intemational law, such as the law on state responsibility or the law on 
treaties, and which although may reinforce and strengthen the rights of states, they may 
often create a legal regime that essentially affords states weaker protection. It is 
therefore well established in intemational law that even though such agreements may 
not infringe jus cogens norms (or other intemational obligations unless expressly 
permitted by such agreements or other mles of intemational law), the lex specialis wil l 
prevail over the lex generalis. This is a reflection of the uniqueness and particularity of 
the intemational legal order which differs significantly from national legal systems 
where contracts between individuals are concluded within the general framework of law 
and yet cannot deviate from it. Consequently, and whilst individuals may enter into 
286 Pauwelyii/2001/536. 
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private agreements, they may do so only by giving due regard to the general rules of the 
legal system within which they are operating, such as for instance the rule of good faith 
or the rule of judicial protection by access to courts in the event of a dispute. 
The scope of examination of the present chapter is focused on the relationship between 
lex specialis and lex generalis regimes, and particularly on the position of self-contained 
regimes within the general system of international law viewed from two different 
perspectives. First, whether such self-contained regimes preclude totally or partially the 
application of the general rules on state responsibility for the violation of their rules, 
thus permitting only the remedies expressly provided for by such regimes. Secondly, 
whether a violation of a rule of general international law, for example a violation of a 
jus cogens norm or an obligation erga omnes, may justify countermeasures with the 
suspension or termination of obligations established within such specific regimes. This 
gains particular significance in the context of the World Trade Organization due to the 
rapidly and widely increasing trade areas covered by its Agreements, thus leaving little 
space for the application of countermeasures under general international law. 
However, before looking in depth into the question of the relationship between specific 
and general legal regimes it is necessary to examine the interaction, i f any, between the 
law on state responsibility on the one hand and the law on treaties on the other as both 
constituting lex generalis. 
2. The Relationship Between the Law of Treaties and the Law of State 
Responsibility 
The relationship between the law of treaties and the law of state responsibility was 
thoroughly studied in the dispute that broke out between Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros CaseP^ This case is of great significance because the ICJ 
had the opportunity to adjudicate on three major, but different in nature and scope, 
branches of international law, in particular the law on state responsibility, the law on 
treaties and the law on the protection of the environment, and on a number of significant 
issues arising from them.^ ^* The focus wil l be limited to the findings of the Court 
^" Gabcikovo/Nagymaros/lCJReps/\991. 
Wellens/1998/766. 
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concerning the relationship between the law of treaties and the law of state 
responsibility, with brief reference to the facts of the case under consideration. 
On 16 September 1977 Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered into an agreement for the 
construction and operation of a system of barrage and locks on that part of the Danube 
shared by them as an international river and boundary. The project provided for the 
construction and installation of two hydroelectric power plants on the Hungarian 
Nagymaros sector on the one hand and on the Czechoslovakian Gabcikovo sector on the 
other, and consisted of a large indivisible complex of installations and structures that 
had to be implemented in an integrated and joint manner. In view of increasing 
environmental concerns at a domestic level, the Hungarian Government decided in May 
1989 to suspend and finally abandon the works at the Nagymaros sector, and those 
works at Gabcikovo attributed to it, notwithstanding that, by that time the works at 
Gabcikovo had to a great extent been completed, whereas the works at Nagymaros had 
hardly begun.^^" 
Czechoslovakia reacted strongly to Hungary's decision and called for it to immediately 
resume its obligations under the 1977 Treaty. A marathon of negotiations between the 
two parties to discover a solution ended in deadlock, leading Czechoslovakia to proceed 
with the search for alternative ways to achieve the unilateral implementation of the 1977 
Treaty provisions, more specifically, the adoption in 1991 of an alternative project 
known as "the provisional solution", or otherwise. Variant C. This latter plan provided 
for the diversion of the Danube river within Czechoslovakia's boundaries without 
Hungary's consent. As a result, and before Czechoslovakia proceeded with the actual 
operation of Variant C, in 1992 Hungary announced the termination of the 1977 Treaty 
existing between the two countries. Czechoslovakia then intensified its efforts for the 
damming of the Danube, a work that was finally completed a few months after 
Hungary's denunciation of the Treaty, and which resulted in a significant reduction in 
the water flow and in the downstream waters of the river"^ '^. 
Notwithstanding the fact that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia were not legally bound 
by the provisions of the 1969 VCLT at the time they signed the 1977 Treaty, it is 
Treaty Concerning the Constraction and Operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks of 
16 September 1977. 
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common ground today that certain provisions of the Convention, and especially the 
rules relating to the termination and suspension of treaties as are expressed in articles 
60-62 of the Convention, reflect and codify existing rules of customary international 
law. As such, and noting that the 1977 Treaty lacked any provision concerning the 
termination, denunciation or withdrawal from the treaty, the Court held that the conduct 
of the two parties should be evaluated under the scope of articles 60-62 of the VCLT 
and insofar as these articles were expressive of customary rules on the one hand, and 
under the law of state responsibility on the other. 
Having determined that Hungary's unwillingness to comply with some of its treaty 
obligations unavoidably rendered the accomplishment of the project impossible,^^^ the 
Court examined Hungary's submission that reasons of ecological necessity had forced it 
to initially suspend and abandon certain works of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project 
and finally terminate its treaty with Czechoslovakia. In this regard, the Court held that 
this ground should be viewed under the scope of the law of state responsibility 
according to which necessity, i f proven as existent, would preclude the responsibility of 
the defaulting state on the international plane. Nevertheless, since this ground was 
invoked in an attempt to justify the suspension and termination of a certain treaty, 
reference to the law of treaties was unavoidable. 
Concerned about a possible misconception between the two branches of international 
law when evaluating the legality of the suspension or termination of a freaty as in the 
present case, the Court wished to draw a distinguishing line between the law of treaties 
and the law on state responsibility. In this respect, the Court noted that whilst the law of 
treaties determines, inter alia, whether a treaty is in force and the grounds on which a 
freaty may lawfiilly and validly be suspended or terminated, the law of state 
responsibility evaluates the extent to which the suspension or termination of an 
international agreement in violation of the law of treaties gives rise to the responsibility 
of the state concerned, and determines the legal consequences of the unlawful and 
invalid suspension or termination of the treaty, provided that the states have not 
agreed otherwise. In other words, "while once conduct incompatible with the law of 
treaties has been established, potential ensuing responsibility should be assessed 
-'^ Gabcikovo/Nagymarosl\CmQ^.I\991l(A?,). 
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according to the law on state responsibility".^^'* As the Court held, this position seems to 
also be compatible with article 73 of the 1969 VCLT according to which "the 
provisions of the present Convention shall not prejudge any question that may arise in 
regard to a treaty from a succession of States or from the intemational responsibility of 
a State or from the outbreak of hostilities between States". While the 1969 VCLT is 
concemed with the genesis of a treaty obligation, its very existence, content and its 
subjects, it does not provide mles conceming compliance with it. Rather, the issue of 
conformity with customary or conventional mles is covered by the general mles on state 
responsibility. As Mr Crawford concludes the ILC articles on state responsibility 
provide "the general secondary law of intemational obligations, in the same way that the 
Vienna Convention provides the general secondary law of treaties."^^^ 
Against this background and with respect to Hungary's claim for the existence of 
environmental necessity, the Court highlighted that necessity, falling within the scope of 
state responsibility, could not validly be invoked as a reason for the suspension or 
termination of the 1977 Treaty. In this regard, the Court stressed that a treaty may only 
be terminated or suspended for one of the reasons referred to in articles 60-62 
mentioned above, namely for material breach, impossibility of performance or 
fundamental change of circumstances.^^^ According to the Court, these articles provide 
an exhaustive list of the circumstances under which a treaty may be lawfully terminated 
or suspended. Thus, the Court was concemed that possible acceptance of additional 
grounds for the lawful suspension and termination of treaties other than those already 
provided would put at risk "the security of treaty regimes".Consequently, Hungary 
could not invoke necessity as a ground for the termination or even suspension of the 
1977 Treaty, and as a result, this ground was dismissed. As pointed out, a justified 
invocation of a state of necessity could be used as a ground for precluding the 
wrongfulness of a state for the temporary non-performance of its treaty obligations and 
for as long as the state of necessity existed, but it could not be used as a ground for the 
unilateral suspension or termination of the treaty. Accordingly, the only effect that 
necessity may have is that it makes the treaty ineffective and "dormant, but - unless the 
parties by mutual agreement terminate the Treaty- it continues to exist. As soon as the 
state of necessity ceases to exist, the duty to comply with treaty obligations revives".^^^ 
Wellens/1998/768. 
Crawford/2000. 
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Accordingly, although non-performance of a treaty obligation may look like suspension, 
it is not. 
What the Court actually held in relation to Hungary's invocation of necessity was that 
this ground could not justify a lawful suspension or terminafion of the treaty due to the 
limited grounds recognised in international law for this purpose. However, i f Hungary 
proved that indeed such a state of necessity existed, then its conduct to suspend certain 
works of the project could be justified under the state of necessity as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfiilness for failing to comply with its treaty obligations to construct 
and operate the barrage and locks system. As a consequence, Hungary would still be 
legally bound to perform its treaty obligations as soon as the state of necessity ceased to 
exist.^ ^^ The difference between the suspension and terminafion of a treaty on the one 
hand, and the non-performance of certain treaty obligations on the other, lies exactly 
within the fact that in the former case, the treaty ceases to have legal effects and to be in 
force, whereas in the case of non-performance the treaty remains legally binding on all 
the parties involved that still have to resume their obligations as soon as the ground 
precluding wrongfulness vanishes. As Professor Crawford noted on the matter, the 
existence of circumstances precluding the international responsibility of a state, such as 
necessity or countermeasures, render, for as long as they persist, the international 
obligation inoperative.^"" Yet, the obligation does not cease to exist, a point that has 
often been highlighted as of great significance. In the words of Fitzmaurice: 
Some of the grounds justifying non-performance of a particular treaty obligation are identical with some 
of those causing or justifying the termination of a treaty. Yet....the two subjects are quite distinct, if only 
because in the case of termination...the treaty ends altogether, while in the other [case]....it does not in 
general do so, and (if a paradox is permissible) the non-performance is not only justified, but 'looks 
towards' a resumption of performance so soon as the factors causing and justifying the non-performance 
are no longer present... 
ZoUer observes in this regard that whilst suspension or termination have as a result the 
cessation of the legal effects of the treaty (and in the case of suspension for as long as 
this situation is persistent), non-performance does not result to the same effect. She 
illustrates this difference with an example. Accordingly, whenever a treaty is suspended 
^''lbid/(101). 
™^ Second/Report/Addendum/Crawford/1999/(222). 
Fourth/Report/Fitzmaurice/l959/41 in Second/Report/Addendum/Crawford/1999/(224). 
108 
the interest stops running, whilst in non-performance the interest continues to be 
calculated.^"^ 
Moreover, it has been very characteristically pointed out that: 
by confirming that the consequences of illegal termination, and in particular whether they could be 
excused, had to be determined by reference to the law of State Responsibility, the judgment implicitly 
lays to rest some of the arguments that had been advanced in the literature that States parties to the 
Vienna Convention had forfeited the right to rely on the broader excuses precluding wrongfulness under 
the law of state responsibility.^"' 
In addition to the above, Zoller is of the view that the 1969 VCLT has not abrogated 
customary international law, and consequently, principles of international law existing 
outside a certain treaty may be legitimately invoked in the form of retaliatory measures, 
such as for example the temporary dispensation of the obligations arising from the said 
treaty^"" 
At the same time it has been argued that the law of treaties and the law of state 
responsibility, although different in nature and different in scope, are not completely 
unrelated. More specifically, it has been noted that "the inherent systematic logic of 
international law requires that the distinct scope of different branches of international 
law should not be used in a counterproductive way, especially not when their raison 
d'etre is not in the first place (or not at all) to be found in providing primary rules, but 
on the contrary, to consist of rules which are above all, of the utmost importance for the 
overall fianctioning of international law".^ *^ ^ In this regard it has also been argued that 
the Court should follow an integrative approach in relation to these different branches of 
law and that such an attempt should not be rendered impossible by the mere existence of 
article 73 of the VCLT. In support of this position it has been pointed out that often 
states try to justify the breach of their international obligations on the basis of 
circumstances precluding wrongfiilness arising both from the law of treaties and the law 
of state responsibility.^"^ According to this view, it seems that it is not really possible to 
separate the law of treaties from the law of state responsibility. With this in mind: 
Zoller/1984/89. 
Evans/1998/692. 
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the law on State responsibility not only 'touches and interacts' with other branches of general 
international law, but constitutes the decisive body of rules governing non-compliance with any other 
legal obligation, and thus 'permeates' all sets of general, conventional and customary primary rules. The 
law on state responsibility occupies a quasi-constitutional place in the international legal order ™' 
Furthermore, the fact that two (or more) states decide to conclude a treaty means that 
this treaty will apply in their relations as lex specialis, regulating their rights and their 
obligations. Nevertheless, the existence of a treaty between two parties does not exclude 
the application of other branches of international law. As the ICJ held in its 1971 
Namibia Opinion, "an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within 
the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation.. .the 
corpus iuris gentium has been considerably enriched, and this the Court, i f it is 
faithfully to discharge its functions, may not ignore". This is further explored below. 
According to some authors, the decision of the Court to adopt a strict interpretation in 
relation to the grounds allowed for the suspension or termination of a treaty sacrificed 
"substantive justice" over "legal security" as the former may call for the possibility to 
introduce new grounds under which a treaty may be suspended or terminated other than 
those already provided in articles 60-62 of the Convention. As the supporters of this 
opinion argue, this becomes even more compelling in cases where the continuance of a 
treaty imposes a particularly heavy burden upon the treaty parties.^ '''^  
3. Lex Specialis, Self-contained Regimes and General International Law 
Now that the interrelation of the law on state responsibility and the law on treaties has been 
clarified, it is imperative to examine the interrelation between the law on state 
responsibility and the law on treaties as leges generales on the one hand and specific legal 
regimes on the other. It has already been pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that 
what is specifically agreed upon by states wil l prevail over general rules of international 
law. This is particularly true in relation to obligations established by treaties, although it 
should be stressed that even a special custom could prevail over a general rule established 
by treaty.^'" It has therefore long been recognized that states when entering into agreements 
may choose to specify the legal conseqiaences to derive from the infringement of their 
obligations under such agreements, or even to set up their own dispute settlement 
Ibid/794. 
ICJReps/1971/31-32/(53). 
Reichert/Facilides/1998/842; Evans/1998/692. 
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procedures and establish their own enforcement mechanisms, even in derogation from the 
general rules not only of the law on treaties concerning the suspension and termination of 
treaties, but also from the general rules of the international responsibility of states. 
Therefore, these specific regimes, irrespective of whether customary or conventional, often 
complement, substitute or depart from general provisions.^" The lex specialis maxim has 
its roots on the widely consensual structure of international law and on the fact that general 
international law is "dispositive", construed as meaning that it can largely be derogated 
from.^'^ The lex specialis has also been used as a means for the resolution of norm 
conflicts.^'^ 
At the same time it needs to be pointed out that international law consists of several general 
and specific legal regimes establishing certain rights and imposing specific obligations 
which often are independent from one another and which stand autonomously in the 
international legal order. While the norms of these separate legal regimes frequently 
interact and seem to be complementary, sometimes they collide. The current state of 
international law recognizes certain rules for the resolution of such conflicts, such as the 
principle that the lex specialis prevails over the lex generalis or that the norm formulated at 
a later stage wil l replace the previous rule. Yet, there is little said about the possible dangers 
from conflicts arising with respect to irreconcilable nornis of international law belonging to 
different legal regimes. 
Mr Riphagen, having concluded that international law is separated between various 
interrelated subsystems in accordance to the Sanction that each one of them fiilfils, 
pointed out that a treaty may establish a distinctive subsystem with its own secondary 
rules to be set in motion whenever its provisions are infiinged by any of the parties and 
which carmot be overruled by other subsystems. He stressed at the same time that the 
existence of such a treaty subsystem did not preclude the application of the rules of 
customary international law regarding the international responsibility of states. This is 
so because the treaty subsystem may itself collapse, "in which case a fall-back on 
another subsystem may be unavoidable." '^"* On the same footing the Study Group 
looking at the question of fragmentation of international law discussed further below, 
described general international law as "omnipresent" existing behind special rules and 
^" Pellet/2001/56. 
'^^  ILCreport/2004/286/(309). 
'^^  Ibid/285/(305). 
Third/Report/Riphagen/1982/30-31/(54). 
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regimes.^Nevertheless, "the interrelationship between the subsystems may be 
complicated by the fact that a particular set of actual circumstances may be relevant for 
more than one subsystem. Here the measure of organization of the relationship becomes 
particularly important: i f it is not possible to allocate the situation to one or the other 
system, the more organized system prevails until it fails as such."^'^ Whilst it is possible 
that the same wrongful act violates rules belonging to different subsystems, and 
therefore a combination between these subsystems and their legal consequences may be 
unavoidable,^'^ difficulty seems to arise whenever a specific conduct is lawful under a 
certain legal regime, or sub-system, and unlawful under another. It is to the inter-
relationship of the various legal systems existent in the international arena that the 
attention is next turned, with particular emphasis given to the implementation of 
countermeasures under the general law on state responsibility within specific, or self-
contained, regimes. The question gains particular interest concerning the relationship 
between public international law and the WTO: are the two to be viewed as two distinct 
spheres of international law with no interaction between them? Or are they to be viewed 
as complementing each other whenever possible? 
But first, what does one mean by "self-contained" regimes? 
The term, which is understood to express a subcategory of lex specialis/^^ appeared in 
the ruling of the ICJ in the dispute that broke out between the US and Iran in relation to 
the seizure of the US embassy and its diplomatic and consular staff in Teheran. In the 
proceedings initiated by the US before the Court, the Iranian government tried to defend 
itself and justify the events in the embassy by relying on alleged previous interventions 
in Iranian internal affairs by the US, such as the latter's involvement in the coup d'etat 
of 1953 and the overthrow of the lawfiil national government. Nevertheless, the Court 
rejected this argument by stressing that no countermeasures were permissible in the 
field of diplomatic relations for the violation of the same kind, apart from those 
provided for by diplomatic law itself and in particular that of declaring a diplomat or a 
consular official as persona non grata, the breaking off of the diplomatic relations and 
the closure of the mission. More specifically the Court detennined that whilst there is an 
obligation under general international law for the sending state to respect the laws and 
^''lLCreport/2004/287/(311). 
'^^  Third/Report/Riphagen/l 982/30-31/(54). 
ibid/32/(69). 
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regulations of the receiving state and not to interfere in its domestic affairs, the violation 
of these obligations does not justify a similar response in disregard of the privileges and 
immunities accorded by diplomatic law by the receiving/injured state. According to the 
Court 
[t]he rules of diplomatic law, in short, constitute a self-contained regime which, on the one hand, lays 
down the receiving State's obligations regarding the facilities, privileges and immunities to be accorded 
to diplomatic missions and, on the other, foresees their possible abuse by members of the mission and 
specifies the means at the disposal of the receiving State to counter any such abuse. These means are by 
their very nature, entirely efficacious.'" 
According to the classical perception of international law from where the notion of 
"self-contained" regimes seems to derive, a regime is autonomous from international 
law i f it meets two conditions: first, that its norms should not be applied or relied upon 
by other institutions existing outside the regime, and secondly that it is "self-sufficient" 
in the sense that it does not need to rely upon any other rules apart from the ones 
incorporated in it 320 
The term appeared also in the work of the ILC on the codification of the law on state 
responsibility. More specifically, Mr Riphagen, who often uses the terms self-contained 
and objective regimes or sub-systems in parallel, made a distinction between general 
consequences of internationally wrongful acts and those included within special 
regimes. The lex specialis would prevail over the lex generalis, leaving only a residual 
role for the latter, meaning that in the event that the sub-system collapses or does not 
contain an adequate regime of legal consequences, the general rules will take over.^^' 
With respect to whether the right to countermeasures will be suspended it has been 
noted, that the provisions on state responsibility are applicable to every internationally 
wrongful act "except to the extent that the legal consequences of such a breach are 
prescribed by the rule or rules of international law establishing the obligation or by 
other applicable rules of international law."^^^ Simma is also of the view that a self-
contained regime is one that precludes "more or less totally the application of the 
general legal consequences of wrongful acts, in particular the application of the 
Teheran/Hostages/lCJReps/mOBS. 
Melescanu. 
In Simma/1985/116. 
Preliminary/Report/Riphagen/1980/128-9. 
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countermeasures normally at the disposal of an injured party".^^^ I f this is the case, then 
the need to narrow down as much as possible the existence of such regimes becomes 
apparent as the enforcement of international law would otherwise be severely 
jeopardized, especially with respect to violations that do not fall within the scope of 
these specific regimes. Thus, the need to resort to unilateral measures provided by 
general international law becomes even more pressing in the event that the wrongdoer 
fails to comply with the decisions of the institutions provided under the "special 
regime", or where the violation persists despite the initiation of the regime's 
proceedings. In such an event it is argued by Mr Arangio-Ruiz that the injured state wi l l 
be able to resort to action permitted under international law in order to secure and 
protect its rights. Nevertheless, he highlights that such "external" measures not provided 
under the regime should be regarded as exceptional and to be only directed against 
wrongfial acts of such gravity that put in danger principles highly valued.^ "^* Due to 
these considerations, Mr Arangio-Ruiz, adopting a different line from the former 
Special Rapporteur Mr Riphagen, preferred not to include in the draft articles "special" 
restrictions on measures affecting obligations deriving from self-contained regimes. The 
general principles applicable to all unilateral measures should be able to resolve any 
issue to be arisen from treaties establishing "self-contained" regimes. He accordingly 
disagreed with the adoption of draft article 2 of part two as it seemed to exclude the 
application of the provisions regarding the consequences of an internationally wrongfiil 
act, whenever the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act were 
determined by other rules of international law.^ ^^ He justified this on the ground that 
states, by introducing such special regimes aimed not to diminish the already existing 
mechanisms of protection, but rather to reinforce them. 
It was fiirther suggested that the term "self-contained regimes" was imprecise as no 
regime could be seen in isolation from general international law as firstly the latter plays 
a determinative normative role in the creation of such regimes and secondly it becomes 
active again whenever the special regime collapses.^ '^ ^ Professor Dupuy supports the 
view that the doctrine about self-contained regimes is misleading.^^^ Okafor-Obasi adds 
that a self-contained regime is a system created by a group of sovereign states in terms 
of fiiU equality, and which provides its own rules concerning implementation. 
Simma/1985/l 17 (emphasis added). Also Bartels/2002/394/fhl60. 
Fourth/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1992/41/(l 16). 
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enforcement and other remedies. Due however to the equality of treaty and customary 
norms, states may resort to measures provided under either field, namely conventional 
or customary international law in order to remedy a violation. Even more so, a state may 
eventually resort to general international law i f such system fails. For these reasons, no 
system under international law can genuinely be regarded as "self-sustained". 
3.1. The Quesfion of Application of General Rules of International Law Within Self-
contained Regimes 
Simma, in a very interesting article published in 1985, examines this question in the 
spectrum of three possible examples of self-contained regimes: the law on diplomatic 
immunities, the European Economic Community, and human rights treaties. 
3.1.1. The Law on Diplomatic Immunities 
Here Simma is not convinced with the conclusion of the ICJ in the Teheran Case 
according to which an infringement of the diplomatic privileges and immunities cannot 
be cured with the infringement by the injured party of the same rules because after all, 
as he points out, diplomatic law is all about reciprocity. Nevertheless, even i f one were 
to accept that the regime on diplomatic immunities does not allow for their violation 
even by way of countermeasures in response to a similar breach, for reasons that 
according to Simma still need to be clearly explained, nothing can preclude 
countermeasures in the form of suspension of obligations in other fields. Thus, 
diplomatic law can be conceived of as a self-contained regime only in a very narrow 
sense, as it does not preclude the application of other special remedies but only imposes 
certain limitations ratione personae and ratione materiae?^^ As a result, even a 
violation of the diplomatic immunities would entitle the injured state to resort to 
countermeasures insofar as they are limited by the principle of proportionality and do 
not violate norms of jus cogens character or humanitarian obligations.^ ^*^ 
Okafor/Obasi/2003/36. 
Simma/1985/121. 
Ibid/120-1; Also comment by Reuter/YILC/1984/264/(30); Zemanek/1987/40. 
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3.1.2. The EU 
It is a common posidon today that the law under the EU, especially under the 
Community pillar, is an autonomous legal order that arguably establishes a self-
contained regime with its own effective and sufficient judicial, and to some extent 
enforcement, mechanisms to deal with violations (see for example the powers of the 
Commission under articles 226-228 EC Treaty and the suspension measures against the 
member state which fails to comply with its Community obligations under article 7 of 
the Treaty on European Union)."' Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has itself 
rejected a right "on the part of member States from taking jusfice into their own hands" 
by not fulfilling their own Community obligations.^^^ More specifically it has been the 
persistent position of the ECJ that the member states have forfeited their right to take 
unilateral measures under general international law.^ ^^ Despite these two points, the EC 
Treaty does not cease to constitute a treaty under international law. Thus, the 
applicability of the general rules of international law on state responsibility and the rules 
on the law of treaties cannot be entirely precluded even with the express wil l of the 
member states participating in the Community structure. This will gain particular 
significance in the event, no matter how hypothetical at the moment, that this structure 
collapses or its own remedies are inadequate to respond to persistent violations of the 
Community law. Accordingly, there are authors who support the view that the faculte of 
states to resort to countermeasures under general international law remains i f the EEC 
machinery has been used to no avail. As noted, "Through such a fundamental change of 
circumstances any treaty system excluding the applicability of certain general legal 
consequences and/or countermeasures will fall back on the general regime.""'' 
As further pointed out by Mr Arangio-Ruiz it should not be concluded that whenever a 
state avails itself of remedies in the context of such self-contained regimes, it abandons 
once and for all its rights and faculties of unilateral reaction under general international 
law. Although it will have a duty first and foremost to use the means awarded to it by 
the specific regime, it wil l still be entitled to utilise the measures provided under general 
international law, the extent of which will be determined on the basis of "availability 
Article 7 (ex Article F. l ) of TEU. 
See Commission/Luxembourg and Commission/Belgium/Cases/1964/\22,2. 
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and effectiveness of the remedies envisaged by the treaty-based 'regime'".^^^ He takes 
the position that the EEC has many general international law features itself, consisting 
of many international legal relationships among the member states and the community 
and largely depending on reciprocity. In addition it is subject to general international 
law rules such as the law on state responsibility.''^^ It would thus seem peculiar, at least 
from an international law point of view, for a member state not to be able to withdraw 
from the community. For this reason Mr Arangio-Ruiz concludes that the EEC is not 
really a self-contained regime, at least not in relation to the right to countermeasures as 
preserved by international law. Thus, it would be unjustified not to recognize such 
remedies, especially in the event of failure of the community mechanism to resolve the 
dispute.^ ^^ Consequently, general international law in relation to legal consequences is 
not entirely precluded from applying at a Community level, at least whenever all the 
other remedies provided for by the system have been exhausted without success. 
The fact that the European Treaties are not to be read in isolation of general 
international law is further reflected in Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union 
which now falls within the jurisdiction of the ECJ. More particularly, article 6 (1) 
provides that "The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States". Paragraph 2 of the same article goes on to add that "the 
Union shall respect fiindamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, as general principles of Community law". The significance of this 
provision, especially of paragraph 1, is further reflected in article 7 TEU, which 
provides that i f the principles covered under paragraph 1 are infringed by any member 
state then the Council may decide to suspend some of the rights deriving from the TEU. 
Whilst this for some arguably enhances the "self-contaiimient" of the Community legal 
order, it has been observed that the connotation of article 7 with article 6 (1) in 
particular is of great significance since it reveals that the action taken by member states 
is not monitored "solely within the context of Community law, but against the broader 
background of international human rights principles".^''^ 
Fourth/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/1992/40/(114). 
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The problem of course arises when the Community institutions are unwilling to take 
action against a member state that violates these fundamental principles established 
under general international law. According to a narrow interpretation which prohibits 
countermeasures other than those, and for the reasons established by the Community 
Treaties as a lex specialis regime, no action will be able to be undertaken with the 
suspension of the obligations arising under these Treaties. If, on the contrary, it is 
accepted that the general law on countermeasures is applicable in parallel to such 
regimes, as this is the exact purpose of countermeasures in the first place it may be 
argued that there is nothing to prevent the suspension even of Community obligations 
(apart from the Community treaties themselves). Furthermore, i f one accepts that a 
member state of the EU may suspend its obligations arising from the Community 
towards a third state, like the UK did in 1982 towards Argentina, then the question is 
raised on what legal ground similar action towards a member state would be prohibited. 
Had the UK been justified in suspending its obligations arising out of the Community 
towards Argentina because of a violation that did not fall within the Community context 
but rather outside it (use of force), then the argument of those supporting that self-
contained regimes prohibit the application of countermeasures unless so provided by 
this regime, weakens significantly. The other member states of the European 
Communities did not seem to protest at the time that the UK action against Argentina 
was in violation of its Community obligations, as a regime lex specialis and which for 
this reason would prevail over a general right to countermeasures under general 
international law. To expect from a state which participates in a specific group of states, 
such as the EU, and has undertaken certain freaty commitments to another state, 
whether a member state or not, to comply with its obligations just because this treaty 
regime provides only for specific and limited grounds of non-performance or 
suspension (which in both cases it would relate to violations of the obligations arisen 
under this regime only) would amount to imposing a duty to the injured state to trade 
with the occupier of its territory and with the violator of its rights. 
Finally, the intrusion of general international law, including customary rules, into 
Community law could not be more clearly indicated than in the Racke Case.^'^^ In this 
case, which is examined in detail in Chapter 4, the ECJ relied on the customary rule of 
fundamental change of circumstances to justify a Community regulation which was in 
Racke/\99m655. 
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violation of the 1983 Agreement concluded between the EEC and the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. 
3.1.3. Human Rights Treaties 
It must be said here that whilst certain human rights treaties may provide adequate 
enforcement mechanisms to remedy any violations, and the European Convention on 
Human Rights offers such an example, most treaties, especially those in the UN context, 
lack a compulsory sanctioning or enforcement mechanism thus leaving their 
implementation to the discretion of member states for so long as compliance best serves 
their interests. However, even within the EConv.HR, countermeasures are precluded as 
the Convention creates a series of objective obligations.^ "^^ The relevant question one 
needs to address is whether the violation of such rules permits the application of legal 
consequences that fall outside the closed "circuit" of self-contained regimes existing in 
the law on state responsibility, or whether their qualification as self-contained regimes 
keeps them distant and autonomous from the rules on state responsibility. Simma is of 
the view that i f the mechanisms provided in such specific regimes, which have to be 
given priority, have been exhausted without the compliance of the violating state, then 
the rules on state responsibility wi l l come into play to fill the legal gap. He says in this 
regard: 
It has yet to be proved that such a "decoupling" of human rights treaties from the enforcement processes 
of general international law was actually intended by the negotiating States. As long as such proof is not 
furnished one has to stick to the premise that multilateral treaties for the protection of human rights, like 
all other treaties, embody correlative rights and duties between the contracting parties ut singuli, resulting 
in a duty on each party to fiilfill its obligations vis-a-vis all the others, and conversely, in a right for each 
party to demand compliance from every other party and, if necessary, to enforce it through 
countermeasures. 341 
The above coincides with the view that the international legal order is still largely a 
consent-built one, therefore making it very difficult to justify preference or prevalence 
of the general rules of international law over the express agreement of states insofar as 
norms other than jus cogens and obligations erga omnes are concerned. Nevertheless, i f 
under a specific legal regime there is no provision for specific remedies, then the rules 
^^'^ Pfundersl\96\l\16. 
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of general international law will once again take over.^ '*^ It can be said in this respect 
that a specific rule does not extinguish the general rule but rather makes it 
"temporarily", and in so long there is agreement to, ineffective. It suspends its effects 
but only for as long as the special rule has not successfially being challenged or 
disputed. It was in this context that the PCIJ ruled in the Chorzow Factories Case that 
the omission of the parties to a specific convention to include an obligation to make 
reparation in the event of an infringement did not preclude such right which it described 
as a "principle of international law". It went further to add that "Reparation therefore, is 
the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself "^ "^ ^ 
A similar approach was adopted in the South Africa Advisory Opinion where the ICJ 
held that in relation to the right to terminate a treaty nothing could preclude the 
application of a general rule of international law unless specifically precluded by a 
specific treaty.^ '*'* This position was re-affirmed in the ELSI Case,^^^ whilst the Iran-US 
Claims Tribunal confirmed this approach by stating that although lex specialis would 
prevail over lex generalis, "the rules of customary law may be useful in order to fill in 
possible lacunae of the law of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in 
its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions."^"*^ 
3.2. The Question of Application of Countermeasures Within Self-Contained Regimes 
in Response to a Violation Under General International Law 
3.2.1. The WTO Example 
Compliance with the rules of general international law and the relationship between lex 
specialis with lex generalis gains significance also in another context, that of the WTO. 
The WTO, a system that provides for specific rules and sets up its own dispute 
settlement mechanisms, may deviate, by common agreement of its member states, from 
•^"^  Pauwelyn/2001/541/fn44. Also, Lauterpacht noted as early as 1949: "It is the treaty as a whole which 
'is"law;'The treaty as ff'wUttle'transcfends'^^ individual pfovisioiis of e^ve^^^  of its 
provisions. For the treaty, once signed and ratified, is more than the expression of the intention of the 
parties. It is part of international law and must be interpreted against the general background of its rules 
and principles". Lauterpacht/1949/76. 
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the 1969 VCLT and the rules on state responsibility which both constitute general rules 
of international law, even though in different subject-matters. Whilst reliance on non-
WTO law by the WTO judicial panels when interpreting the meaning of WTO rules or 
filling procedural gaps is quite a common phenomenon, the position differs with respect 
to the legitimacy of countermeasures within the WTO system for violations outside the 
system. This is specifically so in view of the fact that a WTO member state may only 
deviate from its obligations under the WTO on grounds of national security and the 
general exceptions provided under Article XX of the GATT concluded in 1947. 
Otherwise the uniformity and effectiveness of trade regulations would admittedly be 
endangered i f member states were entitled unequivocally and on their own discretion to 
refuse to comply with their treaty commitments under the WTO. Nevertheless, whilst 
there is the view that countermeasures for violations that fall outside the system should 
be permissible and could be used as a defence provided that the WTO obligation in 
question is bilateral in nature (so that its violation by no means wil l affect the rights of 
other innocent WTO member states), other scholars believe that they would be 
unlawful.^''^ Those supporting the first view make the point that the lex specialis will 
prevail only whenever there is a specific condition in the WTO treaty to prohibit the 
intrusion of the general rules. In all other circumstances, it will co-exist with the rest of 
the body of rules of international law. 
It remains to examine whether the WTO treaty indeed bans the application of 
countermeasures provided under international law taken either in addition to other 
remedies already provided for by the covered agreements, or as an instrument of 
political and economic coercion for achieving goals outside the limited scope of the 
WTO. 
3.2.2. Legal Nature and Jurisdiction under the WTO 
The WTO, apart from containing a body of legal rules indicating the rights and 
obligations of its member states, sets up its own enforcement mechanisms and dispute 
settlement procedures. These procedures are contained in the Understanding on Rules 
M(3 Pr'ocedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter DSU) and are to be 
distinguished from those mechanisms provided under the GATT. In particular, the 
WTO gives the right to all member states to have automatic recourse to the ad hoc 
Pauwelyn/2003(a)/945/fhl35. 
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judicial panels and the standing Appellate Body which have the power to make legally 
binding recommendations and suggestions of the way that the state found to be in 
breach of its WTO obligations could bring its acts in conformity with its treaty 
undertakings and the recommendations made by the adjudicating bodies. '^'^  The 
conclusions of these panels may then be veiled with legal effect once they are referred 
to and adopted by the Dispute Settiement Body. The DSB is the Body before which 
parties can raise issues relating to the implementation of the panels' reports. The 
establishment of the panels, the adoption of their reports by the DSB and the 
authorization of retaliation by means of trade sanctions, have an automatic effect 
"unless there is a consensus against it".^'*^ In other words, the consensus of the member 
states is not a precondition for initiating the dispute settlement mechanism. This is 
considered granted, provided that no state expressly indicates its view to the contrary, 
thus deviating from the regime under the GATT which was structured on the basis of 
the positive-consensus rule. Moreover, the DSU makes the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the WTO of a compulsory nature. Whilst under the GATT it was 
provided that member states "may" authorize the "appropriate" suspension of 
concessions on the ground of the "seriousness" of the circumstances, under article 22.6 
of the DSU the DSB is obliged ("shall") to grant such authorization for the suspension 
of concessions or other obligations once the defaulting state has failed to comply with 
and implement the recommendations and rulings within the set time limits. Such 
authorization is not conditional upon the "seriousness" or the "appropriateness" of the 
situation, provided that the suspension is "equivalent to the level of the nullification or 
impairment" in accordance with article 22.4?^^ Furthermore, whenever an infringement 
is found and no agreement for compensation is reached, the complaining state may seek 
the authorization of the DSU to "suspend concessions or other obligations under the 
covered agreements",^ '^ or in other words, to have recourse to countermeasures 
although this term nowhere appears in the DSU. Once again, the authorization to resort 
to countermeasures (which in the context of the WTO can only be bilateral) is automatic 
and may only be refused i f there is an agreement by the member states against them. 
With the inclusion of specific procedures and remedies for dealing with violations of its 
rules with the ultimate purpose of inducing conformity (as opposed to any concept of 
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punishment),^^^ the WTO is arguably significantly strengthened and re-enforced as an 
autonomous legal order that exists in parallel with other regimes provided under 
international law. 
It is therefore not without logic that Article 3.2 of the DSU regards the WTO dispute 
settlement system as a "central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system", one that protects the rights and obligations of its member 
states. Looking, however, at the question of whether and to what extent WTO member 
states may only resort to the measures provided under the WTO agreements in response 
to violations that incur within the WTO legal order, or as to whether WTO member 
states may have resort to measures provided under the law on state responsibility as 
well, two schools of thought seem to prevail. The supporters of the first school of 
thought believe that unless a multilateral treaty sets up a self-contained regime or 
specifically provides so, the injured state may not limit itself to the measures and 
mechanisms provided under the infiinged treaty, but may also apply "extra-contractual" 
measures. The supporters of the "solidarity" concept on the other hand, reject the idea of 
imposition of measures outside the scope of the infiinged multilateral treaty. Sachariew 
opposes the possibility of application and implementation of measures outside those 
already provided by the infringed treaty as he finds it difficult to understand how such 
measures would be able to be applied without, or even against, the consent of the other 
members to the treaty. Furthermore, he believes that such a possibility would be 
difficult to reconcile with the principle of proportionality i f each and every single state 
to the multilateral treaty decided to apply countermeasures ut singuli?^^ 
With respect to the nature of the WTO, the following has been said: 
WTO law is a specific subsystem of international law with specific rights and obligations, specific claims 
and causes of action, specific violations, specific enforcement mechanisms and specific remedies in case 
of their violation. The WTO dispute settlement system is also concerned with the distinct but parallel 
question of the limited jurisdiction and incapacity of the WTO adjudicating bodies to apply and enforce 
norms other than those of the WTO.""* 
Therefore, the WTO entitles the judicial panels to adjudicate only on those matters 
specifically defined and included in the covered agreements thus granting them with 
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limited jurisdiction, whilst in a case of conflict with other norms of international law, to 
give priority to the rights and duties deriving from these agreements as a regime of lex 
specialis. The WTO judicial panels have jurisdiction to examine complaints made by a 
member state that a certain benefit afforded to it directly or indirectly under the WTO 
agreements "is being nullified or impaired" by the action of another member state that 
fails to meet its treaty commitments.^^^ However, the limited jurisdiction of the WTO 
judicial panels does not unequivocally limit the applicable law for the determination of 
the issues before them. On the contrary, and in the absence of an express provision, the 
DSB, the judicial panels and the Appellate Body can resort to and rely on all sources of 
international law in determining the cases brought before them, on the condition that 
they do not add or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements (articles 3.2 and 19.2 of DSU respectively). Therefore, it is suggested that 
whenever the rights and obligations protected under the WTO agreements are 
threatened by such other rules of international law that are applicable in the WTO 
dispute settlement procedure, then priority should be given to an interpretation in 
agreement and in consistency with the WTO treaty as establishing a regime lex specialis 
(even i f that would effectively mean an interpretation in violation of the obligations 
arising from other international legal instruments). 
As a consequence of the limited jurisdiction provided for under the covered agreements 
and of the fact that the DSU provides for specific remedies that the panels and the 
Appellate Body are entitled to recommend and suggest (art. 19 of DSU), the WTO 
adjudicating bodies do not have the authority to examine claims that fall under another 
system of international law, such as for example claims concerning the violation of 
human rights.^^'' As argued, international law consists of various systems which are not 
necessarily linked. Whilst a measure may be unlawful in one of these systems, it may be 
totally legitimate in another. Although states members to the WTO will always be 
responsible for fulfilling their obligations under other systems of international law, 
"they cannot use the WTO remedial machinery to enforce them".^ *^* It is accordingly 
argued that, "The drafters of the WTO treaty never wanted to provide non-WTO norms 
with direct effect in WTO law, nor allow states to benefit from free use of the WTO 
Article 1.1 of DSU. 
Bartels/2001/507,518-9. See HormoneslCase/\991l{\25). 
^" Marceau/2002/762-3. 
Ibid/775. 
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remedial mechanism to enforce rights and obHgations other than those of the WTO 
treaty."^^^ 
One must also not forget that under article 23, regarded one of the fundamental 
provisions of the DSU, the power to determine a violation of the covered agreements 
under WTO and to decide on countermeasures rests upon the WTO judicial bodies. It 
reads as follows: 
(2) Members shall: (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits 
have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been 
impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of 
this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the 
panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this 
Understanding. 
Therefore, as it is suggested, this provision prohibits unilateral action, transferring this 
competence and the competence to deal with WTO violations to the WTO adjudicating 
bodies, thus making the WTO a self-contained regime (if such a regime can really exist 
in international law, as suggested earlier) but precludes the application of the general 
rules of international law on countermeasures.Furthermore, article 23 limits the use 
of countermeasures according to which: 
(7) The necessary prior authorization of the membership before the (wirming) Members can use 
retaliatory sanctions (Article 22 (2) - 22 (6) of the DSU) once all the prior procedural safeguards have 
been respected. 
(9) The level of countermeasures is also regulated and WTO arbitrators are given exclusive jurisdiction to 
determine a level of suspensions of obligations having trade effects equivalent to the level of nullification 
of benefits (a criteria distinct from the 'appropriate' or 'proportionate' benchmark under general 
international law). 
It thus seems so far that the remedies permitted under the WTO treaty concern the obligation for 
cessation, non-repetition and satisfaction only with very strict conditions on the right to countermeasures. 
Ibid/778. 
The issue was addressed in the Panel Report in US-Certain E C Products para 6.133: "In short the 
regime of counter-measures, reprisals or retaliatory measures has been strictly regulated under the WTO 
Agreement. It is now only in the mstitutional framework of the WTO/DSU that the United States could 
obtain a WTO compatible determination that the European Communities violated the WTO Agreement, 
and it is only in the institutional framework of the WTO/DSU that the United States could obtain the 
authorization to exercise remedial action". In Marceau/2002/760. 
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This suggests according to many that the member states wanted to preclude an open-ended right to 
countermeasures and wanted to transfer to the settlement mechanisms the responsibility to do so 361 
Thus, whilst states would still be liable under the general rules on state responsibility for 
the violation of their general obligations, they would not be held responsible before the 
WTO adjudicating bodies. At the same time, i f a state is found in breach of its 
obligations under a specific legal regime and before the judicial mechanisms of that 
regime, the rules concerning its liability formed in the context of this regime will prevail 
irrespective of what justifications there may exist under general international law. The 
judicial bodies of such regimes, due to their restricted powers and jurisdiction, wil l have 
primary responsibility to apply the law of the specific regime. Koskenniemi and Leino 
therefore believe that it cannot be asked by specific bodies such as the WTO bodies to 
expand their competences so as to enable them to adjudicate on matters of general 
international law. Rather, this will only be accomplished with the establishment of 
strong institutions to represent non-economic interests. 362 
Despite the above, it is to be remembered that the WTO remains a treaty under 
international law and as such: 
the WTO agreement cannot, therefore, be applied in isolation from other rules of international law. Just as 
private contracts are automatically bom into a system of domestic law, so treaties are automatically bom 
into the system of international law. Much the way private contracts do not need to list all the relevant 
legislative and administrative provisions of domestic law for them to be applicable to the contract, so 
treaties need not explicitly set out mles of general international law for them to be applicable to the 
treaty... 363 
The WTO stands in the international legal order as an integral part of general 
international law, and it is thus influenced, evolved, and developed by its rules and 
principles. The relationship between the WTO and general international law has been 
described by Pauwelyn as a mutual relationship of enrichment. 364 
The impact of the general rules on state responsibility on specific legal regimes was also 
examined'by the ICJ in theWcamgua Case^^ nilihg haS often beeii crificized due to 
Marceau/2002/773. 
Koskenniemi-Leino/2002/574. 
Pauwelyn/2003(b)/1001. 
Pauwelyn/2001/552. 
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the Court's failure to determine what the US as a third state could do in view of the 
recognition that Nicaragua had frequently violated international law by militarily 
incurring into the territory of neighbouring countries (Honduras and Costa Rica), and by 
supporting armed bands and rebels. Whilst the Court did not accept that Nicaragua's 
action amounted to an armed attack which would justify a trigger of the right to 
collective self-defence, it held that the trade embargo imposed by the US against 
Nicaragua infringed the 1956 Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
concluded between the two countries, leaving no room for examining the US action in 
the light of Nicaragua's own default and in particular the violation of its Charter 
obligations. In considering article X X I of the Treaty as a possible justification of the 
US measures, the Court emphasized that the party should prove that such action was 
necessary to its essential security interests. The Court went on to conclude that from the 
circumstances of the particular case that no such necessity emerged.^ ^^ However, this 
conclusion also received criticism as according to one view the Court should have 
examined the trade embargo in the light of either the Treaty itself or the law on 
reprisals. As noted in this regard: 
It cannot be correct, it is submitted, to exclude all those treaty commitments from a possible application 
of the right of reprisals which are conditioned by specific exception clauses, as the security clause in the 
respective Treaty. It would be going much too far to see this as a self-contained regime in the sense the 
International Court of Justice has used this notion in the Tehran Hostages case. Trade agreements in the 
widest sense are the area where peaceflil reprisals must apply in the first place if this area of law on State 
responsibility should not become obsolete.'^ * 
The problem grows in significance since in most of the circumstances treaties allow 
derivations from the freaty obligations it is only for reasons closely associated with and 
established by the treaty, restricting in this manner the general use of countermeasures. 
ZoUer in particular argues that precluding states party to a certain treaty from 
responding to an external violation by violating their obligations under the treaty would 
render international law ineffective. I f one construed treaties, whether bilateral or 
multilateral, as "locked circles" that prohibit both measures outside the treaty for 
violations within the treaty and measures within a treaty for violations occurring outside 
such treaty, this would amount to ithe alienation of international law by creating several 
legal regimes existing in parallel but with absolutely no relationship between them. As 
"^•^  For an analysis of the ruling see Frowein/1994/372. 
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she rightly remarks, treaties "would have a legal life of their own independent of their 
surroundings. States after being their creators, would become their prisoners, the 
Pygmalions of international law".^^^ Zoller continued that irrespective of their nature, 
customary or conventional, international rules are related and together form the existing 
international legal order. To demand states to refrain from temporarily not performing 
their obligations, any obligations, towards a wrongdoing state by way of reprisals for 
the violation of any of their own rights, would not only endanger the unity of the 
international legal order as the treaty would become unconnected with the rest of the 
corpus of international norms, but it would also remove "the indirect guarantee of 
compliance which the treaty embodied. Such a situation would be detrimental to both 
customary and treaty law".^^* In 1977, US Representative Pease was arguing, in support 
of US measures against Uganda even in violation of its GATT obligations, that there 
existed "higher principles involved than blind adherence to free trade dogma" and that 
this agreement should not be deemed as "sacrosanct and inviolable".^^^ The position 
that state action cannot be confined within a specific treaty is also reflected in the 
statement of the French Prime Minister Briand who, rejecting Germany's arguments 
that France could not resort to sanctions outside the Versailles Treaty, said that there 
still existed other sanctions under international law.^™ 
This view seems to also apply with respect to other international agreements such as 
those concerning the protection of human rights. Thus, according to the conclusions of 
the American Law Institute, a state party to an international human rights agreement has 
at its disposal not only the remedies provided under these agreements but also the 
remedies provided under general international law in the event of the commission of an 
internationally wrongfijl act.^ '^ Frowein says in this respect that to preclude action other 
than that provided under a specific treaty would be to afford weaker protection when 
needed, especially regarding human rights violations.^^^ 
Zoller/1984/85-6. 
'^'^  Ibid/87. 
"^""^  Pease/1977 in Fredman/1979/1162. 
"° See Briand/Statement/131 in Zoller/1984/88. 
Law/Restatement/1987/Vol.2/174 in Frowein/1994/399-400. 
Frowein/1994/400. 
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At the WTO level this position is reflected in the Gasoline Case according to which 
"the General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international 
law".^^^ As Pauwelyn observes: 
It is true that the DSU has to be considered as lex specialis and that it can - and in certain areas, does -
deviate from general international law. If any ambiguity were to persist in the DSU, however, as to 
whether a breach of WTO rules activates the secondary obligation of cessation, recourse should be made 
to residual international law rules. These rules make clear beyond doubt that in case wrongfial act is 
found, the state concerned has to stop that conduct. The DSU determines, in turn, the means by which the 
prevailing WTO member is authorized to obtain fiilfillment of that secondary legal obligation of 
374 
cessation. 
Further, the WTO judicial bodies have themselves many times referred to the general 
principles of international law and customary international law, and to other treaties, 
whilst article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the agreements under the WTO must be 
interpreted "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law". Furthermore, the power of the WTO panels to refer to other sources of 
international law for an objective application of the agreements under the WTO is 
safeguarded under both articles 11 and 7.2 of the DSU. 
Bearing in mind the above, the WTO is not strictly speaking a self-contained regime as 
other rules of international law such as the rules on state responsibility, rules relating to 
the judicial settlement of disputes, the rules regarding the conclusion, termination, 
suspension or application of treaties, and the rules on how to resolve conflicts between 
legal norms are applicable, insofar as there is no provision in the WTO treaty to require 
otherwise. In conclusion, to say that the WTO law precludes the application of rules of 
general international law would amount to saying that the WTO is viewed as "a self-
contained regime" whilst "the field of general public international law as a fragmented 
system with sealed-off compartments".^^^ In addition to the above, even self-contained 
regimes do not totally and permanently deviate from the general legal regime, but only 
to the extent that there is express agreement to the contrary. As Simma points out: 
the general regime of State responsibility can only be again called to the foreground after all remedies 
provided in the 'subsystem' have been exhausted without any positive results and when further tolerance 
"^Ga4o//ne/1996/17. 
Pauwelyn/2000/341. 
129. 
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Pauwelyn/2003(b)/1029. 
of the imbalance of costs and benefits caused by non-performance can no longer bona fide be expected 
from an injured party.^ *^ 
3.2.3. The General and Security Exceptions under Articles XX and X X I of GATT 
Article XX of GATT exempts from the prohibition of trade restrictions inter alia 
measures taken for the protection of human life or health. While such measures are 
justifiable for the protection of human life or health within the territory of the 
responding state, this becomes less clear with respect to measures taken to protect 
human life or health in another member state's territory."^ The latter requires a 
distinction between restrictions of products themselves produced in a manner 
contravening human rights, and measures taken against products which although not 
produced in a manner violating human rights, are produced by a member state that 
violates human rights generally (the term "generally" not to be construed in a vague and 
ambiguous way). It is suggested that in this latter category one should speak about 
"sanctions" and not about "trade restrictions" as provided by Article XX.^^^ This raises 
two other relevant and quite significant issues, that of whether a WTO member state 
may respond to the commission of a wrongftil act under general international law, such 
as genocide, by another WTO member state by suspending its obligations deriving 
under the WTO agreement between them, and whether the answer to this is at all 
influenced by the fact that the former state is acting on the basis of an obligation to 
respond to genocide, or a mere entitlement under general international law. It needs to 
be remembered here that not all violations of international obligations make it possible 
for response by any other state indiscriminately. Rather, an examination of the nature of 
the rule infringed is required in order to be able to determine whether a state may or 
may not enforce the law by countermeasures or otherwise. Similarly, it is suggested that 
trade sanctions in the context of WTO against a member state not fulfilling its 
obligations under general international law are not permitted unequivocally by any other 
member state, i f at all.^^^ Even more significantly, a distinction is made between 
unilateral "measures" which enforce an existing right, and "counter-measures" which 
pre-suppose the violation of an obligation. 
'Simma/1985/395. 
Bartels/2002/355. 
Ibid/2002/357-8. 
'Ibid/2002/361. 
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It is only extraterritorial trade measures in the form of primary rights that can be 
permitted under Article XX. By contrast, counter-measures in response to the violation 
of another party of an obligation arising outside the WTO covered agreements are prima 
facie excluded Irom the blessing of Article XX. Or, to put it more prosaically, WTO 
members have a right to "protecf or "promote" certain legally defined interests outside 
their jurisdiction, and in certain cases even in the territory of another WTO member, but 
they are unable to "enforce" that member's obligations by way of counter-measures 
unless authorized to do so under an agreement. In the WTO context, we may therefore 
dispense with the question, addressed above, as to which human rights obligations will 
be enforceable by counter-measures. 
As already mentioned above, the WTO is a specific regime that expressly prohibits the 
unilateral enforcement of the rights and obligations deriving fi-om the WTO agreements. 
At the same time, under a Ministerial Declaration made in 1982 the GATT Contracting 
Parties undertook the commitment to "abstain fi-om taking restrictive trade measures, 
for reasons of a non-economic character, not consistent with the General Agreement".^^' 
However, it is doubtful that this Declaration creates any legally binding effect. 
While article XX safeguards trade restrictions on products that have been produced in a 
process and method that infiinges human rights or health, it exempts from its scope the 
enforcement of trade measures that take the form of countermeasures. Such 
countermeasures are not allowed within the context of the WTO, even i f these are to be 
permitted under the general rules on state responsibility. This is qualified by the 
condition that there has not been an agreement to authorize such countermeasures on the 
basis that such an agreement does not put at risk the rights and obligations of third 
parties. 
Article X X I on the other hand allows exceptions fi-om the obligations arising under the 
WTO treaties on grounds of national security. Although WTO member states enjoy 
wide discretion when relying on security reasons to justify conduct irreconcilable with 
their obligations, in the sense that the judicial panels are not entitled to look into 
whether a threat to national security interests indeed existed and the justifiability of the 
measures taken in response to the threat, states need to exercise their discretion in good 
Ibid/2002/393-4 
381 Ministerial/Declaration/1982. Also in Keesing/1983/32169A. 
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faith.^*^ On the basis of this wide scope of the notion of "essential national security" 
emerging "in time of war or other emergency in international relations" it could be 
claimed that serious violations of human rights such as genocide fall within the ambit of 
383 
this provision. 
The approach followed by the WTO judicial panels and the Appellate Body in relation 
to the admissibility of trade restrictions was for a long time based on the exemptions 
under articles XX and X X I . It is suggested nevertheless that there is a differentiation in 
the position of the Appellate Body in the Case of Argentina-Footwear. This case 
concerned the allegation that Argentina was in breach of its GATT obligations and in 
particular of Article V I I I (1) (a) for having imposed tax on imported products. 
Argentina attempted to justify its act on the ground that it had agreed to do so with the 
International Monetary Fund. However the panel did not accept that there were any 
reasons to exempt Argentina from fixlfilling its obligations under the GATT noting the 
following: 
Argentina did not show an irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of its 'Memorandum of 
Understanding' with the IMF and the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994. We thus agree with 
the Panel's implicit finding that Argentina failed to demonstrate that it had a legally binding commitment 
to the IMF that would somehow supersede Argentina's obligations under Article VIII of the GATT 
1994 384 
Whilst for a long PERIOD the approach of the WTO judicial panels in determining 
whether a certain measure was in violation of the obligations deriving from the covered 
agreements relied on the existence of general or security exceptions, the passage above 
seems to suggest a new approach. To this end, it may be argued that WTO obligations 
may be circumvented by an existing conflicting rule of international law. 
Despite the significance of the questions (and thus of the answers) arising from a 
possible conflict between an entitlement even to respond to serious violations such as 
genocide and specific agreements which preclude the general regime of responsibility, it 
seems that in the context of the WTO judicial panels the specific rules will prevail. The 
issue remains as to whether the violation of trade obligations arising under the WTO for 
instance could be justified under state responsibility. This has not been resolved in the 
See Akande/2003/383. 
Brandtner-Rosas/1999/706. 
i9). 
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context of the 2001 articles on state responsibility which will be the focus of the next 
section. 
4. The 2001 Articles on State Responsibility 
In its commentary on article 50 of the 2001 articles on the law on state responsibility 
entitled Obligations not affected by countermeasures, the ILC recognizes the right of 
states to enter into specific agreements to preclude countermeasures, as a regime lex 
specialis. Reference is made to this end to the WTO and to the fact that under article 23 
a member state may only suspend concessions or other obligations under the WTO 
agreements only with the prior authorization of the DSB. It is pointed out that: 
This has been construed both as an "exclusive dispute resolution clause" and as a clause "preventing 
WTO members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations". To 
the extent that derogation clauses or other treaty provisions (e.g. those prohibiting reservations) are 
properly interpreted as indicating that the treaty provisions are "intransgressible", they may entail the 
exclusion of countermeasures. 
This found expression in part four under article 55 which provides the following: 
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State 
are governed by special rules of international law. 
The ILC, in its commentary on this provision, acknowledges the right of states to enter 
into specific agreements that wi l l depart from the otherwise applicable rules of 
international law concerning the legal consequences to derive from the violation of a 
primary rule, namely the law on state responsibility. Whether such deviation is of an 
exclusive or even complementary/coexisting character thus precluding the general legal 
regime in its entirety or in part, is a factor to be determined by the wil l of the parties 
themselves. It is fiarther commented that there may be circumstances under which the 
legal consequences to be derived from the breach of an "overriding" rule may be of 
peremptory character themselves^ It is explained here that any response to the violation 
of a jus cogens norm may not extend to the violation of another jus cogens norm. More 
specifically, the ILC highlighted that: 
Crawford/2002/290-1. 
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In certain cases the consequences that follow from a breach of some overriding rule may themselves have 
a peremptory character. For example States cannot, even as between themselves, provide for legal 
consequences of a breach of their mutual obligations which would authorize acts contrary to peremptory 
norms of general intemational law. Thus the assumption of article 55 is that the special mles in question 
have at least the same legal rank as those expressed in the articles. On that basis, article 55 makes it clear 
that the present articles operate in a residual way.^ *^  
It seems from the above, and especially from article 55, that the ILC precludes the 
application of the general rules on the law on state responsibility whenever specific 
rules precisely and expressly determine the legal consequences to derive as a result of 
their breach. It could also be argued that both the article and its commentary seem to 
imply that the lex specialis regime has to prevail over the general rules of intemational 
law in relation to countermeasures, even i f such countermeasures are taken in response 
to a violation of a jus cogens norm that lies outside such a lex specialis regime. 
However, article 55 seems to remain silent with respect to the application of the general 
law on state responsibility within a specific regime as a result of a violation of an 
obligation that exists outside that regime. In other words, article 55 fails to clarify the 
relationship of lex specialis with countermeasures in response to "extra-contractual" 
violations and according to which "The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in 
conformity with an intemational obligation towards another State is precluded i f and to 
the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in 
accordance with Chapter I I of Part Three" (article 22). From a general intemational law 
standpoint, the violation of obligations deriving from the WTO by way of 
countermeasures in response to a violation that occurred outside that regime wil l be 
lawfiil. This solution will not however prevail i f one accepts that the lex specialis 
regime under article 55 will take precedent over article 22 above and under all 
circumstances. Support for the latter solution upgrades the lex specialis to superior law 
in which the intmsion of general intemational law is totally and permanently precluded, 
thus endowing the specific legal regime with absolute nature. In the view of this author 
however this does not seem to be the most appropriate approach. In her opinion, i f it 
were accepted that countermeasures for reasons falling outside a specific treaty were 
always precluded then there would be a conflict between the notion of countermeasures 
itself, which by definition permits as lawful the violation of any obligation (with limited 
exceptions) of intemational law, and article 55 of the final articles on state 
Crawford/2003/306-7. 
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responsibility. How could countermeasures ever be applied i f prevalence is 
unequivocally always given to the lex specialis regime? This point gains particular 
significance in the context of the increasing competences in trade matters of the WTO. 
Hence, the view which sees WTO rules having an impact "on almost all other segments 
of society and law"^" could not be more true, especially in the light of the effects of 
liberalization of trade on environmental or human rights concerns. I f the entitlement of 
states to resort to countermeasures in the form of trade restrictions is taken away, even 
for the most heinous internationally wrongful acts, then states are not left with many 
more means and powers to enforce international law. This, however, does not only have 
significance whenever a breach of a jus cogens norm is involved, in which case the 
prohibition of countermeasures by a state other than the injured must also be taken into 
account, but also for breaches not of such a serious nature. I f it is recognized that the 
WTO in particular imposes uniform state behaviour in more and more trade areas, then 
it diminishes significantly the sphere of state action i f one accepts that the WTO 
obligations can only be suspended, terminated or non-performed in response to the 
violation of another WTO obligation and only under the procedures provided by the 
WTO agreements. In such an event, the role of countermeasures under the general rules 
on state responsibility becomes vague and meaningless. Although the need to restrict 
the powers of the stronger states in relation to countermeasures must not be overlooked, 
it is also imperative to find other ways of restricting such powers, for example by 
setting clear legal standards on a state's entitlement to countermeasures, rather than 
merely abolishing such powers once and for all. 
It is therefore suggested that a correct interpretation of article 55 would be one that 
supports the prevalence of the mechanisms and regulations recognized under a specific 
regime in response to the violation of the obligations established within such regime, 
thus leaving room for countermeasures in response to external violations. 
5. In the Risk of Fragmentation of International Law 
One of the increasingly interesting areas that has recently attracted the attention of the 
ILC and which will be at the scope of the present section is that of fragmentation of 
international law. In the absence of a clear separation of powers in the international 
387 Pauwelyn/2001/539. 
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legal order, international law comprises several autonomous legal regimes and norms 
which may at times clash between them, endangering the consistency of international 
law. 
The fragmentation of international law is not a new phenomenon. The conflict between 
the West and the East during the Cold War period prevented the development of the 
international legal order into a coherent system of norms. Although aspirations about 
the "completeness" of international law revived with the abolition of the walls between 
the two worlds, international law was once again faced with fragmentation, but this time 
because of a new enemy, namely the rapid proliferation of legal systems. 
In its 52"'' session held in 2000, the ILC decided to include within its long-term work 
the problem of fragmentation of international law, acknowledging its increasing 
importance for the consistency and unity of international law.^ *^ In a study pursued by 
Mr Gerhard Hafner annexed to the 2000 ILC report,^ ^^ the problem of fragmentation 
appeared as the result of the lack of homogeneity and organization of international law 
which until the present day consists of several "erratic" legal regimes, systems and 
subsystems. Despite the contribution of these regimes to the progression of the 
international legal order, they may also cause friction among norms belonging to 
different legal systems, often having the effect of creating obligations upon states which 
are incompatible and irreconcilable between them.^^' This unavoidably raises the 
responsibility of a state which, unable to conform to its parallel obligations, is caught up 
in a mayhem of international rules and legal systems which most of the times lack of a 
hierarchical nature.^ '^ ^ In 2002, the Study Group established by the ILC during its 54* 
session to investigate the scope of the question under consideration defined the term 
"fragmentation" as indicative of the effects of the "expansion and diversification of 
international law".^^^ 
Some of the causes identified as contributing to the problem are: the fact that 
international law consists of a law of co-ordination rather than subordination; that it 
lacks central instruments which would be responsible to resolve any collisions 
Koskenniemi-Leino/2002/559. 
ILCreport/2000/292. 
Hafner/ILCreport/Annex/2000. 
Ibid/321-2. 
ILCreport/2002/240/(506). 
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threatening the uniformity of international law; the emergence, in addition to the 
synallagmatic obligations provided under traditional international law, of obligations 
owed to individuals and the international community as a whole; the existence of 
compefitive rules; the widening of the scope of international law with the increase of the 
actors in the international arena but also of enforcement machineries especially 
provided for under specific regimes; the existence of several parallel secondary norms 
which often prevail over the general rules on state responsibility or even the law on 
t r e a t i e s . I n addition, it has been argued that the lack of both a clear hierarchy of 
norms and homogeneity in the international legal order, the proliferation of international 
judicial bodies often having jurisdiction over the same matters, the parallel development 
of often conflicting legal norms and the emergence of a pluralism of legal regimes also 
exacerbate the problem.^^^ Furthermore, the accommodation of new principles and new 
ideas of a "constitutional" nature in the body of international law has only added to the 
confiision. 
More analytically, such inconsistency may, and has appeared, within the context of the 
ad hoc International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the one hand and the ICJ on 
the other. In this regard, there has been different approach in the rulings of the ICJ and 
the ICTFY on specific questions of law. In its Advisory Opinion on The Legality of 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 1996 the ICJ ruled that armed reprisals should be 
proportionate. However, not long after this ruling the ICTFY was concluding that such 
reprisals were entirely prohibited.^^^ In Celebici specifically the Appeals Chamber 
signified that there was no hierarchy between it and the ICJ and that it was autonomous 
from the ICJ.^ ^^ In this respect Hafiier also draws the attention to the fact that in the 
light of lack of a specific provision regarding the principle nullum crimen sine lege in 
the Statute of the Tribunal, there could be a conflict between the obligations of a state 
arising from the establishment of the Tribunal which came into force with a SC 
resolution on the one hand, and its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights on the other. Furthermore, in the Belilos Case the ECHR gave 
prevalence to the specific provisions of the Convention on the issue of reservations over 
Hafner/ILCreport/Annex/2000/326-31. 
Professor Koskenniemi, although not rejecting the problem, very pointedly argues that international 
law has never been unified so that to risk a possible fragmentation at this instance. However, the term 
"fragmentation" should be construed as revealing the situation where there exist conflicting legal norms 
which may undermine the coherence of international law. See Koskenniemi-Leino/2002/576. 
ICJReps/1996/246/(46); MarticlCase/\996 in Koskenniemi-Leino/2002/563. 
Celebici/Case/200\. 
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the provisions of general international law on the same matter.^ '^ ^ In the Lockerbie Case 
the ICJ said that Libya should comply with its obligations under article 103 of the UN 
Charter even i f it was in contravention with other obligations, and in particular with the 
1971 Montreal Convention. 
It needs to be stressed that a conflict may appear with respect to both primary norms - i f 
there are more such norms regulating the same subject, and secondary norms - i f an 
internationally wrongful act incurs several consequences existing in various systems 
and subsystems of international law. Especially in the latter case, the existence of 
multiple enforcement mechanisms, each one of which claims to be the most appropriate 
for the resolution of a given dispute on the basis of the rules within which it exists and 
is structured upon, tends to enhance rather than diminish the already "disintegrated 
nature of international law."^^^ 
The Study Group, in the report it prepared in 2002, highlighted that further 
consideration should be given among others to the function and scope of lex specialis 
norms and the problem of self-contained regimes, the interpretation of treaties in the 
light of other relevant rules of international law applicable between the parties and in 
view of contemporary developments and the concerns of the international community, 
and the hierarchy of some norms such as jus cogens, obligations erga omnes and article 
103 of the UN Charter.'*^" hi its 2003 report, the Study Group drew a line between 
institutional and substantive elements of the question of fragmentation: while the former 
deals with the issue of institutional hierarchy of the various actors, especially of the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, the latter relates to the incoherence 
or incompatibility of substantive rules. The Study Group considered that its attention 
should be turned on the substantive element instead.'* '^ In identifying the areas in which 
conflict in relation to the substantive law could emerge, reference was made to conflict 
arising as a result of different interpretations of general international law, conflict 
between general and special law, and conflict between specific legal regimes. 
Moreover, the Study Group highlighted the need to investigate the conditions of the 
establishment of self-contained regimes, their scope of application towards general 
Belilos/Case/mS. 
Hafiier/ILCreport/Annex/2000/332. 
ILCreport/2002/241/(512). 
ILCreport/2003/269/(416-7). 
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international law, and the circumstances under which there is a "fall back" to the 
general rules.'*^^ However, the conclusion of the Study Group, at least for the time 
being, that whether or not a specific regime had failed should be looked for in the 
regime itself is unsatisfactory as it does not solve crucial issues such as the relationship 
between countermeasures within a specific regime for serious violations occurring 
outside it.''*'^ 
On the other side there are arguments supporting that the plethora of specific legal 
regimes contributes to the enhancement of the international legal order, whose main 
defect has always been its unenforceability. A study undertaken in 1996 by the 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law concluded that such specific systems, with 
their own rules and mechanisms, strengthened compliance with the primary rules they 
establish.'**''' As Koskenniemi and Leino point out: 
The ICJ, a human rights body, a trade regime or a regional exception may each be used for good and for 
ignoble purposes and it should be a matter of debate and evidence, and not of abstract 'consistency', as to 
which institution should be preferred in a particular situation. The universalist voices of humanitarianism, 
human rights, trade or the environment should undoubtedly be heard. But they may also echo imperial 
concerns, and never more so than when they are spoken from high positions in institutions that administer 
flexible standards that leave the final decision always to those speakers themselves.'"'^  
Along the same lines and in relation to the proliferation of international judicial bodies, 
Professor Abi-Saab remarks that it constitutes a "healthy phenomenon....in a system 
that has notoriously suffered, throughout its existence, from the dearth (not to say lack) 
of objective determinations".'**'^  However, he also highlights the necessity to preserve 
the unity of the overall system within which special regimes are conceived and created. 
He thus precludes that there can exist entirely self-contained regimes as otherwise such 
regimes would not be part of the general legal system, but rather they would themselves 
become legal orders of their own, "a kind of legal Frankenstein, or Kelsen's 'gang of 
robbers"'.'°^ 
ILCreport/2004/290/(319). 
""^  Ibid/292/(329-30). 
''*'Wellens/1995/28. 
""^  Koskenniemi-Leino/2002/578-9. 
Abi-Saab/1999/925. 
Ibid/926. 
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Kirchner identifies two dimensions of conflict resolution in intemational law: the first, 
which the 1969 VCLT seems to follow, relates to a conflict of laws approach, whilst the 
second concems a public law approach which aims to bring coherence in the process of 
"constitutionalization" of the intemational legal order by reconciling the phenomena of 
fragmentation on the one hand and constitutionalization on the other with a view of 
establishing "an overall public law approach".'*"^ He believes that this reconciliation can 
be achieved with the incorporation in the corpus of intemational law of constitutional 
notions such as jus cogens norms, and the moving away from a dogmatic perception of 
intemational law as being of a contractual nature merely involving public entities.'*°^ 
Undoubtedly, the problem of fragmentation of intemational law will only increase in 
significance, especially with the awarding of more contractual freedom to states in the 
absence of a unified code of conduct in the event that a conflict between two or more 
specific and general legal regimes occurs. The conclusions of the ILC on the matter are 
expected with great interest, with the hope at the same time that the ILC will be able to 
correspond to the big questions that will be bom as a result and which go to the very 
essence of the nature of contemporary intemational legal order. 
6. Conclusion 
The notion of self-contained regimes was introduced with the purpose of identifying 
those regimes which establish a complete legal regime of rights, obligations and legal 
remedies in the case of their breach and which set up the appropriate dispute settlement 
bodies and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the rules of general intemational law 
conceming for example the responsibility of states including the legal consequences of a 
violation such as countermeasures would be precluded from applying insofar as the 
issue is regulated under the specific regime which prevails. Accordingly, whenever an 
obligation imposed by this regime is violated, only the measures specifically provided 
can be applied with the exclusion of any other mles of intemational law. 
However, the "exclusivity" of such regimes in relation to the other mles of intemational 
law has frequently been called into question. One needs therefore to remember that 
specific norms evolved within such specific regimes are formed between certain states 
'"^  Kirchner/2004/54. 
Ibid/63-4 
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to serve certain purposes, and those purposes only. Accordingly, these rules cannot 
resolve an issue that arises within a different legal regime, but on the contrary they can 
only deal with issues specifically provided by them. It follows from this that before 
resorting to or relying on the general norms of international law, one needs to first look 
at the terms of the specific rules. This is a question of interpretation. I f however the 
method of interpretation does not produce satisfactory answers according to which 
reliance can be made on the specific rules, then the general rules of international law 
wil l once again become relevant. It has therefore been noted in chapter three that no 
such specific regime can "stand" on its own, as it never ceases to be part of the general 
legal whole. 
Likewise, the need to implement general international law, even when this is explicitly 
prohibited by specific rules, becomes apparent whenever the only means of protection 
available to a state injured by a certain wrong, or even by a state acting in the name of 
community interests, lies in the context of such specific obligations. Otherwise, and as 
already discussed in this chapter, to give prevalence to these specific rules will be 
something like attaching to them a status of jus cogens, diminishing significantly, to the 
extent of extinction even, the application of countermeasures under general international 
law. In addition to that, the practice of states reveals that most of the times 
countermeasures taken in response to a given wrongdoing involve violations of 
obligations arising fi-om such specific rules. This issue becomes particularly relevant in 
the context of the current examination, and specifically in the context of the next 
chapter. More specifically, i f a norm permitting countermeasures by states other than 
the injured in response to infiingements concerning jus cogens norms and obligations 
erga omnes, the significance of which has been illustrated as the object of separate 
examination under chapters one and two, exists or may evolve in the fixture, then it will 
serve no purpose i f states are precluded fi-om not performing obligations that derive 
within the context of specific legal regimes. This is because it is usually with the 
suspension of obligations falling within such regimes that countermeasures become 
more effective. 
Notwithstanding the above, the difficulties which may be created by the fact that whilst 
a certain conduct may be lawfiil under one legal regime but unlawfiil under another 
raise separate questions which must not be undermined or ignored. It has therefore been 
shown in this chapter that it is essential that these legal concerns are addressed in a 
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manner such that the unity of international law, whether always existent or just starting 
to emerge, is not to be impaired. 
With the conclusion of the examination of the relationship between specific rules and 
the law on countermeasures under general international law, the examination is next 
continued with the elaboration of existing state practice regarding countermeasures 
taken in response to violations of collective interests. 
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C H A P T E R 4 
Countermeasures in the Name of Community Interests in State Practice 
1. Introduction 
The legitimacy of sanctions for the purpose of inflicting hardship (punitive or other) 
upon the targeted state in a broader sense, and in particular irrespective of whether 
imposed in violation of certain international obligations (countermeasures) or not, has 
often been put into question. Having developed in a legal system with its roots deeply 
found on the principle of the sovereign equality of states, the imposition of coercive 
measures by one state against another was believed to be an "attack" on the foundations 
of the system itself It was therefore inconceivable that in a non-hierarchical 
international legal order a state which was equal with all the others could impose such 
measures at all. In addition, their effectiveness, especially those of an economic nature, 
was, and is until to this day disputed. The particularly burdensome and punitive 
sanctions inflicted upon Germany after its defeat in WWI,'*'° have often been blamed for 
not re-integrating the country into the international community, enhancing in this way a 
concealed menace which was later to break out with WWII and its catastrophic results 
for mankind. Furthermore, the sanctioning system provided under the League of 
Nations which could be triggered only in case of war committed by a member state, but 
not in response to violations short of war, was not sufficient to prevent forceftal acts, 
such as the bombardment and occupation of Corfii in 1923 by Italy, which argued that 
its action did not amount to war, or the invasion and occupation of Manchuria by Japan 
some ten years later."*" Nor was there an organized system to impose sanctions, the 
application of which was left to member states themselves.""^ Only on one occasion 
were the sanctions under the Covenant of the League of Nations invoked, 
unsuccessfially, in particular against Italy for invading Ethiopia in 1935-1936. 
In the years that followed WWII and until the end of the Cold War era, the debate on 
the issue of economic measures evolved around two substantially different and 
410 Elagab/1988/29. 
NefCZOOS/SO-l. 
•Shaw/2003/1166. 
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conflicting schools of thought. The first of these opinions reflected the view of Western 
states which, alarmed by the communist threat, showed willingness in certain cases to 
use economic measures against what they considered to be an expression of communist 
expansion in the world through serious violations of the most fundamental principles of 
international law. This is demonstrated inter alia by the economic measures imposed by 
Western states against the USSR for its intervention in Poland in the 1980s. The other 
trend represented the position of countries belonging to the Soviet bloc that, wary of 
foreign intervention in what they regarded as falling within their exclusive jurisdiction, 
opposed any notion of economic coercion. Although economic sanctions were initially 
conceived as an instrument of the powers of the SC under Chapter V I I for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, practice was soon to show that the 
antiparathesis of two poles, the East and the West, was much stronger. What the one 
side proposed would be vetoed by the other unless where, and this rarely happened, no 
conflicting interests existed, for instance in the case of an arms embargo imposed 
against South AfHca in 1977. As Mayall observed, the trend during the Cold War period 
was "clearly towards using sanctions as a symbol of 'alliance', European or even Third 
World solidarity rather than as an instrument of international order".'"^ 
In the light of the decentralism of the international legal system and the outlawing of the 
use of force and punitive, even i f peacefiil, action in contemporary state affairs, it 
became imperative for states to find alternative ways to protect their rights established, 
either by custom or by treaty. It is within this context that countermeasures, namely 
peaceful unilateral remedies which themselves constitute a violation of international law 
in reaction to another infringement, have evolved. It can be said, therefore, that 
countermeasures are self-executing measures in the sense that they are applied by the 
affected states because there exist no other mechanism to remedy a certain wrongdoing, 
or even i f such mechanisms exist they are ineffective or inadequate, especially where 
immediate action needs to be taken. 
The emergence of the concept of the international community as a whole, the 
recognition of collective values, and the categorization of internationally wrongfiil acts 
into serious and less serious violations^and which fell 'within the scbpe o f examinatioft 
of the first two chapters, were intended to change the perception and understanding of 
countermeasures especially by states other than the injured, to adopt the terminology 
^'^Mayall/l 984/633. 
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used in the 2001 articles on state responsibility. Despite however the fact that these 
legal developments contributed significantly to widening the circle of subjects entitled 
to invoke the responsibility of a state that has committed an internationally wrongful 
act, the legitimacy of countermeasures in the name of general interests remains 
unresolved. 
This chapter mainly focuses on countermeasures as distinct from other measures such as 
retortion that although unfriendly in nature they do not infringe any international rule as 
some incidents do not fall within the category of third-state countermeasures. 
Nevertheless, the increasing concern for human rights violations in other countries as 
reflected in the inclusion in treaties of "human rights clauses" discussed below, the 
conditionality of foreign aid and assistance upon human rights improvements, and the 
categorization of states according to their human rights records or their support of 
terrorism activities, such as the US' often cited reference to countries belonging to the 
"axis of evil", may be indicative of the determination of states not only not to tolerate 
but also to take action in response to serious violations of international law. This is the 
reason that such examples of state practice regarding action which does not however 
violate any norm of international law are not ignored from the context of the 
examination carried out in this chapter. It is therefore the opinion of the author that 
these cases are not entirely free from any legal value for the international community as 
they may be illustrative of what direction international law may take on the question of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured in the years to come. 
Yet, this should not be construed as meaning that states which wish to impose their own 
values can find shield behind the notion of countermeasures. For any action in breach of 
an international duty to be justified, there needs to be a prior violation of a clearly 
established obligation by the targeted state. In chapter three there was an attempt to 
illustrate that the increasing state interdependence in economic, financial and trade 
affairs - the WTO offers just one such example - makes it more likely that, at least in the 
future, the imposition of a certain measure wil l be in contradiction of an international 
obligation arising in a specific legal context (lex specialis or self-contained regimes). 
And while the violation of international obligations by a state directly injured by 
another violation is widely accepted in state practice, there is ongoing controversy with 
respect to the acceptability and legitimacy in international law of countermeasures taken 
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by states that have suffered no direct injury to an interest that is not specifically and 
individually owed to them but only to an interest that is shared. 
What is essentially at the heart of this examination is whether states not injured in their 
individual but rather in their collective rights, are entitled to take countermeasures 
against the defaulting state for the preservation of the international ordre public. This 
means that in the absence of a clear and unequivocal rule recognizing such right, the 
investigation will concentrate on the practice of states. It is state practice that will tell us 
whether the required, inter alia, opinio juris exists for the formulation of such a 
customary rule.'"'* It has already been noted earlier that the ILC in adopting the 2001 
articles concluded that state practice did not provide evidence for the existence of a rule 
permitting countermeasures of this kind. Nevertheless, from an examination of the state 
practice below one can see that it does not exclude third-state countermeasures either. 
Whilst there exists a veil of uncertainty with respect to the legal ground upon which 
such countermeasures actually rely, as states have been extremely cautious in their 
justifications, two possible interpretations may be given in this regard. Either the states 
resorting to such measures were knowingly acting in violation of international law, or 
they were relying on something which justified their course of action. Although this by 
itself would not preclude wrongfulness, it would reveal a certain opinio juris that is 
moving in the direction of gradually formulating a customary rule of international law. 
This will be examined more analytically after the existing state practice has been 
analyzed. 
Finally, it needs to be pointed out that what this examination attempts to reveal is state 
action which has been in violation of international obligations rather than domestic 
laws. 
2. Coercive Action Other Than Countermeasures 
The decision to enter into trade exchanges with another state belongs entirely within the 
discretion of each state. In the absence of an international agreement there is nothing to 
oblige states to engage in economic or other relations.'"^ The US^  position on this matter 
was always firm, as is revealed by the decades-long imposition of an embargo against 
Warbrick/1991/55. 
Eagleton/1957. Also Picchio Forlati-Sicilianos/2004/101, 
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Cuba. More specifically, the US government has always maintained that in the lack of 
any treaty commitment states possess an inherent right to exercise fiill control over their 
trade relations and to take decisions concerning the exports and imports of goods with 
other countries at will.""^ 
In these cases where no specific international obligation is involved, state practice offers 
abundant examples of especially economic responses to serious violations of 
fiandamental principles of international law. Accordingly, when the Suez Canal crisis 
broke out in 1956 as a consequence of the decision of the Egyptian government to 
nationalize the Canal, the US distanced itself from the attack undertaken against Egypt 
by both the UK and France. Wary that such action encouraged Soviet aggression but 
mostiy undermined the role of the UN and the most fiindamental principles of the 
Charter such as the prohibition of the use of force, the US attempted unsuccessfially to 
resolve the matter within the UN. Although the US found itself on the opposite side to 
its traditional allies, it was determined to use even its economic power in order to put an 
end to the UK/French aggressive policies against Egypt. To this end, the US made the 
provision of loans and aid in oil supplies very much needed by both countries 
conditional upon a ceasefire.""^ On other occasions, the US did not hesitate to deny 
military assistance based on human rights considerations in countries such as Chile, 
Uruguay, Philippines, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Argentina, 
and South Korea.'" ^  A similar approach was undertaken by European countries within 
the framework of regional organizations such as the EU. In particular, and in the context 
of its external relations with third countries, the EU introduced clauses on human rights 
considerations according to which the continuation of the cooperation between the EU 
and these states is made conditional upon respect for human rights. 
Nevertheless, the application of economic measures against another state has not been 
without difficulties or lacking controversy. On the contrary, it is often argued that article 
2 (4) of the Charter prohibits not only armed force but also economic force.'" ^  However, 
this view does not seem to prevail either in the literature or in state practice. States have 
frequently resorted to their economic advantages to induce certain conduct by an 
opponent state. The EU itself uses trade and economic benefits "in exchange" for 
US/Digest/l 976/577. 416 
Bowie/1974/61-5. 
'"^Hufbauer/1985/5,461. 
Ferguson Brown/1988-89/66-7. 
147 
respect for ftmdamental rights. The prohibition of economic coercion may however 
arise in another context, that of non-intervention and the prohibition of the use of 
economic, political or other measures in order to exert pressure on the sovereign rights 
of another state for the purpose of securing advantages of any kind. This principle finds 
expression in article 2 (7) of the Charter and in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, and its customary character can be doubted with difficulty. In this context, 
what is prohibited is not any economic coercion, but rather coercion that intends to 
subordinate the sovereign rights of another state 420 
3. Foreign Policy and Human Rights 
During the 18 '^' century the US policy was much more reserved concerning support of 
universal moral values due to fears that the US would be viewed as an imperialistic 
power.** '^ With the protecfion of human rights at home having a dominant role it was 
hoped that the American example would exercise influence over other states as well. In 
the years that followed WWII special focus was given to the anti-communist struggle, 
even i f that meant establishing alliance with countries that supported repression and 
committed human rights violations themselves. Human rights concerns gave way to 
national security considerations with the former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
noting that "it is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the 
world a direct objective of American foreign policy...The protection of basic human 
rights is a very sensifive aspect of the domestic jurisdiction of...governments."'*^^ 
The monolithic obsession to restrain communism in the world to the disadvantage of 
human rights and other fundamental principles of international law elsewhere came to a 
halt when US foreign policy was re-formulated so as to include human rights issues. 
Since 1973, the US Congress pressed for the inclusion of internationally recognized 
human rights in the foreign policy agenda and which is to be credited with this 
development. In particular, during the period 1974-78 several legislative measures were 
adopted to link foreign security and economic assistance with human rights. Among 
them, Section 32 of the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act associated economic and military 
assistance to foreign governments with respect for human rights and the 1974 Foreign 
Assistance Act amended Section 502B according to which the President should 
Ibid/69. 
Forsythe/1989/102. 
US/House/of Representatives/1973/507. 
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withhold security assistance from governments which were flagrantly violating human 
rights, subject to the exception of 'extraordinary circumstances' imperative for the 
protection of vital national interests.''^ ^ 
One of the principal objectives of President Jimmy Carter was the promotion and 
protection of human rights for the establishment of a new world order. It was the 
administration's belief that human rights considerations should form a substantial part 
of US foreign policy regarding bilateral relations with other states and policy issues, 
concerning such issues as arms sales and foreign aid.'*^ '* Human rights considerations 
became a central issue of concern for that administration whose commitment to human 
rights was said to be "absolute".'*^^ According to that view the US possessed both a 
"legal right" and responsibility under the UN Charter and international law to react to 
human rights violations,'*^^ although the American foreign policy was not always 
disassociated from national interest.''^ ^ It needs however to be pointed out that most of 
the measures associating benefits and other assistance with the protection of human 
rights were adopted at a national level at the discretion of the US government through 
legislative acts and executive orders, and not because or in violation of specific 
international legal obligations. 
In contrast, Canada, while acknowledging that international law gave states discretion to 
impose economic measures in response to "objectionable" conduct of another state 
provided that no specific international obligations were infringed - thus rejecting 
countermeasures as defined earlier - took a more restrained view. More specifically, "as 
a matter of legal and commercial policy" economic sanctions should be imposed only 
on the basis of a SC resolution adopted under Chapter VI I , or by states acting 
collectively in reaction to fundamental violations of international law and peace and 
security, in pursuance of a UN, even General Assembly, resolution.'*'^ * According to the 
Canadian Government economic sanctions constituted a derogation from the general 
principle concerning fiiendly relations among states and therefore any decision for their 
See US/Digest/1976/170. Also see Arms/Export/Act/1976; Intemational/Financial/Institutions/Act; 
Intemational/Developinent/Act/1977 in US/Digest/1977/221. Yet, when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 
the US, in violatioh'tjf both' its'doiiieStic^ legir'obligatiohs^'MiitiMed'pro^ the 
former with both military and economic assistance. For a thorough legal analysis of the administration's 
refusal to suspend assistance to Turkey see Rossides/1991. 
Kommers-Loescher/1979/212. 
Carter/1977. 
See statement of Foreign Secretary Cyrus Vance in Salzberg-Young/1977/269-274. 
CYIL/1983/31 1. 
149 
application should not be taken "lightly". However, from the above it is not clear 
whether Canada was objecting to the implementation of sanctions by all states, whether 
injured states or not, or whether it was confined to states not directly affected by a 
certain wrongdoing. We would be inclined to accept that this line of thinking related to 
third state countermeasures, as it would be very hard to prohibit states whose rights 
have been violated from taking action against the defaulting state, even by way of 
countermeasures. 
In another memorandum by Canada issued in 1985 it was noted that retaliatory action in 
violation of international law was justified i f it came in response to another international 
illegal act. Stressing that sanctions violate customary rules of international law as 
reflected in the 1970 UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, it was noted that "it is the purpose 
behind certain economic measures that serves as the essential criterion to separate 
legally permissible conduct from illicit conduct"."*^^ Once again, no clear reference to 
third states countermeasures was made. 
The Netherlands for its part, and following a mandatory decision of the SC in 1968 to 
impose sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, introduced the so-called Sanctions Bil l to 
fill in the legal loopholes in the national legislation for the implementation of the SC 
mandate. As noted in the Explanatory Memorandum the Bil l was purported to be used 
as a tool toward the national implementation of international decisions, 
recommendations or agreements concerning the maintenance of international peace and 
security, or the furtherance of the interests of the international legal order. When asked 
to define the phrase "international accords" the Dutch government stressed that it did 
not want to exclude from the scope of the Bill accords which although they did not 
constitute a decision of a certain international organization, were taken within the 
framework of an international organization. Under the explanation given, "decisions" 
taken by the EEC Council for common action, or under the European Political Co-
operation could also fall into this category.'* '^^  The Bil l allowed the application of 
measures for inter alia gross violation of human rights and breaches of the international 
legal order that could threaten international peace and security.''^' 
'^ ^ CYIL/l985/388. 
•'^°NYIL/1978/235-237. 
Sanctions/Bill/1975-76/8. 
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4. European Community Action 
Human rights considerations and the observance of fundamental principles of 
international law could not be discarded from the ambit of the EU which in some 
occasions did not hesitate to resort to countermeasures in response to serious 
infiingements of international law, even despite the fact that none of its members had 
been individually affected. A crucial question that arises in this respect is on what legal 
grounds the EU, which in the 1980s was essentially structured on the common 
economic interests of its member states rather than on common foreign policy strategic 
goals, was allowed to take countermeasures in disregard of its own obligations under 
international law, for reasons not strictly falling within its exclusive competences, and 
even against states not members to the Union. This problem, which raises questions 
especially in the context of international and European law,'*^^ was particularly apparent 
in the action taken by the EC against Argentina. 
The adoption of the 1987 Single European Act and the conclusion of the 1992 Treaty on 
EU have dramatically re-orientated not only the Community internal policies, but also 
its external policies on issues of defence, security and human rights in such a way so as 
to enable one to argue that it is upon these changes that the exercise of countermeasures 
by the European institutions can now rely.'*^^ 
The incorporation of articles 6 and 7 in the TEU and the particular weight the EU 
attaches to human rights considerations in its external relations as can be revealed from 
the numerous "human rights clauses", the clear interconnection of human rights with 
unilaterally granted benefits and trade preferences, the emphasis given by the ECJ to 
human rights as an integral part of the general principles of law, and the political 
conditions including respect for human rights as preconditions for accession to the EU, 
are all indicative of the increasingly growing interdependence between the EU and these 
internationally sacred values. 
The legal framework applicable in the case of implementation of measures decided at a 
Community level in the form of embargoes on a wide spectrum of areas, withdrawal of 
unilaterally afforded benefits or suspension of treaties concluded by the Communities, 
Ibid/185. 
Ibid/186. 
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often varies according to whether there exists a SC resolution authorizing or even 
imposing such measures. In the former case, the decision of the SC wil l prevail in 
accordance with article 103 of the Charter that provides that the obligations deriving 
therefrom should prevail over all other international obligations. Until 1970 the 
implementation of UN measures was largely perceived as falling within the domain of 
the member states and thus no regulations were adopted in order to give them legal 
effect at a Community level. This was meant to change in 1970 with the establishment 
of the European Political Co-operation, institutionalized in 1987 with the Single 
European Act. The EPC intended to enhance the cohesion and unity of the member 
states regarding issues in the interests of the Community such as external policies and to 
establish, subject to the consensus of all member states, a "common European identity 
in their foreign affairs."'* '^* According to this system, it was through Council Regulations 
adopted after the political consultation of the member states in the context of the EPC 
that UN sanctions were given effect. With the adoption of the TEU such measures can 
now take effect under the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar and the EC. 
More specifically this practice is reflected in article 301 (formerly article 228a) which 
provides for measures adopted by qualified majority by the Council acting on the 
Commission's proposal, whenever "it is provided, in a common position or in a joint 
action adopted by the Treaty on European Union relating to the common foreign and 
security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or 
completely, economic relations with one or more third countries". The Amsterdam 
Treaty, while not amending this provision, introduced a new article, article 300 (2) 
under the EC treaty, according to which the application of an agreement may be 
suspended with a decision taken by the Council (by qualified majority or unanimity 
according to the matter under consideration) without the consultation of the European 
Parliament and without making reference to a decision taken under the CFSP.'*^ ^ 
Difficulty is raised with respect to economic measures imposed in violation of existing 
treaties or other international commitments and in the absence of SC authorization. The 
EC was faced with considerations of this legal nature in the case of the gross violations 
in Uganda, thoroughly analyzed below. The fact that the EC continued its payments to 
the brutal regime of Idi Amin finds explanation as noted "in the limited possibilities for 
''"Ibid/186-7. 
Paasivirta-Rosas/ 2002/209. 
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reaction which general international law offered"."*^^ Moreover, and as previously 
discussed in chapter 3, under the law of treaties a specific agreement can be suspended 
or terminated on the ground of human rights considerations only i f the treaty so 
provides or i f the human rights violations go against the very object and purpose of the 
treaty.'* '^ Furthermore, such measures do not necessarily aim at restoring international 
peace and security, like UN measures, but rather they "constitute a deliberate reaction 
against international law violations by other States"."*^ * They can only be justified i f 
they are provided under another treaty or a rule of customary international law, such as 
countermeasures, i f allowed at all. They must further be distinguished from acts of 
retortion which concern unfriendly, yet internationally lawful conducts. This is the case 
of withdrawal of unilaterally awarded benefits, and many such examples can be found at 
Community level. Since such benefits constitute the exercise of sovereign rights their 
withdrawal does not constitute an internationally wrongful act.''^ ^ 
The issue differs with respect to measures taken in violation of specific conventional or 
other international obligations. This has driven the Community when negotiating 
agreements with third states to include human rights clauses. This admittedly affords the 
Community institutions flexibility granting them the right to temiinate or suspend a 
treaty towards a state that does not conform with such principles, without having to rely 
on general international law for the non-performance of an agreement.'*'"' As noted in 
this regard, a human rights clause "does not seek to establish new standards in the 
international protection of human rights. It merely reaffirms existing commitments 
which, as general international law, already bind all states as well as the EC in its 
capacity as a subject of general international law", although it was acknowledged that 
such a clause derived its legitimacy from an international agreement.'*'*' 
From the examination of state practice it can be seen that the suspension or termination 
of a treaty has often been justified not on the provisions of the treaty itself but rather on 
rules of customary international law like fundamental change of circumstances or 
impossibility of performance as a result of a state emergency or civil war.'*'*^  It is 
Riedel/1999/723. 
Ibid/724. 
"^ ^ Paasivirta-Rosas/2002/210. 
Ibid/212. 
Brandtner-Rosas/1998/474. 
Ibid/475. 
Riedel/1999/724-5. 
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therefore suggested by this author, as already discussed in the previous chapter, that 
should the invocation of customary rules of the law of treaties be accepted, then equally 
the customary rules of the law on state responsibility, including the rules on 
countermeasures, should also be able to apply within a specific treaty, even for reasons 
not specifically provided by it. Riedel and Will argue that since the EC is not a party to 
human rights treaties, it would "possibly" be entitied to take reprisals (countermeasures) 
only for "violations of the minimum standards of human rights protection recognized in 
customary international law as valid erga omnes'".^^^ Of course, the main challenge here 
will be to prove that there indeed exists a right to countermeasures by a state other than 
the injured under customary international law. 
5. An Examination of Responses to Violations of Collective Interests in State 
Practice 
It is suggested to divide the investigation of state practice into two categories. In 
particular, the first category will include cases which although they do not involve the 
infringement of specific international obligations arising either from treaty or custom, 
they are illustrative of the determination of states to exert economic and other pressure 
against states in response to serious violations of fundamental collective interests. In 
this category reference will also be made to measures whose characterization as lawfial 
countermeasures is disputed not because they are not in contravention with any 
international norm, but rather as not fiilfilling one of the other conditions of 
countermeasures, namely the fact that they must be taken in response to a previously 
committed internationally wrongfiil act. The second category will include state practice 
which in the opinion of the author supports the implementation of countermeasures by 
states other than the injured in response to violations of obligations established either 
for the common good of a group of states, or the international community as a whole. 
The results of the current research in either category are cited by way of chronological 
order rather than significance. 
Ibid/726. 
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5.1. State Action Not Amounting to Countermeasures 
5.1.1. Soviet Action against Israel (1956) 
In 1956 the Soviet Union obstructed the shipment of petroleum by the Soviet Petroleum 
Export Corporation to Israeli importers by not granting an export license to the 
company that had reached the agreement with Israel. This action was taken as a 
consequence of Israel's aggression against Egypt in the Suez Canal crisis.'*'*'* When the 
dispute was brought by Israel before the Soviet Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission 
the petroleum Corporation invoked grounds o f f o r c e majeure for its failure to honour its 
agreement.'*'*^ It is observed that under international law a state-owned enterprise may 
invoke force majeure whenever the performance of its treaty commitments towards a 
private party is not possible due to a government order or decision of the controlling 
state, for reasons not foreseen at the time of conclusion of the agreement. In this event 
the state-owned company is treated by law as a private enterprise, and thus discharged 
of its obligations under the treaty, provided that certain conditions are met with.'*''^ 
In addition to the above measure the Soviet government decided to cut off diplomatic 
relations with Israel by recalling its ambassador, a measure that does not infiinge 
specific international obligations.'*'*^ 
The significance of this particular incident does not lie in the fact that it provides 
evidence of state practice supporting countermeasures by a state whose rights have not 
been individually infringed, but rather in the fact that it reveals the determination of one 
state, here the Soviet Union, to inflict economic burden upon another, Israel, for 
violating a fiindamental principle of international law, namely the prohibition of the use 
of force. Of course the position would substantially change had the Soviet Union have 
possessed a specific obligation under customary or conventional international law to 
export petroleum to Israel or to conduct trade and commercial activities with it. 
Doxey/1971/33-34; also Lillich/1976/24. 
'US/Digest/1970/861. 
' Scott-Maravilla/2002/82. 
Suez/CanaUCrisis. 
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5.1.2. OAS Action Against the Dominican Republic (1960) 
In the light of alleged subversive and aggressive acts against Venezuela and its 
involvement in the attempted assassination of the Venezuelan President, the OAS 
decided to take action against the Dominican Republic in a resolution adopted in 1960 
and with which all OAS member states had to comply under the Treaty of Rio de 
Janeiro.'*'*^  The resolution condemned the Trujillo regime for acts of aggression and 
intervention against a foreign country whilst it authorized the implementation of a 
number of measures against the Dominican Republic. This action was justified under 
article 6 of the Treaty which authorized the OAS to take action whenever the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any American state was affected by any situation 
that posed a threat to the peace in the continent.'*''^  The measures initially involved the 
cutting off of diplomatic relations, the partial interruption of economic relations and an 
export ban of military equipment to the Dominican Republic which later extended to the 
prohibition of exports of petroleum and petroleum products and lorries. This action was 
to have effect as long as the Dominican Republic constituted a threat to the peace and 
security of the hemisphere. It needs to be pointed out that that was the first time that the 
OAS decided the imposition of sanctions against a member state. 
In accordance with Articles 53 and 54 of the UN Charter the Secretary-General of OAS 
reported the action to the SC. The Soviet Union argued that under article 53 only the SC 
was entitled to authorize the application of enforcement action by regional organs 
against any other state, and for this reason the OAS was not empowered to take any 
action against the Dominican Republic.''^'' The US responded that what article 53 
actually precluded was forcible action and not economic, commercial and other peaceful 
measures, although this was not the position taken by the US during the drafting of the 
UN Charter. 
The OAS member states, although acting on the basis of a treaty authorization, were 
third states to the violations that were allegedly committed by the Dominican Republic. 
It is in this sense that their reaction in defending principles which had been established 
for the collective interest of thie OAS and not for each one of them individually gains 
Akehurst/1967/188-89. 
Ibid/192. Nevertheless, it needs to be mentioned that the Bogota Conference of 1948 which led to the 
drafting of the OAS Charter intentionally did not incorporate the notion of sanctions for human rights 
violations except whenever international peace was threatened. Ibid/205. 
Claude/1964/49. 
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significance in the context of this examination, even i f their action, in the form of the 
measures mentioned above, is not found to be in breach of any international obHgation. 
5.1.3. The Case of Greece and the European Convention on Human Rights (1967) 
On 21 April 1967 a military coup emerged in Greece which resulted in the overthrow of 
the democratically elected government and in its substitution with a dictatorial regime. 
To establish its powers the regime proceeded to adopt numerous measures aiming at 
suppressing any political opposition or reaction. With the Royal Decree of April 1967 a 
state of emergency was declared and certain Constitutional provisions were suspended. 
In June 1967 the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe passed a resolution deploring the situation in Greece and calling upon the 
signatory states to the EConv.HR, on the basis of what was then Article 24, to refer the 
so-called Greek case to the European Commission of Human Rights."* '^ A few months 
later, and in compliance with the resolution, Denmark, Norway and Sweden initiated 
proceedings against Greece before the Commission arguing that the Royal Decree was 
in violation of the Convention, and in particular of the right to freedom from arbitrary 
arrest and detention (art. 5), the right to a fair trial (art. 6), the right to private and family 
life (art. 8), the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (art. 9), the right to 
freedom of expression (art. 10), the right to peaceful assembly and association (art. 11), 
the right to an effective domestic remedy (art. 13) and the right not to be discriminated 
against on the basis inter alia of political beliefs (art. 14). They also claimed that Greece 
had improperly invoked Article 15 of the Convention that allowed for derogations from 
the Convention as there existed neither a war or public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation, nor were the measures adopted and their continued application under the 
Royal Decree "strictly required by the exigencies of the situation". Just days later, the 
Netherlands filed similar proceedings against Greece. 
Two questions must be addressed here. The first has to do with whether Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands possessed a right to file proceedings against 
Greece under either the Convention or international law, whilst the second is to consider 
whether such action resulted from these states being individually injured, or injured in 
their collective interests, either as members of a specific group or of the international 
The resolution is reproduced in Council of Europe, Directorate of Information, Doc. B (67) 37 
(26.6.67). 
157 
community as a whole. This has significance for the question whether these states were 
entitled to resort to countermeasures or not. 
On the basis of former article 24 of the Convention any contracting party was entitled to 
bring a claim before the Commission for alleged violations by another party, 
irrespective of the fact that the alleged violation was not directed against the nationals of 
the state bringing the action. In this regard no special interest was needed to be shown. 
Therefore, the answer to the first question above is that under the EConv.HR, which 
constitutes an international agreement, the member states were indeed entitled to seek 
judicial review by referring a case of infringement to the bodies established under the 
Convention for the supervision and safeguarding of its provisions. 
In relation to the question whether such a contracting state would be bringing an action 
under former article 24 as an injured state or not, the Commission had previously 
concluded that: 
A High Contracting Party, when it refers an alleged breach of the Convention to the Commission under 
Article 24, is not to be regarded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing its own rights, 
but rather as bringing before the Commission an alleged violation of the public order of Europe.'*'* 
It is clear from the above that the four states acting against Greece were not acting on 
the ground that there had been an infringement against rights individually owed to them. 
While the alleged violations took place thousands of miles away from the four 
complainants, none of their nationals or their other interests had suffered any kind of 
direct injury from Greece's action. On the contrary, it was Greece's own nationals that 
were the direct victims of the violations. The four countries rather took the action in 
defence of certain values established for the collective interest and good of the countries 
party to the Council of Europe. Their action therefore falls under what it now constitutes 
article 48 (a) of the ILC 2001 articles on state responsibility. 
During the period concerned, once a complaint arrived before the Commission, the 
Commission had to examine it and try to reach a friendly settlement of the dispute 
among the parties involved. In the absence of a consensus, the Commission had to refer 
its conclusions on the facts and on the alleged violations of the Convention to the 
y^u5/na/ECHR/1961/140. 
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Committee of the Council of Ministers which could decide to send the case to be 
examined by the Court. However, at the time of the dispute concerned, Greece had not 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, and as a result the case could not be referred to it 
without its consent. Whenever a case could not be referred to the Court, former article 
32 gave the Council of Ministers some adjudicatory jurisdiction to determine the 
dispute, although this capacity was criticized as the Committee of Ministers constitutes 
a political rather than a judicial body.'*^^ Once the Committee of Ministers concluded 
under this power that there had been an infringement of the Convention, it could order 
the violating party to take all the appropriate measures suggested by the Commission to 
comply with its obligations, and could set a deadline by which date the state should 
conform. Among other measures that could be taken under this provision, the 
Committee of Ministers could request the Greek government to abolish the Royal 
Decree Act that established the state of emergency and suspended the Constitution. In 
the event that there was no compliance, former article 32 (3) provided that "the 
Committee of Ministers shall decide... what effect shall be given to its original decision 
and shall publish the Report". At the same time, the Statute of the Council of Europe 
allowed the expulsion of a contracting party whenever it violated "the principles of the 
rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights 
and fiandamental freedoms". 
As in the case of measures imposed by the OAS against the Dominican Republic, here 
also the four states participating in the proceedings against Greece were acting on the 
basis of an international treaty to which they adhered. However, the fact that the four 
countries here were defending common principles and values, those of fundamental 
human rights should not be overlooked. It is also not without significance that Greece, 
feeling the pressure of the proceedings against it, took the decision to withdraw from the 
Council of Europe. Although this was not the reaction the applicant states had wished 
for, it does reveal the pressure that the dictatorial regime in Greece faced in the 
international arena, something that would not have happened had no such action been 
instigated in the first place. When similar action was taken some years later by the 
Scandinavian states, the Netherlands and France against the military regime that 
assumed power in Turkey at the beginning of the 1980s, the judicial organs of the 
Council of Europe stressed that the Convention is a "constitutional instrument of 
Buergenthal/1968/446. 
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European public order in the field of human rights"/^"* which goes beyond merely 
establishing bilateral commitments between its member states. Rather, it creates 
objective obligations entitling all states to seek their observance.'*^^ 
The situation in Greece did not leave unaffected its relations with the EEC with which it 
had been connected pursuant to an Association Agreement since 1962. The European 
Parliament, in reaction to the military coup d'etat, passed what was later described as an 
unprecedented resolution expressing its solidarity with the Greek people who were 
"suffering in defense of the ideals of freedom and democracy".'*^^ The Parliament also 
made clear that for as long as Greece lacked democratically elected institutions the 
Association Agreement was at stake and it would not be implemented fully unless 
Greece respected its obligations under the EConv.HR. The coup d'etat also provoked a 
number of formal parliamentary questions to the Commission of the European 
Communities.'*^^ More specifically, and at the same time that Denmark, Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands instigated proceedings against Greece before the 
EComHR, the Commission of the EEC rejected a $10 million loan for development, 
despite the fact that the request had already been approved by the European Investment 
Bank.'*^* Most importantly however, and despite the clear uncertainty as to how to deal 
with the situation that emerged in Greece, the Commission decided to carry out those 
parts of its Association Agreement with Greece which involved specific obligations like 
in the areas of trade and tariffs, while to associate those areas which still required 
negotiations and were not bound by specific legal duties with political reform in 
Greece.'*^^  Rejecting claims for the renunciation or suspension of the agreement the 
Community institutions relied upon legal grounds in view of the absence of specific 
clauses in the agreement.'"'*' What is interesting is whether the EEC had the competence 
to "fi"eeze" certain parts of the agreement since the latter made no specific provision that 
could be accommodated to the situation that emerged as a result of the coup, apart fi-om 
some reference in the preamble for the need to strengthen peace and liberty. 
Accordingly, the political criteria of the Greek association could only be drawn by 
inference, whilst it remained unclear what the EEC could do in case of their violation.'*^' 
•**^'(5/iW50s/owio5/EGHR/1991/l-13/(121) in Frowein/199473'45. 
Frowein/1994/360. 
OJ/1967/No. 10/2058. Also Parlement/Europeen/Debats/1967/11-20. 
For instance see OJn967/No.243/2. 
New/York/Times/1967/14. See Buergenthal/1968/448. 
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At the same time, Greece itself was very reluctant to challenge the Community and the 
legality of its decision towards it since the Community had been extremely cautious in 
enforcing its specific legal obligations arising from the agreement.'* '^^  
Yet, Buergenthal notes that were Greece to be expelled from the Council of Europe, the 
EEC itself would be under tremendous pressure to suspend its Association Agreement 
with Greece. To conclude: 
But even if the Community should for legal reasons be unable to comply with a demand for the complete 
suspension of the Association Agreement, it is clear that Greece would be economically harmed by a 
Community policy which limited co-operation with Greece exclusively to a grudging compliance with the 
clearly-defined obligations of the Association Agreement and left unexecuted the wider aims of this 
treaty.^ " 
Buergenthal is of the opinion that it would have been very difficult to suspend the 
Association Agreement in its entirety as a consequence of the coup because apart from a 
general reference in the preamble of the Agreement for the safeguarding of peace and 
liberty by the parties, there was no other clause upon which such action could be based. 
The hesitation of the EEC member states to suspend their Association Agreement with 
Greece reveals the scepticism which existed at the time regarding the imposition of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured in international law. However at the 
same time the European states, through the above described action instigated in the EEC 
and the Council of Europe, did not. remain inactive in respect of the flagrant human 
rights violations taking place in Greece, therefore enhancing the notion of economic and 
other coercion in the name of collective interests. 
5.1.4. Netherlands Action against Surinam (1980) 
With the overthrow of the government of Surinam in February 1980 by Colonel 
Bouterse and in response to the serious human rights violations taking place on the 
territory of Surinam, the Netherlands decided to suspend its Treaty on development 
Cooperation, circumventing the normal procedures provided under the treaty and 
invoking as its justification the principle clausula rebus sic standibus (fundamental 
Ibidyi26. 
Buergenthal/1968/449. 
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change of circumstances) which would have immediate and direct effect.'* '^* Two 
elements need to be fulfilled for the lawful application of this doctrine: first, that the 
changed circumstances constituted an essential basis for the consent of the contracting 
parties when concluding the treaty and secondly, that the changed circumstances 
radically altered the obligations to be performed under the treaty. It has been argued in 
this regard that the suspension of the treaty by the Netherlands could not be justified on 
the ground of change of circumstances since the condition for respect of human rights 
did not constitute the basis of the agreement between the two countries.'*^^ Most 
significantly however, the Dutch government attempted to justify its act upon the fact 
that the Surinamese actions were in violation of the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights to which both countries were signatories, in particular the rights to life 
and freedom fi"om torture which were regarded as establishing obligations erga 
omnes.^^^ Since the Netherlands was not acting as an injured state but rather was 
upholding the protection of fundamental human rights established for the collective 
good, this example sets another significant precedent of state practice supportive of 
action for the protection of collective interests, despite the fact that the argument put 
forward by the Dutch government in order to justify its decision did not rely on a right 
to third-state countermeasures, but rather on the ground of fundamental change of 
circumstances. It is for this reason that the ILC itself, in the commentary of article 54 of 
the final articles, distinguished this example from other cases which clearly set a 
precedent in favour of countermeasures by states other than the injured. 
5.1.5. US Action Against Iraq (1980) 
This incident arose in early 1980 as a result of an attack upon an Israeli kibbutz by the 
Arab Liberation Front which Iraq allegedly supported. The US, in response to this 
attack decided to suspend an agreed sale to Iraq of $208 million worth of turbine 
engines thus subjecting it to countermeasures on the ground of terrorist involvement. 
These trade restraints lasted until 1982, and in 1984 the US imposed a further embargo 
on chemical exports to Iraq that could be used for the development of chemical 
weapons.'*^^ 
Okafor/Obasi/2003/98-9. Also Hufbauer/1985/726. 
Chinkin/1996/196. 
Okafor/Obasi/2003/100. 
"•^  Hufbauer-Schott-Elliott/1990 in Petman/2004/366. 
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This incident, although not widely referred to in commentary may indeed offer another 
example of possible third state countermeasures in response to serious violations of 
international law, in view of the fact that it is not entirely clear whether the agreed sale 
was the object of a private contract, or whether it constituted an agreement between the 
US and Iraq in which case the suspension would be in breach of international law. 
Furthermore, as it has often been stressed, there needs to be a specific obligation clearly 
infringed by the targeted country before countermeasures can be justified against it. For 
the US to be entitled to resort to countermeasures, although as already seen this is very 
much disputed as the attack was not directed against it, it would need to establish that 
Iraq, by clearly and unequivocally supporting terrorism, had violated a customary rule 
of international law which created obligations erga omnes. In this respect this case 
seems to be similar to the claims, examined below, made by the Arab states against the 
US and other countries for supporting Israel, allegedly contributing in this way to the 
violation of an erga omnes obligation. Provided that this requirement is fulfilled and 
that the US with the suspension of the turbine engine sales was in breach of its own 
treaty obligations towards Iraq, then the case would enhance state practice regarding the 
recognition of a right to third state countermeasures. Due however to the doubts which 
exist relating to whether certain state obligations had been infringed by the US in the 
particular case, it is regarded necessary to include this example in that category of cases 
not clearly illustrating state practice in support of third-state countermeasures. In any 
event, the significance of this incident should not be undermined as it reveals the 
determination of one state not directly injured by a given wrongful act to take such 
measures necessary for the protection of what can arguably be described as collective 
interests. 
5.1.6. The Bonn Declaration (1978) and the Hijacking Incident (1981) 
In 1978 the Heads of State and Government of the seven most industrialized countries 
of the world'*^^ issued the so called Bonn Declaration, which reflected their 
determination to take immediate action against a country which refused to extradite or 
prosecute individuals involved in the hijacking of aircrafts or to return such aircraft by 
halting "all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the 
country concerned". This section will not focus on the question of whether the 
Declaration could lawfiilly create obligations and be directed against innocent states that 
'"'^  Canada, France, the UK, the US, West Germany, Italy and Japan. 
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have committed no wrong. The Bonn Declaration however may be useful in the context 
of the current examination concerning the existence of enough or substantial state 
practice to support the existence of a right by not directly injured states to resort to 
countermeasures by suspending their own aviation obligations towards the targeted state 
in response to violations of obligations erga omnes. 
From the wording of the Declaration it can be noted that the participating states took the 
commitment - whether legal or political remains to be seen - to take such action against 
a state refusing to extradite or prosecute, irrespective of the nationality of the aircrafts 
involved in the hijacking and the individuals affected therefrom, or the territory on 
which such hijacking took place, and irrespective of whether that state had accepted the 
Declaration.''^^ One of the issues that needs to be addressed here is on what legal 
grounds such a Declaration could establish obligations, especially against a state not 
having consented to it. It is submitted that any legal obligations regarding the return of 
the hijacked aircraft or the prosecution or extradition did not arise as a result of the 
Declaration, but instead, either from a customary rule of international law having an 
erga omnes character, or the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft''^'* and the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawfiil Seizure of Aircraft, provided of course that the targeted state had been a party 
to these instruments.''^' Therefore, i f a state is not a party to any of these international 
agreements it is difficult to establish its international responsibility, even more so 
because the Declaration does not seem to be part of these Agreements establishing 
special enforcement mechanisms in the event of their violation. Moreover, Busuttil 
argues that since the two Conventions have not been universally endorsed, it is very 
difficult to say that they reflect customary norms of international law.''^^ Accordingly, 
the mere fact of refusing to comply with any of the terms of the Declaration does not 
establish the responsibility of the state.''^ ^ In addition, the Declaration does not reveal an 
intention on the part of its parties to strengthen it with legally binding effects, as a result 
of which it is doubtful i f it creates any legal obligations even as between them.''^'' 
''^'lLM/1978/Vol. 17/1285. 
'*™See Busuttil/1982/476. 
Ibid/477. 
""^  Busuttil/1982/480. Also Chamberlain/1983/620, 
Busuttil/1982/481. 
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Legal considerations regarding the Bonn Declaration have arisen from the decision of 
the seven states which adopted it to implement its provisions against Afghanistan. In 
March 1981 a Pakistani aircraft was hijacked and taken to Afghanistan. In view of the 
Afghan government's failure to cease giving refrige to the hijackers the seven states 
condemned the decision of the Afghan government as being in flagrant violation of the 
obligations arising from the Hague Convention to which Afghanistan was a party, and 
considered a suspension of all flights to and from Afghanistan as provided under the 
Bonn Declaration unless Afghanistan complied with its obligations. A few months later, 
and in the light of no progress having been made by Afghanistan, the UK, France and 
West Germany, the only countries having air agreements with the country, decided to 
denounce their air services agreements with Afghanistan. However, it is imperative to 
examine on what legal grounds these three states based their actions. In other words, 
they could only have lawftilly taken such action, excluding the question of the 
lawfulness of third state countermeasures, i f the obligation breached was individually 
owed to them or specially affected them or i f it was an obligation erga omnes. 
Chamberlain suggests in this regard that although it was difficult to conclude that the 
obligations entailed in the Hague and Montreal"*^^ Conventions were part of customary 
international law, he is of the opinion that "certain principles of customary international 
law can be formulated on the basis of these Conventions as well as of other international 
instruments" and in particular various UN and ICAO resolutions."*^^ Therefore, 
according to his view all states possessed a duty under customary international law not 
to allow their territories to be used as safe havens for terrorists and individuals involved 
in acts of hijacking, provided that their refiisal to extradite or prosecute was not the 
result of technical difficulties but rather of intentional systematic failure to do so."*^ ^ 
However, the fact that all states have a certain duty does not necessarily imply that in 
case of its violation all states have an interest to react. Chamberlain argues in this regard 
that i f the wrongdoing state is a party to any of the Conventions mentioned above, then 
the other states parties will be entitled to take retaliatory measures against it under 
general international law, as that state is in breach of an international obligation owed to 
all the parties to the Conventions. He finds it however difficult to support the legitimacy 
of retahatory measures against a state that is not party to these conventions, unless the 
""^  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed in 
Montreal, 23 September 1971 in Chamberlain/1983/617. 
476, 
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Chamberlain/1983/629. 
Ibid/630. 
165 
other states are directly affected by the violation.'*^^ Although it is not entirely clear, it 
seems to be suggested that only all the other parties to the Conventions would be 
entitled to respond to a violation of an obligation erga omnes partes which has been 
established for the collective interest of the group. Therefore it would be essential, 
adopting this approach to establish whether both Afghanistan and the states taking 
action against it were parties to these Conventions. 
The case becomes even more complicated by the fact that the denunciation of the 
agreements by the three countries did not take effect until one year later, something that 
was consistent with the terms of the agreements themselves.'*^^ Chamberlain in 
particular criticizes this extremely politically cautious position of the UK, West 
Germany and France to give one year's notice before actually giving effect to the 
denunciation of their respective agreements with Afghanistan.'* '^^  Finally, it needs to be 
reminded that countermeasures must be of a temporary character. Issues of suspension 
or termination of a treaty fall within the law of treaties and not the law on state 
responsibility. 
Yet, the particular gravity of hijacking on the safety of international aviation could be 
said to establish a customary obligation erga omnes. Even i f there exists littie proof in 
international law for the customary and erga omnes nature of the obligation to extradite 
or prosecute or even to return the aircraft, could it not be the case that these obligations 
derive from the principal prohibition of hijacking itself? Furthermore, it is the 
determination of these not specially affected states to react to what they viewed as a 
serious violation of international law that has significance for the purposes of this 
section. 
5.1.7. The Imposition of Martial Law in Poland and the Soviet Involvement (1981) 
When in December 1981 the Polish government ordered, with the alleged 
encouragement, advice and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, the application of 
martial law in the country with the repression of trade unions, political dissidents and 
civil rights, the US expressed its profound condemnation and concern for the situation 
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that emerged as a result. Immediately after the decision of the Polish government US 
President Ronald Reagan, in the absence of a SC resolution, gave instructions for the 
suspension of the most significant elements of the country's economic relafionships 
with Poland, the actions of which were, according to the American government, in 
violation of the UN Charter (although not specifying which principles exactly had been 
violated), the Helsinki Final Act (a not legally binding instrument although in certain 
cases it reflects customary norms of international law) and the Gdansk agreement of 
August 31, 1980 with the leaders of the Solidarity movement.'**' At the same time the 
US government called upon Poland to release all the political dissidents whose only 
offence was to exercise their civil and political rights "enshrined in many international 
documents to which [Poland] was a party".'**^ Whilst the shipment of food aid continued 
on the condition that this was received by the Polish people themselves, all shipments of 
agricultural and dairy products were suspended until their distribution could be 
monitored by independent agencies. Furthermore, the US: stopped the renewal of the 
Export-Import Bank's line of export credit insurance to Poland; opposed the extension 
of any new credits and Poland's membership in the International Monetary Fund; and 
was recommending allying countries to impose restrictions on their high-technology 
exports to Poland. In exchange for the lifting of these measures, which were not 
however in violation of international obligations as required by the definition of 
countermeasures. President Reagan called the Polish government to release all those 
arbitrarily held in prison, to cease the violence against the Polish population, to l if t the 
martial law, and to restore the internationally recognized and protected, inalienable 
rights of the Polish people to freedom of speech and association. 
In addition to the above action the US government announced that it would suspend 
aviation privileges in the US to Polish airlines and that it was in the process of 
suspending the fishing rights of Poland within American waters. With respect to 
Poland's civil aviation privileges the US proceeded with the suspension of the 1972 US-
Polish Air Transport Services Agreement on December 26, 1981."**^  The Civil 
Aeronautics Board informed LOT (Polskie Linie Lomicze) about the suspension of the 
foreign air carrier permit issued to LOT. LOT protested against the suspension on the 
ground that the President's decision was in violation of the 1972 Agreement which did 
not permit for its suspension or termination and which was effective until March 1982. 
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More specifically, the Agreement provided that the operating permission granted to the 
airlines of the two parties could be withheld, suspended or revoked on the ground that 
the targeted airline does not satisfy the standard procedures of the aeronautical 
authorities of the state applying the suspension; or that the airline fails to comply with 
the regulations of the suspending state regarding admission and departure of air 
services; or that the suspending state believes that the designated airlines of the other 
party are not owed or controlled by it. It can therefore be seen that the Agreement 
permitted for no suspension or termination for grounds other than the ones provided by 
it, including human rights violations. Furthermore, the suspension or termination of the 
Agreement could take effect only after the consultation with the other party, with the 
exception of Article IV (A) (2) of the Agreement relating to entry and exit regulations, 
something that the US had failed to do. It is noted that the state of emergency as a result 
of the imposition of martial law did not seem to provide a satisfactory legal ground for 
justifying the US insuspending the Agreement without satisfying the condition of 
consultation, nor did it directly affect US interests.''^'' 
The suspension of the Polish civil aviation rights by the US had a strong economic 
impact on Polish tourism. I f justification of the US decision within the Agreement 
cannot be supported, it is necessary to determine whether such action was justified 
under any other legal ground of general international law. Whilst consideration was 
given to circumstances which could render the Agreement void, such as being in 
violation of a jus cogens norm, it was concluded that no such grounds could be proven 
as existing in the particular case. Furthermore, it was noted that the suspension of the 
Agreement could not rely on material breach or fundamental change of circumstances 
recognized under the general law of treaties as valid reasons for the suspension of a 
treaty.''^ ^ The US decision should be therefore examined in the context of the general 
law on state responsibility and in particular countermeasures. The difficulty, however, 
would be to identify the internationally wrongful act committed by Poland for which the 
US, as a non directly injured state, would be entitled to complain, either by resorting to 
countermeasures or otherwise. 
In justifying their decision the US Government pointed to the "exceedingly serious 
world events". In particular: 
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Clearly, under such circumstances, there resides in the President and the Executive [bjranch of the U.S. 
Government ample authority to suspend application of an Executive Agreement between the United 
States and a foreign country, whether or not such suspension is provided for under the specific terms of 
the Agreement.''^ ^ 
In 1982 and following the adoption of fiirther repressive measures by the Polish 
government, the US suspended Poland's MFN status on the ground that it failed to meet 
the import percentage required under the GATT. President Reagan stressed that the US 
would not remain passive to Poland's "outrages", adding: "Make no mistake: their 
crime will cost them dearly in their future dealings with America and free peoples 
elsewhere".'*^^ He fiirther stressed: "By our actions we expect to put powerful doubts in 
the minds of the Soviet and Polish leaders about this continued repression...The whole 
purpose of our actions is to speak for those who have been silenced and to help those 
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who have been rendered helpless". 
The imposition of martial law in Poland and the suspension of human rights caused 
reaction in Europe as well. In a statement issued in January 1982 by the Foreign 
Ministers of the EC member states, they condemned the situation as an infringement of 
the "most elementary human and citizens' rights, contrary to the Helsinki Final Act, the 
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" the 
significance of which went beyond merely Polish borders."*^ ^ However, in announcing 
the steps it was ready to take the EC adopted a more carefiil approach limiting measures 
on considering credit, economic and food assistance to Poland."*^ *^  Due to disagreements 
among the member states the measures were limited to the import of luxury goods and 
thus expected to have only symbolic significance.''^' Despite this it was made clear that 
the EC countries would seek consultation and close cooperation on the developments 
with the US. When examining at a later stage what fiirther action to take they requested 
the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Commission to study the economic 
measures already resorted to by the US, their scope and their impact on the economy 
and trade of the EC member states.'*''^  Moreover, the European Council announced the 
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termination on the basis of special terms of foodstuff sales to Poland whilst the exports 
under normal terms would remain unaffected.'*^^ At a NATO level it was stressed that 
the massive violations of human rights and fundamental civil liberties were in breach of 
the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki Accords. 
The problematic aspects in this case arise not only as to whether or not the US and in 
fact any other country possessed the right to resort to countermeasures in response to a 
violation of international law not injuring them in their individual rights, but also 
because in the opinion of this author the US would also have difficulty in justifying 
their action against Poland in the absence of specific and clearly spelled out 
international obligations erga omnes with which Poland had failed to comply. I f there is 
going to be a recognition of a right to countermeasures in the name of general interests 
in international practice, literature and jurisprudence there needs to be extra caution. 
This is because we do not want a general right by states not specifically injured or 
affected to resort to countermeasures whenever a violation has taken place, but only 
whenever violations of obligations with a certain content, namely jus cogens norms or 
erga omnes obligations, established for the collective interest, have occurred. 
Accordingly, the US action must be looked at on the basis of Poland's obligations. Was 
Poland, by imposing the martial law in the country, violating a specific international 
obligation? And i f the answer is in the affirmative, was that obligation possessing an 
erga omnes character which could trigger the invocation of the responsibility of the 
defaulting state by any other state? Whilst it is true that in contemporary international 
law human rights violations do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of states, it is 
equally true that not all human rights obligations have an erga omnes character. 
Accordingly, not all human rights violations would entitle any state to invoke the 
responsibility of the wrongdoer, unless of course otherwise provided. This is reflected 
in the reference in the Barcelona Case to "basic" human rights having an erga omnes 
nature, as i f to be distinguished, as already suggested, from other human rights not 
possessing such qualification.''^^ It could therefore be argued that the infringement of 
trade union rights or the freedom of expression could not give rise to any entitlement on 
the part of the US unless they were in breach of international obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole, or established for the collective good of a group of 
states. 
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In parallel with the measures adopted against Poland, the US called upon the USSR to 
allow the restoration of basic rights in Poland and warned it that the US would "have no 
choice but to take further concrete political and economic measures affecting our 
relationship"''^^ in the event that the repression in Poland continued. A few days later 
the US announced that it would extend the economic measures to the Soviet Union for 
its role and interference in the situation in Poland. In a statement issued on 29 
December 1981, it was noted that: 
The Soviet Union bears a heavy and direct responsibility for the repression in Poland. For many months 
the Soviets publicly and privately demanded such a crackdown. They brought major pressures to bear 
through now-public letters to the Polish leadership, military manoeuvres and other forms of intimidation. 
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They now openly endorse the suppression which has ensued. 
According to the US, the USSR was in breach of its obligations under the Helsinki Final 
Act (although this is not a legally binding instrument), and the UN Charter.''^ * 
Among the first steps taken was the suspension of landing rights to the US by the Soviet 
airline Aeroflot. Aeroflot had at the time been granted permission under Section 402 of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to conduct two roundtrips per week between Moscow 
and New York/Washington DC made conditional on "all applicable provisions of any 
treaty, convention, or agreement affecting international air transportation now in effect 
or that may become effective during the period this permit remains in effect, to which 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. shall be parties".''^^ The two countries were bound by 
a bilateral agreement, namely the US-USSR Civil Air Transport Agreement of 1966. 
According to the Agreement the service to be operated by designated carriers should be 
approved by both parties. Although numerous intergovernmental agreements took effect 
since the conclusion of the 1966 Agreement in order to determine the service levels, the 
last of these intergovernmental agreements had expired in 1979 with the common 
understanding that fiiture agreement would determine the acceptable pattern of service. 
However, these negotiations never took place. It was therefore the position of the US 
government that since no fiarther agreement existed on the schedules; frequency and 
capacity of flights conducted by Aeroflot, the latter was conducting its flights at the 
"""^  Cumulative/Digest/l981 -1988/III/2968. 
Keesing/1982/31456. 
Ibid. 
"'^  Cumulative/Digest/1981 -1988/III/2970. 
171 
discretion of the US government . I t was therefore noted that the suspension of 
Aeroflot's flights to the US in response to the USSR's involvement in the situation in 
Poland was not in violation of the Aviation Agreement with the Soviets as there was no 
guaranteed level of service under the agreement at that moment. At the same time, 
reference was made to the world events that preceded the decision on the suspension of 
Aeroflot's rights which were of overriding importance. 
Other measures decided against the Soviet Union were: the suspension of issuance or 
renewal of export licenses for high tech items such as electronic equipment and 
computers; the closure of the Soviet Purchasing Commission office in New York; the 
suspension of negotiations on the extension of the grain agreement between the two 
countries; the suspension of negotiations for a new maritime agreement and the 
imposition of stricter requirements for port-access to all Soviet vessels in the light of the 
forthcoming expiration of the US-USSR bilateral maritime frade agreement and as from 
that day; the expansion of restrictions and controls on the export of oil and gas 
equipment and pipe layers to the Soviet Union, initially imposed in 1978 in response to 
human rights violations, so as to include commodities and technical data for 
transmission or refinement of petroleum or natural gas for energy usage; and the 
intention of non-renewal of US-Soviet agreements coming to an end, like for example 
the agreements on energy, science and technology. It is worth-pointing out that none 
of the measures just referred to was in breach of obligations arising either from 
customary or conventional norms. At the same time, the US put pressure on the 
countries participating in the construction of a new natural gas pipeline to withhold their 
co-operation with the USSR. However, West Germany, France and Japan refiised to 
suspend the project.^°^ In January 1982 the US ceased export licences for the export of 
components for gas compressor turbines needed for the construction of a pipeline deal 
between the USSR and the Western European firms.^^'* It seems that some European 
states were reluctant to proceed with more determinative measures against the USSR 
not on legal concerns, but rather on economic considerations.^^^ This conclusion is 
rather strengthened by the fact that not only did certain European states like West 
^•^Ibid. 
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Germany and France not suspend already existing agreements with the USSR, they also 
proceeded with the conclusion of new ones.^ *^ ^ 
With respect to the Soviet Union the European Council decided to reduce its imports in 
February 1982.^ "^ This took effect with Council Regulation 596/82 with which the 
Council decided to suspend the preferential treatment of goods imported from the USSR 
which were exempted from quantitative restrictions according to previous Council 
Regulations, because Community interests required so, although no ftirther explanation 
was given regarding what that meant,.^ "^ However it needs to be noted that this 
concession had previously been unilaterally granted to the Soviet Union, and therefore 
with its suspension no international obligations were infringed on the part of the EEC. 
The EEC member states based their action on former article 113 - which allowed the 
member states, whenever negotiating agreements with third states to reach their decision 
by qualified majority- and not on former article 224 as the crisis did not seem to fu l f i l 
its conditions with respect to serious internal disturbances or obligations for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Greece, for political reasons denied to 
participate in any kind of trade and other measures against the USSR. Accordingly, the 
regulation noted that Greece was not to join in the implementation of the measures 
against the USSR on grounds referring to economic and trade difficulties faced by it.^°^ 
Furthermore it is noted that the EEC action against the USSR did not entail the violation 
of trade agreements within the GATT context.^'" 
The UK on the other hand announced restrictions on the movement of Soviet and Polish 
diplomats and that there would be no new financial aid to Poland, measures that were 
not however inconsistent with international law. The UK government commented that 
these measures "are not really sanctions as such but a signal to the Polish and Soviet 
authorities of Allied disapproval. We believe this is just as strong a signal as the US 
measures".^" 
Despite the action taken especially by the US, countries like France, Italy and West 
Germany continued their agreements with the Soviet Union. As a result, and by the 
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summer of 1982, the US government announced the extension of the ban on oil and gas 
equipment sales to foreign subsidiaries of US firms and foreign companies which 
produced equipment under US license.^'^ This decision, which was criticized by many 
European states as having extraterritorial effect,^'^ need not be examined here. 
It is the belief of this author that the precedent these cases set must be examined with 
caution. The measures taken against Poland and the Soviet Union both raise significant 
questions concerning their legitimacy not only in respect of secondary rules, particularly 
countermeasures, but also in respect of the primary rules infiinged and to which such 
measures were a response. Unless the international obligations erga omnes infiinged by 
Poland and the Soviet Union are specifically identified, the reaction taken mainly by the 
US but also by other states will be viewed with suspicion. Specifically in relation to the 
Soviet intervention, whilst it could be argued that it was in violation of the prohibition 
of intervention in the internal affairs of another country, such a claim would be difficult 
to be sustained had the Soviet Union been acting with the consent of Poland. 
5.1.8. US Action against Nicaragua (1982) 
In 1982 the US government, by Proclamation No. 4941 established a quota on the 
import of sugar which had a direct impact on Nicaragua's exports of the product in the 
American market. This came in response to Nicaragua's alleged interference in the 
sovereignty of neighbouring countries. In 1984 a GATT panel was invited to look at 
Nicaragua's claims that the US action was in violation of its GATT obligations as it was 
taken for political rather than economic reasons and therefore it was unjustified as 
discriminatory. The US not only did not attempt to rebut Nicaragua's allegations, but 
also confirmed that its decision, although it had ti-ade implications, was not taken for 
trade considerations. It refiased to justify its action under any exception clauses or in the 
context of GATT. It rather stressed that the specific dispute could not be resolved in the 
context of GATT, without producing fiarther arguments for this purpose. It is merely 
noted that the US only contested that "its action was fully justified in the context in 
which it was taken".^''* The panel, restricted by its own tenns of reference, found it 
sufficient to examine the dispute on the basis of GATT, accepting Nicaragua's claims. 
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It seems from the above that the US did not hesitate to violate its trade obUgations in the 
Hght of concerns that fell outside the GATT system. However, in order to remedy the 
fears of vulnerable states with respect to the validity of third-state countermeasures, we 
must find ways to strengthen the grounds on which states willing to resort to such 
measures may rely and to impose the most stringent conditions. It needs therefore to be 
stressed that although this case offers a clear example of violation of specific treaty 
obligations, uncertainty may exist with respect to the wrongdoing initially committed by 
Nicaragua which would justify not only countermeasures by an injured state, but also by 
third states. In other words, before one can incorporate this example as indicative of 
state practice in support of third-state countermeasures, it must first be determined as to 
whether Nicaragua had infiinged its international obligations, and i f the answer is to the 
affirmative, as to whether the infringed obligation had an erga omnes character. Had the 
US argued that its action was in response to unlawfiil use of force by Nicaragua, then 
this example would clearly be establishing a precedent of state practice in support of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured in response to a serious violation of 
international law. 
In 1985 the US government issued Executive Order No. 12513 enfitled "Prohibiting 
Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving Nicaragua" which it justified on the 
grounds of an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign 
policy of the US as a result of Nicaragua's aggressive poHcies in Central America of 
subverting its neighbouring countries, destabilizing military buildup and enhancing its 
military and security ties with the USSR and Cuba. The Order prohibited all imports of 
goods and services from, and all exports to Nicaragua were prohibited. At the same time 
all Nicaraguan air carriers were banned from engaging in any transportation from or to 
the US, whilst all vessels of Nicaraguan registry were prevented from entering into US 
ports.^ ^^ Nicaragua on its part argued that the trade embargo was in violafion of the UN 
Charter, the OAS Charter, the GATT, and the 1956 US/Nicaraguan Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol. The latter was terminated by the 
US, invoking arguments that the policies and actions of the Nicaraguan government 
were incompatible with normal commercial relations between the two countries. The 
US was thus reacting to Nicaragua's use of force in violation of the UN Charter against 
its neighbours, Honduras and Costa Rica, by incurring into their territory and supporting 
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armed bands and rebels. In a subsequent complaint filed by Nicaragua against the US 
within the GATT context concerning the trade embargo, a GATT panel was actually 
unable to examine the merits of the case because the US had invoked the security clause 
under Article X X I . However, the panel, not really convinced by the US justification, 
noted in its 1986 report that irrespective of whether the US action was justified under 
Article XXI , such boycotts contradicted the very purposes of the GATT for non-
discriminatory and fireedom from obstacles to trade practices.^'^ 
It is remarkable that when the dispute was brought before the ICJ by Nicaragua, the 
Court, despite the fact that it acknowledged Nicaragua's own wrongfiil acts and in 
particular the use of force in violation of article 2 (4) of the Charter, failed to examine 
the US termination of the 1956 Treaty on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the 
context of the law of countermeasures. Instead, the Court stressed that a state was 
entitled to cease trade relations with a certain state only insofar as there was no treaty or 
other commitment under international law.^'^ Examining fiirther whether the US 
decision to terminate the treaty could be justified under the article X X I exemption from 
GATT, the ICJ held that in the absence of evidence from the US, the embargo did not 
fiilfill the condition of necessity for the protection of essential security interests as 
provided under that provision.^'^ 
This incident, viewed in the context of general international law rather than that of a 
regime lex specialis such as the GATT, could have some legal significance for the 
purposes of the current examination, although the US government did not rely on a right 
to respond to serious violations of collective interests by way of countermeasures, but 
rather on grounds of national security as it was already entitled to do under GATT. 
5.1.9. EC Measures against Haiti (1991) 
In 1991 a military coup that took place in Haiti ousted the democratically elected 
President of the island, Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The OAS responded immediately by 
requesting its member states to impose economic sanctions. In May 1992 the OAS 
decided to step up the trade sanctions against Haiti and in particular to ban from all 
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ports in the hemisphere ships delivering oil and other commercial cargoes to Haiti, to 
ban commercial flights from transporting goods and to cease the issuing of travel 
visas.^'^ In another context the Committee of Ministers of the ACP States recommended 
that states parties to the Lome IV Convention suspend trade with Haiti, also a party to 
this Convention, although there was initial hesitation as to the legality of such action 
under the Convention.The EC states, in the context of the EPC decided in the lack of 
any SC authorization to impose a trade embargo in infiingement of the Lome 
Convention, which although it made reference to human rights did not incorporate a 
right to democracy. This case has been criticized not so much regarding whether such 
action without SC authorization was permissible or not, but rather about the fact that the 
violation of an international obligation on Haiti's part was doubtful. According to this 
position military coups fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states and, whilst the 
Lome Convention made reference to human rights, it is difficult to construe that a right 
to democracy was also incorporated under this provision. 
5.1.10. Countermeasures against Yugoslavia (1991) 
Along with the question of whether third states may be involved in the imposition of 
unilateral economic couiitermeasures for the commission of serious violations of 
international law, is the question of whether regional organizations, such as the EU with 
its increasing economic powers, are also entitled to resort to similar action. 
With the outbreak of the ethnic conflict in the former Social Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia the international community was faced with one of the worst humanitarian 
crises ever since the end of the Second World War. In a statement issued in July 1991 
in the context of EPC, the EC and its member states expressed their deep concern for 
the increasing violence in Yugoslavia and called for the immediate initiation of 
negotiations between the conflicting parties. It was made clear in the statement that any 
peace effort should give due respect to human rights including the right of minorities 
and the right of people to self-determination and frill consideration of the UN Charter 
principles and other norms of international law relating to the territorial integrity of 
states. Leaving open the possibility of even unilateral military action in the event of any 
frirther breach of the cease-fire, the Community and its member states agreed to apply, 
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prior and in the lack of authorization by the SC,^ ^^  an embargo on armaments and 
military equipment that would have effect in the whole of the territory of Yugoslavia. 
At the same time they called upon other states to do the same, whilst also deciding to 
suspend the second and third financial protocols with Yugoslavia for so long as 
nonnalization of the situation was prevented. 
The first SC resolution on Yugoslavia^^'' was not passed until September 1991 with 
which the Community action was confirmed and approved. More specifically, with 
resolution 713 the SC expressed its full support to the efforts already made by the 
member states of the EC along with the states participating in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe for a peaceful and comprehensive settlement in 
Yugoslavia, and to their decision to suspend the delivery of all military weapons and 
equipment to Yugoslavia. At the same time, the SC acting within its powers under 
Chapter VI I decided that all states should impose an embargo upon all military material 
and equipment to Yugoslavia."^ 
The embargo however did not prevent the worsening of the situation and for this reason 
in November 1991 the EC and its member states, within the framework of another EPC 
meeting, decided to proceed with further action. Highlighting the seriousness of the 
crisis with the "indiscriminate bloodshed" and "the unacceptable threats and use of 
force against the population of Dubrovnik", the EC adopted the so-called "Yugoslav 
counter-measures". These measures involved: the immediate suspension of trade and 
cooperation with Yugoslavia and a further decision to finally terminate the agreement; 
the restoration of quantitative restrictions for textiles; the exclusion of Yugoslavia from 
the Generalized System of Preferences; and the suspension of benefits under the Phare 
program, a measure however which was not inconsistent with any treaty.^ ^^ 
Furthermore, the EC expressed its determination to work for consensus within the SC 
for the imposition of an oil embargo. These measures were given effect by a number of 
regulations and decisions passed by the EU Council within the scope of the EEC and the 
European Coal and Steel Community. On the basis of Regulation No 3300/91, and 
whilst cognizance is given inter alia to SC resolution 713 and to the radical change of 
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circumstances as a result of the hostilities taking place in the territory of Yugoslavia and 
their impact on trade and economic relations, the EU Council decided to suspend the 
trade concessions under the Cooperation Agreement between the EEC and the SPRY. 
With Regulation No 3301/91, in which no reference is made to resolution 713, the EU 
Council decided to impose quanfitative restrictions on textile products originating in 
Yugoslavia. With Council Decision 91/586/ECSC, the 1983 Cooperation Agreement 
between the EEC and the SPRY and its Protocols, in addition to the Agreement 
concerning the ECSC existing between them, were suspended with immediate effect. 
The denunciation of the Agreement between the member states of the ECSC and SPRY 
came with Council Decision 91/587/ECSC on the ground, with no reference to 
resolution 713, that "the situation in instruments to be upheld". The same wording was 
used for the denunciation of the Agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia with 
Council Decision 91/602/EEC. The trade concessions granted under the ECSC were 
suspended with Decision 91/588/ECSC with reference made to resolution 713 and as a 
result of the threat to peace the situation in Yugoslavia was creating. Yugoslavia was 
also expelled from the list of beneficiaries of the Community's generalized tariff 
preferences scheme for 1991, on the ground that "the situation which obtains in 
Yugoslavia no longer enables this country to remain on the list of beneficiaries of 
generalized tariff preferences"."^ Again, this measure was not in contravenfion with 
any specific obligation. 
In the period from April to May 1992 the Commission, upon request from the Ministers 
of Poreign Affairs, decided a number of measures to be taken against the Republics of 
c o o 
Serbia and Montenegro and sent the list with the suggested measures to the Council. 
On 27 May the member states agreed to impose a total trade embargo against 
Yugoslavia, a prohibition on all export credits and the suspension of scientific and 
technical cooperation, whilst disagreement occurred with respect to an air transportation 
moratorium and an oil embargo. Two days later the SC passed resolution 757 (1992) 
with which it decided upon the banning of all imports and exports, air fransport from 
and to Serbia and Montenegro, transport and financial services, and scientific, technical 
and cultural cooperation. 
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It needs to be noted that whilst in many cases the Community action, in the form of 
legally binding instruments, was adjusted in order to comply with SC resolutions, the 
legal justification on which the regulations and decisions rely seems to vary. Although 
no express mention is made in the above regulations, decisions and statements by the 
policy-makers of the EC of the right of the Community to resort to third-state 
countermeasures even in the absence of an express SC authorization and in defense of 
fiindamental principles of international law, it is clear that the action taken did not rely 
exclusively on such a resolution. On the contrary, the Community action at times even 
precipitated UN action. Furthermore, there is nothing to clearly and unequivocally 
indicate that the EC acted in accordance with the SC resolutions because it had a legal 
obligation to do so. It is thus suggested that the EC is only legally bound by the UN 
Charter to the extent that it codifies general rules of international law.^^^ The possibility 
of a conflict between an obligation under Community law and under the UN Charter to 
which all EC member states are parties is intended to be resolved by the inclusion in the 
Treaty of Rome of Article 297 (ex Article 224) according to which derogation from the 
EC Treaty is permitted "in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the purpose 
of maintaining peace and international security". Therefore, it seems that EC member 
states are allowed to take economic or other measures in compliance with their other 
obligations under international law for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, provided that a consultation among the member states is made "with a view to 
taking together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the common market being 
affected" by measures taken by a member state unilaterally. However, Article 297 does 
not preclude Community action in the form of sanctions within its exclusive 
competences on common commercial policy.^^'' At the same time Article 307 of the 
Treaty of Rome (ex Article 234) aims to remedy a conflict between Community law and 
public international law with the cooperation between the EC and its member states. It 
is concluded that since the EC is not the addressee of SC resolutions nor does it take 
over the obligations of its member states under other international legal instruments 
such as the UN Charter, the member states inserted Article 297 for the purpose of 
securing their international responsibilities other than the ones arising under 
Community law, which the EC cannot disregard.^^' 
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In a very interesting case brought before the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, the 
lawfulness of Council regulation (EEC) No 3300/91 of 11 November 1991 with which 
the trade concessions established by the Cooperation Agreement signed on 2 April 1980 
by the Member States of the EEC and the SFRY were suspended with immediate effect, 
was put into question. The Cooperation Agreement was denounced with Council 
Decision 91/602/EEC of 25 November 1991. The Agreement provided, among others, 
the reduction of custom duties on imports into the Community of wine of fresh grapes 
not exceeding a specific tariff quota. Although the force of the Agreement was to have 
an unlimited period, it was also agreed that it could be denounced by giving six months' 
notice to the other party. It was mainly argued by the applicants that the Cooperation 
Agreement provided for no human rights clauses, and therefore no non-execution 
clauses, as a consequence of which its suspension could not be justified. The 
Community on the other hand argued that the suspension of the Agreement was justified 
under customary international law on the ground of rebus sic stantibus (ftindamental 
change of circumstances). Concerned first with whether the unilateral suspension of the 
Cooperation Agreement and specifically of the trade concessions on the ground that 
there had been a fundamental change of circumstances complied with the law on treaties 
under customary international law (and with which the Community institutions were 
bound), the ECJ concluded that there was nothing to affect the validity of the Council 
regulation in dispute. More specifically it pointed to the wide-ranging objectives of the 
Cooperation Agreement which included among others the promotion of economic and 
social development and the welfare of the populations of the Contracting Parties, finally 
holding that the maintenance of peace in Yugoslavia constituted an essential element of 
the consent of the parties when concluding the Agreement. As a consequence, the 
disintegration of the country created a fundamental change of circumstances which 
justified the suspension of the Agreement in question."^ It needs to be stressed however 
that no attempt for justification of the measures under a right to third-state 
countermeasures was made. The legal justification given for the suspension of both the 
Cooperation Agreement and the Agreement concerning the ECSC was that there had 
been a significant change of circumstances which affected trade and economic relations 
with Yugoslavia. This justification seems to fall within the law of treaties rather than the 
law on state responsibility, possible weakening the argument that the Community at the 
time was acting with the concrete belief that it possessed a right under general 
i;acA:e/1998/3655. 
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international law to resort to countermeasures in response to a situation that raised 
concerns to the international community as a whole, even i f itself was not directly 
affected by it. However, as Chinkin points out, it would be difficult to prove in this case 
the existence of the two elements necessary to establish fundamental change of 
circumstances as a valid ground for the suspension or denunciation of a treaty. More 
specifically, whilst it would be possible to argue that peaceful condifion in the SPRY 
constituted a precondition for the continuation of the Cooperation Agreement, it would 
be difficult to prove that the internal hostilities radically changed the EC's obligations 
under the treaty. She notes in this regard that, "Under the Vienna Convention 
impossibility of performance is more generally seen as applicable to situations where 
the subject matter of the treaty has ceased to exist rather than loss of political authority 
by one of the treaty parties".^ "^* Moreover, and irrespective of whether or not in the 
present case there indeed existed such a change of circumstances as to justify the 
denunciation of the agreements, one wonders whether this could be used as an excuse 
for any threat to the peace and security and any humanitarian crisis. It follows that any 
discussion on the law on countermeasures would become pointless and there would not 
even be a need to rely on such jusfificafion since treafies would be able to be denounced 
or suspended on the ground of flindamental change of circumstances. The author is 
therefore of the view that the fiindamental change of circumstances must be used with 
constraint and that it will not be able to be relied upon in all cases that arise in the 
future. It is therefore imperative that the international legal order finds appropriate 
means to address humanitarian crises within the law on state responsibility itself, and 
perhaps by resort to countermeasures even by states who have not themselves suffered 
any injury. 
Moreover, despite the fact that the Racke Case concerned the application of general 
international law, in particular the principle rebus sic stantibus as the legal basis for the 
suspension of the agreement (although as noted international law recognizes other 
grounds for the non-execution of a treaty such as countermeasures), it illustrates the 
general problems of law which arise as a result of the non-execution of an agreement 
between two states, irrespective of the reasons behind it. This is because the pacta sunt 
servanda rule constitutes one of the most fiandamental principles of intemafional law."^ 
The Court, by examining the legality of a Community act in the light of customary 
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international law, did not intend to give the impression that customary rules have direct 
effect at a Community level. As suggested, it would be wiser to raise a question of 
legality of a given rule or act, whether Community or other, in the light of customary 
rules of international law rather than relying directly upon a customary rule in order to 
set aside such a rule or act.^ ^^  
When the EC imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992 even before a SC 
resolution, the SFRY argued that the sanctions, by not applying uniform treatment in the 
entire territory of Yugoslavia infringed the Most-Favoured Nation treatment clause, and 
as a consequence it requested the establishment of a panel to look into the case. 
However, the GATT Council declined to look into the substance of the claim as it found 
that the FRY could not automatically be regarded as having succeeded the SFRY in its 
Contracting Party status.^" 
The economic measures adopted by both the SC and the EC from 1992 to 1995 aimed at 
inducing Yugoslavia to accept a settlement in Bosnia. The responsibility for the 
enforcement of the measures adopted by the EC, the West European Union and other 
institutions was given to the Sanctions Assistance Mission established for this purpose. 
The final result of this associated action was the termination of support for Bosnian-
Serb forces by the regime under Slobodan Milosevic. It has often been admitted that the 
sanctions imposed against Yugoslavia during that period played a significant role in the 
decision of the "most immoderate leadership""^ under Milosevic to enter into 
negotiations. 
5.1.11. Denmark v. Turkey (2000) 
Another significant case brought before the ECHR is the inter-state application of 
Denmark against Turkey. Although the case was later settled with the agreement of the 
two parties, and despite the fact that the violations occurred against a Danish national, 
thus giving Denmark the status of an injured state, it is worth looking at the specific 
terms of the settlement. The complaint of the Danish government concerned allegations 
that a Danish national detainedi in Turkey was subjected to iU-treatment in violation of 
article 3 of the Convention. In the settlement that followed, a declaration made by the 
""Kuijper/1998/21. 
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Turkish government was incorporated as an integral part of the settlement. In the 
declaration Turkey acknowledged that there were occasional and individual cases of 
torture and ill-treatment in the country whilst stating a series of legislative and other 
measures on its part to decrease such violations. Turkey expressed its commitment to 
continue improvement measures in the field of human rights and especially against 
torture, and to cooperate with international organs and mechanisms in order to deal with 
these problems. Moreover, Turkey undertook to participate in a number of projects 
concerning the training of police officers especially in relation to investigation and 
human rights issues whilst the two countries decided to establish a continuous political 
dialogue between their governments which would also involve human rights 
considerations. 
The example is stimulating because Denmark did not confine itself to remedies 
regarding the particular dispute but went even further by requiring, as part of the 
settlement, certain re-assurances that torture practices in Turkey would stop. Even more 
interesting, Denmark undertook to financially support a bilateral project the purpose of 
which would be the training of Turkish police officers "in order to achieve further 
knowledge and practical skills in the field of human rights".^'"' 
5.2. Countermeasures by States Other Than the Injured in State Practice 
5.2.1. The Arab Oil Embargo (1973) 
5.2.1.1. An Introduction to the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1947 many Arab countries engaged in an economic 
offensive against Israel and other states supporting it. It is on this ground that in 1957 
Arab states refused overflight and landing rights to Air France over their territories 
because of its involvement in financially enhancing the Israeli film industry.^'*' In a 
statement made by the Secretary of the Arab League it was stressed that the Arab states 
targeted only those firms that were assisting in the strengthening of Israel's economy, 
war efforts and its expansionist and aggressive objectives.^ '*^ 
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hi 1967 Israel, citing security reasons in the context of anticipatory self-defence, 
launched a military attack the result of which was the invasion and occupation of parts 
of Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory. It was argued that the attack constituted an 
unlawful use of force not justified under article 51 concerning self-defence as there had 
not been a previous armed attack to which Israel had to respond, nor an imminent threat 
to its security. ^ '^ ^ Despite UN calls for cessation of this aggressive policy, Israel 
continued to occupy these territories by force. 
In 1973 and after years of unsuccessful negotiations new hostilities broke out between 
Egypt and Syria in an effort to regain their territories on the one hand, and Israel on the 
other. During the conflict, the US was providing Israel with military equipment such as 
jet fighter planes and equipment to replace Israel's losses.^ '^ '' It was againt this 
background that states injured by Israel's actions, like Egypt and Syria on the one hand, 
and not directly injured states such as Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia on the other, decided upon oil reductions for a number of states supporting 
directly or indirectly Israel. The deployment of what was later to be known as the "Arab 
Oil Weapon" as an economic means of coercion raised many concerns about its legality 
under international law. The first question of importance is as to whether and which 
Arab states were entitled to take any action against Israel since not all of them were 
affected by Israel's policies in the same way. And secondly, whether third states like the 
US, the Netherlands, South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia^ "*^  could be subjected to 
economic measures and especially countermeasures, on what legal grounds in view of 
the fact that they were not directly involved in the dispute, and by whom. Since 
countermeasures are only allowed in response to a violation of international law and 
must be directed against the defaulting state, it is imperative to identify whether these 
states, by supporting Israel, were committing a wrongful act themselves. 
5.2.1.2. The Legality of the Oil Measures in International Law 
There can be little doubt that action by an injured state against the wrongdoer is 
justified. Had other states not individually affected by Israel's unlawful use of force 
taken unilateral peaceful measures against it in violation of their own obligations, it 
Shihata/1977/107. See SC/Res/252/1968, SC/Res/267/1969, SC/Res/271/1969, SC/Res/298/1971. 
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would only enhance the argument in favour of third state countermeasures in response 
to flagrant violations of international law. Could however these states impose 
countermeasures against third states to the dispute? As it has often been stated, for 
countermeasures to be lawful they must come as a response to another internationally 
wrongful act. Only i f it was established that the US and the other countries had violated 
a specific international obligation could countermeasures be imposed on them, either by 
the injured state, or arguably by third states. 
As frequently stated by the Arab states the measures were aimed at the liberation of the 
Arab territories occupied by Israel and the restoration of the rights of Palestinians.^ "*^ It 
can thus be argued that the US and the other states, in providing assistance to Israel 
were violating their customary obligation not to provide aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act, and especially in the violation of an 
obligation erga omnes. This duty is owed to all states collectively, and its violation 
would entitle all states to invoke the responsibility of the wrongfiil state. The imposition 
of the oil embargo by the Arab states could as a result be indicative of practice 
supportive of third state countermeasures. But had the Arab states, in imposing the 
embargo, been infringing specific international obligations? 
Paust and Blaustein have argued that the exercise of economic coercion by the Arab 
countries was in violation of the UN Charter '^'^  and of the most-favoured-nation 
freatment clause under the GATT which prohibits discriminatory practices among the 
member states and the imposition of export restrictions. 
It needs to be noted that among the states participating in the embargo, only Kuwait and 
Egypt were parties to the GATT. Whilst Egypt, as the directly injured state in the 
dispute could have made a valid defence under article X X I , it is more likely that 
Kuwait's action could be considered as countermeasures taken in response to a violation 
owed to the international community as a whole, namely the duty not to support the 
infHngement of an erga omnes obligation. However, no attempt was made by any of the 
parties involved to bring up the matter in the GATT.^ "*^ 
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In relation to the legitimacy of the Arab measures with the bilateral trade agreements 
concluded between the US and Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Oman, only the first agreement 
concluded with Saudi Arabia seems to prima facie raise the issue of the illegality of the 
oil embargo. More specifically, this agreement^ "*^  concluded in 1933 provided that the 
two countries accord to each other unconditional most-favoured nation treatment on the 
import, export and other duties and charges on commerce and navigation. Nothing in 
the treaty seemed to allow prohibitions or restrictions on any of the grounds given by 
Saudi Arabia when imposing the embargo against the US. 
Shihata on the other hand supporting the legitimacy of the Arab measures argued that 
these were taken "in an attempt to secure an objective of the highest international order: 
The restoration to the lawful sovereigns of illegally occupied territories and the 
restoration of the rights of peoples deprived of self-determination."^^^ 
Although not expressly worded, this justification seems to be equivalent to the argument 
in support of third state countermeasures for the infiingement of superior norms of the 
international legal order. 
What is indeed noticeable however is that the US had never officially accounted the 
Arab measures to be in breach of their treaty obligations.^^' 
In relation to the legitimacy of economic measures taken by states not directly injured 
by another state, Shihata argued that such measures, apart from deriving authority from 
state practice and the fact that there was no rule of international law prohibiting them, 
were all the more legitimate i f they aimed at safeguarding respect for international 
law.^ ^^ Therefore the emphasis is placed on the legitimacy of the objective itself 
Supporting that the oil measures deployed by the Arab states were not in violation of 
any customary or conventional rule of international law he says: 
A general and absolute prohibition on the use of economic measures for political purposes in the 
international sphere is still an idealist's dream. Before it hardens into a rule of international law, 
enforcement machinery must develop for the protection of the militarily weaker states, which may happen 
to have a relatively great economic power. Precluding such states from the use of their economic power in 
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the settlement of political disputes before a general ban is imposed on armaments and in the absence of an 
effective collective security system could not serve the interests of international justice. It would only 
help the development of what President Rooseveh once described as "a one-way international law which 
lacks mutuality in its observance and therefore becomes an instrument of oppression". 
5.2.1.3. Conclusion 
It has already been pointed out that the wrongfulness of countermeasures arises only 
when certain legal conditions are met. It follows from this observation that were the US 
and the other states assisting Israel to be found in violation of specific obligations under 
international law, arguably the obligation not to render aid or assistance in the violation 
of one of the most fiindamental principles of international law such as the prohibition of 
the use of force, then they could be the subjects of countermeasures consistently with 
international law. This however raises another crucial question concerning the subjects 
entitled to resort to such countermeasures, bearing in mind that not all states were 
affected in the same way by the wrongful act in question. In the author's opinion, this 
case, which is not mentioned in the commentary of article 54 of the final articles on 
state responsibility, offers a significant example of state practice supportive of third 
state countermeasures, at least with respect to the measures adopted by Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia, and for this reason it deserves more attention in the future. 
5.2.2. US Embargo against Uganda (1978) 
In 1971 Idi Amin took power in Uganda signalling a period of a brutal dictatorship with 
8 years of extermination, torture and economic exhaustion for the people of Uganda. In 
the light of these atrocities the African states remained silent, with few exceptions, 
under the pretext of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another 
state, fearing that possible involvement would turn against them like a boomerang.^ "^^  
They also feared that American involvement and intrusion in the affairs of a small 
African country like Uganda by way of economic sanctions bore a risk of similar action 
against them in the future. 
The US government had not been favourable towards the notorious regime and its 
serious and persistent violations of human rights from the very beginning. With a series 
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of measures as early as 1973 the US government decided the closure of the US embassy 
in Kampala, the suspension of its economic assistance to Uganda and its refusal to 
renew it unless there was improvement of the human rights situation in the country, the 
opposition to international development loans to Uganda, the ban on the export of 
munitions and control over other sensitive materials.Despite these efforts there was a 
certain amount of reservation with respect to the emplojmient of unilateral 
countermeasures against Uganda. Even the Carter Administration was hesitant due to its 
own trade and economic concerns and the possibility of other countries using economic 
means for the pursuit of political goals against the US. Reluctant to set an unwanted 
precedent, the Carter Administration stressed that any boycott action taken by the US 
govenmient would be in violation of its obligations under the GATT. This 
governmental line found expression in the statement made by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Congressional Relations Douglas J. Bennet according to whom: 
Boycott actions are not consistent with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), to which the United States is committed as the basis for international commercial relations. 
Whenever these principles [of GATT] are set aside, their overall authority as a protection for our own 
international trade interests is undennined. Therefore, as a general matter, we are extremely reluctant to 
take actions which contradict these principles.^'* 
Behind this position laid a well-rooted belief of American policy-makers that is traced 
back to the 19^ ^ century and according to which the US, as a major trade power, should 
refrain from associating trade with political ends. This trend was strengthened after the 
Second World War where economics and politics were construed as two different 
spheres, the one being autonomous from the other. This was necessitated from the fact 
that the influence of politics in trade and economic matters had in the past catastrophic 
consequences for international stability, peace and security, a prominent example being 
the last world war. It was perceived that economic measures should be applied only in 
response to economic violations unless they were authorized by the SC, whilst human 
rights violations should find cure through political means such as denunciation.^^^ 
Furthermore, there was a need on the part of the US government to differentiate the 
Ugandan case from other US imposed embargoes as against Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia 
and North Korea which rather relied on national security reasons and enforcement of 
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UN decisions. Moreover, the American government did not consider that there 
existed such extraordinary circumstances so as to justify countermeasures 559 
Nevertheless, US Representative Pease stood firm on the Ugandan case. " I f we adopt 
sanctions against Uganda", he said, "we would be establishing a new principle in our 
trade policies. We wil l indicate that we recognize limits of decency beyond which other 
governments may not go in their treatment of their own citizens. We will demonstrate 
that in special cases the Congress will use its authority to insist upon corporate 
responsibility where it may otherwise be lacking". 
In 1977 American foreign policy changed considerably, becoming more actively and 
substantially involved in order to terminate Amin's rule.^^' It had become clear by then 
that the main source of Uganda's foreign capital (which was later used to sustain the 
regime) derived from coffee exports abroad, and in particular to the US. On the 
contrary, the Ugandan coffee going to the US constituted only 7% of coffee imports in 
the country. For this reason the Congress concluded that to take action through 
boycotting Ugandan coffee would not severely harm the American economy. It was 
further realized that where military force could not be taken due to the general 
prohibition of the threat or use of force, it was the exertion of economic pressure that 
bore any chances of bringing the brutal regime in Uganda to an end.^ ^^ It was also 
clearly understood that inaction regarding the atrocities that took place in Uganda meant 
acceptance of Amin's remaining in power. 
In 1978 the US Congress issued a Declaration of Policy that was incorporated in 
Section 2151 of Title 22 of the US Code Annotated on Foreign Relations and 
Intercourse. According to that declaration, as a consequence of the inter-dependence of 
nations largely owed to technological, economic and political advancements, the 
protection of the liberties, economic prosperity and security of the American people 
were "best sustained and enhanced in a community of nations which respect individual 
civil and economic rights and freedoms and which work together to use wisely the 
world's limited resources in an open and equitable international economic system."^^^ 
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On 7 October 1978 the Congress passed a law entitled "Multilateral and Bilateral 
Action to Halt Atrocities in Cambodia and Uganda" with the purpose of dealing with 
the humanitarian situations that emerged there and with the aim of abolishing the brutal 
regimes that ruled in the two countries. More specifically the law pointed to the 
"systemafic and extensive brutality" taking place in Cambodia and Uganda which both 
required "special notice and continuing condemnation by outside observers". In order 
for any action to be effective and substantial, as the influence of the US alone was very 
limited, the US government was urged to seek multilateral support through the UN and 
other international bodies, and to encourage action by states with stronger links with the 
two countries mentioned above. Furthermore, the Congress directed the President to ban 
the export of military, paramilitary and police equipment to Uganda and to impose visa 
restrictions for any Ugandan government official wishing to enter the US for military, 
paramilitary or police training purposes. The lifting of these measures was made 
conditional upon a determination by the State Department that the Ugandan government 
had conformed with the rule of law and international human rights. Finally, the law 
authorized the submission to the SC of a draft resolution for a mandatory arms embargo 
on Uganda to be implemented by all the members of the UN.^^'' 
Only few days later the Congress, having concluded that the government of Uganda 
under the power of General Idi Amin had committed genocide against the Ugandan 
people, adopted PubUc Law 95-435 according to which Uganda's serious misconducts 
permitted for "an exceptional response by the United States". Thus the Congress called 
the US to essentially build up a policy by which it would disassociate itself fi-om any 
state having committed what the US described as the international crime of genocide. 
For this reason it was decided that the direct or indirect importation of any products 
grown, produced or manufactured in Uganda by any corporation, individual, institution 
or group would be banned "until the President determines and certifies to the Congress 
that the Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross 
violations of human rights".^^^ The export ban also extended to cover articles, materials 
or supplies such as technical data or other information that fell within the US 
jurisdiction or exported by any person subject to US jurisdiction. The Congress fiarther 
urged the US President to encourage an international response to the human rights 
violations in Uganda, such as the infliction of economic restrictions by other states of 
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the international community. In addition to these measures the Congress included 
Uganda in the list of states which would be denied any assistance, monetary or other, 
along with Cambodia, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Cuba.^ ^^ 
On 10 October 1978 President Jimmy Carter authorized the imposition of a trade ban 
upon Uganda and in February 1979 the embargo against Uganda took effect with 
Executive Order 12117 for as long as the Ugandan Government did not cease its 
practices of gross violations of human rights. 
These measures were in violation of the US' obligations under the GATT to which 
Uganda was also a member state, especially of its duty not to impose any export 
restrictions and quotas in their economic relations. It is worth pointing out that the US 
government did not attempt to justify its action on the basis of the exemptions provided 
under the GATT, such as for instance under Article X X I which authorizes exceptions 
from the agreement on grounds of national security. On the contrary, the government 
justified its action as a result of the genocide committed by the Ugandan government 
against its own people.^ ^^ 
The EEC member states on the other hand took a more cautious stand towards Uganda, 
owing to their concerns that they had to comply with treaty commitments towards that 
country. In particular, it was noted on several occasions that the EEC member states 
were bound by the Lome Convention which made no reference to any action that could 
be taken against Uganda in view of its gross human rights violations, and that as with all 
the other ACP countries they had to fulf i l their obligations deriving from an 
international agreement.^ ^^ It was even noted that the Ugandan case differed from the 
situation that emerged in Greece as a result of the coup d' etat in 1967 and as a result of 
which the EEC "froze" its relations with Greece under the Association Agreement in 
that the latter contained already in the preamble reference to the basic principles of the 
Community such as human rights, which was not the case with the cooperation 
agreements with Third World countries.^ ^"^ 
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Only few months after the implementation of the American countermeasures, and as a 
result of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda which had the support of Ugandan exiles 
and dissidents, Amin was forced to flee the country. Although many associate Amin's 
loss of power to the Tanzanian invasion and not to the US trade embargo, it was noted 
that the US stand was not without effect in bringing down the inhuman regime of Idi 
Amin. 
In conclusion, the US action constitutes an invaluable precedent for the use of unilateral 
measures in violation of specific international obligations (countermeasures), like 
GATT, imposed by a state not directly injured in response to serious violations of 
international law such as genocide and other serious human rights infringements. It 
reveals the intention and determination of the US, despite certain legal hesitations, to 
take action, even in violation of international law, in the rise of "special", as was often 
cited, circumstances. Although this example alone may not satisfy the requirement of 
opinio juris, it certainly points in the right direction. 
5.2.3. The Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan (1980) 
The invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan in December 1979 provoked the 
immediate reaction of the US government which decided upon the implementation of a 
number of measures against the Soviet Union. These measures were taken before a 
resolution passed by the General Assembly pursuant to which the Soviet Union was 
called to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and were justified on grounds of 
national security and the foreign policy interests affected by the Soviet invasion.^^' It 
needs to be stressed however that not all measures resorted to by the US government 
were inconsistent with international law. 
Arhong the measures which were in violation of specific international obligations was 
the withdrawal of ratification by the US Senate of the SALT I I treaty which had already 
been successfully negotiated between the US and the USSR. It was the posifion of both 
the US and the Soviet Union that states were bound under customary international law 
to refrain from taking action that would conflict the object and purpose of an agreement 
that had been signed but not as yet ratified, a principle which is also reflected in the 
Cumulative/Digest/l 981-88/111/2967. 
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1969 VCLT.^^^ Therefore this measure falls within the category of countermeasures. 
The US further decided the curtailment of Soviet fishing rights in American waters in 
violafion of the 1976 US-USSR Agreement concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
US,"^ and the restriction of Aeroflot flights to the US."" 
Among the measures taken by the US against the USSR which do not however fall 
within the category of countermeasures was the suspension of the export of grain that 
exceeded the amount which the US had been committed to sell. This is of course 
conditioned on the assumption that there was not a unilateral declaration by the US 
agreeing to provide more grain than what was already agreed, in which case it would 
create a legally binding obligation against it. In any event, the decision of the US 
Govermment resulted in the freezing of 17 million tons of grain, a decision that largely 
affected American farmers. In particular, following the Soviet invasion, the Department 
of Commerce was instructed to terminate shipments to the Soviet Union of agricultural 
products including wheat and com with the exception of the shipment of up to 8 million 
metric tons of wheat and com provided for by the 1975 Agreement between the US and 
the USSR on the Supply of Grain.^^^ Furthermore, the US announced: the boycott of the 
Moscow Olympics and an embargo on all exports intended for the Olympics with the 
exception of medical supplies; the suspension of exports of high technology and 
sensitive products; the prohibition and further restrictions on phosphates for 
fertilizers;^'^ and restrictions on the import of Soviet ammonia. In addition to the above 
the Department of Commerce suspended all outstanding validated licenses and new 
applications that were pending regarding the sale of oil, gas field technology and other 
products.^'' Provided that there was no agreement to the contrary, these measures were 
not in violation of intemational law. 
The Legal Adviser of the US State Department, Roberts B. Owen, rejected the Soviet 
claims that the invasion of Afghanistan was justified under the 1978 Treaty of 
Friendship, Goodneighborliness and Cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan, 
under which the parties undertook the obligation to protect the security, independence 
and territorial integrity of the two countries (although it also provided for respect of 
US/Digest/1980/398. 
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national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the 
other). It was accordingly the US assertion that the Soviet action violated international 
law and the UN Charter. President Jimmy Carter, referring to the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan said that: 
Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted 
international rules of behavior.... Soviet efforts to justify this action on the basis of the United Nations 
Charter are a perversion of the United Nations.... the Soviet action is grave breach to peace.. 578 
With specific reference to one of the paramount principles of the Charter it was stressed 
that the USSR had an obligation under article 2 (4) to refi-ain from the use or threat of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Pointing out 
that no treaty could prevail over obligations arising from the Charter it was fiirther 
noted that: 
4. Nor is it clear that the treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan, concluded in 1978 between the 
revolutionary Taraki Government and the USSR, is valid. If it actually does lend itself to support of 
Soviet intervention of the type in question in Afghanistan, it would be void under contemporary 
principles of international law, since it would conflict with what the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties describes as a "peremptory norm of general international law" (Article 53), namely, that 
contained in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter. 
5. Moreover, the Soviet action conflicts with the terms of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty, since it is a violation 
of Afghanistan's national sovereignty. 
In justifying the American measures against the Soviet Union President Carter noted 
that: 
our own nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviet move into 
Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences^ would have resulted in the temptation to move again 
and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the 
world's oil supplies. 580 
US/Digest/1979/34. 
"^ibid/35r''By'way<of-comparison it is noteworthy to point out here that when oh'20 Jxily, 1974 Turkey 
used similar force to intervene in Cyprus and occupy one third of its territory there was no similar 
reaction by the US Govermnent despite the striking resemblance of both these two examples. More 
specifically, Turkey had justified its action on the Treaty of Guarantee of 1959-60 in response to the 
Greek-inspired coup against the democratically elected President, Archbishop Makarios. Not only the US 
did nothing to prevent the invasion or demand its cessation but it also continued providing Turkey with 
military and economic assistance in violation of both US and international law. 
Afghanistan/Sanctions in Hufbauer/1985/658. 
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Although he admitted that he did not expect that the measures would force the USSR 
out of Afghanistan, he pointed out that they were aimed at making the Soviets pay a 
price for their aggression and at deterring them from ftiture aggression. He subsequently 
emphasized that the aim of the US in resorting to these measures was to convince the 
Soviets by peacefiil means that they could not invade a foreign country with impunity 
58 i 
and that they must bear the consequences of their action. 
In his statement before the General Assembly in January 1980 the US Ambassador 
McHenry noted the following: 
For this body to remain silent in the face of open aggression would be for the members of the United 
Nations to condone a violation of the only principles that small nations can invoke to protect themselves 
from self-aggrandizement by larger and more powerful states. It is not the United States whose freedom is 
most threatened by Soviet indifference to the Charter; the small and nonaligned countries, like 
Afghanistan, are most imperiled 582 
The UK government acted on the same footing describing the Soviet invasion in 
Afghanistan as an "unprovoked act of aggression" that posed "a serious threat to world 
peace".Canada condemned the atrocities and the gross human rights violations 
committed by the Soviets against the people of Afghanistan, whilst the Canadian Prime 
Minister Joseph Clark supported the implementation of measures as a means to impose 
pressure on the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan 584 
Other western countries were very thoughtful in imposing countermeasures against the 
Soviet Union in violation of their treaty obligations, although it is suggested that it was 
the economic benefit that was the determinative factor for not taking action against the 
Soviet Union. The EEC, for instance, replaced the US in the sales of grain to the Soviet 
Un ion .However , the European Parliament did urge the Commission to consider 
C O / • 
economic, financial and commercial measures against the USSR. Furthermore, in a 
common statement by Canada, EC, Argentina and Australia days after the Soviet 
invasion, those states asserted that they would not attempt to replace the grain that 
would have been sent to the Soviet Union before the measures announced by the US. 
581 
582 
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However, in later interpretations, the representatives of these countries, with the 
exception of Argentina, said that the statement "was viewed as a commitment not to 
con 
allow sales to the USSR to exceed "normal" or "traditional" levels". Argentina on the 
other hand argued that it had no legal basis to interfere in the activities of private traders 
and thus rejected invitations to join in the economic coercive measures.^ ^* 
What can be concluded from the above discussion is that the US action against the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan offers another paradigm of countermeasures taken by 
states other than the injured in the name of collective interests, more specifically in 
response to the unlawful use of force against another country. The prohibition of the use 
of force is one of the most fundamental principles in contemporary intemational law the 
respect for which amounts to an erga omnes mle. Subsequentiy, all states have a 
paramount interest in the protection of the rule, and therefore they cannot be left 
unaffected in the event of its infringement. It is in this context that the US action could 
be justified. The fact that other states did not join in similar action cannot unequivocally 
lead to the conclusion that they did so because they opposed the possibility to take 
countermeasures in cases of serious violations of erga omnes obligations. Rather, it 
seems that there existed economic and other considerations which interfered in their 
decision not to respond with more forcefial measures against the USSR. 
5.2.4. Intemational Reaction to the Teheran Hostage Crisis (1980) 
Hostage-taking has been frequently used as a means for the achievement of mainly 
political goals, imposing in this manner a threat not only to the lives of the individuals 
involved but also to intemational peace and security and therefore being of concern to 
the intemational community in its entirety. The SC's resolutions in the Teheran 
Hostages crisis are indicative of this intemational concem. On 4 and 5 November 1979 
armed groups seized the premises and the staff working at the time in the American 
Embassy in Teheran and in the American Consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz in protest of 
the earlier decision by the US to allow the former Shah of Iran to seek medical 
treatment in the US, the Iranian government was held liable for these actions that, 
although conducted by non-state actors, bore the government's tolerance. 
Afghanistan/Sanctions in Hufbauer/1985/659-60. 
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encouragement and failure to act duly in order to prevent and terminate them. In 
reaction to the attacks against the US embassy and personnel the SC took immediate 
action by calling for the immediate release of the hostages whilst leaving open the 
possibility of fiirther measures under articles 39 and 41 of the Charter should Iran fail to 
comply. Ultimately these measures were never to be authorized due to the exercise 
of the Soviet veto. 
In view of the SC's failure to take more coercive action against Iran due to the exercise 
of veto by the Soviet Union, the Foreign Ministers of the EEC issued a statement on 14 
April 1980 in which they stressed that the franian government continued to be in 
flagrant violation of international law, ignoring the calls of both the SC and the ICJ to 
comply with its international obligations.^^' On 22 April 1980 the Foreign Ministers 
decided to initiate their national procedures for imposing an arms embargo against Iran 
in accordance with former article 223 of the EEC Treaty, despite the lack of SC 
authorization, for its continued disrespect of international law in what they determined 
would constitute a threat to international peace and security. On 17 May they decided 
to apply the measures provided under the draft SC resolution of 10 January, despite the 
fact that this resolution was never adopted. Under this later decision all contracts 
concluded with Iran after 4 November 1979 were to be suspended, which would bring 
the EEC member states in violation of their treaty commitments.^^^ 
The UK reacted to the Teheran Hostage crisis with the adopfion on 15 May 1980 of the 
Iran (Temporary Powers) Act which came into force two days later.^ "^* Section 1 (1) of 
the Act authorized the Queen to take such decisions about contracts with Iran 
concerning services or goods as she regarded necessary due to Iran's violation of 
international law in the hostage crisis. The Act was adopted two weeks before the ICJ's 
judgment on the Teheran Hostages Case according to which the seizure of the 
diplomatic staff constituted a violation of "obligations essential to the international 
community as a whole".^^^ It is worth menfioning here that in justifying the decision of 
Teheran/HostagesnCJReps/\980. 
SC/Res/457/1979, Se/Res/461/1979. 
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the UK government to take action against Iran the Minister of State, Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, Mr. Douglas Hurd, made reference to an earlier ruling issued by 
the ICJ on the case and which the UK regarded as binding in international law, although 
no firm position was taken on the matter. Furthermore, the UK action against Iran came 
three days before an embargo was decided by the European Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs.^^^ A few days later, the UK Government adopted two Orders which imposed a 
prohibition on the conclusion and performance of any new contracts with Iran, although 
these measures did not affect already existing contracts .The position of the UK 
Government regarding the justifiability of the measures decided against Iran was that 
Iran could not continue disregarding basic principles of international law.^^* According 
to one view the UK Act amounted to "lawful measures" in the sense of articles 42 and 
54 of ILC Draft Articles.Nevertheless, the UK's reaction is not without legal 
significance as it illustrates the determination of a state not injured by a certain 
wrongdoing to respond, even by lawfiil means, to serious violations of obligations owed 
erga omnes, provided of course that the obligations infiinged by Iran in the particular 
incident indeed possessed such character. 
With respect to the position of Canada, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mark 
MacGuigan, stressed that the seizure of the diplomatic staff and the premises of the 
American embassy constituted grave breaches of international law which called "for an 
unequivocal response from the international community."^'''^ Referring to the SC 
resolutions on the matter, the first of which was adopted even by the Soviet Union, he 
drew the attention to the threat posed to the international community as a result of the 
hostage crisis. With respect to the Soviet veto he said: 
The cynical Soviet veto, however, cannot obscure the fact that the international community, both then and 
now, condemns the hostage affair. In addition to the overwhelming support given to the Security Council 
resolutions on Iran, this condemnation from the international community has been reiterated by the 
International Court of Justice which, first in December and then again in May, ordered Iran to restore the 
embassy to the U.S.A. and to free the hostages. These unequivocal judgments by the UN and the 
International Court of Justice fully satisfy the international community in applying economic sanctions 
against Iran.''"' 
''"'BYIL/1980/VO1.29/413. 
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He then justified the measures taken by both the EEC and Canada on April 22 and 23 
respectively based upon the renewed calls by the US President, Jimmy Carter, for 
assistance. In response to Iran's intransigence Canada ordered measures of an economic 
nature imposed upon transport and finance, with other controls concerned with the 
export of goods to Iran. He then concluded: " I have already explained that the 
government has been prompted to take these steps out of its concern to uphold a 
fiindamental rule of international law which is vital to the conduct of international 
relations."^^^ 
Even though Canada seemed to rely upon the ICJ rulings and the UN resolutions to 
justify its own action against Iran, it is necessary to determine whether they could be 
relied upon for the implementation of countermeasures. In relation to the UN 
resolutions it is noted that no legally binding resolution was adopted authorizing the 
application of peacefiil coercive measures against Iran. As for the ICJ ruling, it is 
essential to remember that this creates obligations only towards the parties submitting 
the dispute before it. Even though it must be respected by all states, it can not authorize 
the implementation of countermeasures, as its role is confined to adjudicate on what the 
law is, and not to exceed these judicial powers. Yet, its ruling may have significance to 
the detemiination that an internationally wrongfial act has been committed. Accordingly, 
Canada's reaction as a third state to the hostage crisis constitutes another example of 
state practice supportive of countermeasures or other lawful action as a response to the 
infringement of common interests shared either by a group of states or the international 
community. 
As for the UK's response, although this was actually confined to "lawfiil" measures, it 
seems to this author that the UK government had left open the possibility for fiirther 
action i f "regarded necessary". The emphasis placed upon the seriousness of the 
wrongful act committed by Iran is indicative of the significance attributed by the UK to 
the respect for international law, and the international implications that arose from the 
forcefijl seizure of the diplomatic premises. However, it is necessary to identify the 
rules violated by Iran's actions, or rather omissions, Ind to which states were entitled to 
react, i f at all, by the implementation of economic measures and, even more 
significantly, countermeasures. One could therefore argue in this regard that the 
''^ ^ Ibid/374. 
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obligations arising from the general law of diplomatic immunities are of a bilateral 
nature as between the receiving and sending states, and that as a consequence no other 
state is entitled to invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state. Whilst this is correct, 
one could tum to the way that the diplomatic immunities were disregarded in the 
particular case by Iran, namely the use of force against the American diplomatic 
premises and personnel. Had the Iranian govemment chosen to respond to alleged US 
violations of diplomatic law by declaring the American diplomats as personae non 
grata then no other state would be entitled to react to such decision. It is therefore 
suggested that it is to the unlawful use of force that Canada, the UK and the other EEC 
countries were responding, even though they were not directly involved in the dispute. 
The decision particularly of the EEC member states to suspend all treaties concluded 
with Iran after November 1979 seems to fall within the category of third-state 
countermeasures, and for this reason it is regarded important for the purposes of the 
current examination. 
5.2.5. The Falklands Crisis (1982) 
When in April 1982 Argentina invaded the Falklands Islands, the SC described 
Argentina's action as a breach to the peace and demanded it to immediately cease 
hostilities and to withdraw from the islands, whilst it called upon the two countries 
involved in the conflict to resolve their differences by diplomatic means. However, no 
compulsory, military or economic action under Chapter VII was decided. The UK called 
upon other states to respond to this violation and indeed members of the EEC, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand implemented a number of economic measures such as the ban 
on all imports of Argentine products. 
In this regard, the EEC Council determined that the serious situation created by the 
invasion of the Falkland Islands required immediate and uniform response by all 
member states of the Communities. As a result, with Regulation 877/82 and later with 
Regulations 1176/82 and 1254/82, it decided on 16 April 1982 to suspend the import of 
all products originating from Argentina including the suspension of two agreements 
regarding textiles and mutton and lamb, invoking both former articles 113 and 224. As 
seen above, article 113 established a common commercial poHcy whilst article 224 
imposed a duty upon member states, except during an emergency, to consult each other 
with the view to taking consorted action for the preservation of the common market that 
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has been affected by measures taken by a member state in compliance with its 
obligations for the maintenance of international peace and s e c u r i t y . A s noted in the 
preambular paragraph of the regulation, "the interests of the Community and the 
Member States demand the temporary suspension of imports of all products originating 
in Argentina".^'''* With a subsequent decision of the representatives of the governments 
of the member states of the European Coal and Steel Community the imports of all 
Argentinean products falling under the specific agreement were also suspended.^ ''^  On 
no occasion did the EEC Council express hesitation about the legitimacy of such action 
in international law, in contradiction to their stand towards the regime of Idi Amin only 
few years earlier. Nevertheless, some member states distanced themselves from the 
implementation of the measures provided for under the regulations above. Denmark 
seemed to oppose the idea that trade means could be used for political purposes on the 
basis of article 113. Instead of challenging the above regulations before the EC J, the 
judgment of which could undermine significantly such EEC measures, it preferred to 
announce that since it lacked the legal basis for implementing this form of action it was 
imperative to enact national legislation giving effect to the measures against Argentina. 
Italy and Ireland on the other hand relied upon former article 224 not to apply the 
measures.ZoUer in particular comments that this fact is evidence that the EEC 
measures were not adopted by the Community as an international organization, nor by a 
Community institution, but rather as a result of the collective decision of the member 
states.^ "^  
Argentina for its part claimed that the EEC action against it was in violation of the UN 
Charter, the GATT and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. With 
respect to the argument that the EEC measures were in violation of the UN Charter it is 
argued that this rests on the inorrect assumption that economic measures, like the use of 
"^^  Former Article 113 (now Article 133) constitutes the legal basis for the uniform commercial policy of 
the E C member states, whilst former Article 224 (now Article 297 of the E C Treaty) in particular 
attempts to reconcile obligations falling under the E E C and obligations arising under the UN Charter. See 
EC/Reg/1982/No.877. For the text of these agreements see OJ/1979/L298/2; OJ/1980/L275/4. 
'^'"'lnKuyper/1982/142. 
OJ/1982/L102/3. 
*''* 'Kuypeif/1982/r49-50. Fbnner article 224 has been invoked by irieinbef states to justify not only the 
imposition of sanctions against a third state, but also unilateral deviations from sanctions taken on the 
basis of former article 113 E C , such as was the case of Italy and Ireland in the E C sanctions against 
Argentina. For a European law perspective see analysis by Koutrakos/2001/86. 
Zoller/1984/104. It is argued by White and Abass that the confusion between state and institutional 
practice, namely measures taken by international organizations such as the E E C / E U , on third state 
countermeasures does not corroborate the existence of a right to third state countermeasures. White-
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armed force, falls within the monopoly of the SC.^°^ Regarding Argenfina's claims that 
the EEC measures were in violation of the GATT, it was noted that such measures 
could fall under the security clause according to which action could be justified for the 
protection of essential security interests, the determination of which is left to the 
member states. Along the same lines it was argued that in any case the EEC action was 
required because a territory associated with the Community had been occupied by the 
use of force.Regarding whether the EEC measures violated Argentina's sovereign 
rights, it was made clear that the Community measures aimed solely at the withdrawal 
of Argenfinean forces from the Falklands.^"' However, the EEC's action was also 
criticized by other GATT parties^" who argued that the measures were taken for 
political reasons and not on bona fide economic grounds.^'^ Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that the justification of the suspension of the two agreements between the 
EEC and Argentina on the frade of textile products on the one hand and of mutton and 
lamb on the other under the security exceptions of the GATT was rather strenuous. 
Whilst the first treaty was concluded on the basis of article 4 of the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement within the GATT, the relationship was more strenuous concerning the 
second agreement on mutton and lamb. As noted, "though it is a type of self-limitation 
agreement which is common in the framework of GATT, it does not find a legal basis 
within the GATT itself or in any instrument based on the GATT".^'^ Furthermore it was 
stressed that the security exceptions did not necessarily apply to all agreements 
concluded within the GATT as organization, and that in any case the EEC could not be 
regarded as the injured party to the dispute. 
For this reason it was necessary to attempt to turn attention to other legal grounds that 
would possibly preclude the unlawfiilness of the EEC action. Kuyper in particular, 
examining whether the EEC measures could be justified as reprisals or countermeasures 
as the term is used today, finds it difficult to conclude, beyond any doubt that it indeed 
lays a right upon states not directly injured by a certain wrongdoing to violate their own 
international obligations in the form of reprisals. With reference to the ILC's 
conclusions at the time on the matter, Kuyper observes that the ILC rather opted for a 
collective response to vital collective interests rather than to allow states or a group of 
•'°*Kuyper/1982/152. 
'^^  Ibid/152. 
'^^  EC/Bulletin/1982/No.4/7. 
' GATT/Communique and the position of Spain/Brazil. 
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states acting unilaterally to enforce international law.^''* According to him, third state 
reprisals tend to disregard the role of the UN system in the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and entail risks for the EEC itself regarding similar situations 
against which it does not wish to bring any collective act ion.^As Kuyper points out, 
the entitlement of the EEC to resort to reprisals against Argentina created difficulties 
not only because "the EEC would set itself up as some minor policeman of this world" 
but also due to the fact that: 
third party reprisals are looked at askance in international law, although it has been shown above that 
there are indications in state practice and in the doctrine which tend to support a right to reprisal by third 
states, if the target state has infringed very fundamental rules of international law, such as the prohibition 
of the use offeree.*'^ 
He thus takes the view that the EEC action was justified under the right of collective 
self-defence contained in article 51 of the Charter, since the UK had an established right 
to individual self-defence as the victim of the unlawful military conduct of Argentina. 
This solution was more preferable as it incorporated the EEC action within the UN 
system and did not alienate it from it.^'^ ZoUer also suggests that the EEC action relied 
rather on a right to collective self-defence. She justifies this on the fact that when 
addressing the issue before the GATT, the measures were referred as measures taken by 
618 
the Community and its member states on the basis of their "inherent rights". 
In addition to the EEC measures. West Germany imposed a trade embargo against 
Argentina,^'^ Norway prohibited imports,^ ^*^ whilst France, Belgium, West Germany 
and the Netherlands harmed arms sales to Argentina. Canada, greatly concerned by the 
use of force by Argentina as a means for settling a dispute over a territory, recognized 
the UK's right to self-defense. It was on this basis that Canada decided to impose a ban 
on exports of war material and on all military shipments to Argentina and introduced 
restrictions on the import of Argentinean goods to Canada.^ '^ 
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More interestingly, the US, like Argentina a member to the OAS, decided upon the 
implementation of numerous measures with considerable economic and political effects 
which contributed to the outcome of the dispute.^ '^ ^ Apart from the logistical and 
material assistance it was providing to the UK, the US suspended all military exports 
and security assistance to Argentina, withheld the certification of Argentina's eligibility 
for military sales, suspended the Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees, and 
suspended the Commodity Credit Corporation guarantees. The US government justified 
its position by reference to the principles of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes 
in consequence of Argentina's refusal to accept a compromisory solution. The US 
Secretary of State in particular referred to the need to take action in the light of the use 
of unlawful force for the resolution of d isputes .Many states however, especially 
within the inter-American system, viewed these measures to be in violation of the OAS 
principles and international law. By Resolution I , adopted during the 20* Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and by a great number of OAS member states few weeks 
only after the dispute, the EEC and US measures were deplored since they were neither 
authorized by the SC nor were consistent with the UN and OAS Charters, or the GATT. 
The US was called upon to lif t the coercive measures and to refi-ain from providing 
material assistance to the UK in conformity with the principle of solidarity recognized 
under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.^ '^' In another resolution 
adopted by the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Council it was declared that 
the economic measures against Argentina were in breach inter alia of article 19 of the 
OAS Charter according to which "No state may use or encourage the use of coercive 
measures of an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of 
another state and obtain from it advantages of any kind",^^^ and the UN Charter. 
Avecedo takes the view that the US unilateral withdrawal of benefits from Argentina 
was unlawfiil regarding the grounds upon which it relied, namely, to force Argentina 
accept contrary to its own wish a compromise on the conflict, and which was punitive in 
nature.^ ^^ Furthermore, Avecedo points to the justification used for the suspension of 
the Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees in Public Notice 805 and which relied on 
the US policy and national interest.^ ^^ Yet, at the OAS Economic and Social Council 
Acevedo/1984/323. 
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meeting held in October 1982, the US government rebutted that it had been involved in 
the adoption of coercive measures against Argentina. Rather: 
The United States had no legal obligation to keep up the benefits that it withdrew from Argentina, nor did 
it violate any existing agreement with that country. The measures the United States adopted were not 
intended to obtain advantages of any kind; quite to the contrary, their purpose was to demonstrate the 
consistency of the United States vis-a-vis the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes.""^ ^ The measures 
taken by the Government of the United States demonstrated the United States' adherence to the basic 
principles of international law and were fully in keeping with its international obligations, and particularly 
with the pertinent resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council 629 
According to Avecedo this legal argumentation seemed contradictory in many respects. 
More specifically, it denied the existence of US coercive measures against Argentina, 
something that went beyond the statement of the State Secretary himself on the matter, 
it contradicted the purpose of Public Notice 805 the purpose of which was to advance 
US policy and national interests, and lastly it denied that there had been any violation of 
an agreement existing between the two states, thus implying that the UN and OAS 
Charters and the GATT were not agreements between Argentina and the US.^^° 
Although the US action arguably did not constitute a breach of specific trade 
undertakings towards Argentina, it reveals the determination on the part of the US 
government to respond with economic and other measures to a serious violation of the 
international legal order, even i f no injury was sustained by it. The EEC collective non-
forcible measures on the other hand offer a clear example of peaceful remedies taken 
outside the context of a SC mandate and in violation of specific treaty obligations, in an 
acknowledgment that the unlawful use of force could not leave it unaffected, even i f 
again the EEC and its member states, with the exception of the UK, were not the direct 
victims of attack by Argentina. However, i f it is shown that the EEC action was the 
result of collective self-defence, then another significant question is raised, and in 
particular as to whether the EEC measures could still fall within the category of 
countermeasures, or whether a different legal characterization would be attached to 
them as a consequence of the fact that the EEC and the other states, by resorting to the 
measures .under consideration^ were acting as belligerent parties. 
"^ ^ See Piedra/Statement in Avecedo/1984/342. 
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5.2.6. Non-Forcible Action against the Soviet Union for the Destruction of a Civil 
Aircraft in Flight (1983) 
In September 1983 the USSR shot down and destroyed a South Korean aircraft which 
had strayed into Soviet airspace, killing all the people on board including nationals of 
several states. The USSR justified its act on the allegation that the aircraft had been 
involved in spying against it, although later it was proved that the aircraft was a civilian 
and unarmed Korean Airlines plane. 
The US responded to this 'heinous' act by: announcing the suspension of Aeroflot's 
right to sell tickets in the US; the prohibition of US airlines from selling tickets in the 
US for transportation with Aeroflot; the prohibition of US airlines to carry traffic to, 
fi-om or within the US where an Aeroflot flight is on the ticket; the instruction of US 
airlines to suspend any interline service arrangements with Aeroflot; and the prohibition 
of American airlines trom accepting tickets issued by Aeroflot for air travel fi-om, to or 
within the US. It was the position of the US government that since there were no agreed 
services under the 1966 US- USSR Civil Transport Agreement the USSR had no right 
to have the Aeroflot services in the US maintained, making reference to the arguments it 
advanced when similar action was taken against the USSR for its involvement in the 
repression in Poland.^^' 
Despite the fact that among the passengers killed as a result of the Soviet action were 
American nationals, thus entitling the US to action as an aggrieved state, the US 
government placed particular emphasis on the fact that the Soviet action was in 
violation of both general international law concerning the prohibition of the use of force 
and its obligations under the International Civil Aviation Organization on the signal, 
warning and guidance procedures for the interception of civilian aircrafts.^^^ In 
particular, President Reagan demanded that the Soviet Union give a fiill explanation of 
the circumstances of the shooting, an apology and reparations for the families of the 
victims. He further stressed that "It would be easy to think in terms of vengeance, but 
this is not a proper answer. We want justice and action to see that this never happens 
a g a i n : ^ " ^ ' ' 
"' Cumulative/Digest/1981-1988/II/2190. 
ibid/2199-2209. 
Washington Post, 6 September 1983, A4 in Hufbauer/1985/740. 
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For its part the USSR did not deny the existence of a rule prohibiting the use of force, 
but rather attempted to justify its action on the basis of another customary norm, in 
particular the norm concerning the treatment of aircrafts that were involved in an 
espionage mission. 
In a draft resolution by the SC, subsequently vetoed by the USSR, it was stated that the 
Soviet action was in violation of "elementary considerations of humanity".''^^ In the 
absence of collective action, certain other states among which West Germany, Spain, 
Japan, Canada, the UK and other NATO countries (with the exception of France, 
Greece and Turkey) announced a two-week prohibition on all Soviet Aeroflot flights 
from and to their territories.^^^ To the extent that this decision was in breach of specific 
aviation conmiitments, and it is very likely that it was, and provided that these states 
were not aggrieved parties due to the shooting of the aircraft, their decision could be 
regarded as a violation of an erga omnes obligation not to use force and to respect the 
safety of civilian aircraft. 
5.2.7. Countermeasures against the Apartheid Regime in South Africa (1986) 
5.2.7.1. Introductory Note 
The problem of apartheid had been extensively dealt with by UN organs in the 1960s 
with the adoption of several resolutions, especially by the General Assembly, in 
condemnation of the racial policies of the South African regime, whilst many states 
were calling for a harsher reaction with the implementation of several economic and 
trade measures against the country. In 1977, amid growing international unrest 
concerning apartheid, the SC acting under Chapter VI I of the Charter imposed a 
mandatory arms embargo on SA.^ ^^ 
Apartheid was viewed by some authors as a violation of the right to self-determination 
as incorporated in the 1970 General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States according to which 
people have a right to be ruled by a government without distinction as to race, creed or 
HLR/ l 984/1198. 
In Kido/1997/1052. Also see Petman/2004/362. 
"''Hufbauer/1985/739,741. 
SC/Res/418/1977. 
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colour.^ ^^ Whilst the Declaration does not create legally binding effects, the right to 
self-determination not only found expression in customary international law, but it also 
established obligations erga omnes as the ICJ ruled in the Barcelona Traction Case. 
Furthermore, the ICJ itself had found that the South Afiican practices of racial 
segregation and the denial of fiandamental human rights were "a flagrant violation of the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter".^ ^^ 
5.2.7.2. The Indian Reaction 
In the World War I I era India was the first state in 1946 to take the path of trade 
measures against SA for its apartheid policies and for what it characterized as an issue 
that touched the conscience of the world.^ "*" It raised the matter before the UN General 
Assembly, arguing that with the 1946 Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation 
Act passed by the South Afiican government imposing complete segregation on trade 
and residence, SA had repudiated the Capetown Agreement between the two countries. 
SA in response argued that since the question concerned not Indian nationals but rather 
Indian nationals of SA, it fell within the domestic jurisdiction of its country. However, 
reference was also made to the Capetown Agreement whose object according to SA was 
to encourage emigration back to India and to improve the life of those who remained. '^*' 
Although it seems that both states were relying on their obligations under the 
Agreement, this case may be of some value i f it is to be deduced that the segregation 
imposed by SA was not in violation of the agreement, in which case India would be 
entitled to resort to countermeasures as an injured party. 
5.2.7.3. The Reacfion of Afiican States 
In the conference conducted by independent Afiican states in Addis Ababa in the 
summer of 1960, the African states were called upon to react to the 'shamefiiF racial 
discrimination policies of SA and to take various measures in response. These included 
the imposition of trade embargoes on all Afiican products, the closure of their ports to 
all South Afiican vessels, the prohibition of vessels carrying their flags from using 
South Afiican ports, and the reftisal of landing and overflight rights to aircrafts owned 
GA/Res/2625/1970. See Ferguson Brown/1988-89/61. 
ICJReps/1971/31. 
Villiers/1995/1. 
UNYB/1946-47/144. 
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by SA. A month after the adoption of this resolution, Ghana was the first state to 
implement the decision by imposing a total embargo upon all South Afiican products 
and to close its ports and airports to South Afiican planes and ships. It even required 
South Afiicans entering its territory to declare their opposition to apartheid and, i f 
refijsed, it was denying them entry.^ '*^ 
5.2.7.4. The US Reaction 
In an in-depth examination of the US policy on the apartheid regime in SA it is 
observed that never before had the US been so successful in protecting human rights 
abroad and leading the racist regime to its slow death. This was achieved by means of 
both sustaining regional diplomacy and taking into consideration the strategic interests 
in the African continent, and adopting a more dynamic approach through the 
implementation of peacefial measures. Nothing was ever so effective to threaten the 
structures of apartheid policies, not even the multilateral oil and arms embargoes against 
SA imposed by the UN in the 1960s and 1970s, as the economic measures taken by the 
US alone in the mid 1980s.^ ''^  Only when a firmer approach was adopted by the US, at 
the fime one of the closest trading partners and major investors in SA and in 
combination with the formulation of strong opposition within SA itself, was the regime 
induced to bring to an end these policies.^'*'' The US decision to take action influenced 
other economic powers such as Japan and the UK to do the same. Similarly, other 
smaller states followed with the adoption of what they described as "symbolic 
gestures".The incentive behind the American measures was not to overthrow the 
regime but rather to reinforce domestic forces fighting apartheid. 
Nevertheless, as already seen, the US government was not always favourable to a 
stronger line with measures of economic character against SA. When in 1976 the SC 
adopted resolution 392 calling upon the South African government to cease the violence 
against the Afiican majority and to take measures to eliminate its apartheid policies, the 
US supported the resolution which was adopted under Chapter V I and not Chapter V I I 
and which purported to terminate the flagrant violations of human rights. At the same 
'^^  See New York Times, June 25, 1960, col. 6; July 30, 1960, 1 col. 1. 
Baker/2004/86. 
Ibid/93. 
Villiers/1995/xiv. 
Baker/2004/104. 
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time it made clear that it could not support enforcement action in what the US 
government regarded as falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. 647 
Ten years later, with the strengthening at a domestic level of the voices in support of 
action against SA and with the UK proceeding with limited sanctions in response to 
more extensive measures announced by the Commonwealth countries, the US Congress 
in an overwhelming vote overturned President Reagan's veto against economic 
measures. In this way, the US Congress went beyond its mere role of review in the 
formulation of foreign policy, and SA received "the strongest psychological and 
economic blow it had ever received from the international community". '^*^ 
With the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986^ "*^  direct air flights between the 
US and SA ceased, in violation of the Agreement between the two countries relating to 
Air Services Between their Respective Territories signed in 1947.^ '^' More specifically, 
the right of any South African designated air carrier to provide services under the 1947 
Agreement was revoked whilst all US air carriers were prohibited from continuing their 
services to SA. The American decision was taken pursuant to Article X I (B) of the 
Agreement which established the right of any party to request consultation with the 
other party at any time. Accordingly, "[wjhen the procedure for a consultation provided 
for in paragraph (B)....has been initiated, either contracting party may at any time give 
notice to the other of its desire to terminate this agreement."^ '^ Article X I further 
established that the termination of the agreement would take effect one year affer the 
date of receipt of the notice of termination. However, a few days after the US 
government announced its intention to terminate the Agreement, it revoked the 
operating permit of South African Airways and restricted the operating service of US air 
carriers with SA in accordance with Section 306 of the Act. In contesting the lawfulness 
of the US action. South African Airways filed a petition before the US Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing first that Section 306 did not require 
immediate revocation of its permit and secondly that in any event, no revocation could 
be permitted before the end of the one-year period since the notice for termination was 
given. It was thus the submission of the South African airline that the Final Order 
authorizing these measures against it was inter alia in violation of the 1947 Agreement. 
US/Digest/1976/165. 
Baker/2004/89. 
Anti-Apartheid/Act/1986. 
Petman/2004/371. 
See Cumulative/Digest/1981-1988/II/2184. 
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In making its case before the Court the US government argued that the Court should 
refrain from adjudicating the case before it because the dispute involved the 
implementation of international agreements and a foreign policy issue which fell within 
the powers of the Executive Branch. The Court held that Section 306 was meant by the 
Congress to be given immediate effect and priority over the 1947 Agreement or any 
other conflicting domestic law. It fiirther stressed that the Congress had the right to 
denounce international treaties whenever it sought fit.^^^ 
With respect to the other measures adopted under the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid 
Act, new investments in SA were banned with the exception of investments made in 
firms owned by blacks. Loans going to the private sector and to the South African 
government were also prohibited except for those needed for humanitarian purposes. 
Imports from SA to the US were prohibited whilst the US government was banned from 
buying South African goods and services and from promoting tourism to SA. There was 
also a prohibition against the export of products whilst US nationals were banned from 
making new investments in SA either directly or indirectly.^^^ For the first time in US 
history human rights concerns gained primacy over economic and geo-strategic 
interests.^ '^* The only way for the South Afhcan government to escape from its 
economic isolation was by compliance with the requirements of the Act, or, even more 
remotely, with a decision by both Houses of the US Congress. Among the requirements 
that the regime had to ful f i l l for the termination of the measures against it was the 
release of Nelson Mandela from jail in addition to the fulfilment of three of the four 
following conditions: repeal of the state of emergency and the release of all the detained 
persons; the enhancement of the democratic process with the participation of the 
political parties banned by the regime; the repeal of the Great Areas Act and the 
Population Registration Act; and the initiation of good faith negotiations with genuine 
representatives of the black population.^^^ In the event that no compliance occurred 
within a period of 12 months additional sanctions could be imposed such as the banning 
of importation from SA of strategic materials, steel, diamonds, food, agricultural 
products and military assistance to countries violating the arms embargo against SA. 
South/African/Aii-ways/Case Also sefe Cuiriulative/Digest'198l-1988/II/2r85:7. If^^^ to be said that 
in opposing the inclusion of aviation sanctions in the Anti-Apartheid Act the American Administration 
drew the attention to the fact that such decision would be in violation of the 1947 Agreement with SA, 
and that as a result the US would have to go to solve the dispute through arbitration. In that case, it was 
mentioned, the US would be in danger of being obliged to award damages to SA. 
Law/Restatement/vol. 1/382. 
Baker/2004/92. 
Villiers/1995/125-6. 
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At the same time however the diplomatic and consular relations between the two 
countries were not terminated. On the contrary, the US government continued 
diplomatic negotiations with SA with the purpose of encouraging and influencing it 
towards ultimate change.^ ^^ The contribution of the US sanctions towards political 
change and reform in SA with the final abolition of the apartheid regime is not 
insignificant and for this purpose should not go unnoticed. I f none of these measures 
had been taken the apartheid regime would most possibly still be in place or have ended 
in violence.^^^ Whilst the intention of these measures was not to overthrow the regime 
but rather to reinforce domestic forces fighting apartheid, it was pointed out that, "Even 
the law's most ardent supporters pointed out that there was no precedent for a ruling 
elite relinquishing power without force and that sanctions rarely are enough to dislodge 
a regime that is militarily secure."^^* 
Although the South Afiican example must be viewed in the framework of the 
surrounding circumstances and its specific characteristics due to both the external and 
internal changes occurring at the time, it remains undisputed that i f no economic 
measures were taken this would have allowed the racist regime to continue to commit 
its atrocities with impunity.^^^ In his conclusion about the effect of US sanctions on the 
historic regime transformation it was about to follow the next years, de Villiers argues 
that "US and other punitive measures significantly dictated the form, substance, timing, 
and pace of these reforms. 
For his part, Nelson Mandela, in his first speech before the US Congress after his 
release from prison, took the opportunity to express his gratitude for the adoption of the 
"historic" Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act "which made such a decisive 
contribution to the process of moving our country forward towards negotiations".^^' He 
insisted that the measures remained in place until the goals of the Act, namely the 
abolition of apartheid, were met. The measures continued until 1993 when relations 
between the US and SA were finally restored with the signature of the National Peace 
''^ ^ Baker/2004/94. 
Mullerson/1997/114. 
Baker/2004/98,104. 
Ibid/92. 
''^"Villiers/l 995/207. 
New York Times and Washington Post, 26 June 1990. 
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Accord between the government of SA and opposition groups, following which the 
conditions for the termination of the sanctions were finally met. 
In a concluding note, it has been remarked that: 
South Africa was not invaded by an outside power and did not descend into full-scale internal war, but it 
underwent a political transformation from apartheid to democracy that was every bit as radical as that of 
Afghanistan after the Taliban and that of Iraq after Hussein. The South African state could have collapsed 
but did not. It thus presents a rare instance of regime change- indeed, it was a system change- that resulted 
in a dramatic improvement of human rights. Critical external intervention was applied successfully and in 
a timely way, without the use of military force.^ ''^  
5.2.7.5. The Reaction of the Dutch Government 
When the Dutch Government recommended a number of measures concerning oil 
supplies to and imports and investments in SA, the Advisory Committee on Questions 
of International Law was requested to examine the lawfiilness of these measures within 
the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation among States. According to the report of the Committee prepared in 
1982 and entitled "Measures against South Afiica and the Non-intervention Duty", the 
duty of non-intervention should not be viewed in isolation but on the contrary be 
examined in the light of other rules of international law. Since apartheid was regarded 
by an overwhelming majority of states as a flagrant violation of the human rights of the 
non-white population of SA, it could not be protected within the ambit of the rule of 
non-intervention. In this case, it was noted, a distinction between lawfial and unlawful 
intervention was necessary. However, the question of whether there exists a duty of 
non-intervention needs to be distinguished from the question as to whether there exists a 
right to resort to countermeasures and especially to countermeasures of general interest. 
The report fiirther examined the question as to whether intervention needed to be at the 
initiative of the international community as a whole or whether it could be resorted to 
by individual states. To conclude that: 
it can be established that the Charter was never intended to confer exclusive powers upon the Security 
Council. Although binding decisions in respect of (military) enforcement measures are a prerogative of 
the Security Council in the Charter, it does not follow that the general rules of international law relating to 
'^ ^ Baker/2004/109. 
214 
the right to take measures against unlawful acts are thereby invalidated. Clear proof of this can be found 
in the right, also recognized by the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense.^ *^ 
One could argue of course that the report speaks of the right to take measures already 
recognized in international law, something that cannot be deduced with clarity with 
respect to an existing right of third states to countermeasures in response to the most 
flagrant violations of international law. More importantly, it was the defence of the 
Dutch government that its action was not in violation of a specific obligation under 
international law. Therefore, the example does not seem to fall within the ambit of 
countermeasures, provided of course that indeed no duty on the part of the Netherlands 
was infi-inged. Nevertheless, the above abstract should be viewed in the entire context of 
the report which examines the legality of Dutch action in the absence of a SC resolution 
against the apartheid regime in South Africa and under which the Netherlands had 
suffered no direct injury. 
In the Memorandum of Reply to the First Chamber concerning the Bill on the 
application of sanctions against states and territories,^^'' it was recognized that there 
could exist special circumstances to justify measures other than those authorized by the 
SC for the protection of the international legal order which had nothing more to fear 
than total inaction in the face of the most grave infringements.^^^ Interestingly, in a note 
sent by the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Second Chamber in 1979 relating 
to the question of the oil embargo against SA, it was noted that the obligations of the 
Netherlands under the EEC, the Benelux Economic Union and GATT posed an obstacle 
to its taking unilateral commercial action against South Africa. The only exception 
referred to was the existence of a mandatory SC resolution in which case the 
Netherlands, according to the note, would be entitled to derogate from its other treaty 
obligations.^^^ However, it seems to be also suggested that in the case of a possible 
consent of the other parties to the treaties just mentioned, the imposition of measures, 
even third state countemieasures, would be feasible. As already noted in section 3 of 
this chapter, the Sanctions Bill introduced in 1976 to enable the Dutch government to 
conform with its obligations at the international level did not differentiate between 
lawful measures on the one hand and countermeasures on the other. It could be 
NYIL/1983/XIV/248. 
'^'"*NYIL/1977/Vol.8/205. 
*"NYIL/1981/Vol.l2/170. 
Ibid/240-241. 
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therefore implied that the possibility of even third state countermeasures was not 
precluded. 
The note finally concludes that what has just been mentioned should be taken into 
consideration for an evaluation of the "political effect of an oil embargo by the 
Netherlands", making however no reference to the legifimacy of a unilateral decision of 
the Netherlands to proceed with the imposition of the oil embargo in general 
international law. In other words, what is examined in the note is the jusdficafion for the 
Dutch action under specific treaty regimes but not under the general law on state 
responsibility and the rules concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of third-state 
countermeasures. Furthermore, the possibility of the imposition of sanctions not 
contradictory to Netherlands's obligations under the EEC and its other obligations, is 
left open. More notably this is confirmed in the Statement of the Dutch Prime Minister 
in the Second Chamber of 26 June 1980, which stressed that any action against SA, 
although desired, would have to be in concordance with the country's obligations 
towards its economic treaty partners.^^' 
5.2.7.6. Canadian Measures against Apartheid 
The Canadian government, despite its hesitant position towards economic action, 
announced a number of measures to oppose apartheid, including economic. More 
specifically, it ended the Program for Export Market Development and the global 
insurance policies written by the Export Development Corporation concerning SA; 
broadened and widened the UN arms embargo in order to include high-technology 
items and announced abrogation of their Double Taxation Agreements; introduced a 
voluntary ban on loans to SA and its agencies; announced a voluntary ban on the sale of 
crude oil and refined products to SA by asking Canadian companies not to sell these 
products to SA; and it imposed an embargo on air transport between Canada and SA 
although there was no bilateral agreement on which previous traffic rights were based. 
On the contrary, direct air transport between the two countries was limited to occasional 
charters. With this measure reciprocal air service of charter flights ceased until 
apartheid was abolished. It seems that with the exception of the abrogation of the 
Double Taxation Agreements all the other measures decided by the Canadian 
government were not in confravention of international law. 
Ibid/242-243. 
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5.2.7.7. Concluding Remarks 
The action taken especially by the US in reaction to the discriminatory practices of SA 
in disregard of specific treaty commitments is another significant example of state 
practice in support of countermeasures for gross human rights violations. Apartheid was 
a practice strongly deplored and condemned by the vast majority of countries. The fact 
that the examination was confined particularly to the US action has only to do with the 
fact that in the view of the limited scope of the present examination, there was neither 
the time nor the space to examine thoroughly the measures taken by other countries. At 
the same time, it is also important to remember that in international politics often other 
interests, mainly of an economic nature, come into play, resulting in inaction even in 
response to the most serious violations of international law. This element should not be 
ignored when examining whether or not states support a right to react when the most 
valued principles of the international community as a whole are endangered. 
5.2.8. The Iraqi Invasion against Kuwait and the EEC Response (1990) 
As a result of the Iraqi aggression and invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, the 
SC adopted resolution 660 on 2 August 1990 within its powers under Chapter VI I of the 
UN Charter demanding Iraq's immediate withdrawal from Kuwait and deciding to meet 
again for the determination of fijrther action that might prove necessary, although no 
concrete action was decided at that point. In the light of these developments the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs representing the member states of the EC arranged a 
meeting on 4 August 1990 in the context of the EPC, where they condemned Iraq in the 
strongest terms, demanding from it to the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
its froops from the territory of Kuwait. Rejecting as unfounded the grounds on which 
Iraq based its military aggression against Kuwait and noting that they would work 
systematically for a consensus in the SC on mandatory and comprehensive sanctions 
should Iraq fail to comply with resolution 660, the Community and its member states 
took a step fiirther. They decided to impose an embargo on all oil imports from Iraq and 
Kuwait; to freeze Iraqi assets existing in the territories of Community member states; 
place a prohibition on arms and other military equipment sales to Iraq; suspend all 
technical and scientific cooperation with fraq; and suspend the application of 
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generalized preferences to Iraq.^ *^* This decision came during the time that negotiations 
were still ongoing within the SC and even before a formal SC resolution authorizing 
any kind of sanctions was adopted,^ ^^ although it actually took effect after the adoption 
of SC resolution 661 (1990) of 6 August with which the SC authorized economic, trade, 
finance and arms sanctions. In compliance with the EPC's decision the Commission 
presented to the Council on 8 August various proposals for the adoption of measures 
against Iraq and for their extension to Kuwait with the purpose of preventing the 
aggressor from benefiting from its unlawful actions. The proposals concerned the 
prohibition of the import into Community territory of crude oil and refined petroleum 
products coming from either fraq or Kuwait, the suspension of the generalized tariff 
preferences for products coming from Iraq in accordance with Council Regulations No 
3896/89, No 3897/89 and 3898/89, and the suspension of Council Regulation No 
3899/89 concerning levy reductions. It is noteworthy to point out that the proposals do 
not seem to rely for their legitimacy on SC resolution 661. Rather, in the explanatory 
memorandum emphasis is given to the statement of 4 August made by the Community 
and its member states in the framework of political cooperation. To take notice in the 
main body of the proposed regulations inter alia o f 
the serious situation caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in Resolution 660 (90) of the United 
Nations Security Council and led to the statement by the Community and its Member States of 4 August 
1990 which unreservedly condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and called for the immediate and 
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait's territory, and also led to the decision to take 
economic action against Iraq, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaties of the 
Communities."" 
Following the Commission's recommendations the EU Council decided the same day to 
prohibit trade between the Community, Iraq and Kuwait with Regulation 2340/90. With 
this resolution the Community and its member states agreed "to have recourse to a 
Community instrument in order to ensure uniform implementation throughout the 
Community of the measures concerning trade with fraq and Kuwait decided upon by the 
United Nations Security Counci l " .Taking cognizance of SC resolutions 660 and 661 
EC/Bulletin/1990/No.7-8/Vol.23/(1.5. H) The EPC provided merely coordination among the member 
states to the E C on matters of foreign relations, for which the member states retained their full sovereign 
powers and did not transfer such competences to the European institutions like they did with a wide 
number of economic issues. See OJ/987/L169/1. For more information on the EPC see Stein/1983/49; 
uttall/1987/211. The EPC was replaced by Title V of T E U which provided for a CFSP. 
•^ ^^  Bohr/1993/258. See EC/Bulletin/1990/No.7-8/(1.5.11). 
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with which it authorized sanctions against Iraq, the Council observed that "in these 
conditions, the Community's trade as regards Iraq and Kuwait must be prevented". 
Consequently, all trade with Iraq, including imports and exports, and all activities and 
commercial transactions were banned. It is important to point out that the Regulation, 
although aiming to comply with the SC decisions, did not rely on article 224 concerning 
consorted action by the Community member states in compliance of their obligations 
for the maintenance of international peace and security, but rather on article 113 
concerning a common commercial policy.^^^ This could be perhaps interpreted as 
revealing the intention of the Community to take action irrespective of SC 
authorization. Moreover, with regulation 3155/90 the EC imposed restrictions on air 
services. In a similar context lay the prohibition of commodities covered under the 
ECSC.^" In this way, the member states of the EC decided upon the uniform 
application of economic and other measures against Iraq and Kuwait, measures that 
were decided at a Community level and not unilaterally by individual states.^ '^* 
5.2.9. Collective Action against Yugoslavia (1998) 
Following further worsening of the humanitarian situation in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in 1998 the SC decided to impose an arms embargo against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia under its Chapter VI I competence, whilst not excluding the 
possibility of additional measures should a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Kosovo 
fail. The EU Council, through Common Positions and regulations decided the 
implementation of additional measures in order "to obtain firom the Government of the 
FRY the fulfilment of the requirements of UNSC Resolution 1160 (1998) and of the 
said Common Pos i t ions" . I t needs to be stressed however that Resolution 1160 does 
not authorize any member state to resort to such measures in order to bring the 
compliance of the FRY with its international obligations. The only duty it imposes is 
"that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, prevent 
the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and 
related materiel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training 
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for terrorist activities t h e r e " . I n fact, Russia was unwilling to accept the imposidon of 
economic measures upon the FRY. As a consequence, the EU, the USA, Canada and 
Japan decided to apply unilateral measures. 
The EU Council, with Common Posifions adopted on 7 May and 29 June 1998 within 
its powers under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, decided to freeze all 
Yugoslav assets abroad and to impose a flight ban, which for some states such as 
Germany, the UK and France meant violation of their bilateral aviation agreements with 
the targeted country.^^^ This was implemented with regulafion 1901/98 where the 
Council noted that the FRY had not stopped its indiscriminate violence and brutal 
repression "against its own citizens, which constitute serious violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law, and has not taken effective steps to find a political 
solution to the issue of Kosovo through a process of peaceful dialogue with the Kosovar 
Albanian Community in order to maintain the regional peace and security."^^^ This 
regulation provided that any aircraft operated directly or indirectly by a Yugoslav 
carrier, or a carrier which had its main place of business or registered office in the FRY, 
would be banned from flying between the FRY and the EC, thus revoking all existing 
and new operating authorizations to Yugoslav carriers. This prohibition was limited to 
landing and taking off rights. With a subsequent Council Regulation the ban was 
expanded to cover the take off or land in the territory of an EC member state of any civil 
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aircraft which has taken off from or is going to landing in the territory of the FRY. 
The implementation of flight ban was later challenged in the Bosporus and Ebony Cases 
which are thoroughly examined within the scope of the last chapter. 
The regulation raised significant issues of the legality of the measures under 
international law, especially in view of existing Air Services Agreements between EU 
member states and the FRY. One such example relates to the Air Services Agreement 
concluded in 1959 by the Government of the UK and the then Government of the 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia .The Agreement specifically provided that 
"^SC/Res/l 160/1998. 
See UK/Parliament/Kosovo/Crisis. 
OJ/1998/L143/1; OJ/1998/L190/3. 
OJ/1998/L248/1. 
OJ/1999/L129/27; OJ/1999/L264/3. 
UK/FPRY/Agreement/1959. This Agreement continued to be binding between the UK and the FRY 
and was the subject of a meeting between representatives of the two countries which took place on 14 
October 1996 for the purpose of considering the position of their bilateral agreements. See 
Command/Paper/1998, 
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in the event of any dispute arising relating to its interpretation or application it should 
first be attempted to resolve such dispute with negotiation between the parties. Should 
such negotiations fail then the parties were entitled ("may") to request the resolution of 
the dispute by an arbitration tribunal. Even more significantly, article 17 of the 
Agreement allowed the termination of the treaty by either party by giving notice to the 
other party. In such an event, the termination of the treaty would become effective only 
twelve months after the receipt of the notice. 
There apparently existed a real impediment concerning the lawfulness under 
international law of possible implementation by the UK government of Council 
Regulation 1901/98 with the adoption of the UK Yugoslavia (Prohibition of Flights) 
Regulations 1998 which was passed few days after the Council Regulation entered into 
force and which gave immediate effect to it.^*^ The requirement of the twelve months 
notice was indeed a matter of concern for the British government as it can be revealed 
fi-om the response given by the Secretary of State to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
enquiry on the matter. Initially the UK government was very reluctant to introduce the 
ban on flights conducted by Serbian airlines immediately as required by the Council 
r egu la t ion . In a confidential memo sent to all the member states of the EU the UK 
government contended that it possessed no right under international law to resort to 
"reprisals" and in particular not to comply with existing treaty obligations due to the 
fact that the human rights violations in Kosovo did not affect the EU member states 
directly.^*'' However, in the light of fierce criticism, especially from its European 
partners, the UK government reversed its decision and decided to enforce the ban 
immediately. The Secretary of State, whilst acknowledging the legal implications fi^om 
giving immediate effect to the ban in contravention of the Air Service Agreement, 
especially article 17, went on to point out that "given the continued repressive activities 
of President Milosevic's troops in Kosovo, and the sharply deteriorating humanitarian 
situation, we concluded that it would be right to proceed with an immediate ban on 16 
September 1998."^*^ Asked about the legal grounds on which the 1959 Agreement was 
to take precedence over the Council Regulation imposing the air ban, the Secretary of 
The Yugoslavia Regulations 1998 were later revoked with Yugoslavia/Regulations/1999 in accordance 
to Council/Regulation/1064/1999. 
House of Commons Debates, 24 July 1998, c. 184. The UK Government was faced with the possibiHty 
of proceedings before the ECJ in the event that it declined to conform with its obligations under the 
Community Treaties. See article by Butler in The Independent, 16 September 1998. 
Article by Butler in The Independent, 16 September 1998. 
UK/Foreign/Policy/Report/1998-99/6. 
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State replied that the agreement between the UK and Yugoslavia, which preceded the 
former's accession to the EC, had not been left unaffected. Consequently, the UK 
Government still had a legal obligation to abide by its obligations under the agreement. 
As pointed out: 
There was always a balance to be struck between our legal obligation under the 1959 ASA....and the 
need to bring Milosevic to comply with his obligations. That balance had tilted sharply by September 
given the worsening humanitarian situation on the ground in Kosovo, and in particular the reports of 
serious human rights abuses committed by the FRY and Serbian security forces. As my statement of 16 
September makes clear, I concluded that, on moral and political grounds, Milosevic had forfeited the right 
to the 12 months' notice period which would normally apply under the terms of the ASA.*'^ 
It is significant to highlight the fact that the UK government seems to have taken the 
view that there does not exist in international law a legal right upon states not directly 
injured by a certain breach to resort to countermeasures, no matter how essential to the 
fundamental interests of the international community as a whole. 
Similar concerns were also expressed by Greece, which invoked its bilateral agreement 
with Yugoslavia for its failure to give immediate effect to the decision of the EU 
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Council, as reflected in its Common Positions and subsequently in the Regulations, 
hrespective of the legal debate as to the legal force of Common Positions adopted under 
Title V TEU, especially when these are vaguely phrased, it was pointed out that 
sanctions decided at a Community level are required to be uniformly applied by all 
members of the EC. As noted by President Santer, "decisions taken by the fifteen 
Member States have to be applied by fifteen. I f one or more countries refiises to play the 
game, it strips the decision to impose sanctions of any meaning."^^* 
On the other hand it was argued that the EU, by resorting to the flight ban, despite the 
fact that in this way many bilateral agreements existing between the FRY and individual 
member states would be affected, "broke new ground".^*^ When the flight ban, and in 
particular Council Regulafion 1901/98, was challenged before the Belgian Cour d' 
Appel de Bruxelles, the latter ruled in favour of the legality of the regulation on the 
following grounds: 
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee from the Foreign Secretary on the Yugoslavia Flight Ban, 
30/11/1998, Appendix 32. 
See Agence/Europe/1998/7286/2; The European, 14-20 September 1998, 6. 
European Voice, 17-23 September 1998, 15 in Koutrakos/2001/88. 
''^ ^ Paasivirta-Rosas/2002/214. 
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"- ces mesures repondent a une violation anterieure du droit international; 
- cette violation autorise les contre-mesures; 
- ces contre-mesures ne sont pas d'une illiceite absolue; 
- elles sont proportionnees a la violation initiale du droit international; 
- leur mise en oevre est precedee d; une sommation adressee a 1' Etat responsible de mettre fin a la 
violation initiale du droit international."''^ '' 
5.2.10. Legal Issues Arising from Extradition Agreements 
Not infrequently many European and other states, including the UK, Canada and the 
Netherlands, are faced with questions of conflicts between two international, 
conventional or customary, norms of international law, one of which evolved around 
human rights considerations. The issue was raised among others in the well known 
Soering Case where the applicant, a German national who was accused for murder in 
the US, had been arrested in the UK and was to be extradited to the US in order to stand 
trial there. However, the ECHR ruled that there were substantial cumulative reasons to 
believe that should the extradition be carried out, the applicant faced a real risk of 
exposure to an infringement of article 3 of the Convention regarding the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman treatment. Hence, although the prohibition of extradition to a place 
where an individual would be subjected to torture was not specifically spelled out in the 
EConv.HR, this did not mean that such a prohibition was not inherent in article 3 of the 
EConv.HR itself Judge De Meyer, in his concurring opinion said that extraditing an 
individual to a place where s/he would be exposed to torture or to the death penalty 
would be "repugnant to European standards of justice and contrary to the public order of 
Europe."^^' The significance of this case lays on the fact that the UK and the US were 
bound by the 1972 Extradition Treaty, and should extradition be refused the UK would 
be acting in violation of its treaty obligations, raising its international responsibility. 
The UK was thus confronted with the dilemma to implement a certain international 
commitment while violating another. In the end, the UK sought and received assurances 
Jugoslovenski/Aerotransport/1999/693 in Paasivirta-Rosas/2002/215. "These measures correspond to 
a previous violation of international law; this violation authorizes countermeasures; the countermeasures 
do not constitute an absolute prohibition; they are proportionate to the initial violation of international 
law; their resort follows requests for compliance to the state responsible to cease the initial violation of 
international law." (Translation by author). 
Soenng/m9/429. 
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from the US that Soering would not be tried on capital murder charges, and 
subsequently extradited to the US.^ ^^ 
Similar questions were raised in the case Short v Netherlands where the applicant, an 
American citizen, was wanted by the US for murder. The US and the Netherlands were 
bound by the NATO Status of Force Agreement regarding extradition issues. However, 
the Netherlands was also bound by the Sixth Protocol to the EConv.HR by which death 
sentence was prohibited. Refusing to extradite Short the Netherlands justified its 
decision on the ground that, "in view of the great importance which must be attributed 
to the right not to suffer the death penalty, the weighing of the various interests in this 
case must inevitably result in a decision in Short's favour".^^^ 
The significance of the questions that these cases raise is invaluable. This is because 
both the UK and the Netherlands, while acting in agreement with specific treaty 
obligations, namely those arising from the EConv.HR, they did so even though their 
action would be in contravention of another treaty obligation. In both cases above, the 
two countries required to fulf i l l their extradition obligations towards the US were third 
countries, not directly injured by a certain infringement, or even by the possibility of an 
infringement. Rather, the UK and the Netherlands were acting for the protection of 
collective interests which had been established within the context of the Council of 
Europe, upholding in this way the public order of Europe even in disregard of other 
treaty commitments. 
6. As Conclusion: State Practice and Opinio Juris 
There is little doubt that the problem of enforcement of international norms raises 
significant questions which lie at the very heart of the nature and function of 
international law. This is particularly so with respect to interests the preservation and 
respect of which is fiindamental for a group of states or the international community as 
a whole. The problem of implementation of these "superior" norms examined in earlier 
chapters, could not escape the attention of the ILC in its work on the codification of the 
law on state responsibility. However, this task was not free from problems owing to the 
divergent opinions of states regarding the lawfulness of countermeasures in response to 
692 Lillich/1991/141. 
""^  NYIL/1991/N0.22/433 in Okafor/Obasi/2003/105, 
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serious violations of international law by states other than the injured. Accordingly, and 
in the absence of a clear rule establishing a right to resort to countemieasures for the 
protection of collective interests, the attention in this chapter has unavoidably been 
turned to whether the practice analyzed above reveals such rule in the form of custom. 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute refers to custom as "evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law". One can therefore notice that custom consists of two interdependent elements: 
state practice, that is what states do, and opinio juris sive necessitatis, that is their belief 
that they have an obligation to behave in a certain way.^ '^* 
For the existence of state practice to be determined it is a well affirmed principle that 
some form of continuity and uniformity is required,^^^ although not always the existence 
of state practice will lead to the development of a legal norm. At the same time, a 
customary norm may "instantly" be recognized i f there exists the required opinio juris 
by states.^ ^^  
Difficulties arise in relation to proving the existence of opinio juris, that is the belief 
that a certain state activity is legally obligatory. It is this element that differentiates 
custom from moral or political principles. Yet, one may wonder how is it ever possible 
for a new rule to be formulated by way of custom i f one of its essential requirements is 
that the state action must be in accordance with the law. Shaw points out to this effect 
that the right interpretation would be that opinio juris requires that states act in the 
belief that certain behaviour is law or is moving towards the direction of becoming a 
law.^ ^^ He concludes that: "However, states must be made aware that when one state 
takes a course of action, it does so because it regards it as within the confines of 
international law, and not as, for example, purely a political or moral gesture. There has 
to be an aspect of legality about the behaviour and the acting state wil l have to confirm 
that this is so, so that the international community can easily distinguish legal from non-
legal practices".^''* 
One crucial question arises in the scope of this examination. Does there exist a rule 
under customary international law prohibiting or not countermeasures of general 
Shaw/2003/71. 
^syWCflje/ICJReps/1950/266. 
Shaw/2003/74. 
Ibid/83. 
Ibid/84. 
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interests, meaning that the examples mentioned here were in breach of international 
law? Similarly, one could also ask as to whether there exists a rule permitting such 
countermeasures, or whether there exists no rule on this matter at all, and therefore the 
analysis of state practice has attempted to prove the formulation of a new rule allowing 
countermeasures by states other than the injured. We would be inclined to conclude that 
the issue falls within the former category. It seems that states have been hesitant to 
resort to countermeasures whenever not individually injured because they believed that 
they had an obligation to refrain from doing so. 
Furthermore, the current analysis, which was not confined to new examples but rather it 
attempted to shed light on the already known cases of third state countermeasures, has 
revealed that even in these cases the states not only have been reluctant to clearly spell 
out that they were acting on the basis of a right under intemafional law, but they also 
stated that doing so would be in violation of international law. When, for instance, the 
US Congress decided to impose aviation sanctions against SA as a consequence of its 
apartheid policies, the US government was concerned that such a measure would be in 
violation of its agreement with SA. It was the same reluctance that made the EEC not 
violate its agreements against Uganda, despite the international outcry regarding the 
atrocities taking place there. The UK government itself, in finally consenting to join the 
other EU members in taking action against the FRY stated that its decision was based 
on "moral and political grounds", implying that it was not acting on the belief that it 
was acting in accordance to the law, as required by opinio juris. 
White and Abass have observed that the state practice on which the ILC based its 
conclusions regarding the lawfulness of countermeasures of collective interests does not 
in all cases reveal a response to a violation of an erga omnes obligation (see the action 
taken against Poland), nor has there been in all instances an infringement of an 
international obligation, whilst some of such practice was the result of action taken in 
the context of an international organization such as the EU, although they do 
acknowledge that the line between institutional and state action is not clear.^^' 
On the other hand, the legal value of certain other examples must not be ignored either. 
In particular, when the EEC decided in the 1980s to take action against Poland, the 
Soviet Union or Argentina in response to serious violations of international law, the 
White-Abass/2003/516. 
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issue of legitimacy or illegitimacy under international law was never raised as an 
obstacle. An additional factor that needs to be taken into consideration when studying 
these examples is that often the human rights or foreign policy of states was drafted on 
the basis of their economic, political or geo-strategic interests. This consideration has 
also contributed to the reluctance of states to protect community values by unilateral 
peaceftil means when these were threatened by intransigent states. 
Therefore, although the existing practice does not suffice and does not conclusively 
support a right to third state countermeasures, it says something important about how 
things may evolve in the fiature. Still, opinio juris plays a pivotal role in the formulation 
of a customary norm, and consequently more state practice is required for establishing a 
right permissive of countermeasures for the protection of collective interests. 
Having left open the possibility of fiiture formulation of a rule permissive of 
countermeasures for the protection of collective interests reflected either in jus cogens 
norms or erga omnes obligations by states not specifically injured by their infiingement, 
it is imperative to ascertain that such rule will not be subjected to abuse. Proportionality, 
which is analyzed in the next chapter, fialfils exactly this fimction, safeguarding not only 
the rights of the wrongdoing state, but also the interests of the international community. 
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C H A P T E R 5 
The Principle of Proportionality 
1. Introduction 
It has already been stressed throughout this work that in a decentralized legal system 
where as a general rule no enforcement mechanisms are available, countermeasures 
become important because they enable the state whose rights and interests have been 
infiinged to remedy the violation and its unlawftal consequences by inducing the 
wrongdoing state to cease its wrongfiil conduct and to offer reparation for the injury 
suffered. However, the fact that the determination of whether a violation that would 
justify countermeasures in the first place has indeed occurred is made unilaterally by the 
state resorting to them, makes countermeasures vulnerable to abuse and excessiveness. 
For this reason the international legal system has attached certain conditions for the 
lawfialness of countermeasures, examined in section 5.2 of this chapter. In this 
fi-amework, proportionality, which is at the focus of examination of this last chapter, 
comes as one condition of lawfulness amongst others that intend to restrain the powers 
of states when resorting to countermeasures. 
When in domesfic law the state needs to take action through policing measures in order 
to either prevent or punish the commission of a certain criminal act, it is required that 
the police abide by specifically defined rules and principles, the aim of which extends 
primarily to the protection of fundamental, inalienable human rights and the observance 
of the rule of law applicable in a just state. Any action taken not only must not be taken 
arbitrarily and in abuse of the powers entrusted by law, but it must also be the result of 
pressing necessity without which the legitimate objective cannot be achieved. However, 
the fact that certain action was necessary does not by itself mean that the specific action 
finally chosen was also proportionate. Proportionality possesses a prominent posifion in 
national legal systems where the state and the individual stand in an apparent 
relationship of inequality. The notion has developed out of the need to regulate and 
restrict as much as possible the interference of state mechanisms in the sphere of 
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individuals concerning their rights, whether deriving fi-om the private or public sector, 
and with the purpose of balancing individual freedoms and community interests. 
In international law proportionality may arise in three contexts: as an integral element of 
the primary norm, in the law of the use of force and in the law of state responsibility. 
Since the current work is focused on the secondary rather than the primary rules of 
international law, the first category regarding proportionality as part of the primary rule 
will be excluded from the scope of the current examination. Having clarified that, 
proportionality in the international legal system derives its significance from the 
principle of sovereign equality of states and plays a crucial role not only in the law 
concerning the use of force ijus ad bellum and jus in bello) but also in the law of 
countermeasures. Proportionality therefore becomes relevant in international law 
whenever the legal balance in the relationship between states has been disturbed as a 
consequence of a certain wrongful behaviour. Proportionality is used as a means of 
evaluation of whether the response to the wrongfiil act, forcible or not, ftalfils specific 
standards of legality. Or whether it is excessive. Since often both the initial wrongfial act 
and the response concern the violation of different international legal norms, the 
fiinction of proportionality lies in the sphere of balancing and prioritizing different 
conflicting legal interests.'* '^ In that sense, proportionality does not resemble reciprocity 
in that the legal balance cannot be re-gained by mere application of equivalence because 
the rights and obligations in question are different in kind.^^^ At the same time, 
proportionality seems to have been increasingly influenced by current trends regarding 
humanitarian considerations. 
Although proportionality is a notion synonymous to something that is balanced and not 
excessive, equipoise but not equivalent, measured and not exaggerated, reasonable and 
not irrational, symmetrical but not identical, it is generally acknowledged that there is a 
lack of consensus with respect to the exact scope, definition or even terminology used to 
define proportionality.^*'^ Despite the fact that proportionality is not a notion 
independent from the intensity, means, objectives, degree, extent, legal consequences, 
seriousness, and the principles at stake as a result of the initial act and the act in 
response, its content is still the object of varied opinions. This is particularly so with 
™''Feldman/1999/118. 
™' VanGerven/1999/58. 
™^Zoller/1984/50. 
™' VanGerven/1999/47-8, 
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respect to the concept of proportionality in the law of countermeasures. Whilst 
considerable attention has been given over the years to the content of proportionality 
when applied in the law of use of force lata sensu, the principle of proportionality in 
relation to the law of countermeasures has significantly remained under-developed. 
Much of the expressed hesitation for example in recognizing a right to states other than 
the injured to resort to countermeasures is the fear that their use may lead to abuses. It is 
therefore imperative that countermeasures be legally restrained. This can only be 
achieved i f the legal standards by which proportionality is determined are clearly and 
unequivocally defined. By contrast, the lack of consensus with respect to proportionality 
in this field makes the search for predictability and foreseeability much more difficult 
and subjective, whilst it endangers not only the feeling of justice but also these basic 
values of international peace and security as it leaves the door wide open to more 
arbitrary and unjustified violations of international law.^ "^* The degree of control and 
review of the legitimacy of countermeasures depends on how precisely the principle of 
proportionality is formulated.^'^^ However, in the formulation of international norms 
states are reluctant to give way to specifically elaborated definitions which in the future 
could constrain too much their own course of action. Instead, flexible, general, and 
often ambiguous terms are preferred. 
Moreover, the complexity and perplexity of the question of proportionality in the law of 
countermeasures is also owed to the fact that the concept is often attempted to be built 
upon national legal analogies. The substantial difference however is that in domestic 
law there exist impartial and effective institutions to apply the concept. On the confrary, 
and as already discussed extensively throughout this thesis, the international legal order 
lacks similar compulsory institutions and mechanisms. 
Accordingly the crucial question that one needs to address with much care is what 
countermeasures must be proportionate to. Several theories have been developed in this 
regard, with some placing emphasis on a strict relation between the breach and the 
response, and with others turning their attention to the aims pursued or the interests at 
stake in each case. This chapter will therefore attempt to shed some light on the various 
conceptions formulated regarding the content of proportionality in the context of the EU 
'"^  Bowettt observes in this regard that, "The principle that, while the critical decision to act must be 
subjective, the legality of the action must be subsequently evaluated by objective and impartial standards, 
applies in the case of a State resorting to self-defense and ought to be of general application to any form 
of coercion". Bowett/1976/98. 
™ VanGerven/1999/61. 
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and national legal systems, bearing in mind the observations above. It will however 
primarily concentrate on an examination of the question in the law of the use of force 
and the law of countermeasures, and whether proportionality does or should coincide in 
these two areas of international law. Moreover, the present examination wil l attempt to 
touch upon the question as to whether the nature of the infringed obligation, and more 
specifically whether of a bilateral nature or erga omnes, has, or should have, any 
bearing on the assessment of proportionality, in the light of course of the fact that the 
notion of countermeasures taken for the protection of collective interests has not yet 
been finally concluded in international law. 
2. The Principle of Proportionality in the Law of the EU 
The question of proportionality was not excluded fi-om the context of the EU. Although 
the Treaty of Rome makes only a brief reference to the principle, proportionality was 
subsequently developed through the case-law of the ECJ as a general principle of law.^ *^ ^ 
Proportionality in European Law is used as a tool of judicial review concerning not only 
Community but also national measures of administrative and legislative character. 
The Court in applying the proportionality rule has identified three elements, in 
particular the suitability and the necessity of the measure under review and the absence 
of a disproportionate character. A measure meets the requirement of suitability 
whenever the means employed are suitable for the fulfillment of the legitimate goal, 
whilst it is necessary whenever the adverse consequences of the measure on a legally 
protected interest are justified in the light of the importance of the pursued goal.^ ^* 
The criterion of proportionality varies according to whether the Court is called to review 
the proportionality of a specific Community measure or the proportionality of a certain 
national measure. In the former case what is under review is a private vis-a-vis a public 
interest and in particular the rights of the individuals affected by the Community 
measure on the one hand, and the Community interests on the other. In this event, and 
although proportionality seeks to protect the rights of individuals, the proportionality of 
the measure is weighted on the basis of whether it is manifestly inappropriate to achieve 
its objectives or not. Whenever, however, it is the compatibility of a national measure 
™' Imematiomle/ECR/l9Wl25; Nold/ECR/\974/5U-\4; UK/Council/ECR-l/1996/5755; 
/fouer/ECR/1979/3727. 
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with the fundamental freedoms established under Community Law that it is under 
scrutiny, in the balance of proportionality there exists a national vis-a-vis a Community 
interest. The test in this case is much stricter and proportionality is measured by way of 
necessity. What matters here is whether the less restrictive measure has been opted for 
ornot.^ *^^ 
Tridimas points out that although there are several factors taken into account when 
determining proportionality, such as the nature of the action taken, the degree of 
discretion of the authority taking the decision, the effects of the action and the type of 
the interests affected, the objective of the measure and the interests the measure aims to 
protect, the existence of alternative measures and the urgency of the situation, what is 
essentially the focus of the ECJ is a balance between the objectives sought and the 
impact of the measure on individual rights. To finally conclude that "in Community 
law, far from dictating a uniform test, proportionality is a flexible principle which is 
used in different contexts to protect different interests and entails varying degrees of 
judicial scrufiny."'"*' 
The issue of proportionality was also raised in the light of the UN sanctions imposed 
against Yugoslavia. More specifically, the EC gave effect to the UN measures by 
passing Regulafion 990/93 with which the member states had to comply. In the 
Bosphorus Case,^" one of the main concerns under consideration was the balance of 
interests. This case concerned an agreement concluded between Bosphorus Airways, a 
Turkish airline, and the Yugoslav national airline, hereinafter JAT, for the leasing of 
two aircraft owned by the latter. The aircraft were to be fiilly managed and controlled by 
the Turkish airline for a period of four years, and in order not to circumvent the UN 
sanctions, the two parties agreed that the rent would be paid into blocked accounts 
belonging to JAT. In one of the journeys of one of the two aircraft in Ireland, the 
aircraft was impounded by a Ministerial Order under Article 8 of the abovementioned 
Regulation according to which "[a]ll....aircraft in which a majority or controlling 
interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities 
of the Member States." Although the Irish High Court quashed the decision of the 
Minister, the judgment was appealed and referred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
™'Ibid/66. 
™ Ibid/69,76-7. 
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Court referred for preliminary ruling by the ECJ the question as to whether Article 8 
was also applicable with respect to aircraft owned by a Yugoslav undertaking but leased 
to a non-Yugoslav undertaking. Bosphorus Airline argued that the Regulation not only 
infringed its flindamental rights such as its right to peaceful enjoyment of its property 
and its freedom to contract a commercial activity, but it was also disproportionate and 
manifestly unnecessary as the owner of the aircraft had already been penalized by 
having the rent deposited in blocked accounts. The ECJ, having affirmed that the aim 
and context of the Regulation intended to give effect to UN SC Resolutions on 
Yugoslavia, concluded that paragraph 24 of Resolution 820 (1993) included all aircraft 
the majority or controlling interest of which was held by an undertaking operating in the 
FRY, even i f the management and control of the aircraft belonged to a non-Yugoslav 
company, or an undertaking not operating in the territory of the FRY. It fiirther rejected 
the claims of the airline pointing out that the rights claimed by Bosphorus did not have 
an absolute character, and that they could be restricted in the pursuit of the general 
interest of the Community. According to the ECJ, measures restricting certain rights 
were the direct result of sanctions being applicable even to parties which are not at fault. 
As noted, the need to end the war which at the time was ongoing in the region and the 
massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law occurring on the 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, was pressing. Noting that the essential interests of the 
international community supervened over the rights of Bosporus in this particular case 
the Court ruled that the impounding of the aircraft was not inappropriate or 
disproportionate.^'^ 
The question of proportionality in the light of the sanctions against Yugoslavia was also 
raised in the Ebony Maritime Case.^^^ The provisions of Regulation 990/93 were also 
relevant here. More specifically. Article 1 ( I ) (c) and (d) prohibited the entry into the 
territorial sea of Yugoslavia by commercial vessels, and any activity that aimed to 
promote transactions with this country, whilst Article 9 allowed the competent 
authorities of the member states to detain, pending investigation, all vessels, freight, 
vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes suspected of having violated, or being in 
violation of the Regulation. Furthermore, Article 10 allowed member states discretion 
as to the sanctions to be imposed in case of violation of the Regulation, such as for 
instance forfeiture of vessels and cargoes. The case in question concerned a tanker, 
Ibidy(26). It should be noted that this case has also been brought before the ECHR, but as of 30 March 
2005 it was still pending before a Grand Chamber. See Application no. 45036/98. 
Ebony/Maritime/ECR-l/\991/\111. 
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Lido I I , owned by Loten Navigation and flying the Maltese flag which had left Tunisia 
having as its destination Rijeka in Croatia and carrying a cargo of petroleum products 
belonging to Ebony Maritime. After an inspection of the vessel and its cargo in Brindisi 
(Italy) the vessel continued for its final desdnation. However, during the journey the 
vessel faced problems with water coming in and announced that it had to change its 
direction and go to Montenegro for the purpose of fixing the vessel. Before entering the 
Yugoslav territorial waters the vessel was taken by NATOAVEU forces and was sailed 
back to Brindisi where it was handed to the Italian authorities. The latter ordered the 
impounding of the vessel and the confiscation of its cargo in compliance with the 
national measures taken to give effect to the Community Regulation. In the proceedings 
brought before the Consiglio di Stato against the judgment dismissing the request for 
the annulment of the order filed by the owners of the vessel and the cargo, it was argued 
that the owner of the cargo was punished without proof of fault thus imposing a regime 
of strict criminal liability and that the decision of the Italian authorities to penalize the 
owner of the cargo in the same manner as the owner of the vessel irrespective of the 
degree of their involvement in the infringement was disproportionate. The Court, whilst 
stressing that it belonged to the discretion of the member states to choose the penalties 
to be imposed for the violation of the Regulation, noted that they were bound to respect 
certain procedural and substantial conditions analogous to penalties applicable for the 
infringement of national law of a similar nature and significance. The Court further 
emphasized that, notwithstanding the fact that the application of a system of strict 
liability was not contrary to Community law, a penalty had to be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and that it was up to the national court to decide whether 
the confiscation of the cargo irrespective of the degree of involvement fulfilled these 
conditions. To determine this due consideration should be given to the objective of the 
Regulation which in this case was to bring to an end the humanitarian crisis caused by 
the war in the region. 
It has been very pointedly remarked that the two cases reveal that the Community Court 
when assessing proportionality gave significant weight to the public interest at stake and 
aimed to be preserved by the sanctions. Proportionality was therefore assessed on the 
basis of the objective of the restrictive measures under scrutiny on the one hand, as 
opposed to the interests and rights affected on the other. 
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3. The Concept of Proportionality in National Law 
From the attention of this section cannot be excluded the perception of proportionality 
under German law which influenced the development of the principle in the context of 
European Law. In particular, German law associates proportionality with the suitability 
of the measure for the fulfilment of the pursued objective, its necessity in the absence of 
other means available for the achievement of the pursued objective, and the lack of 
excessiveness/disproportionality with regard to the negative effects the measure 
creates .More precisely, in order to evaluate whether the measure under scrutiny is 
necessary and proportionate there is first a weighing of the means used, the aims 
pursued and the interests the measure seeks to protect, and subsequently these are 
weighed towards another interest which is safeguarded by another rule. The means used 
for the achievement of the specific objective are then examined with respect to whether 
they impose an excessive burden on that other interest. As noted this test does not 
derive from the principle of proportionality itself but from the values protected under 
the German Basic Law.^'^ 
In France, proportionality gradually developed as a notion that takes into consideration 
the motives, the purpose and the content of administrative action along with the 
balancing of interests, the existence of any discretionary powers and the importance of 
the protected interests. ^ ' ^  
British courts on the other hand have been extremely skeptical in incorporating the 
principle of proportionality as an independent principle of law in the exercise of judicial 
review. Rather, the courts rely on the test of unreasonableness according to which the 
court wil l only interfere with a decision i f it is so unreasonable that no reasonable public 
authority could have adopted it.^'^ The problem with this approach is that it is equally 
applicable to all cases irrespective of the nature of the rights involved in each particular 
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case and that the administration is not obliged to specifically justify its action. 
Despite this general approach, British courts are required to apply proportionality in 
cases where an issue under Community law arises or whenever a right protected under 
the EConv.HR is involved. With the coming into force of the 1998 Human Riglits Act, 
^'WanGervenyi999/44-5. 
Ibid/45. 
Ibid/51-2. 
'^^  Lord/Hoffmann/1999/109. 
Craig/1999/99-100. 
235 
UK courts must refer to the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, although they are not 
obliged to follow it. '^*^ Feldman has pointed out that in so far as proportionality is 
formed on the basis of the Strasbourg decisions, then the assessment of proportionality 
will rely upon three factors. The first relates to the nature of the right to be affected with 
the interference: whilst some rights can be restricted, others cannot. The second has to 
do with the ground which the authority produces in order to justify its interference. Such 
grounds may vary from protection of the public order to protection of morals. And the 
third concerns the source and form of the interference. In other words, interference may 
be more difficult to be justified i f it affects a limited number of persons than a larger 
number of people as is the case with the adoption of a certain administrative measure. 
4. Proportionality in the Jus Ad Bellum and the Jus In Bello 
4.1. Introduction 
There was a time in history when a state possessed a "right to every thing that can 
secure it from such a threatening danger, and to keep at a distance whatever is capable 
of causing its ruin".''^' As Dinstein put it, "Once it was believed that when the cannons 
roar, the laws are silent".Nevertheless, the adoption of the UN Charter together with 
the formulation of international humanitarian law were meant not only to restrict the 
circumstances under which the use of force would be jusfified, but also to regulate the 
conduct and the means allowed during an armed conflict. Going beyond merely having 
some symbolism in the conception of contemporary international law, and despite the 
generally acknowledged defects of the international legal system, these norms have 
made an invaluable contribution to international peace and security and on how the 
international community should be construed. 
It is necessary however to make a clear distinction between the law of the use of force 
(jus ad bellum), which relates to whether a state possesses a right to use force against 
another state, and the law of armed conflict {jus in bello), which concerns the rules 
applicable in war and more precisely the manner in which a war can be conducted. Both 
fields are restricted by the principle , of proportionality, „ although in each case 
proportionality is assessed on the basis of different criteria. The resort to force {jus ad 
Feldman/1999/121. Human Rights Act section 2. 
™ Feldman/1999/137-9. 
Vatteiyi916 in Stevens/1989/25. 
Dinstein/2004/1. 
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bellum), whether taken in self-defence or after SC authorization, must not be 
disproportionate to the "legitimate ends of force"Propor t ional i ty in this case is 
determined on the basis of the reasons of using armed force, in other words whether or 
not a specific forceful response is justified as self-defence for the purpose of repelling 
an attack. Here the purpose of proportionality is to allow a state to defend itself while 
minimizing to the extent possible the effects to international peace and security and to 
the international community as a whole.Proportionality in the jus in hello on the 
other hand is related to the rule that during an armed conflict the parties involved do not 
have unlimited fi-eedom as to the means and methods they may use and the injury they 
may inflict upon the enemy.Here instead proportionality is built upon humanitarian 
considerations and a fiarther distinction is made according to which proportionality is 
viewed under a different lens when concerning combatants and civilians.^'^^ Finally, the 
fact that proportionality is consistent with the jus ad bellum does not preclude 
responsibility i f a response is not at the same time proportionate in the jus in hello and 
vice versa. 
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The determination of proportionality in the law of the use of force and the law of armed 
conflict gains all the more significance, especially in view of the risks envisaged from a 
possible escalation of the conflict and its tragic effects in respect of loss of lives and 
destruction caused. Proportionality in this context aims to formulate the scope and 
intensity of, and the effects to derive from, the lawful use of force in general. 
4.2. Historical Perspective 
The principle of proportionality in the course of forcible action finds its roots in the 
Christian theory of just war according to which war would be excused i f its cause was 
just. The principle of proportionality was later elaborated by writers such as Grotius and 
Vattel on the basis that the justification for war did not suffice and that the overall evil 
to be caused by war should be counter-balanced by the good to be achieved.^ ^^ 
Nevertheless, during this period not only did there exist no clear distinction between the 
right to going to war and the means used during an armed conflict (jus ad helium and 
™ Gardam/2004/10-11. 
Ibid/16. 
Ibid/391, 
™ Ibid/14,16-7. 
Ibid/11. 
™ Jolinson/1975/214. 
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jus in bello), but also, and insofar as the reason for going to war was just, the cause 
justified the means7^ ^ 
In the 19"^  century war was regarded by many authors as a means of pursuing national 
policy and as such not belonging in the range of international law. During this period 
however the jus in bello made its appearance as a distinctive body of rules according to 
which the only legitimate objective of war was to weaken the military capabilities of the 
enemy. This principle was later to find expression in the Hague Conventions of 1899 
and 1907 and constituted the basis for the formulation of the modem law of armed 
conflict which outlaws both the infliction of unnecessary suffering but also the use of 
means which are not proportionate to the military objective sought. On this footing 
proportionality developed as a principle to protect both combatants and civilians.^ ^*^ 
4.3. Jus Ad Bellum 
The right to self-defence does not purport to give unlimited powers to the states 
invoking it. The fact that a state has been the victim of an armed attack does not entitle 
it to resort to more force than necessary to achieve the lawful objective which in all 
circumstances must be to repel the attack. Proportionality aims to impose certain legal 
restraints on this right, the abuse of which would have adverse effects for the rule of law 
and international peace and security. That the use of force must comply with the 
principle of proportionality is a principle well established in international law. 
Proportionality in this respect is not confined to the context of a strict relationship 
between initial attack and response, since there may be occasions where an equivalent 
or even identical use of force may not suffice to bring termination of the wrongful 
act,^ '^ but in addition it looks at what is necessary to secure the objectives pursued, 
namely to halt and repel the attack.''" It may also be argued that the injured state may 
take such action as necessary to guarantee that its territorial integrity is not threatened 
again in the future. In relation to this Judge Ago concluded that when measuring the 
proportionality of specific action taken in self-defence what counted was the 
relationship between the action and its purpose that is identified to be the repeal and 
™ Johnson/198l/xxii,xxiii, 3; Arend-Beck/1993/14; Gardamyi993/395. 
™ Gardam/1993/398. 
Kaikobad/1992/316. 
Eighth/Report/Addendum/Ago/1980/69. Although the view has been expressed that a clearly 
disproportionate to the initial attack response would entail the danger of escalation of violence. See 
Mitchell/2001/160-1. 
™ Wicker/2002/18. 
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cessation of the attack, and not a symmetric comparison between the initial attack and 
the response. 
As noted: 
The action needed to halt and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to 
those of the attack suffered. What matters in this respect is the result to be achieved by the 'defensive' 
action, and not the forms, substance and strength of the action itself.''"* 
Whilst Judge Ago recognized that the limited use of force by a victim state in response 
to limited use of armed force could not always be sufficient for the repeal of the attack, 
he also stressed that self-defence should not be confused with sanctions or reprisals. 
According to his view, what matters in self-defence is not that the defensive action must 
be commensurate to the rights affected by the initial attack and the response, like in the 
case of reprisals, nor that it must be commensurate to the wrongdoing, such as in the 
case of punitive action. It is stressed in this regard that: 
Its lawfulness cannot be measured except by its capacity for achieving the desired result. In fact, the 
requirements of the 'necessity' and 'proportionality' of the action taken in self-defence can simply be 
described as two sides of the same coin. Self-defence will be valid as a circumstance precluding the 
wrongfulness of the conduct of the State only if that State was unable to achieve the desired result by 
different conduct involving either no use of armed force at all or merely its use on a lesser scale. 735 
Ago concluded that proportionality in self-defence does not require association of 
strength and content between attack and response since a "State which is the victim of 
an attack cannot really be expected to adopt measures that in no way exceed the limits 
of what might just suffice to prevent the attack from succeeding and bring it to an 
end. ,736 
Greig in assessing proportionality in self-defence observes that "the amount of force 
should be commensurate with the objectives that a plea of self-defence might 
reasonably entitle a State to achieve".^ ^^ McDougal and Feliciano also take the view that 
"concealed in this shorthand formulation of the requirement of proportionality are 
references to both the permissible objectives of self-defence and the condition of 
necessity that eV6ked'fhe fHspoiise'in coefcio^^ Accordiiigly, ariy action taken in 
Schwebel/McflragMa/Ca5e/(212). Also Eighth/Report/Addendum/Ago/1980/69. 
"'Ibid. 
"•^Ibid. 
Greig/l976/887 in Kaikobad/1992/316-7. 
™ McDougal-Feliciano/1994/241-2. 
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response to an unlawful attack must be restricted in terms of both intensity and 
magnitude to what is necessary for the fulfilment of the set objectives. As the authors 
conclude, "Coercion that is grossly in excess of what, in a particular context, may be 
reasonably required for conservation of values against a particular attack, or that is 
obviously irrelevant or unrelated to this purpose, itself constitutes an unlawful initiation 
of coercive or violent change."^'''' It therefore seems that proportionality in the context 
of the use of force is assessed on the basis of the objectives pursued by the forceful 
response. This is also the approach taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case which is 
examined below. 
Yet, no unanimity exists on the matter as some authors place the emphasis upon the 
initial danger ,whils t others on the injury inflicted.'''*' 
Dr Kaikobad suggests that evaluating proportionality is not an easy task. This is because 
there are a number of other factors to be taken into consideration such as the nature and 
scale of the attack but also the "vital interests" at stake, thus giving a certain degree of 
relativity and subjectivity to the notion of proportionality 742 
Furthermore, merely looking at the objective of a defensive act may not always give the 
right solutions, especially in relation to the use of nuclear weapons. Although this issue 
largely falls within the jus in bello, its relevance in jus ad bellum cannot be ignored. No 
matter how justified in going to jus ad bellum, the responding state is submitted to the 
rules o f j u s in bello. In the case concerning the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons the ICJ pointed out that "a use of force that is proportionate under the law of 
self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the requirements of the law 
applicable in armed conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law." 743 
739 Ibid/243. 
'Bowett/1958/269. 
Higgins/1994/231. 
'Kaikobad/1992/317. 
'lCJReps/1996/245/(42). 
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4.4. Jus in Bello 
The jus in bello, or international humanitarian law, comprises norms the purpose of 
which is to balance the military necessity on the one hand and humanitarian 
considerations on the other. Whilst the jus in bello has been formulated out of the need 
to restrict as much as possible human suffering during an armed conflict, it has also 
been accustomed to the realities that emerge during a war. As noted, the jus in bello "is 
not absolute mitigation of the calamities of war..., but relief from the tribulations of war 
'as much as possible': that is to say, as much as possible considering that war is 
prosecuted for military ends, and the ascendant objective of each belligerent State is to 
win the war."'^ '*" 
The requirement of proportionality as an essential component of the law of armed 
conflict can be traced not only in customary international law but also in conventional 
law and in particular in Protocol I adopted in 1977.^ ''^  Article 51 (5) (b) of the Protocol 
in particular provides that "an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated". '^*^ Since this provision comes under the title of indiscriminate attacks it 
should be construed that an attack that fulfils the requirement of proportionality is not 
indiscriminate. Furthermore, proportionality should be assessed with respect to a 
specific attack, whilst from the phrase "may be expected" used in the provision above it 
seems that what matters in assessing whether a given attack is "excessive" or not is not 
the actual outcome of the attack but rather what was the initial expectation. This has 
been criticized as introducing a subjective element in the evaluation of 
proportionality. ^ ''^  
Three factors seem to be relevant in determining the content of proportionality in the jus 
in bello, namely the selection of the target, the means and methods of the attack, and 
whether unnecessary loss of civilian life has been carried out in comparison to the 
military advantage pursued. Yet, the weakening of the military advantage of the enemy 
may not be an adequate or satisfactory criterion in determining proportionality. It is 
noted in this respect that short-term effects may arguably not be sufficient to lead to the 
^•"'Dinstein/2004/17. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1977, Laws of Armed Conflicts 423, 430-1. 
Ibid. 
Dinstein/2004/121-2. 
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conclusion that a certain response was proportionate or not. On the contrary long-term 
effects on the population, or on the environment, must also be taken into consideration 
whilst proportionality should be assessed on a case-by-case basis rather than 
cumulatively.^ "*^ Gardam observes that: 
The key to the dilemma is the subjective nature of assessing proportionality. It requires balancing 
between two opposing goals: the swift achievement of the military goal with the minimum losses of one's 
own combatants and the protection of the other party's civilian population.^ '" 
Proportionality is also raised in another context, that of belligerent reprisals, namely 
action which would under normal circumstances be contrary to the jus in hello but are 
exceptionally permissible in response to the violation of jus in hello by the other party 
to the conflict.^^° Provided that belligerent reprisals are not directed against specific 
targets like the civilian population and other protected persons, or cultural and historical 
monuments, or the environment, they must always be proportionate to the breach of the 
law of armed conflict which actually provoked them, which however is not associated 
with equivalence but rather with excessiveness. Consequently, the reprisals may affect 
different targets than that affected by the original act as long as they are not 
excessive."' 
4.5. Proportionality in the Context of Judicial Review 
With the decline of the theory of just war which found its roots in divine law and the 
law of nature (what the law should be rather than what the law is), and the emergence of 
nation states, war was construed as an instrument for pursuing national policy and as a 
sovereign right of states. Despite the fact that during this period there existed no body of 
rules regulating the use of force, it can be revealed from state practice that certain 
customary rules justifying the resort to force gradually started to emerge such as for 
example the idea that war should be resorted only as a means of last resort.^ ^^ 
It was against this background that the Caroline Incident evolved,^" which is 
considered to have set the structures for the development of the principles of necessity 
Gardam/1993/409. 
'^'Ibid. 
Dinstein/2004/220. 
Ibid/221 and 223. 
Gardam/2004/39-40. 
^" Caroline/Incident, 29 British and Foreign State Papers, 1129; 30 British and Foreign State Papers, 195. 
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and proportionality under the UN Charter.^ '^' The incident was evoked between the US 
and Great Britain in 1837 when British forces set on fire to an American vessel which 
was docked in American waters. More specifically, around 70-80 armed men belonging 
to the British forces, boarded on the Caroline and attacked the people on the vessel with 
muskets, swords and cutlasses. Once the vessel fell into the hands of the attackers it was 
set on fire and thrown into the Niagara falls. The vessel had been allegedly involved in 
providing war assistance, material and other, to rebels who were at the time fighting 
against the British colonialism in Canada. As a consequence of the British attack on the 
vessel one American citizen lost his life. Although the US President in his message to 
the Congress described the incident as a serious violation of American territory, he 
confined action to enforcing the guarding of the frontiers with Canada in an attempt to 
prevent similar occurrences in the fiiture, and to seeking reparation by Great Britain. 
The initial reaction of the US government was mild in fear of further escalation of the 
crisis.''^^ 
After the Caroline incident the state of New York arrested a British subject, Mr. 
McLeod, for his involvement in the arson of the vessel and the killing of the American 
citizen. The reaction of the British government was immediate, asking for his release on 
the ground that the act with which he was charged had a public character, "empowered 
by Her Majesty's colonial authorities to take any steps and to do any acts which might 
be necessary for the defence of Her Majesty's territories and for the protection of Her 
Majesty's subjects".^ ^^ The US government in its response asserted that the principle of 
the inviolability of the territory of a foreign state could only then be legitimately 
violated, and therefore justified, i f it was the result of "absolute necessity". By the 
summer of 1842 the US government was even more determined to resolve the matter 
for which it had never received an apology from Great Britain. It therefore demanded 
from the British government to show that there existed: 
necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the 
necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing 
unreasonable or excessive; since thesact justified,by the.necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that 
Gardam/2004/40. 
" ' Stevens/1989/18-19. Also see Message from the US President to Congress, January 1838 in British 
and Foreign State Papers (1837-8) Vol. 26, at 1372-73, 1376-77. 
Correspondence of Mr Fox to Mr Webster, March 1841 in British and Foreign State Papers (1840-41) 
Vol. 29, 1127. 
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necessity, and kept clearly within it. It must be shown that admonition or remonstrance to the persons on 
board the Caroline was impracticable, or would have been unavailing; it must be shown that day-light 
could not be waited for; that there could be no attempt at discrimination between the innocent and the 
guilty; that it would not have been enough to seize and detain the vessel; but that there was a necessity, 
present and inevitable, for attacking her in the darkness of the night, while moored to the shore, and while 
unarmed men were asleep on board, killing some and wounding others, and then drawing her into the 
current above the cataract, setting her on fire, and, careless to know whether there might not be in her the 
innocent with the guilty, or the living widi the dead, committing her to a fate which fills the imagination 
with horror.^ '^  
Although the American government clearly questioned the necessity of the British 
response, it can be inferred from the above abstract that it relied also to an element of 
proportionality in that the British government was required to show that it had done 
nothing "unreasonable or excessive" and that its action was not only necessary but it 
also did not go beyond that necessity: "since the act justified by the necessity of self-
defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it". Although 
necessity and proportionality are two notions very close to each other, one must not 
forget that they are in the end two separate and independent concepts. Accordingly, the 
fact that the necessity for certain action is proven does not automatically mean that the 
action is also proportionate either to the injury suffered or to the aim pursued. It seems 
therefore that what was required by the British government to be shown was primarily 
that the attack on the vessel was jusfified in response to the necessity for certain action, 
which relates to the question whether it was necessary to use force at all, and that the 
action taken was the most appropriate for achieving the purpose aimed at, which is 
associated with the question whether the force used was proportionate, and to what. The 
abstract above may however also imply some reference to the jus in bello as it doubts 
the manner in which the attack was carried out, as to whether alternative action was 
unavailable and the fact that it was indiscriminate. 
Lord Ashburton, in replying to the US demands affirmed that the intrusion in a foreign 
territory could be accepted when a "strong overpowering necessity" arises, and 
continued that "It must be so, for the shortest possible period during the continuance of 
an admitted overruling necessity, and strictly confined within the narrowest limits 
imposed by that necessity."''^ * 
Ibid/1138. 
Lord Ashburton to Mr Webster in British and Foreign State Papers (1841-42) Vol. 30, at 196. 
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He insisted however that the selection of the time and the decision to set the vessel on 
fire were made in an attempt to limit unnecessary loss of lives and destruction of 
property.^^^ However, and although the necessity for action has also been disputed,^^^ 
the question that remains is whether the particular action taken, in its extent and 
severity, was the most appropriate under the circumstances in order to cease the 
aggressive activities in which the vessel was allegedly engaged, and as to whether 
alternative milder means would not be sufficient. 
There is a certain degree of disagreement as to the legal characterization of the incident, 
with Bowett arguing that what was involved was self-preservation rather than a right to 
self-defence.^^' For Jennings on the other hand, although there was in this incident an 
attempt to define the content and limits of the right to self-defence, the emphasis was 
placed on the role of necessity, with the notion of proportionality not clearly being 
spelled out.^ ^^ Even long after the Caroline incident, the nofion of proportionality 
remained submerged, something that was attributed to the fact that at the period in 
question, when war was viewed as a sovereign right of states, proportionality was to 
some extent performed by the rules of jus in hello that associated the quesdon of how 
certain attacks were carried out with the aims of the use of force. As Gardam points out, 
this falls today within the jus ad helium. 
In the dispute that developed between Albania and the UK in the Corfu Channel Case, 
Albania argued that the minesweeping undertaken by the British Navy without its 
consent was a violation of its sovereignty. The minesweeping took place a few weeks 
after the explosion of two mines in the North Corfu Channel which had resulted in the 
destruction of two ships belonging to the British Navy and the loss of many lives.^^'' 
Although the Court refused to recognize a right of intervention for the purpose of 
collecting evidence, since to do sowould be a recognition of a powerful weapon in the 
hands of strong states and violation of the territorial sovereignty of another state, it did 
hold that the way with which the operation for the minesweeping was carried out was 
not "out of proportion to the requirements of the sweep The responsible naval 
commander, who kept his ships at a distance from the coast, caimot be reproached for 
Ibid/199. 
Stevens/1989/35-6. 
™' Bowett/1958/59-60. 
Jennings/193 8/92. 
^" Gardam/2004/42-3. 
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having employed an important covering force in a region where twice within a few 
months his ships had been the object of serious outrages",^ ^^ ascertaining that the 
purpose of the British government was not to exert any kind of pressure to Albania. It 
seems that the Court, in its consideration of the British action and as to whether it 
conformed with the requirement of proportionality took into account the objective of the 
operation which was the minesweeping of the area. 
Among the issues examined by the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua concerning US training, military 
equipment and assistance to military and paramilitary groups acting in and against 
Nicaragua, was the question of propor t ional i ty .The Court, rejecting the US 
arguments that it had acted in collective self-defence to armed attack carried out by 
Nicaragua against El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, in the absence of evidence 
supporting the existence of an armed attack found that the US had acted in violation of 
the rule prohibiting the use of force. According to the findings of the Court, this would 
be so even i f the US action had complied with the rules of necessity and proportionality. 
In the event however that the US action was neither necessary nor proportionate then 
this would constitute an additional ground for wrongfulness.Commenting further as 
to whether the US assistance of the Salvadorian contras among which the mining and 
attacking of Nicaraguan ports and oil installations was proportionate, the Court declined 
to find that the US action complied with this requirement. More particularly the Court 
found that although the exact extent of assistance provided by Nicaragua to Salvadorian 
armed groups remained unclear, the US measures "could not have been proportionate" 
to the aid given by the Nicaraguan government to these groups, whilst the US activities 
went well beyond the period the alleged attack had occurred.^^^ As the Court had 
already proclaimed, "there is a specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only 
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to respond to it, a 
rule well established in customary international law".^^^ The Court therefore upheld that 
proportionality in self-defence is linked to what is required to repel the attack, and that 
ibid 
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accordingly the US action was not in proportion to the act that provoked it, namely the 
aid and assistance provided by Nicaragua to the Salvadorian contras. Gardam observes 
that it can be deduced Irom the judgment that the targets, the scale of the attacks and the 
effects on third states did not comply with proportionality.^™ 
Concerns were further expressed with respect to the conformity of the use of nuclear 
weapons with the principle of proportionality, a question raised before the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons The 
Court, having concluded that there was no customary or conventional rule of 
international law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons, focused its attention 
on the law of the UN Charter and the law of armed conflict as the most relevant fields 
for the determination of whether the use or threat of nuclear weapons was permitted, in 
view of the particularly catastrophic consequences to derive therefrom. 
Reaffirming the principle that the right of self-defence was subject to the rules of 
proportionality and necessity as ruled in the Nicaragua Case, the Court stressed that 
proportionality, by itself, did not outlaw the use of nuclear weapons as the response 
should be viewed in the light of the armed conflict (jus in bello). With specific reference 
to international humanitarian law the Court highlighted that this finds expression in the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 which include the Regulations Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land, and the Geneva Convenfions of 1864, 1906, 1929 
and 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. These instruments make clear that the 
right of belligerents to inflict injury upon the enemy is significantly restricted with as a 
result the limitation of the means that can be used during armed conflict, whilst the 
civilian population is immune from acts of reprisal. It is derived from these instruments 
that certain types of weapons are prohibited i f they inflict unnecesseiry suffering in 
comparison to the pursued legitimate military objectives and make difficult the 
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. For the Court, the prohibition of 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering upon combatants constitutes a "cardinal 
principle" which as a consequence bans certain weapons, irrespective of whether this is 
specifically provided under a treaty or not.^ ^^ As it pointed out: 
It is undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so 
fundamental to the respect of the human person and "elementary considerations of humanity" as the Court 
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put it in its Judgment of 9 April 1949 in the Corfu Channel case (I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 22), that the 
Hague and Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession. Further these fundamental rules are to 
be observed by all States whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, because 
they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary law.''' 
The Court deduced that the body of rules of international humanitarian law and the 
obligations arising therefrom applied also to the use or threat of nuclear weapons {jus in 
bello) and that the use or thi eat of nuclear weapons should comply with article 2 (4) and 
51 of the UN Charter {jus ad bellum). However, the Court felt unable to conclude with 
certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would be incompatible with the rules of 
humanitarian law (jus in bello) although it did recognize that nuclear weapons bore such 
characteristics that made them "scarcely reconcilable" with the rules prohibiting 
unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate attacks. At the same time the Court 
highlighted the right of each state to protect itself, thus leaving it to be inferred that the 
right to self-defence would prevail over humanitarian law should the need emerge. 
Undoubtedly, the Opinion left some with a feeling of disappointment since it did not 
mitigate the fears of a possible nuclear war by at least setting the most stringent 
conditions for the permissibility of nuclear weapons in the light of the considerations 
and prohibitions under the law of armed conflict. As Dinstein further observes, the 
inability of the Court to definitely resolve the matter as to whether the use of nuclear 
weapons "in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake" '^'* would be permissible is difficult to accept as "it appears to 
be utterly inconsistent with the basic tenet that LOIAC (the jus in bello) applies equally 
to all belligerent States, irrespective of the merits of their cause pursuant to the jus ad 
bellumr'^'^^ 
The use of nuclear weapons raises concerns both in respect of unnecessary suffering but 
also of indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian losses. Most important, the 
Court with its opinion leaves a legal gap with which the requirement of proportionality 
that is so important both in jus ad bellum and especially in the jus in bello is 
circumvented. 
It has been argued however that the use of nuclear weapons, i f used with certain 
constrains in respect of the target and location may not automatically be 
Ibid/(79). 773 
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disproportionate. It was the British position at the time that the proportionality of the 
use of such weapons should be viewed in the light of the threat posed against the victim 
state. In the words of the British Attorney General: 
It cannot be right to say that if an aggressor hits hard enough, his victim loses the right to take the only 
measure by which he can defend himself and reverse the aggression. That would not be the rule of law. It 
would be an aggressor's charter.^ *^ 
Similarly, Judge Higgins, in her dissenting opinion, in interpreting the terms 
"unnecessary suffering" made specific reference to the conclusions of the Lucerne 
Conference of Governmental Experts on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons of 
1974 according to which these terms involved an "equation" between the suffering 
caused and the necessity for choosing a particular weapon. Although Judge Higgins 
highlighted that even a legitimate target cannot be attacked i f the civilian casualties to 
be resulted wil l be disproportionate to the military gain from such attack and that a 
weapon which cannot be directed against military objectives only, "even i f collateral 
harm occurs", will be unlawful per se,''^^ also pointed out that: 
The prohibition against unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury is a protection for the benefit of 
military persormel that is to be assessed by reference to the necessity of attacking the particular military 
target. The principle does not stipulate that a legitimate target is not to be attacked if it would cause great 
suffering.^ ^* 
She therefore takes the view that it is on the basis of a comparison between the suffering 
caused and the military necessity that certain weapons have been outlawed by states 
which judged that there existed other means for achieving certain military objectives.^^^ 
According to her the use of weapons which are able to cause massive suffering and 
destruction should be permitted only in exceptional circumstances as a means of last 
resort and when the life of the nation is threatened.^*''. 
Although one can see the justification of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances 
in the law of the use of force where proportionality is measured in accordance with the 
military objective to repel the initial attack, it is difficult to see how their use can be 
reconciled with the law of armed conflict. I f we were to accept the use of such weapons 
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in self-defence without respect tothe laws regulating conduct in armed conflict, then we 
would be going years, even hundreds of years, back to when international law justified 
any means as long as the cause was just. As Judge Shahabuddeen observes, "At the 
moment, however, there is nothing to suggest that humanitarian law provides for an 
exception to accommodate the circumstances visualized by the Court. It seems to me 
that to take the position that humanitarian law can be set aside in the stated 
circumstances would sit oddly with the repeated and correct submissions on the part of 
both sides to the argument that the Court should apply the law and not make new 
law".^^' The same view is taken by Judge Koroma in his own Dissenting Opinion who 
said that nuclear weapons should not be, and are not exempted, from humanitarian law. 
As he rightly put it, the question is not concerning whether or not a state may defend 
itself under extreme circumstances, but as to whether it may use any means in order to 
achieve this.^ *^ In the words of the US Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, "the rules of 
international law must be followed even i f it results in the loss of a battle or even a war. 
Expediency or necessity cannot warrant their violation...".^^^ 
It is further the view of the present author that the issue gains significance in the context 
of peremptory norms. Should the prohibition of unnecessary suffering and the killings 
of the civilian population on a massive scale be determined as being of a jus cogens 
norm and viewed outside the military objective aimed at, and this is exactly what the jus 
in bello is all about, then the use or threat of nuclear weapons would be unlawful. 
Moreover, the argument concerning the legality of such weapons in a case of extreme 
emergency threatening the life of the nation is closely associated with the argument 
relating to the "ticking" bomb: would we allow the torture of an individual for the sake 
of humanity i f we were sure that he was aware where an atomic bomb had been planted 
and which would go off any minute? 
5. Proportionality in the Law of Countermeasures 
5.1.In the Search of International Enforcement 
The general prohibition of the use of force as a means of settling state disputes has not 
eliminated the threats and dangers with which the international community is faced 
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with. Countermeasures in particular may become such a strong weapon in the hands of 
those states using them that the imposition of the most stringent conditions regarding 
their use is an essential prerequisite i f they are not to become an instrument of 
vengeance in an international legal community whose main characteristic is the non-
existence of compulsory judicial and enforcement mechanisms. It was early 
acknowledged by former Special Rapporteur Mr Arangio-Ruiz that "the matter has been 
rightly recognized as also being of great importance in legally controlling resort to non-
forcible measures. Although less dramatic and harmftil, such measures can be equally 
detrimental to the preservation of fiiendly relations and the development of cooperation 
among States".^ '^' Furthermore, in a community which is structured on the basis of 
sovereign equality of states, because of which it differs substantially from domestic 
legal orders, no state can claim that it has been entrusted with world enforcement and 
punitive powers as against the rest. The notion of proportionality comprises an integral 
part of the law of countermeasures. No response can be regarded as lawfiil i f it is 
disproportionate, as with it the rights of the wrongdoing state and the international 
community as a whole are aimed to be protected. The former is protected because 
proportionality secures that there will be no violation of its own rights in respect of the 
aims set, the means used and the effects to be derived fi^om the response; and the latter 
because proportionality is an indication when a certain act ceases to be a 
reestablishment of legality, and goes beyond seeking to achieve goals which are 
themselves unlawful, for instance the punishment of the wrongdoer. The latter can never 
be a legitimate objective, nor can it safeguard international law, peace and security. 
Quite on the contrary, as history has shown with Germany's exclusion from the League 
of Nations and the imposition against it of heavy compensation demands and sanctions 
of a punitive character as a result of its role in the First World War, such action did not 
prevent it from fiirther pursuing its aggressive policies, leading to more human suffering 
and devastation bom out of the Second World War. This is the reason that in the 
aftermath of the Second World War the objective was not the punishment but rather the 
rehabilitation of Germany. Furthermore, the varied interests of states in the intemational 
legal arena, but also the in practice real inequality of states make the need for legal 
restraint even more compelling. This reality is best described in the words of McDougal 
and Feliciano who pointed out that: 
'^ ^ Third/Report/Arangio-Ruiz/l991/18/(52). 
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The "establishment of a civil society which generally administers the law" has been described as 
"mankind's most difficult problem". In a community of States afflicted with clashing conceptions of the 
appropriate ends of law and civil society, whose largest arena is a military arena of multiplying devices 
that promise both infernal destruction and access to the heavens, the establishment of a society generally 
administering a law adequately expressing the deepest aspirations of the world's peoples for freedom, 
security and abundance - the establishment, in other words, of a world public order of human dignity - is 
truly a problem of the most heroic proportions.'*' 
It is the varied perception of the world order by states that make them fear foreign 
intervention and strongly upkeep the notion of sovereignty which they refuse to 
abandon. It is for these reasons that contemporary international law confines itself at 
establishing a minimum order that prohibits unauthorized coercion and violence. As 
early as 1958 Professor Brierly pointed out that what differentiated municipal from 
international law was not the lack of sanctions in international law, but the fact that the 
sanction mechanisms under municipal law are organized and systematic, whilst in 
international law there is a lack of an organized sanction-imposing system. As a 
consequence, "The true problem for consideration is therefore not whether we should 
try to create sanctions for international law, but whether we should try to organize them 
in a system. 
In the absence of such a centralized international legal system, states are empowered to 
become the guardians of their own rights and are entitled to resort to unilateral, peacefial 
measures in order to induce termination of the wrong committed against them and the 
compliance of the wrongdoing state with its obligations that derive as a result. 
Nevertheless, the international community is now called upon to face new challenges 
with respect to serious violations of international law, so serious that they attack 
fundamental principles commonly shared by all states. The lack of compulsory judicial 
and enforcement mechanisms has put at risk the very effectiveness of international law, 
and has fed a controversial debate as to whether states not injured are or should be 
entitled to take action in the form of countermeasures in order to bring to an end these 
violations. Two mainstreams exist on the matter, the one supporting such 
countermeasures, and the other opposing it. Professor Koskenniemi argues for example 
that in view of the unwillingness of states to commit themselves to clear-cut definitions 
of notions such as erga omnes obligations, serious breaches, or the fundamental 
interests of the international community, which may in the fiiture trigger "automaticity" 
McDougal-Feliciano/1961/261. 
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of action, and their preference for flexible terminology allowing them discretion for the 
protection of their national interests should such a need arise in the future, makes the 
danger of abuse of solidarity measures apparent. It is therefore imperative that resort to 
787 
such measures is restricted. 
Nonetheless, as long as the issue of countermeasures in the name of collective interests 
remains unresolved the dangers arising from the use of such measures are not 
eliminated. Furthermore, i f the international community is to recognize a right to such 
countermeasures in the future, it has to make sure that they will not be abused by any 
state. For this purpose, and in order to mitigate the fears of many states regarding 
authorization of countermeasures by states other than the injured, it is necessary to 
reduce the risks of abuse by those states that are favored in terms of military and 
economic strength. 
5.2. The Legal Constraints of Countermeasures 
Leaving aside for the time being the question of whether countermeasures by a state 
other than the injured are permissible or not, it should not be forgotten that 
countenneasures, constituting an internationally wrongful act themselves, exceptionally 
entitle a state whose rights have been violated to suspend the performance of its own 
obligations towards the wrongdoing state with the aim, as article 49 of the 2001 final 
articles provides, to induce its compliance regarding cessation and reparation. The 
final articles also acknowledge that countermeasures need not be reciprocal in character, 
deviating in this way from the maxim an eye for an eye, as reciprocity, while it could at 
times comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality, could also collide 
with them in given circumstances, thus endangering fundamental principles of 
international law. Countermeasures, which must not involve the use of force, must be 
temporary in character, a principle affirmed by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo - Nagymaros 
Case. As already seen in Chapter 3, the Court in that case differentiated between the 
suspension or termination of a treaty as a consequence of a material breach as provided 
under article 60 of the 1969 VCLT on the one hand, and suspension of the performance 
of obligations by way of countermeasures under the law on state responsibility on the 
other. Countermeasures are therefore taken for the fialfillment of a certain aim and must 
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be terminated as soon as this aim is accomplished.^*^ Furthermore, for the legality of 
countermeasures to remain uncontested, they must solely be directed against the 
wrongdoing state, they must not be aimed at inflicting punishment, whilst their effects 
must be reversible as far as possible. The latter means that i f the state resorting to 
countermeasures has to select between many lawful and effective measures, it must 
select those which would allow resumption of the performance of the obligations once 
the they are terminated. 
Moreover, the 2001 ILC articles make clear that countermeasures are prohibited with 
respect to obligations arising from the UN Charter concerning the prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, obligations regarding the protection of fundamental human rights, 
obligations of a humanitarian nature harming reprisals, and obligations arising from jus 
cogens norms.^^' The universal significance of human rights, as this is reflected from 
the several international instruments existing for their protection, could not really leave 
unaffected the development of countermeasures. 
Special Rapporteur Professor Crawford had also proposed a further provision 
prohibiting extreme political or economic coercion which aimed to endanger the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the wrongdoing state, or which would 
amount to interference in its domestic affairs,^^^ a proposition not finally followed by 
the ILC. Instead, in the commentary of final article 50 (1) (b) concerning the 
requirement of respect of international human rights, reference is made to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which provides for a 
distinction between exercising economic and political pressure for compliance with 
international law and inflicting suffering upon vulnerable groups within the targeted 
state.^ ^^  It can therefore be inferred from this that particularly burdensome 
countermeasures will be assessed in the context of the obligations requiring respect for 
fundamental human rights. 
Article 50 (2) of the final articles fiarther provides that a state resorting to 
countermeasures is still under a duty to fulf i l l its obligations under any dispute 
settlement procedure existing between itself and the wrongdoing state that is related to 
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the dispute in question, and under diplomatic and consular law concerning the physical 
inviolability of diplomatic and consular personnel, premises, documents and archives. 
It is within this context that proportionality should be assessed, as the considerations 
just analyzed narrow significantly what it may be done by way of countermeasures, and 
they make the scope of proportionality very small. As it can be inferred, when a state 
has the obligations owed to it violated, there are distinct limits as to what it can do in 
response. This must be judged within the context of what it has been left to it to do, 
excluding the restrictions mentioned above. The crucial question therefore is: What is 
an injured state, or for this matter a state other than the injured, entitled to do in 
response to an infringement of an obligation owed to it? Is it entitled to anything, 
irrespective of the cost? Proportionality answers this question by telling us what the 
state is entitled to get, and by keeping the notion of countermeasures clear from punitive 
elements.^'''' This is exactly where the principle of proportionality gains significance. As 
Professor Crawford has pointed out, proportionality is the sine qua non of the legality of 
countermeasures,^ ^^ while it serves to restrict the intensity and nature of unilateral 
power that legitimizes what in other circumstances would be illegitimate and therefore 
safeguarding the own rights of the defaulting state.^ ^^ At the same time, it aims to bring 
legal certainty and predictability in international relations by setting the conditions with 
which excessiveness of a certain action can be measured. 
Furthermore, proportionality draws a line between the intemationally wrongful act and 
the countermeasures, whilst it may be related to the purpose pursued by the latter. As 
the ILC observes in its commentary to article 51 of the final articles a disproportionate 
response may have been unnecessary in inducing the compliance of the wrongdoer with 
its international obligations, namely cessation and reparation. Yet, proportionality may 
render unlawfial countermeasures which although necessary to bring the compliance of 
the defaulting state were not proportionate 797 
One of the main concerns regarding countermeasures in general and proportionality in 
particular is that they are assessed by the state resorting to such measures. The view has 
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therefore been taken that proportionahty should be more precisely formulated.Here 
again emerges the question as to what countermeasures must be proportionate. While 
the earlier sections dealt with an overview of proportionality in the context of EU, 
national legal systems and the law of armed conflict, the following sections will focus 
on the content of proportionality in the law of countermeasures. An additional question 
which wil l be raised is how proportionality would or should be assessed, should there 
exist in international law a right to all states to resort to countermeasures in response to 
a violation of an obligation erga omnes. 
5.3.The Concept of Proportionality in the Work of the ILC 
When with the adoption of article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, as later repeated in General 
Assembly resolution 2625 on the Friendly Relations of States,^ ^^ the use of armed 
reprisals as a means of resolution of international disputes was harmed, the notion of 
countermeasures gained in significance. One of the main concerns that remained 
however, in view of the non-central character of the international legal order, was the 
setting of boundaries in the capabilities of states when resorting to countermeasures. As 
pointed out by Mr Riphagen, no matter how serious the initial wrongdoing, the offender 
has certain rights that no one can violate in response. In his opinion this rule constitutes 
a negative statement of the rule of proportionality according to which: 
the author state does not, by the mere fact of committing any breach of any obUgation, become an 
"outlaw". Rather, the rules of international law determine the legal consequences of the breach, i.e. the 
possible responses, including the new obligations of the author State. These responses are not necessarily 
strictly proportional to the breach. They may involve legal consequences having a serious impact on the 
sovereignty of the author State, as, for example, in the case of a response against aggression committed 
by the author State. But the point is that even the most serious "international crime" (in the sense of art. 
19 of part 1 of the draft) does not in itself- i.e. automatically- deprive the author State of its sovereignty as 
such''' 
It was acknowledged at an early stage of the work of the ILC on the codification of the 
law on state responsibility that the application of countemieasures as a response to a 
prior breach in order,to preclude the wrongfulness and therefore the responsibility of the 
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responding state, should be commensurate to the injury suffered by the initial 
offence.*"' 
For Mr Riphagen, the source (i.e. customary, conventional or other), the content, and 
the purpose and the object of an obligadon that has been infiinged cannot but influence 
the legal consequences of the breach (qualitative proportionality). Moreover, the factual 
circumstances under which a breach occurred are also relevant for the response such as 
the seriousness of the wrongful act and its effects on the interests of another state. Such 
circumstances may aggravate or extenuate the responsibility of the author state, in other 
words the legal consequences deriving Irom the wrongful act (quantitative 
proportionality). The need to find equivalence between the actual effect of the 
intemationally wrongfial act and the actual effects of the legal consequences then 
becomes for Mr Riphagen apparent. Therefore: 
A manifest "quantitative disproportionality" between breach and legal consequences should be avoided, 
but, while this principle can appear in a set of general draft articles on State responsibility, a further 
elaboration must be left to the States, international organizations or organs for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes which may be called upon to apply those articles.**"^ 
Mr Riphagen has argued that the criterion is always qualitative in the sense that what is 
important when examining the lawfiilness of a specific countermeasure is the 
seriousness of the violation on the one hand and the seriousness of the sanction taken on 
the other, although as argued, there is not in international law a perfect correlation 
between breach and response.*"^ Nevertheless, "translating quantity in terms of quality 
and vice versa", as characteristically was pointed out, is not an easy task especially 
when the new legal relationship established because of the initial wrongfiil act does not 
merely establish an obligation for restitutio in integrum, but also authorizes the injured 
state to resort to countermeasures, or even creates a right or a duty for third states to 
adopt a non-neutral position towards the defaulting state.*'^ '* In 1969 the Commission 
implied about proportionality that: 
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two factors in particular would guide it in arriving at the required definition: namely, the greater or lesser 
importance to the international community of the rules giving rise to the obligations violated, and the 
greater and lesser seriousness of the violation itself 
It was suggested in this regard that in determining the legal regime of responsibility, 
that is the legal consequences to be derived from an internationally wrongfial act, it was 
not enough to draw a list of the new legal relationships and categorize such legal 
consequences in a scale of strength. Nor was it satisfactory when choosing which legal 
consequences are more legally admissible in each particular case to merely draw a line 
of proportionality as between the breach and the response. It was thus proposed that in 
addition to the scale of consequences in accordance to their sfrength, a substantive 
criterion was also required, and in particular a scale of values affected from both the 
breach and the response.*^^ Nevertheless, a scale of values necessarily fell within the 
ambit of the primary rules, something that the Commission repeatedly precluded in Part 
One of its Draft Articles, with the exception perhaps of article 19 and with what it 
named as "international crimes". However, as Mr Riphagen noted, even in the case of 
international crimes there existed different legal consequences to be chosen from for 
each particular situation.*"^ 
For the purpose of determining the legal consequences to be applied in a case of a 
violafion and of estimating proportionality, Mr Riphagen recommended to do so by way 
of approximation taking into account a scale of possible responses on the one hand and 
the general rule of proportionality between the actual breach and the actual response on 
the other. At the same time he acknowledged that the seriousness of the situation 
created as a result of the violation might entail a more serious and stronger response. To 
achieve that, Mr Riphagen suggested three restrictions in relation to: 
(i) the protection given to the object of the response by the rules of international 
law; 
(ii) the coimection under international law between the object of the breach and 
the object of the response; and 
(iii) the existence of a form of international organization lato sensu covering the 
situation. 
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According to him, these requirements provided for flexibility when determining the 
question of proportionality. 
Nevertheless, it was also suggested that the wrongfial act might in fact be of such 
negligible significance so "its breach" not to entail all the legal consequences provided 
by the secondary rules for that particular act. As Mr Riphagen remarked, "the mirror-
image of this immediate appreciation of a particular set of factual circumstances is the 
principle of law called the principle of proportionality.. .".^"^ 
When the issue of proportionality was later examined by Mr Arangio-Ruiz the attention 
was turned to the determination of the real objective of the countermeasures in each 
particular case.^°^ However, when defining the notion of proportionality in relation to 
countermeasures, Mr Arangio-Ruiz rejected that it was appropriate to make reference to 
terms such as "manifestly disproportionate" that his predecessor had accepted, since 
there was a risk to introducing subjective and ambiguous elements. Instead, he opted for 
terms such as "out of proportion" or simply "disproportionate". As for the criteria 
required for the assessment of proportionality Mr Arangio-Ruiz stressed that it would 
not suffice to take into account merely the damage caused by the wrongful act 
(quantitative element). An additional, qualitative, element should also be taken into 
consideration, and more specifically, the importance of the interest/right protected by 
the infiinged rule, and the seriousness of the breach. As a consequence, Mr Arangio-
Ruiz proposed article 13 according to which "Any measure taken by an injured State 
under articles 11 and 12 shall not be out of proportion to the gravity of the 
intemafionally wrongful act and of the effects thereof'.*'^ 
The next Special Rapporteur, Professor James Crawford, turned his attention to the aims 
to be pursued by countermeasures ascertaining that it was necessary to legally restrict 
those (the aims). Emphasis was therefore given to the coercive character of 
countermeasures. Accordingly, the ILC accepted as lawfial countermeasures whose 
purpose is stricfly to bring compliance with the obligations of the wrongdoing state bom 
out of its wrongfiil act. This view is reflected in article 49 of the 2001 articles on state 
responsibility according to which an injured state is entitled to resort to 
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countermeasures only for the purpose of inducing the wrongdoer to comply with its 
obligations, namely the cessation of the wrongful act, the provisions of safeguards of 
non-repetition, and reparation for the injury caused (part two of the articles). However, 
Cannizzaro observes that despite the change of perception regarding the nature of 
countermeasures, article 51 does not correspond to this change because in effect it 
envisages a relationship between breach and response.*" Therefore, i f the ILC wanted 
to focus on the coercive nature of countermeasures, then it should have defined 
proportionality as a relation between the intensity of the constraint and the gravity of the 
initial breach. Moreover, Cannizzaro believes that it is improper to put all 
countermeasures under the same category, namely that they all aim at the coercion of 
the wrongdoing party, as it does not give flexibility nor establishes a link between the 
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aim pursued and the means used. 
In addition to the above. White and Abass note that i f proportionality is assessed on the 
basis of the injury caused then this would imply that the purpose of countermeasures is 
to punish the recalcitrant state, something explicitly precluded under the current articles, 
and that as a result there seems to be a contradiction in the position of the ILC.*'^ 
Although these thoughts are shared by the present author, it is also important to stress 
that proportionality cannot be completely disassociated from the initial breach. 
5.4. The Development of Proportionality in the Law of Countermeasures 
Reprisals, as measures short of war taken by one state against another, developed in 
state practice in the latter half of the 19* century.*''* According to Oppenheim reprisals 
constituted "such injurious and otherwise internationally illegal acts of one State against 
another as are exceptionally permitted for the purpose of compelling the latter to 
consent to a satisfactory settlement of a difference created by its own international 
delinquency".*'^ 
The question of proportionality was discussed in the Naulilaa incident in 1928, although 
even before that some authors had made reference to the concept of proportionality 
^" Article 51 as appears in the Final Articles on State Responsibility reads as follows: "Countermeasures 
must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the internationally 
wrongful act and the rights in question". In Crawford/2003/294. 
*"Cannizzaro/2001/893-94. 
White-Abass/2003/513. 
Gardam/2004/46. 
'^^  Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1952/136 in Gardam/2004/46. 
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pointing out that reprisals out of proportion to the act that provoked them were not 
lawful.*"' The Arbitration Tribunal which was established by Germany and Portugal 
was called to determine whether the reprisals taken in that course were grossly 
disproportionate. 
The incident between the two countries was evoked when in October 1914 some 
members of a Portuguese firontier post in Naulilaa killed three German officers whilst 
wounding two others. In retaliation the Governor of German South-West Africa ordered 
German forces to attack and destroy forts and posts in the Portuguese territory which as 
a result were abandoned and later looted by the native population. The two countries 
reached an agreement for the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with 
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles to try claims concerning acts of the German 
government since July 1914 and before Portugal's accession to the war. The Tribunal, 
having concluded that the Portuguese action to kill the German officers was a mistake 
and as a result did not constitute a wrongful act, held that reprisals constituted an act of 
self-help of the injured state in retaliation to a violation of international law, and that it 
had to comply with proportionality. More specifically, the Tribunal stressed that 
reprisals: 
have for object to suspend momentarily, in the relations between the two states, the observance of such or 
such a rule of international law. They are limited by the rules of humanity and good faith applicable in the 
relations of state to state....They tend to impose on the offending state reparation for the offence or the 
return to legality and avoidance of new offences. This definition does not require that the reprisal be 
proportioned to the offence.*" 
The Tribunal fiirther noted on the question of proportionality that according to the 
German doctrine of reprisals, these did not need to be proportionate to the offence. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal did acknowledge an existing disagreement among authors on 
the issue and that the majority viewed that there needed to be a proportion between the 
offence and the reprisal as a condition of legitimacy.*'* It went further to note that 
(2) The necessity of a proportionality between the reprisal and the offence appears to be recognized in the 
German reply. Even if one admits that international law does not require that reprisals be measured 
approximately by the offence, one must certainly consider as excessive, and consequently illicit, reprisals 
*"^In Zoller/1984/125. 
Naulilaa/RlAAJ\92SfUo.2/95l. 
*'*Ibid/(1026). 
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out of all proportion to the act which has motivated them. In the present case....there was an evident 
disproportion between the incident of Naulilaa and the six acts of reprisal which have followed it.*" 
The emphasis placed by the Tribunal lay upon the lack of equivalence between the 
initial wrongdoing and the reprisals. The conclusions of the Tribunal that 
proportionality was a prerequisite for the legality of reprisals reflected the opinion of 
writers of the time according to which "reprisals must be in proportion to the wrong 
done, and to the amount of compulsion necessary to get reparation".However, the 
state practice that followed the Naulilaa incident was not always consistent to this 
approach according to which proportionality had a restraining power. One of the 
reasons identified for this was the lack of agreement regarding the aims of reprisals, "an 
established referent against which to measure the reprisal action".*^' It is therefore 
observed that i f what was aimed for by the reprisals was retribution, then the gravity of 
the offence could be a relevant factor in evaluating proportionality. Should however the 
aim have been reparation, then the injury suffered would be essential in assessing 
proportionality. 
In more recent times, Zoller took the view that proportionality becomes relevant 
whenever the response to the wrongfial act goes beyond the suspension or termination of 
a right or obligation equivalent to the right or obligation that had initially been 
infiinged. In this context, the notion of proportionality implies a harmonious 
relationship between different things and therefore calls not for mathematical 
approximation but rather for relative equality. 
Proportionality in relation to countermeasures was the subject of examination by the 
Arbitral Tribunal established with the agreement of the US and France in the Case 
Concerning the Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946^^^ The dispute broke out 
between the parties when France refiased to allow a Pan American aircraft traveling 
from the US to Paris with change of gauge in London to disembark its passengers and 
freight, whilst suspending future Pan Am flights to Paris. France argued in particular 
that the decision of the Pan American Airlines to use smaller aircraft for the route from 
London to Paris was in violation of the 1946 Agreement. In response the US, for as long 
Ibid/953. 
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht/1952/141 in Gardam/2004/47. 
Gardam/2004/48. 
*-^Zoner/1984/131. 
ILR/1979/Vol.54/304. 
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as the French authorities enforced the restrictions against Pan Am, ordered two French 
airlines to file the schedule of their flights. A few days later they prohibited Air France 
from operafing certain flights to the US. Both orders were passed under Part 213 of the 
US Civil Aeronautics Board's Economic Regulations. In the meantime the two 
countries by common agreement submitted their dispute to an Arbitral Tribunal 
requesting it among others to determine whether the US orders were lawful and 
proportionate. 
In assessing the lawfulness of the US action the Tribunal noted that it would have to 
base its conclusions on the aim actually pursued and whether that was confined to 
reciprocity, quicker settlement of the dispute, or prevention of fiiture violations by other 
states.^ "^* The Tribunal re-affirmed in this regard the rule that countermeasures should be 
equivalent to the breach although it acknowledged that proportionality could be 
assessed only by approximafion. He also added that: "In the Tribunal's view, it is 
essential, in a dispute between States, to take into account not only the injuries suffered 
by the companies concerned but also the importance of the questions of principle arising 
from the alleged breach."^^^ 
The Tribunal stressed that a mere comparison of the losses the parties in the dispute 
suffered or would have suffered did not suffice for the determination of whether the US 
action was proportionate. Rather, it gave emphasis to the interests and principles at 
stake by the initial action of France and its impact on the general air transport policy of 
the US and on a large number of international agreements with states other than France 
concerning changes of gauge in third countries. What mattered in this regard was the 
proportionality between the effects of the initial wrongfijl act and the effects sought by 
the countermeasures. Zoller further illustrated this point by associating the case before 
the Tribunal with the restriction of civil rights by police for the maintenance of public 
order. The determinative factor for proportionality in this latter case would be to balance 
the effects of the exercise of the civil rights and the effects of the implementation of the 
police measure. As Zoller very characteristically points out, this principle is reflected in 
the 'aphorism' that 'The police may not use machine guns to kil l birds'. 
Subsequently, what proportionaHty measures is not the breach and the response but 
whether the countermeasures resorted to are proportionate to the purpose aimed at, and 
Ibid/337/(78). 
Ibid/338/(83). 
Zoller/1984/135. 
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the means used in order to achieve it.*^^ She also stresses that equivalence may not 
always be the right answer since even an equivalent response may indeed be 
disproportionate and cause more harm.*^* 
Should the US action have been evaluated in the light of measures aiming to compel 
France to lift the ban imposed on Pan Am to land in Paris, the US measures, which 
resulted to the suspension of any flight between Paris and Los Angeles, would have 
been disproportionate to the purpose they wanted to achieve. Instead, the US 
emphasised on the effects of the action taken by it, which it claimed did not exceed the 
effects that derived as a result of France's initial decision. According to the analysis 
made by the US: 
France has denied a U.S. carrier its right under the Agreement to provide a West Coast- Paris service; Air 
France's Paris- Los Angeles service was approximately equivalent in law to the West Coast- Paris service 
Pan Am proposed to resume. In fact. Air France operated its Los Angeles- Paris round trip service only 
three times a week while the Pan A m service would have been six times a week".^^' 
Viewed in this context the Tribunal did not find that the US response was 
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disproportionate in comparison with the French measures. It needs to be noted 
however that in this case the countermeasures resorted to fell within the same field and 
concerned the same routes as the ones affected by the initial measures to which they 
were a response, although their economic effects upon the French airlines were more 
severe.* '^ 
The principle of proportionality was also examined in the Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project between Hungary and Slovakia. Under an agreement 
signed between them in 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia decided the construction 
and operation of a system of barrage and locks on that part of the Danube shared by 
them as an international river and boundary.*^^ When in 1989 Hungary, due to 
environmental concerns, decided to suspend and finally abandon the works of the 
^^'Ibid. 
Ibid/136-7. 
US/Digest/1978/770 in ibid/135-6. 
In his dissenting opinion Mr Renter, although he agreed with the legal analysis of the Court on the 
issue of proportionality according to which this should be assessed not only on the basis of the facts but 
also in the light of the questions of principle to be bom from the facts, he added that these questions of 
principle should also be considered in view of their probable effects as well. 
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project, Czechoslovakia responded by diverting the waters of the river Danube within 
its boundaries, which it justified as a measure of 'approximate application' of the 
agreement. Looking at the arguments of both parties the Court stressed that with the 
conclusion of the 1977 Treaty Hungary had accepted the damming of the Danube and 
the diversion of its waters but only on the condition of common operation and benefit of 
the project. Consequently, it had not forfeited its rights for the equitable and reasonable 
sharing of the Danube as an international watercourse. The Court therefore reached the 
conclusion that Czechoslovakia, by diverting the waters of the Danube (but not by 
constructing the works which would put into operation Variant C during which Hungary 
suffered no injury), had itself committed an intemationally wrongful act. Assessing the 
lawfialness of Czechoslovakia's response, as later succeeded by Slovakia, the ICJ 
confirmed the principle that countermeasures should be commensurate to the injury 
caused with due consideration of the rights in question. The Court, with special focus on 
the right of all riparian states to enjoy in a regime of full and unqualified equality in a 
commonly shared river, concluded that: 
Czechoslovakia, by unilaterally assuming control of a shared resource, and thereby depriving Hungary of 
its right to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube - with the continuing 
effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkoz - failed to 
respect the proportionality which is required by international law.*^^ 
The criterion adopted in both those two cases was of qualitative rather than quantitative 
character, placing the emphasis on the nature of the rights involved. In this same 
framework article 51 of the 2001 ILC articles is drafted. Accordingly, what matters for 
purposes of proportionality is not only the injury suffered and the losses, usually 
material, caused as a result (quantitative element), but also the significance of the 
interests involved, not only of the injured state but also of the wrongdoing state, and the 
seriousness of the breach. * '^' 
It should be stressed at this point that although proportionality finds proper application 
regarding violations of customary intemational law the same does not apply with 
respect to conventional law where states can agree to anything, provided of course, and 
this is the only limitation, that it is hot in conflict with jus cdgens norms. From the study 
of Mr Arangio-Ruiz on self-contained regimes, it derives that states are not precluded 
fi-om entering into agreements between them which provide for special machinery to be 
Ibid/(85). 
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initiated in the case of an infringement, either as a response to the wrongful act which is 
related to the obligations under the particular instrument, or "in response to any 
internationally wrongful act i f the particular measures or sanctions contemplated affect 
the instrument in question in any way".*^^ It is thus sustained that proportionality does 
not come into play in these cases. Rather, "it will suffice to verify whether the measure 
is admissible under the relevant instrument in the circumstances, assuming, of course, 
that the target State is a party thereto. This may also happen- as long as jus cogens is 
respected- in derogation from the general rules of the law of treaties on suspension and 
termination of multilateral treaties." 
Cannizzaro also distanced himself from the view which wants proportionality to lie in a 
quantitative relationship between the breach and the response. He believes that ' in a 
plurality of instruments and tools of self-redress'*^^ in the international legal order and 
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which derives from the need of states to protect their legal rights and interests, 
emphasis must be placed upon the function each response fulfils instead. This function 
can be normative, retributive, coercive or executive. In other words, different 
countermeasures, different functions, different measurement of proportionality. This 
conclusion relies on the proposition that in resorting to countermeasures states do not 
pursue one and the same purpose, and in this sense it is different from the opinion which 
regards countermeasures as having an instrumental role, namely to bring compliance 
with the breached obligation or to obtain reparation. The instrumental perception of 
countermeasures would unavoidably be construed as a relation between the aims and the 
means of the action. This, according to Carmizzaro, entails the danger to justify 
excessive in relation to the original breach responses, i f proven to be necessary for the 
accomplishment of the aim.*^^ Furthermore, it rejects that countermeasures may seek 
other than a coercive aim, thus "wiping out the richness and variety of the different 
forms in which reactions to wrongful acts may materialize."*'**' 
The proposition that countermeasures are multifunctional in nature seems to correspond 
with the conclusions of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Air Services Agreement Case 
according to which countermeasures may pursue a variety of aims. Accordingly, "The 
ILCreport/1992/40/(122). 
Ibid/40/(113). 
Cannizzaro/2001/889. 
Ibid/895. 
Ibid/891-2. 
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scope of the United States action could be assessed in very different ways according to 
the object pursued; does it bear on a simple principle of reciprocity measured in 
economic terms? Was it pressure aiming at achieving a quicker procedure of settlement? 
Did such action have, beyond the French case, an exemplary character directed at other 
countries and, i f so, did it have to some degree the character of a sanction?"^'" 
As a consequence of this mosaic of countermeasures one should also think in terms of a 
mosaic of proportionality. Therefore, proportionality should not be conceived as a fixed 
notion, unchangeable and inflexible, applicable to all situations no matter the 
differences between them. Proportionality must on the contrary be "built" on a case-by-
case basis. As noted, the proportionality of a response to the infiingement of a bilateral 
trade obligation cannot be compared with the proportionality required for the response 
to a violation of an obligation erga omnes. Whilst in the first case the reciprocal 
suspension of rights may suffice, in the latter case the reaction may aim at imposing the 
compliance of the defaulting state with the infi^nged rule. Furthermore, and despite the 
fact that the coercive element may be apparent in both cases, it may have different 
significance where a measure is taken in response to a violation of an erga omnes 
obligation.^'^^ Professor Brierly, writing in 1925 on the principle of non interference in 
the domestic jurisdiction of another state in accordance with article 15 (8) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, emphasized that a simple violation of immigration 
law could not be placed on an equal footing with a state act which amounted to "a 
massacre on a colossal scale even though the victims may be its own nationals".^ "^^ 
Accordingly, the nature and function of countermeasures in each instance varies 
significantly. Cannizzaro therefore suggests that the emphasis is hereby placed on the 
appropriateness of the aim/fianction of the response (external proportionality) and the 
appropriateness of the adopted measures in light of the result they want to achieve 
(internal proportionality). He fiirther proposes to divide the response to several bundles 
of measures and determine the objective pursued, individually rather than cumulatively, 
by each one of them. In this regard, i f a state in response to a wrongful act proceeds to 
suspend its reciprocal obligations under the infiinged treaty and at the same time freezes 
the assets and goods of the wrongdoing party, it is suggested that proportionality should 
not be evaluated on the basis of the totality of the measures. Rather, it should be 
measured on the basis of the objectives pursued by each measure. For this purpose, the 
RIAA/1978/Vol . 18/442/(78). 
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suspension of the treaty will be judged on the basis of the objective regarding the re-
establishment of the legal balance disturbed by the initial wrongful act, whilst the 
freezing of assets will be judged on the basis of the need for compliance or the 
obtaining of reparation. That proportionality should be evaluated on the basis of the 
function of the acfion is reflected according to Cannizzaro in the ruling of the ICJ in the 
Gabcikovo- Nagymaros Case. In other words, should the aim of Slovakia's acfion have 
been to adverse the effects of the breach and unilaterally bring the benefits that would 
derive from the completion of the project, then its action would be proportionate. 
However, the Court relied its conclusion on a different legal explanation. More 
specifically, it judged Slovakia's action on the basis of the breached treaty and the 
proper function of the response. The purpose of the treaty was to create a project the 
benefits of which would be commonly shared by the two countries, and not to grant a 
right for the unilateral implementation of the treaty and the unilateral exploitation of the 
river. In conclusion, the diversion of Danube by Slovakia was not the proper funcfion of 
the response, which should rather be to restore the balance between the parties and seek 
844 
reparation. 
In accordance with the above considerations Cannizzaro suggests that the 
appropriateness of the aim be determined in the light of the infringed rule and the legal 
consequences of the breach, whilst the appropriateness of the measures adopted is 
judged on the basis of the result they want to achieve. 
With respect to the functions of countermeasures, Cannizzaro identifies four possible 
functions: a normative, a retribufive, a coercive and an executive. Countermeasures with 
a normative function aim to re-establish the legal balance of the parties involved. Here 
the action under scrutiny aims to achieve a balance between the breach and the response 
and corresponds to the non-performance of the same or equivalent obligation. In a 
hijacking incident in 1971, India reacted by prohibiting the flying over its territory of 
Pakistani civil aviation, which resulted in damages greater than the damages caused by 
the initial infringement. India justified its action by saying that its response was a 
reciprocal reaction to Pakistan's action which amounted to the suspension of India's 
flying rights over Pakistan. Similarly, in the Air Services Agreement Case the US 
justified its response by saying that the services in question were equivalent in law and 
thus its action was proportionate. In the case of countermeasures with retributive 
^'"'Cannizzaro/2001/898. 
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function there is an assessment of the effects of the breach and the response, with the 
intention of inflicting a certain cost on the wrongdoer for its misdeed. Retributive 
countermeasures arise in the case of unilateral obligations compliance with which does 
not rely upon the performance of a certain other obligation. In coercive 
countermeasures, the response aims at inducing the wrongdoer to reverse the effects of 
its wrongful conduct and to comply with its obligation. What matters here in respect of 
proportionality is the breach and the need to re-establish the pre-existing situation. 
Coercive countermeasures become relevant in relation to the violation of obligations 
owed to the international community. Proportionality is thus not assessed by 
comparison of the damages caused but rather by what is appropriate in order to bring to 
an end the violation, as the most fundamental interests of the international community 
are at stake. However, even countermeasures with this function are subject to 
limitations, especially whenever human rights issues are involved.^ "*^ With respect to the 
executive function of countermeasures it is noted that this aims to secure the benefits 
that would derive from the infringed obligation even without the cooperation of the 
wrongdoing state. The injurious effects of the countermeasures must not supervene the 
benefits to be achieved whilst the means used are necessary for the accomplishment of 
the aim.^''^ 
Cannizaro finally concludes that the function of proportionality is two-fold, first, it 
serves as an indicator of the means and forms of the response and limits the power of 
the responding state in the selection of the objective of the response. Secondly it 
restrains the power to select the measure of reaction and imposes a duty that the 
response is appropriate to the aim pursued and not disproportionate to the initial 
breach.^ ^^ 
6. A Critical Approach 
In view of the great perplexity of the question of proportionality and the varied 
approaches often followed on the matter, it will now be attempted to clarify the main 
features of the principle on the basis of all earlier considerations. First, one needs to 
examine whether proportionality, as applied in the law of the use of force, can be 
"transplanted" to the law on state responsibility. 
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It has already been pointed out that proportionaUty in the use of force is closely 
associated with the objective of the forceful response which in all cases must be 
confined to repelling the initial attack. On the contrary, the law of state responsibility is 
built on the assumption that not all the wrongful acts short of the use of force are of the 
same gravity and seriousness, and thus, not all bear exactly the same legal 
consequences. Moreover, in the use of force, the seriousness and gravity of both the 
initial wrongdoing and the response, but also the interests at stake, cannot be compared 
to any other violation of international law short of such force. This can be revealed from 
the fact that with the exception of authorization from the SC, a state may only resort to 
force in response to a breach of equal gravity, that of armed attack, acting in individual 
or collective self-defence. In this sense the response is reciprocal in kind to the original 
misdeed. Of course, this should not undermine the seriousness and gravity of other 
infringements of international law such as genocide and torture which attack 
fundamental principles of the international community as a whole. Yet, nothing can 
endanger international peace and security and the international legal system in its 
entirety so directly as a state that uses armed force to pursue its policies. The attack of 
another state is by itself a very serious infringement of one of the most fundamental 
principles of international law that requires determinative action for its cessation, even 
i f it is more intense and extensive than the initial wrongdoing. It is therefore suggested 
that due to the different objectives aimed at and interests at stake proportionality cannot 
have the same content in both the use of force and the law of countermeasures. 
As to whether proportionality as applied in the law of armed conflict regarding the 
means and methods of warfare should be applied in the law of countermeasures, one 
should not forget that the jus in bello is not entirely autonomous from the jus ad bellum: 
even a proportionate response in respect of means and methods, wil l give rise to 
responsibility i f the resort to force was unlawfiil in the first place, or i f the force used 
was disproportionate to the military objective pursued. Again, it is submitted, this 
criterion cannot suffice for assessing proportionality in the law of countermeasures. 
It remains to evaluate the different positions formed in relation to the proportionality of 
countermeasures. It has been seen that the criterion used by the Tribunal in the Naulilaa 
incident was one of comparison between the initial wrongdoing and the response. One 
wonders whether this could be the right solution, especially in the light of the now well 
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attested principle that countermeasures must not aim at the punishment of the defaulting 
state. It is submitted by the present author that a mere comparison of the breach and the 
response which is equivalent to the maxim an eye for an eye, attaches a punitive 
element to countermeasures and thus should be rejected. Furthermore, the position that 
proportionality should be based on the equivalence between breach and response cannot 
lead to satisfactory results because, as rightly suggested, this would amount to imposing 
a heavy burden upon the victim state which would be unable to take measures necessary 
to protect its legitimate rights and interests.^ '*^ 
McDougal and Feliciano on the other hand, writing at an early stage, argued that the 
coercion exercised by one state against another, its intensity and the consequences to 
derive therefrom are related to the nature and scope of the objectives it sets. In particular 
they argue that the degree of coercion is equivalent to the scope of the objective set by 
the responding state and the value it attaches to this objective. Consequently, the 
limitation of the degree of the coercion relies upon the limitation of the set objectives.**'*'' 
ZoUer on her part searches for proportionality in the aims pursued by the 
countermeasures and the means used to achieve them. Similarly Cannizzaro places all 
the attention on the appropriateness of the aim, not the subjective aim of the state 
making use of countermeasures but rather the "legal objective",^^° and the 
appropriateness of the measures to accomplish this aim. Although this author shares the 
concerns expressed by Professor Crawford who supported the limitation of the 
objectives of countermeasures, she also considers that the approach proposed by 
Cannizzaro is not without merit or significance. In particular, his approach seems to turn 
the attention in the right direction as it establishes objective criteria for the 
determination of proportionality, and for this reason it should have been reflected in 
article 51 of the ILC final articles. However, and as already acknowledged, this by itself 
does not suffice since the more serious the initial wrongdoing the more serious and 
intensive the response may need to be for its cessation. Furthermore, the nature of rights 
affected by a certain wrong need also to be taken into consideration. These elements 
will be particularly important when assessing the proportionality of countermeasures 
taken in response to particularly serious violations of international law such as jus 
cogens norms or obligations erga omnes, whether from the position of an injured state 
or a state other than the injured. At the same time, it should not skip the attention that 
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countermeasures may not be excessive in relation to the injury actually inflicted. It is 
accordingly submitted by this author that the aims, the gravity of the wrongful act, the 
injury suffered and the interests at stake should all be taken into account when deciding 
whether a certain action was proportionate or not. The theoretical analysis made by 
Cannizzaro establishes a reasonable approach to the question of proportionality and 
therefore should be given the attention it deserves, even now that the work of the ILC 
on state responsibility has been completed. 
Finally, the author acknowledges that there still remain specific difficulties that may 
arise in the context of proportionality should countermeasures for violations of 
obligations erga omnes be permitted. 
7. Conclusion 
The principle of proportionality has evolved out of the pressing necessity to restrain the 
use of countermeasures to the maximum extent possible and has developed as an 
essential element of legality of such measures. However, proportionality gains all the 
more significance in the light of an "anarchical" society, such as the international, 
which lacks the mechanisms necessary to monitor its correct implementation by 
individual states. This, along with the ongoing controversy as to the exact scope of the 
principle, which is only reflecfive of the perplexity of the question, elevates 
proportionality as one of the most difficult problems when it comes to countermeasures. 
This is only aggravated by the possibility of allowing in the future resort to 
countermeasures in response to violations of obligations erga omnes and peremptory 
norms, the significance of which extends beyond a merely bilateral relationship between 
two states since these norms have been established to protect collective interests. The 
approach adopted by the ILC in article 51 does not seem to quiet these concerns, and 
therefore re-consideration of the matter may prove essential. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
One of the main incentives behind the development of the law on state responsibility in 
the context of the ILC's work as analyzed in the first chapter of the current research, lies 
in the acceptance that the international system of states has evolved to a normative order 
which consists not only of rights and obligations but also of rules which deal with 
possible violations. This has led to the necessity, apart fi-om and complementary to the 
wide range of norms established through treaties, customs or general principles of 
international law regarding what states should do and what they should not do - known 
as primary rules, to also develop a set of rules concerning the legal consequences to 
arise as a result of the violation of the primary norms - known as secondary and tertiary 
rules. Accordingly, the law on state responsibility is built upon the understanding that 
the violation of a primary norm which constitutes an internationally wrongfiil act, 
entails new obligations for the defaulting state like the obligation to cease the wrongful 
act and to offer reparation for the injury caused. Still, the codification of the law on state 
responsibility did not mean codification of the vast body of primary norms as well - this 
was simply not feasible in view of the structure and nature of the international legal 
order. 
When the ILC first took up the task to codify the law on state responsibility in 1953, it 
turned all of its attention to violations of the primary rules on the treatment of aliens, 
thus restricting the scope and content of state responsibility to violations of this kind. 
Despite this initial approach it was soon acknowledged that international law consisted 
of other rules which called for attention and protection in the event of their violation 
which incurred the responsibility of the state irrespective of the nature, origin, object or 
content of the infringed rule. Yet, and as the study on state responsibility progressed, a 
new concept started to make its appearance in the debates of the ILC: that the violation 
of primary norms did not always have the same significance, weight or effect due to the 
importance attached to, and the nature of the rights certain primary norms sought to 
safeguard. Accordingly, whilst the essential nature of many international norms did not 
extend beyond a relationship of a bilateral nature, others established collective interests 
fundamental to the international community as a whole such as the prohibition of 
genocide. The question therefore placed upon the ILC members was how to deal with 
violafions of certain primary rules considered to be, because of the essendality and 
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"primacy" of the interests they protect, of a more serious nature: would the legal 
consequences to be applied as a result of an internationally wrongful act be the same in 
all instances, or would there be a need to categorize the legal consequences between 
serious and less serious on the basis of the nature of the rights protected by the infringed 
primary rule? And would such categorization between primary norms and legal 
consequences have any bearing on the determination of the state or states entitled to 
invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state or not? 
The debate on the categorization of internationally wrongful acts in accordance to the 
interests they protect became more intense with the revival of the notions of jus cogens 
norms and erga omnes obligations. As the second chapter attempted to show, these 
concepts contributed to the progress of international law insomuch that it is now alleged 
that the international legal order has developed into something more than merely a 
voluntarist structure between absolute sovereigns. Rather, it seems to resemble more an 
international public order which is concerned among others about interests intended to 
protect the common good of mankind. One could argue that some form of moral, or 
constitutional status, is now attached to certain rules, although acceptance of these 
contemporary ideas has not been free from scepticism. Indeed, some states have been 
extremely reluctant to accommodate such notions (which as already noted may have 
been perhaps inspired by pure idealism, yet again perhaps not) as they raise significant 
questions of international legitimacy: who decides which norms qualify as such and for 
what reasons? Definitely, i f the international legal community is to be construed to be 
based on state consent, then such concepts appear to go against the consensual character 
of international law and how international law has been traditionally perceived. 
Furthermore, the abstract and indeterminate content of these and other concepts such as 
"the international community as a whole" have provoked suspicion among 
commentators who have even seen in these attempts a new form of colonialism and a 
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threat to legal stability. Moreover, these principles are viewed as compromising state 
sovereignty since their violation is not anymore considered to fall within the exclusive 
domain of any state but on the contrary it establishes a legal interest to all members of 
the international community in their protection. 
On the other hand, these developments could not but influence and play a primary role 
in the work of the ILC. It was precisely in this context that the concept of state criminal 
Koskenniemi/ 2005/115. 
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responsibility, previously supported by what it seemed to be a minority of authors, re-
emerged and flourished in the fom for the drafting of the law on state responsibility, 
drawing a disfinction between a delictual and a criminal regime of responsibility which 
was to entail penal sanctions against the recalcitrant state. Although the notion of 
criminal responsibility was not eventually sustained in the final articles on the law on 
state responsibility, the understanding that not all violations bore the same gravity did 
not cease to constitute a common ground of understanding. As discussed, this position is 
now reflected in articles 40 and 41 of the final articles regarding the legal consequences 
to derive as a result of serious violations of peremptory norms. At the same time, article 
48 confirms that there exist certain interests which, either because they are owed to the 
international community as a whole or because they are established for the collective 
interest of a group of states, entitle states other than those which have directly sustained 
an injury from a given wrongdoing to invoke the responsibility of the defaulting state. 
One of the most controversial considerafions before the ILC however was what could a 
state other than the directly injured do in response to a violation of this kind, raising 
thus significant questions of enforcement and implementation. The attention was 
subsequently turned to the notion of countermeasures which had at an early stage 
emerged in the draft articles as a means of self-help, as unilateral peaceful measures of 
redress which, although themselves in violation of international law, their wrongfialness 
was to be precluded because they were to be taken in response to another, previously 
committed internationally wrongful act. However states realized from the beginning the 
powerfiil effects of countermeasures and for this reason sought to restrict to the extent 
possible not only their content but also the states entitled to resort to such measures. 
The difficulties to be bom from these legal considerations are not to be underestimated. 
On the contrary, there is still an ongoing theoretical debate on how, and on what criteria, 
one identifies these "special" primary norms as establishing more fundamental rights 
than others. Even more prominently lies the question as to which state is entitled to do 
what as a result of the violation of these rules. When the ILC first considered these 
issues, state practice was very limited, and therefore it had to rely to a great extent on 
emerging tendencies rather than on concrete and well established rules of international 
law. Similarly today, more than four decades later, and in the absence of a duty to act in 
protecrion of such interests, we are still faced with considerations of implementation of 
these "different" primary norms. Article 54 of the final articles on state responsibility 
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has not mifigated these concerns. Yet, the ILC did not wish to take a definite posifion, 
therefore leaving the door open for future developments on this issue. 
The problem of enforcement of international law raises one of the most difficult 
challenges not only in international legal theory but also in international legal practice. 
In the light of the prohibition of the use of force as a means of settling state disputes, 
enforcement in international law takes the form of countermeasures through the non-
performance of obligations arising from conventional or customary rules. Due to the 
decentralized character of the international legal order and in the absence of institutions 
empowered to enforce international law, implementation, through the application of 
countermeasures, is entrusted to each state separately which is called, by its own means, 
to protect its interests and rights. Still, the enforcement of international law is faced with 
yet another challenge: that of lex specialis or so-called self-contained regimes. More 
particularly, the growing number of legal regimes which provide not only for primary 
rules but which also set up their own dispute settlement mechanisms - the EU and the 
WTO constitute the most prominent examples for this purpose- and sometimes their 
own enforcement mechanisms, raises questions concerning the impact of these regimes 
on countermeasures under the general law on state responsibility. Whilst it is a well 
attested principle of international law that specific rules take prevalence over general 
rules, questions arise whenever the enforcement mechanisms of a specific regime fail, 
or they simply do not exist in the first place. This issue, which lies at the heart of 
examination of the third chapter, gains even wider ramifications with respect to whether 
the non-performance of obligations provided under a specific regime by way of 
countermeasures is permissible in response to violations not related to that specific 
regime. I f one accepts the view that such general legal considerations do not fall within 
the jurisdiction of the specific regime and that as a result they can not be taken into 
consideration as a defence, then the scope and content of countermeasures as a means of 
enforcement of international law is significantly narrowed down. However, this 
position seems to cause some unrest among those who believe that in the absence of 
other alternatives, the notion of countermeasures plays a pivotal role in the protection of 
the international legal order. It is accordingly submitted that the traditional mechanism 
of enforcement of international law, namely unilateral self-help or countermeasures, 
cannot be paralyzed because of the existence of specific legal regimes, especially 
economic and trade measures. This is particularly so whenever the fiandamental 
principles of the international community as a whole are endangered, and even i f that 
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would seem to compromise interests in the economic or trade sphere. To say otherwise 
would mean to undermine enforcement in international law, enhance these regimes with 
a quasi-peremptory character, and give them prevalence over substantially "higher" 
principles of intemafional law. At the same time, the existence of parallel and often 
conflicting rules of intemafional law belonging to various legal systems raises non-
negligible concerns regarding the fragmentation of the international legal order. In so 
long that there is no determinative consideration of this issue, the phenomenon of 
having diverse opinions and even legal decisions on the same subject on the basis of the 
angle, or for this purpose, the legal regime being looked at, will become more and more 
frequent, imperilling the very coherence of the international legal system. 
Nevertheless, very few issues have created so much controversy as the question of 
enforcement of collective interests by states which have not suffered an injury on what 
we would call their strictly speaking individual interests. There are particularly strong 
views by states and commentators, especially by those opposing the notion of 
"solidarity measures", which express concerns that cannot be overlooked. The not so 
unrealistic fears of abuse of such right by strong states with respect to whether a serious 
violation of a jus cogens norm or an erga omnes obligation has occurred and the limits 
of such reaction, have led many to the conclusion that it is better to do without such 
measures. It could be argued in this regard that the ILC itself, ambivalent as to the 
lawfulness of countermeasures by states other than the injured in view of insufficient 
state practice supporting third-state countermeasures at the time of the conclusion of the 
final articles, has opted for a provision (article 54) which would allow for the 
application of such measures in the fiiture, should state practice develop towards that 
direction. 
Indeed, a close examination of the cases studied in the fourth chapter and in which 
states seemed to be acting in the name of collective interests cannot determinatively 
lead to the conclusion that there is an established customary or other rule of 
international law permitting resort to such measures. More specifically, although state 
practice offers abundant examples of state practice concerning economic and other 
peaceful measures imposed on grounds of humanitarian considerations which however 
were consistent with international law, one can distinguish a great amount of reluctance 
between states, even in the cases which constitute "clear" examples of third-state 
countermeasures, regarding the lawfulness of measures in violation of specific 
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international, treaty or other, commitments. States have been extremely cautious firmly 
to allow the use of countermeasures against another state in the absence of an individual 
injury. Other examples of state practice on the other hand raise significant questions 
regarding the validity of claims that a serious infHngement of fundamental interests 
owed to the international community as a whole had in reality taken place. In other 
occasions states defended their action as not being in violation of any international 
obligation, or as justified on grounds of national security or fundamental changes of 
circumstances. At other times state practice is inconsistent. Whilst in certain occasions 
states were ready to resort to such countermeasures, such as when the EEC decided to 
suspend the treaties it had concluded with Argentina in reaction to the latter's invasion 
to the Falkland Islands, only few years before it was concerned that a suspension of its 
treaty obligations towards Uganda would be in breach of international law. In other 
occasions of serious infringements states did absolutely nothing, simply because this 
was in their best geo-strategic, economic or other interests, enhancing in this manner the 
arguments concerning a double-standard international "morality". 
As it can be seen from these observations the current opinion on the question of 
countermeasures by states other than the injured, far from being unambiguous and 
conclusive, raises justified doubts about their legitimacy under current international law. 
This makes the implementation of what have been recognized as fundamental principles 
of the international community as a whole considerably difficult, to the extent that one 
questions what is the purpose of distinguishing between essential and ordinary norms i f 
the ordinary norms are more likely to be protected and enforced through 
countermeasures by an injured state, than norms giving effect to community interests 
since in most such cases of their violation there is simply no injured state, as defined in 
the final articles, at all. 
Furthermore, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Arman, recently, reminded us that, 
"without implementation, our declarations ring hollow. Without action, our promises 
are meaningless."^^^ As the Secretary-General correctiy remarks there is no consolation 
to the population that is being racially discriminated against, tortured, or exterminated, 
i f in the other part of the world a treaty condemning apartheid, torture or genocide has 
just been concluded, or i f a declaration or a resolution has been passed, i f there is no 
way to give these words genuine substance and significance, not merely by the 
^" Report of the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi /mnan/2005/(130). 
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assumption that they will be respected, but also by providing implementation 
mechanisms in the event of not being respected. Professor Koskenniemi, repeating 
Pascal, once revealed the significance of enforcement in international law in one single 
sentence: "Do not command what you can not enforce" .Whi l s t most of the times 
most states comply with most of the international norms,^ '^* the international community 
now needs to turn its attention to the problem of enforcement, especially whenever its 
most fundamental interests are at stake. 
In this regard, many authors, fearing "the unilateral, world-ordering politics of a self-
appointed hegemon",^ ^^ place the emphasis to collective, institutionalized, action as the 
appropriate answer to the problem of enforcement. Along the same lines the UN 
Secretary-General points out that states need to make a commitment towards "collective 
strategies, collective institutions and collective action".^^^ According to him, the goals 
of development, security and human rights cannot be advanced by states individually, 
but rather only as the result of concordant efforts, whilst the UN could play a significant 
role to this effect. Even more progressively, the Secretary-General turns our attention to 
an emerging need of responsibility to protect. Although he acknowledges that this 
position is still very much premature, he points to this direction in the fiiture, where the 
international community will have the responsibility to protect people should the 
national authorities fail to do so.* '^' Nevertheless, this position unavoidably raises the 
question as to whether the UN possesses the legal capacity to assume the role of a 
supranational government, with the SC acting as a world police and the Charter being 
the Constitution of the international legal community. The debate on this matter grows 
deeper with the SC assuming more responsibilities in a wide number of areas -
terrorism, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing to name some- and elaborating more 
coercive mechanisms against states in the last 15 years than ever before in its entire 
history. 
Whilst there has been a growing opinion in the literature, particularly after the cessation 
of the Cold War era, to attach a constitutional role to the UN, such efforts come as a 
result of the wrong assumption that the international legal order must and can be built 
Koskenniemi M., Erik Castren Institute of International Law and Human Rights Seminar on The 
Enforcement of International Law, August 2002 quoting Pascal. 
See Franck/1990. 
855 Habermas/2003/706 in Koskenniemi/2005/118. 
856 Report of the UN Secretary General, Mr Kofi Annan/2005/(3). 
Ibid/(135). 
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upon the same structures as national legal systems. Whilst the entrustment especially of 
the enforcement of international law to independent and impartial international 
insfitutions would be the ideal solution in an ideal world, it is currently neither feasible 
nor desired by states. This is because states are very reluctant to concede too much of 
their sovereign powers to international institutions that could in the fijture turn against 
them with enforcement action. The persistence of the five permanent member states to 
the SC to uphold their veto powers constitutes perhaps the most prominent example. 
Most important, the role of the SC itself is restricted to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. I f the UN, and the SC in particular, is ever going to undertake the 
role of international governance, it would first have to be legally empowered to do so, 
and it would have to accommodate to modem realities, with its institutions being 
reinforced, the international community equally represented, and the determination and 
will to take effective action whenever this is needed. 
Until then, and in view of the almost unequivocal prohibition of the use of force, 
intemational lawyers worldwide will be faced with one very substantial dilemma, to 
strike a balance between the necessity not to use the notion of fundamental principles as 
a shield for intemational injustice, and the need to address serious infringements of 
intemational law that affect every state. 
Whilst there does not currently seem to exist a mle permissive of a right to third-state 
countermeasures, one can only speculate about how the law on state responsibility and 
state practice may develop in the future. As it can be revealed from the increase of 
human rights clauses in trade and economic agreements, human rights considerations 
are at the centrefold of contemporary legal developments. It is therefore the possibility 
that a mle in support of solidarity measures for the violation of these and other norms 
establishing community interests wil l finally emerge that makes it imperative not to 
overlook the dangers to be entailed from such a right, and imposes the need to re-
consider ways of dealing with such threats. This is owed to the fact that in the absence 
of a compulsory judicial jurisdiction or an intemational executing body to observe the 
law, it is the state taking the countermeasures that assesses whether a serious 
infringement has been committed and whether such measures fiilfil certain conditions of 
legality. One of the criticisms for example of article 19 of the ILC draft articles 
introducing the notion of state crimes was that it was worded in an open-ended way, 
allowing states to take action without any constraints, compared, for instance, with the 
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obligation to go to judicial settlement imposed by the VCLT on a state invoking the 
claim of jus cogens. 
Having already in mind that countermeasures by states other than the injured are 
defended only by way of response to a limited category of internationally wrongful acts, 
and thus their scope is restricted significantly only as a means of peaceful coercion to 
infiingements of collective interests, this thesis has also attempted to stress that 
countermeasures of this nature must comply with the principle of proportionality. This 
finds justification upon the realization that the recalcitrant state, by committing a certain 
violation, no matter how gross this may be, does not cease to be a member of the 
international community with rights and obligations. It is therefore through 
proportionality that not only the rights of the defaulting state are guaranteed, but also 
that the right to countermeasures for the protection of common interests will not be 
manipulated by any state. It follows that proportionality should strike a balance between 
the initial wrongdoing - its gravity, its injurious consequences, and the nature of rights 
it affects on the one hand, and the response - the legal aims it seeks to pursue and the 
means, methods and intensity used to ftilfil these aims on the other. The principle of 
proportionality, which is examined in the final chapter of this thesis, has developed 
through literature, practice and judicial review, as a legal instrument of constraint, a tool 
for determining the legality of a given action. Nevertheless, the proportionality test 
becomes even more compelling if, in seeking to protect interests owed erga omnes, 
more than one state decide to take action against the violator. The assessment of 
proportionality in this event unfolds to a challenging legal question that raises 
significant legal considerations. This is because whilst a given state action, examined in 
isolation, may meet the requirement of proportionality, multiple independent state 
action, i f viewed in its totality, may be disproportionate, thus significantly undermining 
the rights and interests of the wrongdoing state, and seriously damaging the rule of 
international law. 
The mandate of the ILC is the "codification and progressive development" of 
international law. "Progressive development" has its limits. By adopting the formula it 
used in Article 54 of the articles on state responsibility, the ILC left open to the states 
the possibility of "progressive development" of countermeasures powers for not directiy 
injured states - i f that is what the states want to do. 
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